mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
|
Post by mac on Oct 25, 2017 21:05:46 GMT
An important question is why would Custer go down to Ford B. My favorite daffy idea is that he went down and attempted to attack across the river at Ford B but was stopped by the quicksand there. This being the ford routinely used both before and after the battle. Of course I am yet to be convinced that Custer went anywhere near Ford B much less tried to attack across it. However this question and the various explanations do need to be addressed. More later. Cheers
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Oct 25, 2017 23:26:09 GMT
I don't know. Why did Custer go to Ford B?
It is well known that the place is haunted. The quicksand appears only when the Army appears, but not when Indians use the place to cross the river. It was guarded, as Beth suggested, by Jedi Knights, everyone of which is in the top 5 percent of their class at Leavenworth, and under the overall command guidance of that well known West Pointer - Sitting Bull.
The short answer to why Custer went to Ford B, is that he didn't.
I don't mind the quicksand stories. I do wish someone would tell me why Custer would go to or try to cross that river at the absolute worst place that river can be crossed for tactical purposes. The ironic thing is that the people who are the biggest fan boys of Georgie are the very ones that promulgate this story which serves to make their hero look like a complete moron.
|
|
azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
|
Post by azranger on Oct 26, 2017 11:56:37 GMT
I believe there could easily be quicksand there if you are trying to cross in a line. When we ride across at Real Bird's it is in column and specific area. I have no doubt that depending upon spring run off and debris build up there could be some NOGO terrain features in the water including depth, trees, and quicksand pockets.
When we crossed at the Reno retreat crossing I was on the upstream side of our group and Rio step in to a hole. He was 90% under water. Up to the saddle. He then stuck his head under the water so my horse appeared to be headless from the horn forward. I got out of the stirrups and was prepared to swim when his head came up. We swam a short distance and he regained footing as if nothing ever happened. A good horse.
Think about what that would have been like to have troopers doing various rates of travel across a river and then expected to regroup on the other side of trees and in the Big Village. I agree with Benteen that an individual could cross almost anywhere as long as there was ingress and egress but that is not the same as crossing under fire and wanting to have as many soldier as possible crossing and getting ready to fight on the other side.
The key to me is any crossing place opposed or likely to be opposed within a short period of time. Without opposition you can cross in column either by twos or single file almost anywhere a single horse can cross.
Regards
Steve
|
|
|
Post by yanmacca on Oct 26, 2017 13:53:36 GMT
Ford B or not Ford B, that is the question!
Well the idea of Custer attacking via ford B is down to the obvious, as some say [even military men], that he took the MTC route to the ford in an effort to cross. MTC is a natural route to this rather large ford and we have to assume that Custer was riding blind up to a point and that he was in earnest too.
But we have debated the Custer route for months now and we are mostly in agreement that Custer veered right and mounted the ridge lines and kept his distance from the lower part of MTC.
Why would he do this I hear some ask, well it was a death trap, because he had no protection from flank attacks and MTC was surly open to ambushes plus he had already encountered bands of Indians so who's to say that more and even larger bands were in wait up ahead.
I must say that the ford would have been a tempting target, with the village spread out just waiting to picked, but something made him stick to the high ground and carry on north, so if we rule out the capture of the Indian women and kids, then what are we left with?
The only thing I can think of is what I have said before, he thought that the Indians facing Reno were there to halt the cavalry’s progress and buy time for the rest to escape, so the most logical route would be north, so he wanted to squeeze them in from both ends.
|
|
mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
|
Post by mac on Oct 26, 2017 21:09:26 GMT
Well I think those three posts have covered the tactical and practical reasons why an attempt cross the river to stage a village assault at Ford B is very unlikely. Another proposal is that Custer went down MTC to Ford B to "take pressure" off Reno by drawing away warriors. Is Custer that altruistic? Cheers
|
|
|
Post by Beth on Oct 26, 2017 23:17:10 GMT
Well I think those three posts have covered the tactical and practical reasons why an attempt cross the river to stage a village assault at Ford B is very unlikely. Another proposal is that Custer went down MTC to Ford B to "take pressure" off Reno by drawing away warriors. Is Custer that altruistic? Cheers I am sure that Custer was very altruistic. He gave Benteen the chance for a long relaxing ride over hill and vale, which unfortunately he then had to send a message to rescind the offer. He allowed Reno to take the easier route through the valley. He chose for himself the longer more challenging route over the bluffs. I am sure once he looked over the valley and saw that Reno obviously had everything in and plus several messages that the Indians were coming out to meet them, Custer felt totally assured that everything was under control. I do not believe though that after he made sure he had everything firmly in place for his plan of action that he felt any need to again check on Reno.
|
|
mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
|
Post by mac on Oct 27, 2017 1:10:47 GMT
Do I sense sarcasm Beth !
|
|
azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
|
Post by azranger on Oct 27, 2017 13:52:56 GMT
I am convinced and have formed at least a current opinion that Benteen was sent to cut off SFRC where Herendeen had visited and fought against 600 of the same Indians. His line puts him 5 miles up SFRC if he continued into it from Noname. Three companies appear to me to be looking for actions rather than just looking.
