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Post by quincannon on Nov 9, 2018 19:40:23 GMT
Steve any movement to Ford D, including any use of the western corridor, to any commander above the grade of high private, makes that commander assume the back door is closed. When the enemy sees you, the expectation is that the enemy will soon be at the place they observed you and in force.
It is like dropping your drawers on Broadway, and not expecting someone to kick you in the butt to think otherwise, or expecting to find an honest Three Card Monte game. Appearance and reaction to appearance go together like ham and Swiss cheese.
"No clumping of markers" How many casualties do you need to convince any commander with his head screwed on straight, that the back door is closed, and therefore any further offensive action is compromised. It does not take six or seven. One is sufficient. In fact taking fire in that location without sustaining a casualty is also quite a sufficient signal that your shit is weak and you had better dig out plan B or C or D, because Plan A, what you intended, is no longer viable. Any fire you take is ample evidence of occupation.
About the only thing you left out is trying to find the Good Fairy. You can see the ford from The far high ground. Searching for noncombatants in the rocks and shoals is a bit premature, unless you intend serial rape. What valuables? The only thing that would be of military necessity is to determine if the damned place was occupied or not. Smoke and dust indicate occupation. If he was trying to determine where fords were at that late date, he should have stayed at Fort Lincoln for all that stupid son of a bitch was worth.
Going back to my comment of yesterday. Custer should have beaten the living shit out of Wolf Tooth and quickly, then turned around, joined Benteen and what was left of Reno, moved a half dozen miles toward the divide he had crossed that morning, and called it a day. Wolf Tooth, and the poor decision to continue after skirmishing with him, lost the battle. Everything else was anti-climax
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Post by quincannon on Nov 9, 2018 20:28:42 GMT
Steve's witnesses.
Thompson: Could Thompson walk along the east side of the river, faster than a column on horseback could move, keeping in mind that Thompson and Watson would have to move slowly for fear of discovery? Probably not. Did Watson ever verify Thompson's story? Not to my knowledge, nor is there any record I am aware of that Watson even knew of Thompson's story. Was Thompson in full possession of his faculties, when the story first came to prominence? Apparently not.
Martini and the 600 yards: Did Benteen ever go to the place where Martini said he left Custer and measure the distance for himself? Don't think so, but maybe. Martini was an illiterate, or at least not literate in the English language, so that must be born in mind in anything dealing with Martini at that stage of his life.
Curley: Is there anything that Curley ever said that was not filtered through the lens of Camp, the poster boy of agendas? I can't recall there being any such time.
Not saying any of these people are lying. Just trying to impeach the witness, laying out the facts surrounding their testimony, for the benefit of the jury.
So, I for one will assume the use of sound tactics, techniques and procedures over testimony any day of the week. That is particularly so at LBH when anyone commenting in that era about the battle automatically becomes a pop star and a Custer fan boy favorite. I am strictly a post Van de Water kind of guy.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Nov 9, 2018 20:29:57 GMT
Steve any movement to Ford D, including any use of the western corridor, to any commander above the grade of high private, makes that commander assume the back door is closed. When the enemy sees you, the expectation is that the enemy will soon be at the place they observed you and in force. It is like dropping your drawers on Broadway, and not expecting someone to kick you in the butt to think otherwise, or expecting to find an honest Three Card Monte game. Appearance and reaction to appearance go together like ham and Swiss cheese. "No clumping of markers" How many casualties do you need to convince any commander with his head screwed on straight, that the back door is closed, and therefore any further offensive action is compromised. It does not take six or seven. One is sufficient. In fact taking fire in that location without sustaining a casualty is also quite a sufficient signal that your shit is weak and you had better dig out plan B or C or D, because Plan A, what you intended, is no longer viable. Any fire you take is ample evidence of occupation. About the only thing you left out is trying to find the Good Fairy. You can see the ford from The far high ground. Searching for noncombatants in the rocks and shoals is a bit premature, unless you intend serial rape. What valuables? Cheyenne valuables, I need to invite you to a PM, sorry so late.The only thing that would be of military necessity is to determine if the damned place was occupied or not. Smoke and dust indicate occupation. If he was trying to determine where fords were at that late date, he should have stayed at Fort Lincoln for all that stupid son of a bitch was worth. Going back to my comment of yesterday. Custer should have beaten the living shit out of Wolf Tooth and quickly, then turned around, joined Benteen and what was left of Reno, moved a half dozen miles toward the divide he had crossed that morning, and called it a day. Wolf Tooth, and the poor decision to continue after skirmishing with him, lost the battle. Everything else was anti-climax Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Nov 9, 2018 20:47:16 GMT
Aware, because of our phonecon of last week Tom.
Did Custer know of them? If not, valuables is a non-starter. You have to determine knowledge of value, before you use it as a reason to go sending people after it.
