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Post by quincannon on Aug 3, 2015 16:02:25 GMT
I think we must assume that Keogh was on Calhoun Hill at some time if to do nothing more than set the positions of Companies C and L.
My estimate of those position locations are Company L being about half way down Calhoun Hill oriented generally southward toward Henryville and Deep Coulee, with Company C to the rear on higher ground perhaps two hundred meters away and partially masked by terrain.
Are we completely sure that the right of Company L was threatened by fire from the Greasy Grass Ridge area> They would be were they on top of Calhoun Hill. So if these assumptions are correct, it may provide a clue as to at what point a decision was made to go down and drive those people on GG away. The Bonafides map indicates two or three debris fields of cavalry cartridges all in a general deployed line formation backing up that hill, to the point where we know they took up their final position. Calhoun Hill and GG Ridge have a direct line of sight. I do not believe the area below the top on the south side does though.
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Aug 3, 2015 16:45:03 GMT
I believe Keogh had an initial plan, consistent with Custer's orders, what what followed was all Plan A. He had no plan B.
Situation. Keogh and 3 companies were left on the south end of Battle Ridge to await the arrival of the Benteen and McDougal detachments. As I have said in numerous posts, he placed 2 companies on Calhoun Hill, He placed himself and his company in a position where he could conduct a mounted attack to clear a path for the regiment rear body, when they arrived.
Given his estimate of the situation, he placed himself and his company as the main effort. They were the ones most at risk, attacking all the Indians filling the low ground to the south, Henryville, etc. He placed himself with the company facing the most risk. Also, by going himself he could explain what was going on to the 4 company commanders and lead them in to the assembly area vicinity Calhoun Hill.
The swale was likely his extended assembly area, where he could dump the pack train and reorganize the regiment for future action. At this point, this element was the regiment main body, and main effort. 7 Companies plus the enormous company and a half pack escort means the 7th Cavalry combat power was here.
The critical failure was positioning himself with I Company. He should have been with L Company. The main enemy threat was not the Wolf Tooth element. It was from the village. He was not in position to see what the enemy was doing from this AOR. He also was not in position to know what was happening with L and C Co.
So I can blame his horrendous decision making. But the real issue is his horrendous command and control. He placed himself where he could not know what his three companies were doing, nor what the enemy was doing.
Also there is a military culture thing I need to explain. Company command is a big deal, one of the most satisfying experiences in any officers career. I have seen on these boards an excessive belief that date of rank trumps equivalent commands, especially on the amateur/lunatic board. The term battalion in 1876 meant a temporary organization of 2 or more companies to perform a specified task. Time could be 10 minutes or for a week or two. This task organization meant any 2 companies, so Bns in this era consisted of combinations from multiple regiments, and all three services.
A real battalion, in the modern sense, would have placed the commander and headquarters on Calhoun Hill. In this jacked up system, it was a collection of platoons. What I mean is for modern officers to consider 3 platoons form different units defending a common position. None of us have the same rate or senior rater. It is a common saying in the US Army that there is no seniority for LTs. For a First Lieutenant to court martial a 2nd LT for refusal to obey orders would be ludicrous, simply can't happen.
SO Keogh also positioned himself where it would cause minimal offense to his peers, the company commanders Calhoun and Harrington. I understand the ranks are Captain, 1LT, 2LT. But they are all peers in this situation.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 3, 2015 17:03:57 GMT
I disagree in part with this last sentence.
Company commanders are peers regardless of commissioned rank. Quite true.
When Custer gave Keogh charge of those three companies to form a battalion, what we would today call a task force, although considering the size of those three companies (no more than modern platoons) that title would be generous, Keogh stopped being a peer and had the responsibility to exercise command of the whole.
It may very well be that Keogh, as Montrose suggests, placed himself where he would cause minimal offense to fellow company commanders, but it was still wrong, a dereliction of responsibility, and blame attaches.
