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Post by Beth on Jul 31, 2015 5:49:29 GMT
I don't know if one can ever figure out what happened because there are so many scenarios that fall into the possible and even a few in the probable range.
On Keogh's wound--the only comment I've ever read was his knee was shattered and that the injury corresponded to an injury on his horse. But I've never read if that was his only wound.
I wonder sometimes if they started on the ridge and then were just swept down the swale by the overwhelming force of the NA--sort of like the whimpy high school football team facing a rated college team. Or just road down and slaughtered fleeing towards the high end of Battle Ridge. Or perhaps caught between two or more forces like a forced play in baseball
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 31, 2015 9:35:59 GMT
Well if Keogh was incapacitated (which a shattered knee would do), then surly all offensive actions would be cancelled, maybe I have got this wrong but everyone below Keogh was either a first or second lieutenant, two of these would be a fair distance away with L company, leaving Porter (1st Lt.) and Harrington (2nd Lt.) now Porter could be doing his job at commanding I company in the absence of Keogh, similarly Harrington would be doing the same with TWC being absent.
It would take a brave and rash act for Harrington to suddenly charge into unchartered waters with his commander WIA, especially since no effective command structure had yet been set in place with the Keogh injury.
Back to Keogh, if he was patrolling the rear area and taking stock of the situation (which is what he should be doing), then he would be a fair distance from the hostiles (deep coulee/greasy grass ridge), now most of the weapons used by the warriors would have an effective range of between 200-300 yards and a maximum range of 400-600 yards, but Keogh could have been between 700-1000 yards away.
Yan.
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Jul 31, 2015 13:52:07 GMT
We have no way of knowing where Keogh was when the bullet hit his leg and then his horse. He could have been in the area of Calhoun Hill and when hit, his horse took off toward I company. Maybe he had just ordered C company to charge when he was hit. Maybe he was riding back toward I company and the gap when hit. All we really know for sure is that he came off the horse in the vicinity of where his body was found. Since he was mounted when hit, he would have presented a big target as opposed to the soldiers who were on foot.
It is certainly plausible he was near C company, ordered the charge, then moved back toward I company when hit. That could possibly explain why I company appeared to have done little to no fighting, but rather just fled toward LSH. I would suggest that the time interval between the time he was hit and the time C and L were overwhelmed was no more than 10 minutes, and maybe as few as 5. I say that since the battle flow was from the south to the north and the pressure on I company from the south started the stampede toward LSH. For those few minutes, I company would have been more or less leaderless with men dispersed. It would have taken time for the next in line to realize he was now in command, decide what to do, then get orders issued. That required time was probably not available due to the Indians overrunning the south end of I company and coming through the gap.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 31, 2015 17:49:02 GMT
The things we know.
1) The battle flow was south to north.
2) The movement of Company C was the causal factor for unhinging the position. That is not to say that the position would not have been unhinged in due course, but it is apparent the Company C movement was the proximate cause, and hastened an already untenable situation making it worse.
3) Keogh was wounded at some point.
4) Ten minutes is a long time, at least it can be.
Things we assume:
1) Disregarding competence, we must assume in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that Keogh was engaged in exercising command of the battalion, and presumably he had turned over command of Company I to 1LT Porter.
2) Keogh would have accessed that the area around Calhoun Hill was the area of immediate criticality, that alone demanding his presence.
3) We can further assume that the gap was either undiscovered or it had been, and Company I was further away than is normal for a reserve to be, looking only here at dragoon doctrine for a mounted contingent covering the actions of a dismounted contingent. Note here that life would be a lot more simple in figuring these things out had there been only two companies or better yet four companies.
Things that make little sense:
1) Would anyone deliberately chose to defend the Keogh Swale area? What does that tell us?
2) Where did those Indians in Crazy Horse Ravine come from and by what route and when?
Based on the comments made this morning I think we are getting someplace. I particularly like what Colt has said. Unlike many he gives Keogh the benefit of the doubt. I think that prudent, because even a bad commander is not going to sit back smoking and joking with his nearest and dearest, when a battle is underway. I believe Keogh to be marginally competent, but I think we also must examine the decision process and not the man. His decisions or lack of decision was at the root of cause.
