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Post by quincannon on Jan 17, 2023 20:28:24 GMT
That is very helpful. I will find some Netherlands markings and use them for my post war collection.
That's two of us with bad memories Pachi. I though JSIT mentioned a delay as well.
Regardless, you seem to be coming down hard on indecision/hesitation. That's perfectly OK in my book as an activity. It fits in somewhere, but as you know for every decision, and indecision/hesitation is a form of decision, there must be a reason. For the life of me I cannot see any reasonable explanation for such inaction, including picking out your fair sex dinner partner for the evening. Maybe Custer was kicking himself for forgetting to bring the place cards.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 17, 2023 20:35:42 GMT
Well, forming skirmish lines are what dragoons do Ian, even today, although we no longer call them that.
I would certainly expect Custer to deploy at least two companies as skirmishers on that high ground, as an immediate action drill. The skirmishers intention in that instance would be to halt any forward progress attempted by the Indians moving forward from those hidden positions. The skirmishers would attempt to prevent the Indians from crossing the 200 meter line to Custer's front. Two hundred meters is plenty of room for those skirmishers to remount (covered by the mounted companies) and withdraw, probably unmolested.
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 17, 2023 21:54:32 GMT
That was a piss poor attempt at a ww2 british tank squadron, you caught me at work then we went the pub to watch the end of the match, I will amend things tomorrow.
Ian
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Post by rollingthunder on Jan 17, 2023 22:32:32 GMT
Companies C, I and L left the area without problems, as I understand it. Perhaps Custer with E and F wanted to buy them more time and did not think they would have difficulties on their way back south. Then when he wanted to get out he was already surrounded on all sides by far more warriors than he could handle.
The fog surrounding the actions of E and F is very thick. Every action has a reaction from the enemy, and the enemy is not stupid or cowardly, he is just the enemy.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 18, 2023 0:38:07 GMT
That's OK Ian. My focus with the little guys is the modern era defined (by me) as post 1946. I just wanted to know if someone used the Sherman Firefly post war. Thought, without any basis for the thought, that they might have been returned to the USA, or destroyed the way so much Lend Lease stuff was after the war. There is a picture of the Philadelphia Navy Yard post war, with about 20 Captain Class (our Buckley Class destroyer escort) lend lease ships, some less than 2 years old waiting to be scrapped, after being returned from the RN
I am not at all sure they all left without problems Pachi. Best bet would be Company L, but C and I, I just don't know. All we really know is that they left.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Jan 18, 2023 7:21:17 GMT
Enjoyed reading this, even (also ) the Fireflies.
Let me start from the beginning by saying timing is very important.
We do not know what Custer was thinking, but we do know what the Cheyenne were thinking because they told us. The Cheyenne at the river in the Northern valley saw Custer deploy on the ridges to the East (i.e. Battle Ridge extension and Cemetery), and they thought they could not stop him because there were so few of them, and so many soldiers. This suggests to me that at the time Custer arrived; Custer would not have seen large numbers of Indians in the Northern Valley. Hence he would go on the attack. The Indians tell us that due to the differential in the numbers they decided their best course of action was to cross to the East side of the river and find cover/concealment and to wait for Custer to approach before firing. I believe this answers the question; why did Custer go on the attack?
What went wrong for Custer?
Custer had been sighted long before he reached the Northern Valley. Crazy Horse, and others, had left the Reno fight after Reno retreated because they knew there was a force moving past them towards the village. They would never get back fast enough to reach the Northern Valley however.
The Cheyenne village was full of fighters who had heard that soldiers were coming and were preparing themselves before Custer arrived.
Initially Custer was facing the few brave souls firing from their positions on the East side of the river, but, these men tell us they were soon being reinforced by warriors from the village. So after a short time the position had changed dramatically for Custer. What he thought would be a low resistance river crossing had become heavily contested.
