Why go to Ford B?

[quincannon]

Not sure what you are trying to tell me.

What I am trying to tell you is that when where you see trees out here you can expect to find water. When you see rivers and streams you can expect them to be tree lined, and most of the time have very steep and deep banks. We have a great deal of flooding out here which effects the depth of river and stream banks. It is not uncommon for them to be ten to twelve feet deep. The one about a quarter of a mile from our my house has banks seven to eight feet deep in most places, and I have seen that creek go from a trickle to overflowing its banks in a couple of hours.

Now given these conditions Custer is going to have to accept a crossing point that is less than ideal. What you can expect with these crossing points though is that a pathway through those trees will be present. If there are multiple crossing points at a ford, then there is a good probability that there would be several pathways as well. So knowing your are going to have to deal with trees and underbrush, you then try and find a ford that meets your tactical requirements, and has as many of the attributes of a decent place to make a crossing as possible. The only place in the LBH battle space that meets that criteria the best is Ford D.

And no I don't think a force of two hundred cavalry crossing through a tree line makes any sense at all. What I think is five forces of approximately forty each crossing through a tree line at five places makes sense.

Would I attack it now? Sure, unless I could find something better.

PS: I see at least three places where that river could be crossed by a company size force in that second picture, where after crossing the entire river bank defense would be unhinged. 

[dave]

Not being from the area I am curious if the large root systems of the Aspen trees affect the forming of fords and increase the steepness of the banks of the rivers they live along or is this just a fallacious belief on my part? Reason for my curiosity is we have cypress trees that grow along soughs and their root systems, often called knees, are real pains.
Regards
Dave

[quincannon]

Don't know that answer Dave. Out here we have Cottonwood, and at higher elevations (snow country) Aspens and Pine are more prevalent.

Most of our watercourses Sand, Fountain, and Monument Creeks being the main ones, have wide channels throughout their length,with very deep banks, but the majority of the time the flow of water is so low that crossing (wading through) them, water hardly reaches much above the ankle. That all changes with a combination of Spring Rain (which many times resembles short duration monsoons) and the Spring run off of snow in the mountains. At that time those creeks rise to overflow very quickly within an hour or two. Manitou Springs which joins Colorado Springs seamlessly on our west side at the foot of Ute Pass has been flooded six or eight times that I can recall in the time I have lived here, with a huge amount of property damage. Looking at that creek today, it is hard to imagine that in the right conditions if can get well out of hand so quickly.

Another thing that needs mentioning is that rivers and streams that are winding in their course, usually present fording places near where the stream bends. Usually you look on the other side of the bend in the direction of stream flow, and you will find a place to cross.

And yet another factor is that pathways of travel through wooded areas along wooded streams for the most part are pretty prominent. The Indians had been using these same pathways for centuries. US Route 1 from Maine to Florida started life as an Indian Trail. US 24 as it passes through the mountains here was an Indian migration trail at one time as well.

We cannot, despite how good they are, get an accurate depiction of what Custer actually saw and was confronted with by Ian's pictures alone. All we can do from what exists today, is make the value judgment that both B and C were absolute not-starters for military purposes, that A afforded passage only if unopposed, and that D was the only possible place where Custer had any chance of making an opposed crossing.

[yanmacca]

I try and put two scenarios together when I am confronted with fixes like this, so let me explain:

Now there are many who think that Indian pressure stopped Custer dead in the water at ford B and forced him uphill to battle ridge.
Now we have been trying to explain to these doubters that this could not be the case and that no action took place at ford B, mainly because the lack of evidence [bodies and cartridges] and Cheyenne accounts who say that this happened further north.

So the last few days we have been trying to sort out why he never tried to cross at ford D. Now I have done my bit by showing that the ground could have been heavily sown with timber and brush, which is still visible today in most parts, but I am finding no takers for this scenario.

So let’s say that it was Indian pressure that forced him away from ford D, but like ford B we have no evidence of any major fire fight or body markers, but we have some impact rounds found on BRE which were fired by army carbines [Scott says ten different carbines] and we know that soldiers defended cemetery ridge and even stashed their horses. So what if BRE and cemetery ridge was as far as they got.

[quincannon]

That - far as they got - is a both a distinct and likely possibility Ian.

The fact is that it does not matter.

What I have been trying to say is that the condition of the ford itself, the vegetation and indeed they lay of the land is not a reason to consider that this ford not be used. In contrast these "do not use" or "use only unopposed" are present with the other three.

