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Post by yanmacca on Oct 30, 2017 14:22:01 GMT
Beth, the BLBH has more secrets then a June Bride!
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
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Post by azranger on Oct 31, 2017 13:16:35 GMT
Sometimes terrain features are an inconvenience (Benteen's route) in time, distance, energy expenditures and sometimes they are a game change. In this battle I believe the terrain features added concealment to the river area to the north. The movement north route is easy to determine when viewed from higher ground before crossing MTC since Battle Ridge is the only terrain feature that has the north-south corridor. It's the same reason they built the current road on NPS land. I believe that Custer may have believed all Indians responded to Reno. I think the number of Indians was underestimated which would influence Custer's decision making. When Custer went past LSH at some point he realized there were more Indians willing to fight. That led to the retrograde back which ended with the five companies fixed and destroyed. That Ford Ds was the offensive goal is what I believe. The change to defense began when Custer did not cross the river. The Indians were in close pursuit so Custer could never get to a preferred defensive site.
In Gordon Harper's book there is an analysis section in Analysis 2 "How the Indian Bands Came Together at the Little Horn" many thousands arrived there without being on the Rosebud. If Custer had sent scouts up the Rosebud he would have had a better picture of what he would be up against. So he could have made an informed decision rather than charging into the unknown.
I think from Reno Creek there were trails that would lead to village without crossing at ford A. Whether they (Custer) could see the actual trails or not the visual route to take would be there. That view from Reno Creek does not include the crossings.
So I agree with what Chuck states regarding the lack of recon. Custer did this on fly and paid the price. What we need to remember is that during the CW the cavalry quite often was the recon for the larger numbers in the Army. In this battle there was no Army other than the cavalry and it appears both the recon and the available Army was lacking. The 7th was fed to the Indians a few companies at a time.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Oct 31, 2017 21:01:35 GMT
It is true that they were fed as small packages to the enemy but in this case we can see some reason to it. The notion of going to Ford B then leaving your force distributed as small packages for the enemy to consume makes no sense at all. The Ford D theory does explain why those packages were created and why they are found where they are. As to warrior numbers; that is a key point. Custer never really understood what he was up against or where they were. From LSH Custer would be able to see the mayhem on Battle Ridge would he not? Cheers
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on Nov 1, 2017 13:35:36 GMT
BRE and LSH are ground zero at the monuments. You walk out the back of the Indian monument and you are walking down BRE. You walk a short path from the LSH monument to the visitor center on CR.
Regards
Steve
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Post by quincannon on Nov 1, 2017 15:32:55 GMT
Ian: From the top of Calhoun Hill to the top of Last Stand Hill is slightly less than 3/4 of a mile.
I dod not check the others but they all seem a bit off.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 1, 2017 17:14:48 GMT
I am not sure I understand your meaning. I agree that we sould try to pin down distances and provide this information for easy reference.
That does not change the fact that Calhoun Hill to Last Stand Hill is a little less than 3/4 's of a mile, not the 2.33 miles that you posted above.
I determined this with dividers a map and a milage/distance scale included on that map.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 2, 2017 0:02:20 GMT
4100 feet (not yards as you have it posted) is about right and that would put it somewhere between 2/3 and 3/4 of a mile, which appears to be correct.
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on Nov 2, 2017 11:52:47 GMT
So I will take some GPS coordinates next year and a picture of where that coordinate was taken. I did that this year in South Fork Reno Creek when Chip took me to a battle site of the 1874 expedition. I found the marker placed by Weibert there and found out the Weiberts lived in a house there before moving to the Ranch on Reno Creek.
What was interesting was all the available water in SFRC even though Reno Creek was try. That adds to its desirability as a travel corridor if water is available.
Regards
Steve
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on Nov 2, 2017 11:53:57 GMT
I believe in Google Pro you can also get a profile view which helps in determining the degree of difficulty.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 18, 2017 17:28:10 GMT
Hi everyone, now I was going to post this before I went away, but I forgot. Now there are many who believe that Custer wanted to attack across ford B and was repulsed and force up to battle ridge, where he then took up positions to defend the area overlooking the ford.
But let’s think again here, so let’s run with this theory because it has been the favourite of many an author, historian and poster for eons.
Now there was a distinct lack of bodies around the ford and even the whole area, so this would suggest that this fracas was not a bloodbath. But to force a body of cavalry away from a location in a frantic rush for the high ground, would require numbers.
