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Post by yanmacca on Nov 7, 2018 16:17:15 GMT
Mac, look at the 'Rain-in-the-Face' map and you will see that a group makes a stand on what looks like cemetery ridge, which was known to be E Company or 'the grey horse soldiers' by the Indians. Now on the map we can see that R-I-T-F says that the Indian non-coms actually crossed the river and a point facing cemetery ridge and promptly scarpered back across, so was E Company tracking these Indians and turned to face them as the crossed the river? Who knows, but the two locations to me, look like cemetery ridge and Gibbons ford. Going back to why soldiers may have been at ford B, well if you knew that you had been spotted and you also knew that the village was in turmoil [the Reno attack], then couldn't Custer to trying to stir up trouble by scaring the Indians to death by simulating an attack from B whilst whizzing out of sight behind battle ridge in an effort to hit the place from the more weaker north end? It was a smaller version of what he just did with Reno, only Reno had a battalion. But the same principles apply with a smaller force attracting the enemy, whilst a larger force went around the back, but in this case the smaller force was instructed to withdraw and not engage, then move forward in a parallel course as to the main body.
What am I getting at here, well I would imagine that he thought that Reno had drawn most of the fighting men on to him, so why not draw what is left to ford B and that would give him time to cross further north. So E Company could be used more as a lure then as a part in any attack.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 7, 2018 18:41:18 GMT
Steve: "You would think it odd". OK, you think it odd. I don't, but it was clearly a mistake. Not a mistake of dividing with a Nogo in between so much, but a mistake none the less, because he failed to properly resource, both prongs of a two pronged attack, and failed to reconnoiter the full extent of the village. Had the villages been arrayed in the normal manner, Custer doing what he intended would have been looked at as a stoke of genius, despite the Nogo features that separated the two attacking columns.
So, to answer your inquiry. Before he knew the full extent of the village(s) moving parallel with one column in the valley, and one on the bluffs, was risky, but one worth taking. After he knew the extent of the village(s) and we are not quite sure where that was on the ground, such a move to further divide into two columns, separated by 500 to 700 yards, with one of those columns near the river, would be the act of a mad man.
Easy is not the word that comes to mind when it comes to closing the distance with someone shooting at you, either relatively short or extremely long. Ask the commander of the Panzer Army trying to relieve Stalingrad. Ask the commander of Operation Condor, trying to relieve Dien Bien Phu. Ask Marcel Crombez and the 5th Cavalry trying to break into and relieve Chipyong Ni. Ask the commander of the 1st Cavalry Division trying to relieve the Marines at Kha Sanh. Ask Albert Martin and the Gonzalez Mounted Ranger Company trying to break into the Alamo. Ask them all how "easy" it was.
You are looking at distance and terrain. I, and all those people I mentioned, were looking at the opposition, and distance and terrain were secondary considerations.
If it was easy, and using the conventional scenario here exclusively for purposes of this discussion alone, why was it not so easy for Custer to move to the Keogh area, or the three companies in the Keogh area to move to Custer? The distances involved are relatively the same as your 500 to 700 yards between the closest elements of these two forces. No, easy is not, and should not ever be a word used, when the subject is combat
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mac
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Post by mac on Nov 7, 2018 21:00:05 GMT
"Had the villages been arrayed in the normal manner, Custer doing what he intended would have been looked at as a stoke of genius, despite the Nogo features that separated the two attacking columns. "
I have long believed that this was Custer's intention due to his thinking the villages would be discrete, sadly for him they were concentrated.
Does the idea of a company higher/ closer to the crest on the west side of Battle Ridge have any resonance? If not would a small force in this area as "eyes" on the river/left flank makes sense? Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 7, 2018 21:13:25 GMT
I think that if the column was under fire from east, west and maybe south, which could have been the case on Luce ridge, then the prospect of crossing deep coulee with a huge village just over the river with a large fording area would be deemed as a danger and who would knock any commander for protecting himself from any nasty surprises, so an element used as cover would make good sense as Custer knew that he was not only only being followed but had eyes on him from the west.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 7, 2018 22:19:35 GMT
Having someone on the west side of battle ridge as the column moved northward makes all the sense in the world, but you do not put a company or two out there for that job, when your whole force is a mere five companies, and a grossly under strength five companies at that. Three or four people would do nicely. You don't expect them to fight. You expect them to press the fire alarm.