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 31, 2015 19:06:23 GMT
To be fair though Chuck, I am not giving Keogh a hard time on purpose, my posts on this matter are centred on the notions of A: where was Keogh when he got hit and B: was he controlling all three companies at that time. Thus leaving the door open for others to contribute with their ideas.
My last post was trying to find out if Harrington acted alone without orders, and also if he knew that Keogh had been wounded. Keogh would have had no choice but to hand over control to another officer, if he had time.
Another point to make concerning Harrington, is that C company was not his command, it was TWCs, now how would he explain to TWC that he took off without orders and got half of them killed.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 31, 2015 19:42:16 GMT
I don't believe there is any overriding requirement to be fair to Keogh or Harrington, nor anyone else Ian.
It is rather hard to be fair to anyone who gets their entire command wiped out, when him, he, or they collectively, could have attained a different result.
I don't think we are after fair here. We are after why.
As I said earlier Ian, Second Lieutenants are likely to do some rather stupid things at times. It comes with the territory. Personally I don't believe Harrington did something stupid this time. It is conjecture on my part, but I think he was ordered by someone to do what he did, and that could have only been one of two people, Keogh or Calhoun.
Finding what you seek then means we must first try to determine if Keogh was wounded before or after Company C set off. That answer will still not be conclusive, but just may be a step along the way.
Make no mistake, on the afternoon of 25 June Harrington, and only Harrington, was in command of Company C. It has to be that way, for the last thing you want is a moment or two of indecision based upon, what will Tommy say. After all we don't know if the presence of Tom Custer would have made things better or worse. My guess is worse, considering the efforts of the whole battalion.
Keogh and Tom Custer were both wild cards, in a deck that needed bold decisive leadership, and an absence of fear when it came to the conscience decision to disobey an order.
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Post by Beth on Aug 1, 2015 0:03:01 GMT
At one time in his career wasn't Keogh a respected officer?
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Post by quincannon on Aug 1, 2015 2:41:44 GMT
So was Benedict Arnold, probably the best combat commander we had save Nathanial Greene. Times change and often people change with them, and for some the change is not so good.
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Post by Beth on Aug 1, 2015 3:15:01 GMT
It always strikes how when you have veterans from one conflict, fighting in the next--some adapt and others seem to get lost.
Beth
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 1, 2015 10:43:54 GMT
When I said "fair" Chuck, I was referring to myself and not Keogh, I was trying to be impartial and look at what may have gone wrong in terms of what the Indians did and what Keogh didn't do.
Going back to officers, there were five in the Keogh battalion, but I reckon we can rule out Calhoun and Crittenden, as these had their hands full, Porter too could be blameless, so that leaves Keogh and Harrington.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 1, 2015 11:47:59 GMT
I am not following at all, why you are leaving Calhoun out of the mix. He was the second senior officer. Granted, he did have his hands full, but if Keogh did not order Harrington to go down to GG Ridge, then I think you must look to Calhoun, who may have ordered the movement if Keogh was already wounded, or asked him, one company commander to another to take some pressure off his right.
Being impartial when dealing with this battle alone I think quite difficult. Normally you would think that being impartial would weigh the good one does, against the bad, and in particular a bad performance. I have to constantly remind myself for instance that while McClellan was a horribly inept field commander, he had great organizational skills and as such greatly contributed to the eventual Union victory in the ACW.