The Indians tell us that they were soon moving North and then East behind the cavalry positions. I believe the archaeology shows this to be the case. Add to this some evidence that there were sizable hunting parties returning from the North at that time, and we begin to see why Custer was forced to abandon the attack and retrograde to the high ground he had previously occupied. More later Cheers
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Post by rollingthunder on Jan 18, 2023 13:51:05 GMT
Well, we know from Stands in Timber and other Cheyenne accounts that there was a twenty to thirty minute stand at the Cemetery ridge. But this must be taken with great caution. Those gentlemen don´t measure time like we do, and they did not have watches to consult. It may be that those twenty or thirty minutes were only ten or twelve, or even less. The time of that stand is very important and there is no way to find out how many minutes it lasted.
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 18, 2023 14:34:57 GMT
I guess that any pause on cemetery ridge was to sort out what to do next, the order to send units back would be put into place, as QC said the any skirmish lines would be placed to give them time do the preps. To be honest, only for Smith being absent from his company, I wouldn't take much stock in officers wounded, but having said that, TWC was not with his and Sgt Bobo was also not with his. So a lot could have gone down during that pause. The pause was a logical move, you have to weigh up your options before rushing blind into a move back, traling elements could be set upon.
Ian
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Post by quincannon on Jan 18, 2023 14:45:26 GMT
Just about every bit of evidence points to the fact that Custer's battalion engaged in a stand up firefight. If we take Gall at his word then Company L moving at a deliberate, (as opposed to being in a great hurry) pace, suggests that the battalion (-) must have been holding off the Indians with some measure of success. The fact that Company L was moving is an indicator that the holding could not last long, and the battalion leadership knew it.
Now, I tend to be suspicious about all testimony, from whatever source. In this instance I am prepared to accept everything the Cheyenne had to say as the complete unvarnished truth (with the exception of course of their time telling ability - thank you Pachi). So if it is the truth then my initial question remains on the table - Why didn't the battalion move southward, once it was determined that their access to the ford was blocked. It was blocked by those very few Indians, might have been twenty, might have been fifty, but it was still blocked, and the dust clouds that Indian reinforcement would have made would have told Custer that it was going to stay blocked, and that he had lost his race with the clock.
Ian: If it took Custer twenty minutes to make up his mind what to do next, then he should have been back in Monroe, Michigan rocking on his front porch and drinking lemonade, not leading a battalion of cavalry in combat. Things do take time to decide, but not that much.
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Post by rollingthunder on Jan 18, 2023 19:30:11 GMT
Why didn't the battalion move south, once it was determined that their access to the ford was blocked? Of course, that's the million dollar question.
But to start assuming why that stand was made is to enter the Kingdom of Speculation, and I don't think that is the reason for this thread. We can all come up with many ideas; crazy, funny, tragic, tactical...
I don't think like Chuck that Custer, a military man from what we know with a lot of combat experience, mentally quick to make decisions and nerves of steel under enemy fire, would suddenly run out of ideas. Did trust kill the cat? Can be.
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 18, 2023 20:14:38 GMT
Ian: If it took Custer twenty minutes to make up his mind what to do next, then he should have been back in Monroe, Michigan rocking on his front porch and drinking lemonade, not leading a battalion of cavalry in combat. Things do take time to decide, but not that much. I don't know QC, we dont know how long any halt lasted on cemetery, the journalist who did the interview could have held ten fingers up twice and the Indian probably nodded.
GAC had over 200 men in five groups and these groups could have been spread over a large area, some of them could have arrived from the valley flats at different intervals and under fire, so it is anyones guess when order and command kicked in again.
Ian
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Post by quincannon on Jan 18, 2023 21:54:05 GMT
Yes Ian, that 20 minutes is highly suspect, both by what you said about the twisted way the tale gets to us through translation, and the idea that a combat experienced commander is going to sit on his backside ruminating about a decision that he must make, for so long a period.
We really don't know if those 230 men in that battalion were spread all over the landscape, or together in one compact group. We know there were five parts to the battalion but spread or together is something that we really have no handle on. By this I am speaking about brief moments in time, when decisions were being made. We do know that eventually they did separate or were separated. Were it me and were I a 19th instead of a 20th Century soldier, and I was facing Indians, who are apparently somewhat put off by numbers, regardless of how ill trained those numbers are, I would stay together at all costs, even though staying together might cause me some other problems. The old saw, make the other guy think he's beat before the fight starts applies.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Jan 20, 2023 4:20:58 GMT
I am inclined to go with the information we have before trying to understand Custer's motivation.