The whole idea of pressing northward after the column started to take fire from Wolf Tooth is insanity. When you take fire from a G, you can bet Aunt Mabel's apple pie that more are either there or will be there soon. Wolf Tooth played a very unrecognized important part in the decision making process that afternoon. The tactical principle involved here is always make the enemy think you are stronger than you are. Sun Tzu said it best. When you are near, make the enemy think you are far. When you are far make the enemy think you are near.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 8, 2018 11:52:18 GMT
Wolf Tooth played a very unrecognized important part in the decision making process that afternoon. Yes, it is clear to me through the ground work and map finds done by Steve and Tom around MTC, Nye-Cartwright and Luce ridges show that firing had taken place which in itself shows that Indians where getting too close for comfort, I think that Custer started feeling the heat not long after Martini left and that even Martini's horse could have been wounded on his way back from the area. Remember what we where fed years ago, that up to the point that Custer had reached battle ridge or ford B, that he hadn't fired at shot, well that is not the case.
Custer must have knew that he needed to clear the claustrophobic MTC and get across that low ground in deep coulee to break onto the high ground along battle ridge, that would give him not only the advantage of height but also the advantage of LOS. To do this he must clear back any restless bands of Indians from his advance, which made Wolftooth separate and more importantly, keep his distance and follow.
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azranger
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Post by azranger on Nov 8, 2018 19:45:18 GMT
Chuck
I get what you are saying. I think distance away from the Big Village is a relative concern. Depending upon numbers of Indians and their available weapon systems. I am all in that all 5 companies were to move north. Just how far that each went is my issue.
The traditional opinion is that Custer E&F plus HQ moving toward LSH and leaves CIL behind. If commanders at that time could do that then it does not appear to me they could do other things. Lots of military persons accept that CIL remained behind to the south in and around the CA. Why would they think that acceptable?
Very few informed opinions allow Custer north of LSH. I know Donahue and Scott believe it. I think Fred accepts it but that is about as far as I can think of persons that outside of this group believe it possible. Gordon Harper believed it but he is not a source to often used. I think he got it from the Cheyennes and Wiebert.
My problem in eliminating E company moving north from MTC along the Western travel corridor is it makes three eyewitnesses wrong. Curley sees gray horses move down MTC, Thompson sees fighting from his location on the river, Martin states he was within 600 yards of the river when he is sent back. All three of these accounts are consistent with each other yet describe what they saw from different locations.
Add to it the Maguire map of July 10, the Freeman map, and the current markers.
Myself looking at the markers they don't appear to action under heavy fire. They are scattered but in line. I would expect clumping like those between LSH and the CA or those in Deep Ravine. The total distance is also quite long to have been done by shooting from GG alone.
My current thought is that F/F represents the leading edge of a movement back toward Weir. They knew that route because if Martin is correct they were able to observe it from MTC. I think it quite possible the E Company was not fleeing to the river when pushed off CR. They may been attempting to move back over a route that had taken earlier.
I really don't think that the route back to Weir would go into Deep Coulée through N/C and Luce to reach MTC. Lots of ambush locations and a prior knowledge of Indian occupation. With worn horse moving down lower such as toward F/F would be easier travel. It would be more open and better fields of fire.
To many Indians willing to fight across the river from the Big Village is still my answer to why things didn't work out.
Regards
Steve
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azranger
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Post by azranger on Nov 8, 2018 19:51:07 GMT
I have often wondered if Martin accidentally shot his own horse with his revolver. He could have had it out and used as a quirt to move his horse faster. He sees an Indian cocks the hammer back and moves out. The reason I say that it is that if an Indian shot his horse he should have felt the horse reaction to being shot.
My horses get irritated from flies landing on them. If you poke them with a stick they move. If you surprise them they move. That horse had to be awful tired if getting shot didn't phase him.
Steve
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Nov 8, 2018 20:11:04 GMT
Steve, how about F&F were killed in Calhoun coulee/ravine trying to clear it. just before the Calhoun area collapse. L was beginning to collapse, C came to their aid. Gall or LWM surge got them.
Regards, Tom
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mac
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Post by mac on Nov 8, 2018 21:01:02 GMT
One of the things I learned from Fred is that there has to be a flow to the battle sequence.
Cheers
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Nov 8, 2018 21:15:34 GMT
Indeed, Mac. At one point a long, long ago, on a board far, far away Chuck stated that the only place were there was a discernable place that there was a skirmish line. He was correct, in fact there were two one oriented west and one west. Archaeology tells us this, both by L. They did not last long. This was taking place as E&F proceed north with HQ.