If the Indians had fled up SFRC Benteen would have been in a good position to pitch into them. If had continued on the same line after clearing SFRC he might have reached the LBH about the same time the Indians would have finished off Reno and captured the pack train.
We have two points that are certain within reason. The flat below the divide from which Benteen was sent and the map mark on the ridge separating SFRC and Noname by Gibson found in Benteen's Scout to the left by Darling. Getting from the divide to the view above SFRC was a great ride and everything they stated regarding terrain and defiles are still there.
Regards
Steve
|
|
|
Post by yanmacca on Oct 27, 2017 14:28:17 GMT
I have an idea that Custer's route was done on assumptions rather than line of site, as he didn't know what the terrain was like once he cut towards MTC and the ridge lines, equally so after he reach the end of LNC ridges. Bouyer would aid him, but part of the journey especially behind battle ridge would block his view of his objective. I am only guessing here, but from LCN, he couldn't see the ford D area, some say from LCN he couldn't even see the end of the village. So it was one almighty gamble.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Oct 27, 2017 16:12:44 GMT
Once again there is gambling and there is risk taking by calculation, and evaluation of mitigating factors surrounding risk.
Professional gamblers, don't really gamble in the true sense of the word. They evaluate risk and mitigating factors surrounding risk. If they don't they may be gamblers, but are not professional, at least not for long.
I tend to agree with Steve, the Benteen sojourn was properly termed armed reconnaissance. With reconnaissance, your mission is to see and report. With armored reconnaissance your mission is to see, report, then fight.
|
|
dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
|
Post by dave on Oct 27, 2017 17:54:44 GMT
To paraphrase Shelby Foote that Gettysburg was the price the South for having Robert E. Lee, then was the Little Big Horn the price the US Army paid for having GAC? Is that a fair statement or not? Custer was demanding his men, Reno and Benteen, to accomplish impossible goals with the numbers they had in their commands against the numbers of hostiles. Reno had no chance charging into the entire village and could not have survived staying in the valley with the numbers attacking him. What was Benteen too do? Proceed to Custer with the hostiles flanking him the whole way then allow himself to be surrounded and not protect the packs?
Ford B was an impossible goal and GAC would have gained an actual idea, if he was uncertain, of the size of the villages and numbers of Indians he faced. The question should not be "Why go to Ford B" but rather "Why not go South and join Reno, Benteen and the pack train?" The whole concept of proceeding to Ford D and going North baffles me as Custer was a professionally trained and experienced soldier hence my Foote statement. Regards Dave
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Oct 27, 2017 19:24:39 GMT
I am not sure Foote gave a fair evaluation of Lee in that statement, either that or it was written in such a manner that anyone reading it may misinterpret its meaning. I think it might be better said that Gettysburg was the price to be paid for having A.P. Hull and Dick Ewell commanding a corps in their first major operation. Hill started a battle he has no business starting and that act was in violation of Lee's directives to him. Ewell, was just plain incompetent at a corps commander, not by lack of drive and aggressiveness as the popular opinion holds, but rather by infirmity and the fact he was used up as an effective commander in 63 and should have been put to use elsewhere, consistent with his diminished capacities. All that said Lee has little choice but to fight that battle once contact was made. The slipping away and around the flank, down toward Emitsburg, Longstreet's pipe dream was just that, a pipe dream, once battle had been joined on the first day. The time for that was on 29-30 June, not the evening of 1 July. The counterargument is that Hill and Ewell were Lee's choices. The other part of that argument centers on the adoption of a strategically offensive campaign plan, which could not only not be sufficiently supported, but one that apparently had no attainable strategic objective. So Lee can kick the can for those choices, and if that is what Foote meant he was both fair and correct, but fighting and blaming him for how he fought, when that fighting was consistent with the doctrine of the day, seems to me to be a bit unfair. Custer on the other hand was by previously demonstrated competency to command was a boil on the backside of the U S Army since the day he was commissioned in one form or fashion, so in that regard your statement was completely fair. The subject here is - Why Go To Ford B?. Maybe the answers we seek do not lie in that question. Maybe the question we should ask, reaching back further, is was Custer a carpenter or a hammer. The former knows how to use tools. The latter is just a dumb piece of iron and wood, that cannot operate on its own, one that must have the skills of a carpenter to be made an effective implement. My money concerning Custer would be nothing more than a tool, that can only be made to be effective in the hands of others. That then is the difference though between a Custer and a Stanhope Ring. Custer could be effective given close supervision. Ring was a complete worthless entity in combat. He did not have the stomach for it
|
|
|
Post by yanmacca on Oct 27, 2017 19:28:31 GMT
The question still remains, why go right by a ford you know is there, to one you don't know even exists.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Oct 27, 2017 19:40:27 GMT
The answer is that you go right by that ford if it leads to some place you don't want to go.