You cannot transform the value these objects to the Cheyenne, into an objective in battle. To a Philistine, the Ark of the Covenant is just another goddamned box the Jews carried around with them.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 9, 2018 20:59:15 GMT
I am not saying that the western route is a figment of our imagination as it could be very well true, there again it could have been a trail left by a bunch of horses being herded towards the village via ford B.
But I cant be swayed from what I have always thought about those half a dozen or so markers along the western perimeter, and that is that they are C Company troopers running or riding to get away from the Lame White Man charge, now once a time I would have said why would they run into Calhoun coulee where the Indians are gathered, but the initial push by C to get to FFR could have cleared these hostiles.
I know we have some survivors say they saw this and they moved here, but if you look at the vantage spots of some of these people, you can see that it was a hell of a long way a way and a lot of features would have looked very different from a mile or two away, to when they would have approach them from a different angle years later.
If I was going to believe any one, then it was the three Crows and even they never saw that much, because if they where on Bouyers bluff when they saw what they claimed, then that place would soon become a death trap, especially with what went on around Luce ridge and that action was before any at ford B.
Am I making sense here?
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Post by quincannon on Nov 9, 2018 21:12:15 GMT
Yes you are making sense, because anyone who was not there during the battle can speak with absolute authority on the battle. Even then, you must filter what anyone has to say through the objective lens of what would be sound tactics. If any action does not make good tactical sense in this latter day then it MUST be looked at with a jaundiced eye.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 9, 2018 21:42:31 GMT
I thought that tactics are flexible when it comes to terrain so if you didn't want to ride down MTC because of fear of ambush, then you would stick to the side which was furthest away from the village which was the eastern side, now the terrain on if the terrain on that side was not conducive for a sound tactical advance then you must adapt your formation to fit the terrain and I think that this is what they did, either moving i two groups or possible three.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 9, 2018 22:23:29 GMT
Tactics are flexible, but you are talking technique and procedure, not tactics.
The tactic in this case is either a shallow or deep envelopment around the enemies flank, while someone else, the supporting attack is holding the enemies attention, away from your intention(s). The people involved in supporting you (Reno) are using the tactic of frontal attack. Both attacks have totally different objectives, while still being part of the same effort.
The technique and procedure is do we go this away or thataway in pursuing the tactic. Technique is always a matter of doing this or that, while the procedure is how do we implement the technique at a micro level.
Example: I want to envelop the enemy flank into his rear. I have two choices as routes for that movement.
a. I can move along the bluffs near the river all the way to my deep objective of the river fords above the enemy encampment. This choice insures that I can always keep the activities in the village under observation throughout the movement process. At that point you must decide, if I do this what are the advantages and disadvantages using the then current cavalry procedures, such as formations, deployability, the ability to both place and mass fires on the enemy. Finally you must determine if the choice of this route is the best, and that using it will most likely lead to attaining your final objective.
b. Your other option is moving east of the second ridge line. You are masked by terrain, but by the same token you do not have the ability of constant observation the river route gives you. Your ability to use more secure formation is enhanced, and that gives you a better ability to deploy, place and mass fires on the enemy, and you have to possibility to reach your objective unobserved. "Possibility" is a big word. There are no guarantees.
So the bottom line Ian is these are the things that must be decided by the commander, sometimes instantly, once that commander is committed to the tactic. There is no question as to what technique I would employ in the situation just given. I would go the east of the second ridge line as my technique to execute the tactic chosen. The main reason for this in my mind is that I could employ every procedural trick in the book if I chose the river route and would still be discovered, and discovery means that my chances of tactical success are so reduced that the effort is for naught.
There is no plan without disadvantage. The job of the commander in choosing tactic, technique and procedure is to minimize disadvantage and maximize advantage. Sometimes the difference is as slender as the silk in a spider's web.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 10, 2018 11:30:21 GMT
Can I please interrupt this thread for a second with a little idea what has been going around in my the last few days. Know the initial attack called for [as Chuck also mentioned above] Reno in a supporting attack role holding the enemy attention whilst the main attack is carried out on another front, well with Custer employing simple tactics against what he thought was an enemy will to flee rather than fight, why couldn't employ a similar tactic when he reached MTC. If you look at the two maps, one shows the regimental attack plan [minus Benteen] and the other shows a similar attack plan but on a smaller scale, with Smiths company in the Reno role.
This is wild shot on my part, but this is what we are here for to debate this stuff and I think both assaults do resemble each other, if that was in his mind of course. But the only difference could have been for Smith to move north himself after the main column had gone behind battle ridge and take part in the main assault.
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Nov 10, 2018 14:01:06 GMT
Yan, That second attack, with Smith going to Ford B while the rest of the battalion goes behind BR is of course possible, but the problem I have with that is Smith's move toward ford B, followed by withdrawal north along the western corridor, announces Custer's presence in the north, if we assume he was undetected to that point, which we know is not true. A single company down around ford B shows the hostiles a very weak force, inviting a counter attack. When they pull out to the north, they will be followed which officially closes the escape route back to the south toward Reno.