Regards, Tom
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Nov 8, 2018 21:18:46 GMT
Sequence follows flow, guided by tactics, even if the tactics are poor. Good tactics can be as simple as hit and run, much like your quick post above, Mac. Bad ones can take too long, observable, and involved for the situation.
Regards, Tom
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Nov 9, 2018 14:34:33 GMT
Steve mentions some folks that agree with the move to the Ford D area, he can add Richard Fox to that informed group as well. This excerpt from his 2015 book "Archaeology, History, And Custer's Last Battle" confirms it.
Though erosion in Battalion cohesion (and ultimately defeat) occurred roughly in the latter sequence, it did not happen until after the left wing had maneuvered offensively on Cemetery Ridge—and well beyond. After these maneuvers, the left wing returned to the Custer Hill vicinity. Only then did disaster occur. There is a manifest aversion to accepting the idea of an episode on and beyond Cemetery Ridge. To do so implicates Custer himself, for if not driven, the battalion movements are his responsibility. To reject any such notion shifts blame, overtly or otherwise, to his subordinate commanders. Thus, subscribers to the fatalistic theory are often attracted to the argument that at no time did (or could) any element of the doomed column proceed beyond Custer Hill because of overwhelming Indian forces. Yet the evidence for a Cemetery Ridge episode is, in light of archaeological interpretations, substantial and convincing. On Cemetery Ridge, Companies E and F composed the left wing, with regimental staff members, including General Custer, attached. F Company as a discrete unit is often obscured in the historical record because of what can best be described as an enduring obsession with the “gray horse company.” For a variety of reasons, mostly associated with the fatalistic theme, the actions of E Company became shrouded in mystery. Many questions arose, and Indian eyewitnesses had the answers. Only E company, of the five with Custer, rode gray horses. So the best way to inquire about E was with reference to the grays. What happened to the gray horse soldiers? early researchers asked Sioux and Cheyenne participants. Where did they go? In the answers, Company F became obscured whenever the two companies maneuvered together as an intact wing. Or, since questions specified the gray horse troop, Company F, which rode bays, lost its visibility when the two left-wing troops operated independently."
Regards. Tom
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Post by quincannon on Nov 9, 2018 16:13:03 GMT
I am perfectly willing to accept the route along the river, the western corridor, as an axis of advance, and the six or seven markers arrayed before Greasy Grass Ridge representing casualties occurring on the move northward, as long as someone can answer the following.
a) Why was the route chosen and used?
b) After sustaining six or seven casualties, which is a significant number when a company only averaged forty soldiers, nearly twenty percent,why would anyone in his right mind attempt to continue the mission, given knowledge that the back door was shut tight.
I also agree that the axis LSH-Calhoun Hill-FF Ridge- Weir Point would be both the best and the intended retrograde route. I believe the positioning of both Companies C and L lend credence to that, which then further begs the question of why it would be chosen if there was knowledge of casualties sustained on the western corridor, meaning the LSH to Weir Point route was already compromised.
I do agree that the objective of using the western corridor was probably the intention of Company E after being driven off of Cemetery Ridge.
In light of what Tom has provided immediately above, is anyone really sure that it was Company E's horses that were driven. Could it have been another company altogether (most probably Company F) or a mixture of Company E and some other company? Just a guess but I would think that any horse being ridden all day, would be lathered and collect dust giving them a gray or light tan appearance (at a distance) regardless of their real color.
Another guess. Linking Company E cheek by jowl with Company F, thus thinking wherever thou goest I will follow, is a fundamental mistake which does not take the dragoon techniques and procedures of the cavalry of that era into consideration. To be sure the TP of the dragoon was to operate in twos with one mounted covering the other dismounted with maneuver, and the dismounted covering the mounted with fire, but that does not mean they were side by side. It means just what it says. It means cover each other by fire and/or maneuver as the situation dictates, within range of available weapons. Therefore with two companies working in concert it would not be inconceivable for that separation distance to be 100 to 200 yards apart. That would be a significant distance when talking about the northern portion of the LBH battlefield.
So what is the bottom line? Same damned thing it has been since we started this board.
1) If you go to B or anywhere near it (western corridor) there will be no D. If you believe in D you must dismiss B. So. B and D must be considered mutually exclusive within any scenario, be it ours or the conventional.
2) For those who believe Custer (the man) never got further than LSH they dismiss all of the artifacts further north, as if they are fairy dust sprinkled by some winged nymph.