A much better question would be why was he not aware of both fords and the prevailing conditions at each of them. The answer to that one is much more simple - He was a numb nuts, who did not reconnoiter.
|
|
|
Post by Beth on Oct 27, 2017 21:19:03 GMT
I have an idea that Custer's route was done on assumptions rather than line of site, as he didn't know what the terrain was like once he cut towards MTC and the ridge lines, equally so after he reach the end of LNC ridges. Bouyer would aid him, but part of the journey especially behind battle ridge would block his view of his objective. I am only guessing here, but from LCN, he couldn't see the ford D area, some say from LCN he couldn't even see the end of the village. So it was one almighty gamble. I am unable to get behind the idea that Custer didn't know the terrain. I think that for a long time people have assumed that Custer didn't know the area based on that he hadn't personally been there. It has served as an explanation on why he failed at Little Bighorn. The "Custer didn't know the area" tends to be used as the reason for why he might have went onto the bluffs in sort of a bumbling fashion. The theory that he didn't know the area allows for his attempted/failed Ford B movement and then the image that he went on, in a rather blind attempt to either to find another ford to get north of Indian village in a pincer movement or to take the fleeing women and children hostage. (I do not believe the later at all). If we take away the premise that Custer was foolhardy that day and forgot a lifetime of experience, then we can to look at Custer's history as well as what he could have and should have known about the area in June 1876. First, Custer was a WP graduate as well as many (but not all) of his officers. They had been taught geography and mineralogy.* A number of his officers, even those would acted as he closest advisers, had actual war experience where they learned to apply classroom knowledge to real life. They should have had an idea on how to read maps, take scouting reports, and then apply it to the terrain they would be moving over and fighting on. I tend to believe that Custer's Civil War records prove that he was used to fighting in areas that he only knew because of maps and reports of people who had been in the area. He was able to take that information and move through personally unknown areas to fight battles. Custer's Black Hills expedition helps reinforce that Custer was able to move in unknown territory with confidence and purpose based on maps and/or scouting information. It also gave him knowledge of western terrain. In June, 1876 Custer should have seen or had maps of the area involving his movement once he left Terry. This area was not a totally unknown place, as if it had never been seen by Europeans. There had decades of exploration of both fur traders and the military. Both had moved through it and mapped it. I am sure at the very least Terry had maps aboard the Far West from the war department that were used to plan the attack. Custer would have seen those maps before he and Terry parted. Terry's instructions to Custer and especially his instructions to scout out Tullock's Creek shows that Terry was aware of how different creeks related to the area and could be used both as possible locations of the tribes but also as wayfares. Custer should have had a feel for the terrain, that river valleys tended to have a plain on one side and a bluff on the other. He might not have known the width of the plain to the bench or the height of the bluffs but he should have known that they existed. He should also have known that the bluff side would have had numerous ravines leading down to the river and was rough ground to travel over. Custer had scouts and guides with him who had been through the area and could give him first hand accounts. He even told his wife in a letter that he had Crow scouts who knew the area. I believe that every action Custer took that day was based on maps and scouting information from Herendeen, Bouyer and the Crow scouts. I agree with Steve that Custer probably sent Benteen on a scout based on information from Herendeen. I also believe that he went on the bluff based on the knowledge of his Crow scouts that further to the north there was a wide enough area to cross the river and mount an attack. Custer's unknowns that day were the exact location of the village, its strength and its layout. He didn't know for sure if there were villages spread out in creeks that flowed into the Little Bighorn so he sent Benteen to find out. Once Custer was fairly certain that the bulk of the Indians they had been searching for lay ahead of Reno, he recalled Benteen. Custer also didn't know known exact distance to the northern ford but he would probably had a reasonable guesstimate. I believe that Custer felt that despite the unknowns, he could confidently travel up to the bluffs and mount his own attack from the north of the village. His peek at Reno confirmed to him that the village was located below and that Reno was moving towards it. Once he had confirmed Reno's situation plus sent an order to Benteen come forward, Custer moved confidently and quickly towards the Ford D area. I will hold out a slight chance that Custer may have sent a small party to feel out the situation at Ford B but I have no idea what it's possible purpose would be once he was committed to moving North. It doesn't exactly seem like a smart move when speed was important and they were dealing with exhausted men and horses. Perhaps it was meant to see if it would be Ford B could be used by the Indians to scatter away from the combined Reno/Custer attack but I am unsure of his actions on the bluffs confirm a reaction to that intelligence or it was viewed as non issue. Custer's further movement north gives me the impression the he didn't feel that Ford B was important. I tend to believe that at the time Custer was close to the Ford B area, he felt the battle would be fought further north in valley and Ford B would be behind Reno and not a factor. Sorry this ended up sounding like a school history report. *Classes at West Point in 1860 1. Military Engineering and Science of War 2. Mineralogy and Geology 3. Law and Literature 4. Practical Military Engineering 5. Tactics of Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry, and Equitation [ACIE] 6. Ordnance and Gunnery 7. Ethics 8. Chemistry 9. Drawing - Landscape 10. Tactics of ACIE, Strategy, Out Post Duty and Military Organization and Administration 11. Natural and Experimental Philosophy 12. French Language 13. Spanish 14. Drawing - Human Figure, Topography 15. Tactics of Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry
|
|