Therefore, having no evidence to suggest that any, some, or all of Custer got near that ford, is itself evidence that there was enough opposition in or near those fording places to stop him. That may have been in the flats or they may have met sufficient force on the ridges themselves.

You do not know for a fact that some part of Custer did not try to make that crossing, that they reached the river, got feet wet, turned around and withdrew. The reason could well be that while one or two companies got there, the remaining three or four did not, and the fact that some did not caused the other to fall back.

Only a complete fool would try to cross that river under any circumstance, opposed or unopposed at only one place. Do not confuse the words crossing place, with the word ford. Fords out here are generally composed of multiple crossing places, and many times these crossing places are a hundred or more meters apart depending upon the configuration of the river itself. Most likely there were four or five crossing places in the area we now call ford D from the place where the old river course turns west to the point where it again turns north.

[mac]

Two things here
First Custer may have seen, when he arrived, that the village was not fleeing in the direction and numbers that he expected.
Second (and probably as well) there were already warriors concealed on his side of the river and they were being quickly reinforced. Crossing a river with a small force, where the enemy are on both sides seems to me to be a big undertaking and likely designed to get you surrounded. (Advice welcomed)
Cheers

[yanmacca]

Nov 25, 2017 9:13:59 GMT mac said:

First Custer may have seen, when he arrived, that the village was not fleeing in the direction and numbers that he expected.

Morning Mac.
I have read many different accounts and seen many maps concerning the semi-exodus of this village and like everything else about this battle and the results are very conflicting.
Some say that the women and kids never even crossed the river, but hid in the thick brush and timber which you can see today. Others say that some did cross the river and when they spotted the soldiers, they quickly crossed back. Many could have even ran west towards onion creek and the bluffs.
Then we have the warriors telling everyone to stay in the village.

So what Custer could make out from any high ground, is anyone’s guess.
Here is an image showing the view from battle ridge and given the fact that this was taken during the winter, it gives me the impression that all Custer could see was dust probably caused by turmoil;

[yanmacca]

Nov 25, 2017 9:13:59 GMT mac said:

Second (and probably as well) there were already warriors concealed on his side of the river and they were being quickly reinforced. Crossing a river with a small force, where the enemy are on both sides seems to me to be a big undertaking and likely designed to get you surrounded.

Let’s try and figure of his formation when he arrives on BRE/CR, now as you know the by reading the Donahue book, the Indians say he came in divisions [companies], so a column or two columns, would not look like a number of separate divisions [companies].

There could be a case that the five companies moved along their own path to the flats, but having said that, I think that any separation or ground between these companies would be small and not hundreds of yards, as I think they would want to keep not only in visual contact, but in shouting distance.

If Custer split them too far then he would lose control of them and we know what happened with Elliott at the Washita. Plus any company that was too far away from the main body would be vulnerable even to bands like Wolftooth’s fifty or so.

I would think that any move off BRE to the flats would be done differently than the move from Nye-Cartwright to BRE, as the Indians would now be more active and he knows that his presence was known.

Maybe it dawned on him that he had outstripped everyone and he was hanging on a limb with no support from the regiment and facing an objective which was growing stronger by the minute.

[azranger]

Nov 23, 2017 20:28:04 GMT yanmacca said:

Steve, if we look at the terrain around ford D, we can try to ascertain just what the bank of the river was like around that time.
If we look now and search out the old course, you can see how heavily wooded the river course was back then.
It is easy to see a nice flat and open ford with the road and railway making it so, but just check back and trace the river back as far as ford A and even now you can see how trees lined its banks.

This ford may have not been as inviting as Custer expected and if you add a few hundred armed Indians, it would look even less so.
So we could be looking at a case of "lets turn back and try again further back"

The advantage of Ford D is it is flat land and wide open  until you reach the river. The bluffs have you moving  through a defile and above river elevation. So moving down is slowed and strung out which means easier to make hits.  I think we would need to know how the road in the valley was aligned before we decide it not was not clear. At the 7th Ranch the river is adjacent Reno Creek Road and it is clear but not for road construction. 

Regards

Steve

[azranger]

I think even Google Maps gives us the wrong impression sometimes. We launched our tubes at the cavalry camp. If you follow the road going by the Real Bird's house and all the horse corrals to the river that would put at the separation point with the Cavalry Camp to the right and the reenactors camp to the left.