3) If you believe that something of Custer went to Ford B, then the western travel corridor is fully in play, but you bear the burden of explaining why Companies C,I, and L did not join Custer with E and F in the north.
4) Anyone believing in the conventional theory lock stock and barrel, leaving three behind, going north with two, but no further than LSH/CR must explain why a unit of cavalry, would willingly give up its most valuable weapon - mobility, for four hooves to the cavalryman is just as much a weapon, as revolver, carbine, and saber.
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azranger
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Post by azranger on Nov 9, 2018 18:15:42 GMT
I am perfectly willing to accept the route along the river, the western corridor, as an axis of advance, and the six or seven markers arrayed before Greasy Grass Ridge representing casualties occurring on the move northward, as long as someone can answer the following. a) Why was the route chosen and used?( 1) Observations of the use of the drainages for escaping non combatants.(2) Looking for a particular camp that would indicate valuables.(3) Looking for a fording place.(4) The route was obvious for whatever troopers moved toward Ford B. b) After sustaining six or seven casualties, which is a significant number when a company only averaged forty soldiers, nearly twenty percent,why would anyone in his right mind attempt to continue the mission, given knowledge that the back door was shut tight. I think there is more than one event on the route and markers are no help for that. What is evident is no clumping of the markers and space in between.I also agree that the axis LSH-Calhoun Hill-FF Ridge- Weir Point would be both the best and the intended retrograde route. I believe the positioning of both Companies C and L lend credence to that, which then further begs the question of why it would be chosen if there was knowledge of casualties sustained on the western corridor, meaning the LSH to Weir Point route was already compromised. I don't think they untented to use the Western Corridor but whoever may have used it could tell Custer about an easier route from Deep Coulée to MTC. That route would be from the Calhoun Area just be the military crest following Deep Coulée. It was blocked and some got no further than F/F on a move toward CA. I do agree that the objective of using the western corridor was probably the intention of Company E after being driven off of Cemetery Ridge. I think that is where the overlap of markers are at the deep part of Deep Ravine.In light of what Tom has provided immediately above, is anyone really sure that it was Company E's horses that were driven. Could it have been another company altogether (most probably Company F) or a mixture of Company E and some other company? Just a guess but I would think that any horse being ridden all day, would be lathered and collect dust giving them a gray or light tan appearance (at a distance) regardless of their real color. I think it is possible that E,F and HQ used the western route. But as Fox stated the Gray Horses are the ones recalled. Another guess. Linking Company E cheek by jowl with Company F, thus thinking wherever thou goest I will follow, is a fundamental mistake which does not take the dragoon techniques and procedures of the cavalry of that era into consideration. To be sure the TP of the dragoon was to operate in twos with one mounted covering the other dismounted with maneuver, and the dismounted covering the mounted with fire, but that does not mean they were side by side. It means just what it says. It means cover each other by fire and/or maneuver as the situation dictates, within range of available weapons. Therefore with two companies working in concert it would not be inconceivable for that separation distance to be 100 to 200 yards apart. That would be a significant distance when talking about the northern portion of the LBH battlefield. So what is the bottom line? Same damned thing it has been since we started this board. I think all five companies met at LSH especially if Custer was with E. No one would stay at the Calhoun Area without Custer ordering it.1) If you go to B or anywhere near it (western corridor) there will be no D. If you believe in D you must dismiss B. So. B and D must be considered mutually exclusive within any scenario, be it ours or the conventional. It you take that route and move up Deep Ravine you would join C,I,L. At that point they may have seen the wide flat at Ford D and moved north from there across CR and down BRE. 2) For those who believe Custer (the man) never got further than LSH they dismiss all of the artifacts further north, as if they are fairy dust sprinkled by some winged nymph. It is certainly hard to believe for me that Custer would leave 3/5 of command at the CA.3) If you believe that something of Custer went to Ford B, then the western travel corridor is fully in play, but you bear the burden of explaining why Companies C,I, and L did not join Custer with E and F in the north. I believe that they did both. They got withing 600 yards of MTF and turned north. I am sure that anyone on the right flank in the elevated ares could see it as they moved toward MTF. They would see the route toward CR. They may have even looked from GG.4) Anyone believing in the conventional theory lock stock and barrel, leaving three behind, going north with two, but no further than LSH/CR must explain why a unit of cavalry, would willingly give up its most valuable weapon - mobility, for four hooves to the cavalryman is just as much a weapon, as revolver, carbine, and saber.
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