mac
Brigadier General
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Post by mac on Nov 11, 2018 11:14:43 GMT
Here is the tactical flow I see in Custer's movements. It is not my work alone but stems from what I have learned from the many members of these forums. Coming to Ford A Custer is tactically intent on a valley attack and believes the Indians are camped close to Ford A and probably in discrete villages. He sends Reno in as an advance guard but then from the messages coming back makes one of the snap tactical decisions QC references above and decides to forgo the valley attack and instead move to envelop the village. To that end he moves to the ground east of the river. When he sees the village he again makes an adjustment. He realizes that there is just one "Big Village" and so sends the message to recall Benteen. Undeterred he moves on at full strength to the Ford D area. The main procedure here is, I feel, speed. In this case why go to Ford B? I ask a terrain question. From the point where Custer exits MTC for the contact with Wolf Tooth et al, is the village visible? If not then I could understand Company E moving down as a force (as Curley says) to "peak" at the village and then return to Custer (Curley is gone) and let him know that they need to proceed to Ford D. Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 11, 2018 12:07:16 GMT
Why would Custer, through Smith, draw attention to himself, the only result of which would be to close Custer's back door. Let's say that only a hundred did come over, and no more, and all the rest drawn to the north by this Ford B action went straight north to confront Custer's main body. The back door is still closed, by the hundred, and in that situation a hundred would be more than sufficient, while in the north the odds are greatly increased against the main body's front. There is no key terrain as such at LBH, but there is a key area that must be kept open if you ever hope to get out if the situation you face goes sideways. That place is the junction of Medicine Tail and Deep Coulees. Your proposal along with the historical scenario insures that place being held by the enemy. Drawing them over on foot insures they stay there. The road to Ford D does not lead past Ford B for all, or any portion of Custer. Ford B is only in play if the battle is intended further south, and there is no indication that was the case. Chuck it was only an idea my friend, as the last few weeks we have had debates about this trail which could have started in MTC, gone to ford B and then across the western edge of battle ridge, now some say that soldiers where seen at this ford, I think that some Indians have pointed this ford out to researchers claiming that the grey horse were there at ford B, so there is a lot of data knocking around supporting actions at ford B and also a lot which says that no action at all took place and the fighting if any was ford D.
I myself have put my backing against a move north with ford B being bypassed, as Keogh standing idly on a ridge line a mile away while one company takes a look at a ford does not impress me at all, neither does leaving Keogh on battle ridge while Custer legs it off on a recon.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 11, 2018 12:14:28 GMT
Here is the tactical flow I see in Custer's movements. It is not my work alone but stems from what I have learned from the many members of these forums. Coming to Ford A Custer is tactically intent on a valley attack and believes the Indians are camped close to Ford A and probably in discrete villages. He sends Reno in as an advance guard but then from the messages coming back makes one of the snap tactical decisions QC references above and decides to forgo the valley attack and instead move to envelop the village. To that end he moves to the ground east of the river. When he sees the village he again makes an adjustment. He realizes that there is just one "Big Village" and so sends the message to recall Benteen. Undeterred he moves on at full strength to the Ford D area. The main procedure here is, I feel, speed. In this case why go to Ford B? I ask a terrain question. From the point where Custer exits MTC for the contact with Wolf Tooth et al, is the village visible? If not then I could understand Company E moving down as a force (as Curley says) to "peak" at the village and then return to Custer (Curley is gone) and let him know that they need to proceed to Ford D. Cheers
Well done Mac! Can I add that we are taking the word of a number of men who saw Custer go down MTC, but I don't think any of them saw the conclusion of this move. the battalion in my eyes would be moving in a number of sub sections, which would not only suit the terrain but add to security of the march. The early phase of this move could have been seen by these men, but I don't think they saw anything past deep coulee. Thompson claimed he saw soldiers in lines on the hill firing at targets, could he be witnessing the actions on Luce ridge and that red letter 'W' ?
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
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Post by azranger on Nov 12, 2018 13:55:15 GMT
Here is the tactical flow I see in Custer's movements. It is not my work alone but stems from what I have learned from the many members of these forums. Coming to Ford A Custer is tactically intent on a valley attack and believes the Indians are camped close to Ford A and probably in discrete villages. He sends Reno in as an advance guard but then from the messages coming back makes one of the snap tactical decisions QC references above and decides to forgo the valley attack and instead move to envelop the village. To that end he moves to the ground east of the river. When he sees the village he again makes an adjustment. He realizes that there is just one "Big Village" and so sends the message to recall Benteen. Undeterred he moves on at full strength to the Ford D area. The main procedure here is, I feel, speed. In this case why go to Ford B? I ask a terrain question. From the point where Custer exits MTC for the contact with Wolf Tooth et al, is the village visible? If not then I could understand Company E moving down as a force (as Curley says) to "peak" at the village and then return to Custer (Curley is gone) and let him know that they need to proceed to Ford D. Cheers
Custer doesn't have much because he didn't look for it. What he has is horses on the benches which indicate lots of Indians in close proximity. If they are apart so would the horse herds be apart. The scouts formed their opinions based upon the horses. They knew their was a concentration of Indians from their observations.