The common saying in the Army is actually -- Rank among lieutenants is like chastity in a house of ill repute - nonexistent. That was cleaned up a wee bit but you all get the idea.
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Post by royalwelsh on Aug 3, 2015 17:54:31 GMT
Montrose,
Another classy post. I can see no "battalion" logic other than for Keogh to command from Calhoun Hill, rather than to get fixated on Benteen's approach and Deep Ravine ingress. That was the decisive location.
Just a few relatively minor observations:
(1) The "elephant in the room" remains GAC's precise orders to Keogh, in the sense of whether they were so prescriptive as to fatally inhibit Keogh's freedom of action. That doesn't excuse his failure to timeously vacate, but merely to partly explain the failure to do so.
(2) I believe that Keogh would have considered himself formally somewhat "above" Calhoun, Harrington and Porter, from the wing and battalion structure. I would hope that he formally turned over command of "I" Company to Porter, but cannot say so with any conviction. I see the peer problem more as one of nepotism within the regiment than rigidity within the contemporaneous army, in relation to Harrington and especially in relation to Calhoun.
RW
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Post by quincannon on Aug 3, 2015 19:01:29 GMT
I was reading something interesting along these lines a week or so ago concerning operations of the three combat commands of 4th AD on the road to relieve Bastogne,
There were a couple of occasions where a team was formed by two companies. On those occasions the tank company commander exercised command over both the tank and armored Infantry companies, where both company commanders were present, and on one occasion where the armored Infantry commander outranked the tank company commander. It was not explained by the author if this was standard practice in all the armored divisions (if so I had never heard of it) or it was just how the 4th AD did business.
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 3, 2015 19:22:18 GMT
Chuck, the only way the Indians on greasy grass ridge could harm Calhounās men was if they had weapons capable of firing over 1000 yards, if the majority had bows and pistols then this rules them out completely, if they had repeating rifles then I believe that these were not able to reach that far, that leaves modern long rifles, and how many of these were in in Indian hands.
Now these pesky braves on GGR could be irking Calhoun so he wants Harrington to get close enough to fire a few volleys to drive them down the reverse slope. Only unknown to both Calhoun and Harrington the coulee between these two features was full of Indians.
The only answer I can give you regarding the 4th ID is that the tank commander knew how to use his tanks better than the Infantry officer, it is almost like the army surgeon telling the regimental cook how to prepare his kitchen because he out ranks him.
Yan.
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dave
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Post by dave on Aug 3, 2015 19:51:09 GMT
Amazing simply amazing. Three retired career soldiers providing insightful and professional analysis of Keogh actions without personal ownership in this discussion of the true facts. My goodness if this keeps up amatuers like myself will be able to study this battle, seek information on our own, coupled with professional viewpoints and determine for ourselves what actually occurred and not what we want the facts to be. This is what this board was created for, the dissemination of information about events during the Indian Wars for interested individuals. Having professional view points is icing on the cake. Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Aug 3, 2015 20:45:52 GMT
Dave I think you are giving all three of us credit beyond that which we deserve. I think all we do is know how to smell a stinker when it presents itself.
Ian: It beats the hell out of me, how any fire from Greasy Grass could be considered effective. Conventional wisdom is that Company C was sent for that purpose. Perhaps we should question conventional wisdom as to who set the convention, and just how wise it was in the first place. Perhaps we should question just how full is full as well? I was not there.