As to the wait. Accounts say that when Custer left the valley one group rode over the hill and did not return. I say this is Company L. This being the case the troops waiting are not the full command; Custer has already formed a plan. Accounts also say that when Custer leaves the valley the Indians on the ridges above him drop off the ridges and retreat. What message does Custer take from this?
I posted a discussion thread on the locations of the companies a while ago; this quote relates to it and has relevance here.
John Two Moons (Cheyenne Memories of the Custer Fight page 65)
After the soldiers turned upon the little ridge, the Gray Horse company stopped where (the present) monument is. The others went on stopping at intervals until there were four lines, the last opposite to the camp.
Indians were struggling up the gulch north east of the soldiers like ants.
Yellow Nose made two dashes towards the soldiers and returned, and said to his people “Let us charge”. The third company, the one near the river, had moved back a little towards the second. The Indians were trying to drive the three companies on this ridge, running north and south, over towards the Gray Horse company.
They crowded the company furthest north and they started to run down the ridge. As they got part way down the ridge near the Gray Horse company the latter began to fire and drove the Indians off and the soldiers reached the Gray Horse company. The latter shot at the Indians so fast that they drove the Indians over the hill towards the (present day Crow) agency.
Note he references that initially there are three companies on the ridge. I say this is Battle Ridge Extension and the third company nearest the river is Company F.
Company E (Gray Horse Company) are on Cemetery. Two Moons sees this from his position as being where the monument is.
The other two of the three companies on Battle Ridge Extension are Companies I and C; I have no proof of their actual order but I suspect from North to South the order is F, I, C, Headquarters, E on Cemetery. I will pause here for thought and return later. Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 20, 2023 8:45:51 GMT
Hi Mac. If we run with the idea of three left on the ridge and these three being under pressure (Indians trying to force "I & "F" towards E), then this could be the reason why "I" arrived on the sector if died around. I have mentioned this in the past regarding Keogh being forced rather than sent.
Ian
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Post by quincannon on Jan 20, 2023 16:45:42 GMT
I do not think you folks are understanding the point I am trying to make, or I have not made myself sufficiently clear on how important to understanding this phase of the battle is, before you get down in the weeds of timing. Motivation is the key factor. Why did Custer do what he apparently did, when testimony supported by some small bits of evidence suggest that he did not have to, and that at least one alternative, withdrawal under very little pressure apparently, was a course of action open to him.
"One company went over the ridge and was never seen again". Well, if that Company was L, it was seen again a mile or more away, and the body count suggest that L was largely intact at the Calhoun Hill location where they fell. L (or whichever it was) is the key here. This company's successful withdrawal indicates that the other four could have withdrawn as well.
Why in heaven's name did Custer choose close engagement, when his objective had already been proven out of reach. It makes no sense. And NO I do not buy all the bull shit about leader casualties and other such nonsense. None of these guys were the sharpest knives in the drawer, but they were not stupid either, and they were professionals well capable of reading the tea leaves. In this instance the tea leaves were saying George you were twenty minutes too late, the other guy is gaining strength by the moment, get your battalion together and go.
Keep in the forefront of your mind that the Indians possessed a combined arms capability (not really but you will get my drift). The came at him with both Infantry (their dismounts) who where very skilled at infiltration, and the ground was very friendly to that capability. They also had considerable mounted mobile combat power, which could be readily used in rapid flanking maneuvers. As a professional, I read that combination as being formidable, and not something I would want to face with a shade over two hundred effectives, a limited supply of ammunition, with water, food, and medical supplies highly suspect.
Now that was the basic situation. Why didn't George go. After thinking about it over these last few days, my only conclusion is that George saw something that is unknown to us, something the Indian narratives, and the evidence are not showing us in this latter day.
That is why motivation is important. That is why we must know or be pretty sure what was in the commander's mind. To proceed further without this vital knowledge, is, in my opinion, a fool's errand that will lead nowhere.
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