The location of horses is known and they are on a bench away from the village. There is no visible village but smoke is observed. Custer knows the village is across the river and not far from the horses. As Col Hoyt points out the horses are the Center of Gravity for this Big Village. Reno moves up the valley in a frontal attack blocking south movement. Custer flanks Reno's position and go after the horses forcing the Indians to fight on foot. If the horses are moved into the village that is a good thing. Even poor shots should be able to shoot at thousands of horses in a small area. The horses would destroy the infrastructure to some degree and disrupt any orderliness in the village. Custer has 8 companies engaged and Benteen with the pack train on the way.
I am saying that Custer knew of the size of the horse herd. He knew where it was located. What he didn't know was the Cheyennes had horses across the river and were getting them as he moved down from Weir.
Custer chose to put the NOGO terrain features between himself and the known horse herd. He had to know he was giving them access to all those horses. He was not concerned that they had an option to prepare for battle. I do not buy that Custer could not have flanked or enveloped in the valley sooner. The other advantage is that he would have seen the Cheyennes from the benches and had 8 companies. Those benches would have been perfect for the carbines. Elevation and wide open field of fire.
Instead Custer chose the Bluffs where the only place to get view was Weir or before. Once he moved toward and out of MTC (that 600 yards that Martin talks about is where they could see the trees and tipis but you can not see the river portion of the fords) there is no place to see the river crossings until ford Ds. That Whole stretch requires physically riding up to the edge and looking down toward the river.
Regards
Steve
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 12, 2018 15:54:09 GMT
I wonder if the reason he went over the bluffs and not the valley, was because using the valley would not give his battalion the option of surprise.
If the village got wind of Reno as he approached, could they also prepare for another battalion moving around their right [Reno's left] flank.
Custer may have wanted the advantage of just appearing on either the flank of the village or even the rear, he may have thought that the bluffs would give him enough cover to allow for this maneuver and give him a unopposed crossing as Reno had the Indians attention, something that moving to Reno's left in the valley wouldn't allow.
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colt45
First Lieutenant
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Post by colt45 on Nov 12, 2018 20:55:31 GMT
Yan, That probably is the reason he went the bluff route, plus the fact he was already on that side of the river. If he had performed proper recon before the 25th, he would have known the west side of the river was the place to be, not the bluffs. And if he wasn't so bent on making this a 7th cavalry operation only, he might have put the whole regiment in the valley so as to force the Indians north into Terry.
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on Nov 13, 2018 22:27:26 GMT
Colt's last sentence above is the best reason for Custer to not make the best available choice. "And if he wasn't so bent on making this a 7th cavalry operation only, he might have put the whole regiment in the valley so as to force the Indians north into Terry. "
Excellent Comment
Regards
Steve
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
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Post by azranger on Nov 13, 2018 22:36:23 GMT
It was never totally about not being seen. Wolf Tooth left before Custer got close to the valley. Soldiers in the valley see Custer's companies on the bluffs. There would be thousands of eyes in the village and we can hardly think that no one could see them on the bluffs. Custer was observed as he approached MTC.
There was two groups of Cheyennes that engaged Custer at Luce and N/C. They had to have seen him in order to confront him there. They weren't on random patrols. They saw his route down to MTC and knew where to go to ambush him as he climbs out and heads north.
Custer was heading to ford C-D to keep Terry out of it and give the 7th the victory.
Regards
Steve
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Nov 13, 2018 22:44:59 GMT
We know the Indians saw Custer long before the first engagement, but Custer may not have known he had been seen until engaged at LNC. If he did know he had been seen and continued on anyway, it is more evidence he let his ego make the battle decisions for him, with little regard for the welfare of his command. Again, more evidence he wanted a 7th only victory, and common sense be damned.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 14, 2018 9:58:18 GMT
Lt. Edgerly heard Custer say at officers call ;
We would press on as quickly as possible as we could and attack them in the village if possible. The idea was that the Indians would not stand against a whole regiment of cavalry, and as soon as they learned of our advance, they would try to get away from us.
This is the reason behind the whole plan of attack for that day and if Custer did see that his surprise attack over the bluffs was being compromised, then this would mean to him that he needed to speed things up, rather than worry about a few Indians whose only goal in his mind was to try and slow him down whilst the village gets away.