So when I look at what is across from the cavalry camp and on around to Real Bird crossing  on satellite imagine it does convey what we actually saw from the edge of the river.

[quincannon]

Ian: If you accept the idea that the battalion PLD was somewhere around LSH or at least short of the area of CR/BRE then you would have a battalion line with each of those four or five companies the Indians say they saw still in column. Those companies would stay in that column until the company commander's order brought the companies into line.

When you move from a company column into a company line you need room to do so. One to two hundred meters is probably the type of lateral distance required to do that, so when that entire battalion is on line with the battalion's companies also in line you are talking 800 to 1000 meters wide.

That is why you have echelonment in military structure. The battalion commander deploys that battalion and then let's his company commander's fight the battle. His (the battalion commander's) job is then to orchestrate the battle, not fight it. The battalion commander orchestrates/coordinates any further movement that would involve two or more of his subordinate companies.

[yanmacca]

Nov 25, 2017 15:43:47 GMT azranger said:

I think even Google Maps gives us the wrong impression sometimes. We launched our tubes at the cavalry camp. If you follow the road going by the Real Bird's house and all the horse corrals to the river that would put at the separation point with the Cavalry Camp to the right and the reenactors camp to the left.

So when I look at what is across from the cavalry camp and on around to Real Bird crossing  on satellite imagine it does convey what we actually saw from the edge of the river.

Both those photos show a totally different type of bank Steve, one has a gentle slope and the other is like the White Cliffs of Dover.
Great shots.

[yanmacca]

Nov 25, 2017 17:08:25 GMT quincannon said:

Ian: If you accept the idea that the battalion PLD was somewhere around LSH or at least short of the area of CR/BRE then you would have a battalion line with each of those four or five companies the Indians say they saw still in column. Those companies would stay in that column until the company commander's order brought the companies into line.

That is the problems I am facing Chuck, because sometimes I cannot tell the difference between what you thought they did to what you would do.
Remember when we worked together trying to formulate the battalion move from Calhoun to BRE?
I kept making maps and you would tell me what I should amend until we got it right.
Well the last one I did, showed a diamond formation with the HQ in the middle and an advanced guard.
Now that is totally different to a battalion in line.

[yanmacca]

Steve posted this image up a while ago and I have took the liberty of enlarging a portion of it to show just how much firing took place on both BRE and cemetery ridge;

[quincannon]

Ian: In both cases this one and the movement from Calhoun to BRE, I am telling you both what the book says and what I would do.

I BELIEVE IN THE BOOK. The book is the summation of best tactical principles, techniques and procedures. Rarely if ever do I stray from the good word of the holy book of tactics.

I assume that other commanders throughout history pretty much stayed by the book as well, therefore the book is a baseline from which you can judge performance.

I believe the trouble you are having is visualizing how units move and deploy. That diamond formation we ironed out a few months ago is a formation for traveling, that provides all around security for the force, front-rear-flanks. It's not a formation for offensive battle. There comes a point for a unit traveling that it must deploy into line. For a battalion that means at an arbitrary point on the ground, where the battalion commander feels that the other side of which is the most likely place his battalion will meet the enemy, he designates as the Probable Line of Deployment (PLD). At that point the battalion commander releases his battalion from their traveling formation by bringing them into a battalion line. The released company commanders at that point will probably still continue on in company column, until they decide to further deploy into line. That is as far as I can go with 19th century force structure.

In the modern day with modern structure. that company commander would bring his platoons on line, probably still in platoon column, and it would there become the responsibility of the platoon leader to bring his squads on line, and it may take one step further down to the squad leader to bring his squad on line

Diamonds are for traveling. Lines are for shooting.

Illustrations are for a three company battalion

A battalion line, companies in column, after it crosses the PLD ( X indicates units and subunits; Ignore the dots. I had to put them in to show proper spacing)

X .....X.....X
X......X.....X
X......X.....X

A battalion line, companies in line

XXX.....XXX.....XXX

A battalion line platoons in line

XXX.....XXX.....XXX------XXX.....XXX.....XXX------XXX.....XXX.....XXX

A battalion line squads on line

XXX...XXX...XXX...XXX...XXX...XXX...XXX...XXX...XXX...XXX...XXX...XXX...XXX...XXX...XXX...XXX...XXX...XXX  Plus one more set of 9 X's