We know Custer fired a lot of rounds around LNC, which gives away his position officially. No need to send a decoy attack to ford B. Doing so splits his command yet again, further reducing his combat power, and leaves that one company extremely vulnerable. Custer's plan appears to have been an envelopment, given the attack in the valley with Reno and the movement east of the river northward by the rest of the troops. To make that tactic succeed, Custer needed to be unobserved, so I don't think your scenario of sending a company to ford B as a diversionary attack is plausible, but not impossible.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 10, 2018 14:47:14 GMT
Thanks for the input Colt, it was just a thought which came about through matching what was mentioned about Custer moving in two directions towards ford D with a interest shown in ford B. I was going to add that the plan to do this was formulated before they took any fire and the approach was deemed safe, once under way the Indian number grew and this was too late to halt the move, so covering fire was used to help Smith to get out of MTC and move towards battle ridge using the western slope of battle ridge. The two moves are similar though and to draw attention to ford B by any fighters still in the village would allow for a move north without these Indians there to form a defense around ford D, they would however still follow the cavalry once they knew that this was a feint but that would still have bought time for Custer and keep him one step ahead. Ah well it was worth a thought
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Post by quincannon on Nov 10, 2018 18:17:50 GMT
When you are near appear to be far away. When you are far away appear to be near.
Ian's plan of a decoy force to Ford B is quite good. Sending a company alone and exposed fulfills - appear to be far away, and would work if only two factors were present. The first is a coherent plan based upon engaging the enemy battle force on the east side of the river in the basin of Medicine Tail and Deep Coulees. and the second part is having a hidden, well resourced force behind the second ridge line, that is sufficient to bring that Indian force to decisive battle, while retaining sufficient force to secure their own right and left flanks. Come into my parlor you stupid sons of bitches and I will kill you.
Ian has drawn the correct lessons from Cowpens.
The plan did not exist,the force not sufficient, and Dan Morgan was dead.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 10, 2018 20:11:26 GMT
Cowpens Chuck, no I can't go there sorry we lost.
The only difference I would think between the maps is the way both Reno and Smith actually acted when reaching their destination, Reno placed his men on line and stood his ground, Smith on the other hand was to stay mounted and just do enough to draw the Indians attention for a short while whist the rest moved across deep coulee and beyond battle ridge.
If this was only half a success and say 100 Indians congregated at ford B to repulse this threat then it would have done its job as those warriors could even be drawn across the river on foot which leaves them out of the frame whilst Smith rides away.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 10, 2018 22:32:49 GMT
Always read more about those you lost, and in depth, for it is in knowing what you did wrong where the lessons of battle lie.
Reading about those you win only validates your inflated opinion of your own force, and tells you nothing of where you may have to go next.
Your own Army Ian, felt pretty good about itself after WWI, while the other guy examined what he did wrong, and came up with new ways that led him to great success for four years, to your own consternation.
The same thing happened to us in the Gulf War, where all we thought we would have to do is apply the various whiz bang technologies to insure future victories. Along came 19 guys with box cutters, and we mourn three thousand plus deaths every September 11th.
There is nothing more of a disaster for a military than being complacent, failing to observe what goes on under their very noses.
Cowpens was the greatest and most decisive tactical victory in the history of the United States Army and remains so after the passing of nearly two hundred fifty years. but drawing on its lessons means that it would only work once. Failing to draw on those lessons is another story altogether.
Why do you think I dwell so much on the early days of the war in the Pacific, and in Korea, the French in Indo China, the Alamo, and what we study here. It is the causal factor of defeat, and the decision processes used when the odds are against or even, that tells the story of leadership, training, innovation, and most of all the failure in some cases to do all three. It's very hard for us, for we Americans seem only to remember the good stuff, and forget the bad. People who only want good stuff to happen MUST look at the bad, to insure the good.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 10, 2018 22:56:38 GMT
Why would Custer, through Smith, draw attention to himself, the only result of which would be to close Custer's back door.
Let's say that only a hundred did come over, and no more, and all the rest drawn to the north by this Ford B action went straight north to confront Custer's main body. The back door is still closed, by the hundred, and in that situation a hundred would be more than sufficient, while in the north the odds are greatly increased against the main body's front.
There is no key terrain as such at LBH, but there is a key area that must be kept open if you ever hope to get out if the situation you face goes sideways. That place is the junction of Medicine Tail and Deep Coulees. Your proposal along with the historical scenario insures that place being held by the enemy. Drawing them over on foot insures they stay there.
The road to Ford D does not lead past Ford B for all, or any portion of Custer. Ford B is only in play if the battle is intended further south, and there is no indication that was the case.
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