With Keogh and Tom Custer it is difficult to put even a smidgen of weight on the good side of the scale, as officers (and that is important - as officers). Both were more fit to be honored vets in the Grand Army of the Republic for what they had done ten years before, than be serving officers in positions of responsibility on 25 June. Being awarded two Medals of Honor, or a Papal Medal does not qualify one for leadership. It only qualifies you to wear those medals for deeds long past.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Aug 1, 2015 12:39:30 GMT
OK some hard stuff to back the argument. Indian accounts say CH rode back through the village and crossed over the river and up what we call Deep Ravine. It surprises me that anyone ever thought anything else. Red Feather then says CH charged through a small gap in the ridge. This is what I now call Wagner's gap (well found Fred). If we go to Wagner's U timeline from Strategy of Defeat we see (Local Sun Time) 2:30 Custer leaves Keogh 2:47 Keogh orders Harrington to Calhoun Coulee to stop warrior infiltration. 2:49 Harrington moves off on his attack 2:56 C is in retreat 2:56 CH reaches head cut of Deep Ravine 2:56 Keogh deploys I to head off warriors from Deep Ravine 2:57 Calhoun shifts skirmish line west to aid C retreat 3:01 Calhoun assaulted from Henryville The times here are the compelling things and I realise these are Fred's opinions but I think we all have a lot of respect for Fred's research and thus his opinions. The point here is that in about 5 minutes Keogh has sent off Harrington, taken himself to the gap with Porter and set up a quick defence and probably taken a hit. Calhoun has been forced to re align and is then under assault. Body positions suggest to me that Calhoun and Crittenden were probably gallant in trying to hold their line. Clusters of bodies on each side of the gap suggest some kind of quick defensive posture with Porter supposedly with the cluster on the north side although some say his body was never identified. CH after pushing west to east through the gap then came back east to west, with even more warriors. In this case Company I would be caught between CH and friends and the ridge with people pouring along the ridge from south to north. Goodnight! This I think makes some sense for the Keogh position and grouping. Keogh probably could have lasted longer, it seems to me, if instead of trying to defend the whole ridge by deploying I he had pulled everyone up onto Calhoun Hill. Survived longer, not survived. As with all these battles (note the plural) as soon as the warriors close to hand to hand it is all over. Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 1, 2015 14:55:11 GMT
Mac, if the gap in the ridge line was plugged by Porter and I company then would CH and his band simply ride through them? We have heard how the Indians never relished rushing head on against a strong defensive line, but instead favoured envelopment. So I don’t think any of I company saw CH until he was upon them, in which case it was too late to attempt anything but fight for their lives.
Another way of looking at it is the possibility of I company being inactive until survivors from the other two companies come tumbling over the ridge line, and about the same time CH comes through the gap and catches them all cold, this would certainly cause panic and disruption to any plans to formulate a defence.
Chuck, I believe that these three companies were totally out of touch with each other once their formations were configured, I don’t know the exact distance between C and L companies but it must have been a fair distance. But if Keogh was wounded how would Calhoun know, these things happen very fast and if Keogh was riding with just an orderly then he would be more worried about helping his commander then informing Calhoun, so would Calhoun carry enough clout to mobilise C company into a sweeping manoeuvre without Keogh’s clearance.
Yan.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 1, 2015 15:34:30 GMT
Mac: When you are there is September ride down Calhoun Coulee to the point where there are three or four markers facing Greasy Grass Ridge. Tell me also if Company C could have moved down that coulee in line, or would the terrain only permit movement in column. Base your decision as to which on the restrictiveness of the terrain, and the fact that a line is hard to control anyway, but near impossible over broken terrain. Time it and see if you think it could be done in seven minutes, keeping also in mind that you must deploy into line, fight, and then start your retreat. Judging only from the map that appears to be a fairly tall order.
My personal opinion is that Company I was back in the swale position, well before anyone came through that gap.
I believe that Company I was out of touch with the rest Ian, but think Companies C and L were fairly close as that would be consistent with dragoon doctrine, one dismounted, the other covering the dismounts, same way that dismounted mech infantry does not stray all that far away from their covering AFV's.
Calhoun knowing Keogh was wounded would depend upon where Keogh was wounded. Were he in the C-L vicinity, I think there would be a fair chance he would know. If not, and were he back with Company I, Calhoun would not have a clue.
Did Calhoun have enough clout. Don't think he would need any, just a - will you help me to Harrington. Again all this depends upon Keogh's whereabouts. A will you help me, suggests a complete absence of Keogh.
To both of you. I think it is a mistake to take anything here for granted. That timeline to me takes several things for granted, that cannot possibly be known. What was it HR used to say - You prove a theory by disproving it. So then that timeline is just a nice story until, all these things are proven. I have a feeling that it will be just a nice story for a long time to come. Mac, your ride will see if that seven minutes holds up.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Aug 1, 2015 15:57:18 GMT
Good thread and posts boys! Regards Dave
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