Timing Considerations

[mac]

This thread is based on my conviction that Custer took all his command to the Northern Valley (Ford D) and never approached Ford B. For those just starting, this theory can be explored in my other threads. The titles hopefully are clear enough.

Here I want to open a discussion on some thoughts arising from the consideration of the locations of the companies in the Northern Valley.

I want to try to construct a time sequence.

For example

Event 1 I have Company L as the first Company to leave the Northern Valley and I have this happening as Custer and the rest of the command are leaving the valley and moving back to Battle Ridge Extension and Cemetery Ridge.

According to Gall Company L are moving cautiously and in no hurry.

Event 2 Company C leaves the command and moves along the back of Battle Ridge following after Company L.

Event 3 Company I leaves the command and moves along the back of Battle Ridge following after Company C.

Event 4 Company F are attacked on Battle Ridge Extension and lose their horses. They are forced to run along the ridge to Last Stand Hill. Company E supports their retreat by heavy firing which forces the Indians to retreat from the ridge. (Account by Two Moons)

More to come.

Cheers

[quincannon]

I believe there is another question that must be asked before you can even approach the timing and sequence issues you propose above Mac. That question is why if there was only slight skirmishing opposition in his front as Custer was descending into the valley, and he could see that opposition building from the same direction, but still at a distance,  did he not just turn his battalion around and start back from whence he came? That would seem to be the first alternative under the circumstances, seeing the opposition building and his dreams of a crossing at Ford D, or anywhere down that way, dashed.

The most obvious answers are, (1) indecision (2) fragmentation of the battalion in the valley itself, or (3) fragmentation on the first ridgeline (Cemetery/BRE). It could have been any one of the three, or indecision coupled with one of the other two.

Then you consider what Gall has to say "L moving cautiously and in no hurry". That pace of travel suggests that no threat had yet been detected from the south, but that L was on the lookout for a threat as they moved. Taken with the original question asked, - why did not the whole battalion move - there seems to be a disconnect. If L could afford to take its time, surely the battalion, as a whole, could have moved at the same pace, exercising due diligence as they moved.

There is something we are missing here, and I do not have a clue what it is.

I wonder what Gall would have done if he had to take on Custer's entire battalion in the Calhoun Hill area? I wonder what Lame White Man would have done in the same circumstances? Would he have been so anxious to mount that attack he launched against C, had there not been only C but a couple of others as well?

So. If Custer could have pulled his whole battalion out, why didn't he?

[yanmacca]

What I can recall from Cheyenne acounts is that they hid in the undergrowth and benches waiting for the soldiers to come to them, so they could have suckered them into a trap.
If the whole place turned into a shooting gallery then the command structure would be hard to maintain, then we have the story of an officer down, so things would be in a bit of a funk for a time.

Ian

[quincannon]

I generally agree, but coming down off high ground, as Custer's battalion would have been, one would think some of that opposition could have been detected while they were on that higher ground.

Whatever it was with those hidden Indians, it would seem it was still no more than a skirmish and not a full on fire fight, which still begs the question, if the action was still at the minor stage, why didn't Custer just turn around and go back south with his entire battalion? Having those people to his front and blocking access to the ford, would have told him he was too late to achieve any success crossing. So if he could not cross, why stay. I said not long ago in another thread that even a half way decent commander knows when to stay, and when it is time to go. Why take needless casualties, when there is nothing to be gained by doing so?

As I concluded above Ian, we are missing something here, and I cannot put my finger on what it is.

[mac]

Totally agree QC!

John Two Moons talking about the Northern Valley concurred when he said "If these soldiers had all stood together the Indians could have done nothing with them." (Cheyenne Memories of the Custer Fight page 65)

He obviously implies there were a lot of soldiers, not just two companies, and he wonders why some had moved down towards the river.

I have some thoughts but need a bit of think time.

Cheers

[quincannon]

I need more than a bit of think time on this one Mac. Been going over it in my mind all day, and just can't figure out why Custer did not just turn around. He could see there would be no joy at Ford D. Regardless of all the unknowns that surround this battle, Indians being at Ford D before him scotches the intended enterprise. There is nothing unknown about them being there before Custer, and that Custer was not blind to that fact. From that juncture, what's the point?

[yanmacca]

Maybe the wounded officer had a big play in this, or maybe wounded officers.
The theory that custer or smith stopped a round could be the reason why they simply didn't call it a day and head back.

But this is only me speculating at a theory.

Ian

[rollingthunder]

What doesn't fit me too is L are moving cautiously and in no hurry. If they were not in a great hurry. It´s because in the area of the Ford D, Custer saw that there was no immediate danger for the rest of the Battalion, and that they simply had to return in good order.

Another possible cause for that slowness could be what Ian says about Custer or some officer getting hurt. According to John Stands in Timber's recollections, they spent about twenty minutes in the Cemetery Ridge area, practically doing nothing.

[quincannon]

Well, if I am reading you both correctly, you are leaning toward indecision to be a possible causal factor. JSIT's narrative is troubling in terms of that delay, but frankly I cannot see "practically doing nothing" as viable. It is also inconsistent with the artifact fields spread all over the area north and east of Cemetery Ridge.

As to a fallen officer or officers. The leadership of this battalion were all ACW combat experienced officers, with a couple of notable very junior officer exceptions. Had the battalion been commanded by Sturgis, I could well buy what you guys are selling. That was not the case though. While undoubtedly there would be concern over the wounding or death of an officer or officers, including Custer himself, I cannot see any of these guys getting caught like a deer in the headlights, unable to think and decide, just because of a fallen leader. The painting of the Death of Wolfe at Quebec is great art, one of my favorites involving military subject matter, but it is romantic fiction.