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dave
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Post by dave on Aug 3, 2015 21:12:26 GMT
Chuck
I believe you and other professionals and those who served shorter terms bring invaluable insights to non veterans who have little if any knowledge regarding military decision making. Of course, vets are not all knowing but non vets can't see the faults that vets do. Very simple analogy would critiquing a football game. An individual who never played would have little idea of what takes place on each play. They would not know to look at the linemen as much as the quarterback and unable to see what each player's role is during the play. That is how I see you and the others who can read a map or divine what actions should have occurred as compared to what did. A quick example was your response to Montrose's post about the axis of support and why Keogh was in the swale. Most civilians would have missed that observation and remained unaware why Keogh might have been in that position. Vets provide the spice for the dish enjoyed by all. Regards Dave
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Post by Beth on Aug 3, 2015 22:06:43 GMT
Amazing simply amazing. Three retired career soldiers providing insightful and professional analysis of Keogh actions without personal ownership in this discussion of the true facts. My goodness if this keeps up amatuers like myself will be able to study this battle, seek information on our own, coupled with professional viewpoints and determine for ourselves what actually occurred and not what we want the facts to be. This is what this board was created for, the dissemination of information about events during the Indian Wars for interested individuals. Having professional view points is icing on the cake. Regards Dave What he said. It is a pleasure to read the exchange going on in this thread. I do a couple questions. If Keogh set up the swale area for staging once Benteen arrives, it would imply that it was believed that Benteen was expected to follow Custer up the hill. If they were planning an extended staging area wouldn't that also imply no one saw the NA as an immediate threat? They had to know that Benteen wasn't going to be riding over the hill in the next 20 minutes. Can you please clarify for me what direction it seems they were expecting Benteen to travel and arrive? I try my best but I am directionally challenged unless I have a map in front of me so any landmarks mentioned would help. Beth
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mac
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Post by mac on Aug 3, 2015 22:13:00 GMT
Fred has a reason why he believes C was sent off and it is not related to fire from GG probably for the reasons Ian has pointed out. I note Fred does not post it anywhere so I will not post it here but one just needs to acquire his book and look at timeline U. This is a great discussion! We can now perhaps ask that if Keogh was not on Calhoun Hill for much of the time then should Calhoun have seen what was building and communicated this to Keogh? Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Aug 3, 2015 22:15:49 GMT
I kick myself in the butt for not seeing it before. Actually not seeing it is not half the fault that a focus on what was, and not focusing on what was to be expected.
Line of sight from the swale to that ridge complex does not matter a hill of beans by itself. If you have been asking yourself all these years why Keogh was behind the ridgeline when Benteen would come via Weir Peak, you would be beating your head against the same brick wall I have. Why indeed would he do that and not recognize the critical point of decision is Calhoun Hill. Therefore why was he separated by such a distance from the other two companies.
The answer and the focus should have been, which way would a Custer or a Keogh expect them to come If you conclude that would be on an axis Sharpshooter to Luce to N-C then to that swale assembly area Montrose spoke of, then and only then does line of sight enter, and from there, choice of position.
None of this means what Keogh did was the right solution, far from it. It is only a possible reason.
When I first heard of the gap, I said Ah Ha, and even trumpeted the discovery. In light of this it does not become meaningless, but certainly much, much less important than I had thought.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 3, 2015 22:26:17 GMT
Mac: I don't have the book, but what I will say is that Company C had enough combat power to get them to where Calhoun Coulee spills out in front of Greasy Grass Ridge, and enough to reach that line of positions on F-F Ridge where the combat power petered out. That in turn tells me that CC was not as full as some may think. Not empty, but were it full Company C would not have gotten very far beyond their line of departure and certainly not seven to nine hundred meters forward of it.
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mac
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Post by mac on Aug 3, 2015 23:26:29 GMT
QC I take your earlier point on timeline and times. When C get where they are going the warrior accounts suggest that after dropping back the warriors took a moment to decide to assault Company C, all adding to the duration of the action. As I have always said on these boards, the critical thing is how close are the warriors. If they can reach you during reload you are a goner. Add to this that it is a small number of soldiers in a big space. I imagine that men in Company C saw quickly what was happening and were retreating fairly soon after their arrival. montrose I hope you can keep posting as with this board as it is now we can probably cover some ground without dumb interuptions. Cheers
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Aug 3, 2015 23:32:39 GMT
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