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
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Post by azranger on Nov 14, 2018 11:06:20 GMT
Custer believed they were discovered or potentially discovered at the divide. It was the reason he moved daytime on the 25th. He should assume that he was discovered. It could be that he thought he would have concealment on his exact plan but if that was truly a plan then Reno should have known it before he left Custer in Reno Creek. Custer should have sent for Benteen at that time.
Did Custer think only 3 companies were discovered at the divide?
After sending Benteen and even after sending Reno Custer changed from following Reno to moving to the bluffs. Whatever triggered his movement it seems to be lost.
The Indians had outposts on Weir or near Weir. Thompson wrote of the rock pillar. The Cheyennes had guards across the river and Wolf Tooth maneuvered to avoid them. The bluff side gave a better observation point for the Indian security details.
Regards
Steve
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 14, 2018 14:58:44 GMT
We know the Indians saw Custer long before the first engagement, but Custer may not have known he had been seen until engaged at LNC. If he did know he had been seen and continued on anyway, it is more evidence he let his ego make the battle decisions for him, with little regard for the welfare of his command. Again, more evidence he wanted a 7th only victory, and common sense be damned. Hi Colt. There is an account by Sgt. Kanipe which says that Custer probably changed his mind on going into the valley with Reno, after Kanipe spotted 60 to 75 Indians up on the bluffs north of where Reno was corralled, he reported it to Sergeant Bobo, who reported it to Lt. Harrington, and Harrington to Capt. Tom Custer, and Tom Custer to General Custer. General Custer immediately turning to the right in the direction of the Indians.
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Post by crowsnest on Nov 14, 2018 16:27:31 GMT
Custer believed they were discovered or potentially discovered at the divide. It was the reason he moved daytime on the 25th. He should assume that he was discovered. It could be that he thought he would have concealment on his exact plan but if that was truly a plan then Reno should have known it before he left Custer in Reno Creek. Custer should have sent for Benteen at that time.
Did Custer think only 3 companies were discovered at the divide?
After sending Benteen and even after sending Reno Custer changed from following Reno to moving to the bluffs. Whatever triggered his movement it seems to be lost.
The Indians had outposts on Weir or near Weir. Thompson wrote of the rock pillar. The Cheyennes had guards across the river and Wolf Tooth maneuvered to avoid them. The bluff side gave a better observation point for the Indian security details.
Regards
Steve
Custer doesn't send for Benteen until he has eyes on the village, because he is still of the belief that he is facing multiple villages spread about the area. The Lone Tipi sight only reinforces this to him. It's remains only showed a smaller village in that spot, not a village of thousands. He doesn't call on Benteen until he sees a "Big Village" it's only at that point he knows he also needs to consolidate his forces. He's already doomed at this point by pressing forward, regardless of his decisions from this point.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Nov 14, 2018 18:32:54 GMT
Crow, you make an excellent point. What about not following the Rosebud to the and witnessing the Rosebud battlefield? How about not sending Herendeen through Tullock's to appraise Terry of the change in plans on the 24th? The infantry could not have helped GAC, but maybe, just maybe Terry sends the 2nd cavalry companies and the mounted infantry scout column giving support(another prong of attack) to give the NA's something else to think about. But, enough WIFF's on my part. Your post is to the point. Oh, and, one more thing. Did the night march not tire out the troops and horses and make their condition less than optimum for a battle on unknown terrain?
Regards, Tom
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Post by crowsnest on Nov 14, 2018 19:12:06 GMT
Crow, you make an excellent point. What about not following the Rosebud to the and witnessing the Rosebud battlefield? How about not sending Herendeen through Tullock's to appraise Terry of the change in plans on the 24th? The infantry could not have helped GAC, but maybe, just maybe Terry sends the 2nd cavalry companies and the mounted infantry scout column giving support(another prong of attack) to give the NA's something else to think about. But, enough WIFF's on my part. Your post is to the point. Oh, and, one more thing. Did the night march not tire out the troops and horses and make their condition less than optimum for a battle on unknown terrain? Regards, Tom The condition of the troop was a major factor in the outcome of this battle. The night march drained the troops, but of course GAC didn't know if he'd be engaged the next day or not (although it certainly had probability). The significant ground covered on the 25th not unreasonable, but in conjunction with an engagement it was asking a lot. The temps likely above 90 for at least part of the day were draining. The condition of the horses was just as significant to the outcome too. I think while the battle was lost once Custer continues east of the Bluffs, but the condition of the troops is the reason it was a route, in addition to the moderate fighting capabilities of the unit in general.
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