I do like the way you are thinking and making a thorough analysis of these issues though.

[yanmacca]

Hi Pachi, yeah the pause on the hill, it could have been to re-group and tend to wounded, E Company provided cover whilst things got sorted which does sound plausable, if officers were wounded.

The companies sent back first could have been the ones not yet engaged.

QC, any companies could have been sent south in good order pretty quick, they don't really need much in the way of orders as the main group stabilised the situation on the high ground.

Ian

[quincannon]

Both the delay and pausing to tend the wounded are plausible. Both are well within the parameters of what could have happened. Given their plausibility, what is the probability, when you fit these two bits of information in with what else was happening.

For instance, I cannot see anyone sitting on their dead asses, for any reason, wounded, tired, indecision, and letting themselves be surrounded by a bazillion hostiles, who do not wish them well. These guys were smarter than that. At least I would hope they were.

If one company could have been sent back in good order, five companies could have as well, I would think. The question then is why weren't they? We do not know if there was any reason to stabilize the situation on the high ground - do we? I am not aware of any given the Indian accounts. It was a small skirmish initially. Had the skirmish been allowed to develop into a full blown knock down drag out firefight that would be a completely different story. Why have a deliberate firefight, when it is not necessary?  With dragoon technique being used properly, there would be no need to do so. Dismounted mount up, while being covered during mounting by the mounted, then move out smartly.

Off main topic:

Ian am I correct in thinking that Challenger and Warrior troops and platoons each have four assigned vehicles?

Was the Sherman Firefly used by anyone post war that you know of?

Building my 1/100 scale little guys again.

[rollingthunder]

I have written from memory before and sometimes the memory works badly. Stands in Timber did not say: "practically doing nothing."

I've been rereading the chapter on the battle and it says this:
"The Indians have a joke about it. Beaver Heart said that when the scouts warned Custer about the village he laughed and said, "When we get to that village I'm going to find the Sioux girl with the most elk teeth on her dress and take her along with me." So that was what he was doing those twenty minutes, looking.

Hanging Wolf thought they could have gone back between the river and the top of the ridge and made it back to Reno. But they waited too long. It gave many more warriors a chance to get across and up behind the big ridge where the monument stands, to join Wolf Tooth and the others up there.

Another thing many of the Cheyennes said was that if Custer had kept going—if he had not waited there on the ridge so long—he could have made it back to Reno. But probably he thought he could stand off the Indians and win."

[yanmacca]

British tank troops are four tanks each with a HQ of two, they kept the 1944 set after each troops was supplemented by a firefly.
The squadron is now 4 x Challenger II troops, 4 x Tks each + 2 x SHQ = 18 in total

Early WW2 a British tank squadrons had five 3 x tank troops + 2 x SHQ = 17 in total
Late 1943 when they received Firefly, they changed one of the M4 troops to firefly.
This left 4 x M4 (3 x M4) & 1 x firefly troop (4 x firefly).
Not sure if this was at the digression of the squadron Co but they ended up attaching one firefly to each M4 troop making:
4 x tank troops, 4 x troops per squadron + 2 x SHQ = 17 in total
It looks like this became standard later.Not got my data to hand, but I am sure that is pretty much on the money.

[yanmacca]

Concerning post war Fireflys;

In total, the 1900+ Fireflies were used by the 4th, 8th, 27th, 33rd Armored Brigades, the Guards Armoured Division and the 7th and 11th Armoured Division in Normandy and north-western Europe, including the Netherlands and Northwestern Germany. In Italy, it was deployed with the British 1st and 6th Armoured Divisions. The Canadians had Fireflies with the 1st (Italy) and 2nd Brigades and in the 4th and 5th Canadian Armoured Divisions, mostly in north-west Europe in 1945. The 1st Czechoslovak Armoured Brigade operated 36 Firefly 1Cs during the siege of Dunkirk in 1944. The 4th New Zealand Armoured Brigade had some during the Italian campaign, as did the Polish 1st Armoured Division (NW Europe) and 2nd Armoured Brigade (Italy), and the 6th South African Armoured Division in Italy. After the war, Fireflies were still used by Italy, Lebanon (until the 1980s), Argentina, Belgium and the Netherlands (until the late 1950s).

[yanmacca]

I have read one account by some Indian, saying that they moved back up to the high ground and halted, they were making preperations, preperations? For what?

Reading through stuff over the last few years and the lack of training given to these troopers, it seems like they form skirmish at a drop of a hat, just look the known and probables, skirmish lines.

Reno in the valley (FACT)
Custer in MTC (MAYBE)
Custer around ford D (MAYBE)
On Cemetery (FACT)
On BRE (MAYBE)
Calhoun Hill (FACT)
FFR (some sort of short defense)
Benteen reaches Reno Hill (FACT)
Godfry on Weir (FACT)

When Benteen reached Reno hill he promptly formed on of his companies into skirmish, this was to put a firing line between Reno and the enemy as Reno was in bad shape. so if the Custer Bn was also reforming on the high ground, he could have done what Benteen did, only they got round him pretty quick.
Custer still had the river along his flank which seperated the village from his position, his flank could have compromised if the Indians left the circles and scooted up behind him, so in effect the could have snipped him off from both flanks, so I guess that time was a worry.

Ian