If Custer had decided that this was the place to fight Indians, then he would have contested that area with everything he had and it would have been one hell of a battle.
Now if Custer was forced away by Indians of foot, then surly he would have made straight for the high ground that he had just left. Why would he go to battle ridge? Battle ridge would not only take him away from any support from the south, but would also put a large coulee between him and Benteen.
Obviously he was not chased by mounted hordes so he did have some composure and I would think that moving back up to the LNC ridges would be a better option for him rather than battle ridge, which just played into the Indians hands.
If I was Custer, I would rather deploy on Ney-Cartwright ridge in a hope of my support coming and if it didn't then I would withdraw the way I came.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 18, 2017 18:16:56 GMT
Now you're thinking like a commander and tactician, and not someone like those many authors, historians, and posters you mentioned.
The one thing about authors, and historians is all they have done is feed us slight variations of the same old story for a hundred forty years, when a deep dive into the tactical issues surrounding this event tell us that the story they peddle was rotten then, and it remains rotten today. You see in Godfrey's Century article where he, very early on was having more than second thoughts about the conventional scenario, and he was there. That is one of the reasons I find Godfrey so compelling.
The difference between an historian, author, or average poster and one who has commanded at battalion and higher level is twenty odd years of experience and practical application. That does not make those that have commanded right or always right. What it does though is let's them see what those without that experience cannot most of the time.
One additional thing. Tactics are universal. A frontal attack or an envelopment, or any other tactical maneuver on paper looks the same at platoon, at company, at battalion and brigade levels. The lines drawn on that paper are the same, it is just the size of the area those lines cover that differs. The higher the echelon, the more area your maneuvers covers. When you're leading a platoon distance does not preclude you always having positive control over your squads. It gets a little more difficult to control your subordinate elements when you command a company, and the higher in echelon you go the more difficult it is for one man, the commander, to exercise that positive control. Two echelons down is the general rule, and beyond that it becomes impossible, so you must have subordinates you trained and trust to do that for you. You must give them specific mission type orders and let them command, and divorce yourself from running something that is their business not yours. One of the most overlooked things about this battle, in my opinion, is that Custer as a regimental (brigade level) commander, messed around far too much in the other children's play pen when it was not needed , and far too little when it was.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 19, 2017 11:08:50 GMT
Good post Chuck.
I tend to base my theory on what other commanders did that day, and yes I know that Custer was more brazen then either Reno or Benteen, but this is how I would expect a battalion under pressure to react.
Now as I said yesterday, if Custer want ford B to be his attacking point, then he would have initiated a full blown attack and if this attack faltered due to enemy resistance then why would he go onto ground he didn’t know in an effort to regroup, it doesn’t make sense. He knew that the ridge line which brought him here was clear and closer to his support.
Look at what Reno and his battalion did, he deployed and then fell back along the same route he took to get to the flats in front of the village, true he did take a new course onto the bluffs, but the Indians did have a say in this.
Benteen and the foray to Weir point, once this battalion deployed, it came under pressure and withdrew, which way did it withdraw, the way it came.
But I suppose that this further supports the notion that Custer had no intentions of attacking at ford B and all his resources where aimed at the northern end with ford D.
Side Bar: did we ever discuss the idea that Custer checked out ford C? this ford was also on Custer’s route north.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 19, 2017 16:18:39 GMT
As you say Ian, it is the natural thing to do when your advance has been repulsed to go back from whence you came. Not always, but at least 90 percent of the time. That does not necessarily mean all the way back, but there is always some rearward movement involved. You may try to hold the ground that you did gain if possible, but that is situationally dependent.
Had Custer gone to Ford B, and had be attempted to hold some of that ground, not the ford, rather the ground immediately east of it he would have quickly been surrounded and overwhelmed.
Godfrey did not believe there was any action at Ford B. Reading between the lines of what was in his article, I believe he thought Custer had something else in mind. To the best of my knowledge the excursion to Ford D is vintage last half of the 20th century, and I think late in the last half. No one mentions it until after 1970 or so, but I would need the more learned than I to verify that. My best guess on Godfrey is that he thought that Custer was met by a whole lot of Indian combat power on CR and BRE, formed some semblance of a cohesive line there, and subsequently the battalion was broken up, and the results of that break up are what you see portrayed today. That's my read, and as far as I know, mine alone
We discussed Ford C in passing some time ago, and gave it little to no attention. My feeling is Custer probably did not know it was there. You can cross there of course, but its only military value is crossing from west to east and then not in big numbers.
The only ford that had any military value was Ford D. It was the only one of the four, where you could make an opposed crossing.
I believe when these early writers, story tellers, heard the word ford they automatically gravitated to Ford B. It was next to where they knew the village was. It was close enough for those who used it to support Reno. Once they found it (Ford B) they looked for no further options. They were convinced that they struck the mother load, and we have been saddled with those theories ever since. When those in a latter day discovered there was activity at the Ford D area as well they had to find some way of shoehorning B with D, lest the complete story telling apple cart be upset.
I also believe that acceptance of Ford B as "The Only Ford" gave rise to the Reno/Benteen betrayal theory - Custer tried to support Reno, so why did they not try to support Custer - in many peoples mind. In a way, had Custer attacked at B you cannot blame them. The distance and time factors. if you accept that theory favor it. Reality though is that the distance and time factors they cling to are far off the mark. The further north Custer goes, time and distance alone preclude any support from the south.
If you accept the timing I posted the other day in response to Benteen, Reno was just getting to the bluffs and Custer was passing Calhoun Hill on his way north. Assuming then from that point the Custer battle lasted 45 minutes to an hour. Benteen and Reno could not have been there, assuming their best efforts, to support anyone.
We see so much bad information put out there about this battle. Reno with the never ending ammo pouch for his weapons. Benteen holding a grudge that would cost 210 lives. Custer as the master tactician. Indians always run. That list could go on forever. Most people with half a brain reject them all.
What I have learned from the study of battle itself extending now near sixty years is that 1) Most answers are simple 2) Soldiers generally try to do their best. 3) Everything looks easy until you try it. 4) Doing things the hard way saves lives. 5) The most direct approach gets you killed. 6) The very best course of action always is to out think before you try to out fight.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 19, 2017 19:54:53 GMT
You are probably right concerning ford C, as it offered nothing in the way that both B and D did, plus it was harder to spot with many trees around that area.
I was going to add that even though we get stories of soldiers at the river and being hit in the water, that Custer never even actually reached the water at ford D. I know some Indians [Sioux] say that they thwarted an effort actually in the river itself, but many of the Cheyenne accounts say that Indians had actually crossed over to meet the soldiers before they even reached the river.
This is why I mentioned before about how Custer would have retraced his route if under pressure as we could see an example here of soldiers being turned back from the river and moving back up the route they came from. They had come down though a coulee that led from BRE and headed back that way after a brief fire fight. I know Custer may have not visited cemetery ridge on his way in, but he could see the importance of its value as he made his way out.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 19, 2017 20:33:00 GMT
Tom and Steve are the last two of our company to be at LBH and their travels this time centered on the CR-BRE-Ford D area. I look to them for guidance here.
We have all heard those stories that seem in conflict. Some say he did, while others say he did not. My view is that both might be and probably are true, depending upon the viewpoint (location) of the person telling the tale.
As mentioned above, my opinion of what Godfrey may have thought was that Custer was met by a great deal of Indian combat power as he reached the CR - BRE area, and his forward motion stopped there. My opinion of Godfrey's words alone here. Just mine.
Had that been the case though I think we could reconcile did they or didn't they with that alone, considering those five companies would have been spread out laterally, at least initially, where some may have been down close to the river, while others were spread over those two ridge tops. A visual picture -- the left is down by the ranger housing while the right extends nearly to Highway 212 east of the Indian memorial.
The U S Army has always had an unhealthy affection for lines. They get very upset when they can't form a line and re-fight Gettysburg. They tend to fall apart when that vision of how to operate is not present. They tend to follow normal/natural pathways. They tend to deploy early into attack formations. They have never learned how to continue the fight surrounded and prevail. That is indicative of a certain softness in our thinking. There are exceptions of course, but we have become all too fond of easy, and that was just as prevalent then as it is now. It is cultural I suppose, thinking there is a mechanical solution to all of our problems, Half of the defeats we incurred in Korea were because of cut supply lines and the inability to fight successfully from surrounded perimeters. We think we can always reconnect like at Chipyong-Ni, but damn it we never train and plan to fight that way. You can only do what you plan for and train to do.
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