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Post by deadwoodgultch on Jan 14, 2022 11:58:55 GMT
I have been on this board for several months now but am not really a “poster” as I am in way over my head. I have been interested in the LBH for a number of years but have no military experience and am not a student of the LBH as are most who post here. I would be interested to hear what the thoughts are on some questions I have: - was there ever a time when all five companies were still together that they realized, or should have realized they were in real trouble? Should they have made a Reno type decision to “charge” and get out in force? Had they done so was their best route south toward Reno or west away from the river to distance themselves from the village and where Indian presence may have been less? - could some or many of them gotten away in a timely full scale, non stop, all at once retreat? Terry This poster was on the board last night, there are several questions that this poster asked about that I would like Mike R to look at see if he would have answered differently. I know they are old, but I wondered if we may have given him short shrift. Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Jan 14, 2022 16:42:53 GMT
I am not sure what you are trying to get at here. My view is that Terry's questions were answered as well as they could have been answered under the prevailing circumstances of the battle, and what very little we know about how that battle actually transpired.
Mike's answer was short, but it was also truthful. When you hit a pane of glass with a hammer, it shatters, and scatters. Then when you walk upon that scattered glass in a pair of heavy boots it is crushed.
In the early days of Korea, against the Immun Gun, and later the same year during the First CCF Intervention the same thing that occurred to Custer happened many times to UN (primarily US) forces. There was not enough friendly combat power to cover everything that needed to be covered and as a result platoons, companies, and some battalions were easily surrounded by enemy swarming infiltration, and the results were exactly the same as we see in the northern sector of LBH, isolation, followed by complete destruction. The tactic is most effective when friendly forces are spread thin. There is absolutely no opportunity to counterattack, and little if any chance of success if a counterattack can be mounted. It is a far different situation, with the friendlies having sufficient force levels, and continuous lines. Penetrations can still be made of course, by swarming infiltration, but with adequate forces being available counter attacks are made, and are successful provided that the shoulders of the penetration are firmly held.
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tja
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Post by tja on Jan 15, 2022 4:49:09 GMT
Tom:
Thank you for resurrecting my old post. I was very surprised to see it today. While I would be interested to hear Mike R’s thoughts on it, I never felt short shrifted in the replies from everyone else. That said, I am now embarrassed to say, I am on this board almost everyday but do not sign in. I read all the “recent posts” and continue to be amazed at the knowledge and theories all the posters have. It only serves to remind me that, as I wrote originally, I am over my head on this. I wish I had more to add to the conversation. Thanks again for trying to ensure my questions got an adequate response. Going forward I will sign in. Thanks Terry
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Jan 15, 2022 12:06:22 GMT
Tom: Thank you for resurrecting my old post. I was very surprised to see it today. While I would be interested to hear Mike R’s thoughts on it, I never felt short shrifted in the replies from everyone else. That said, I am now embarrassed to say, I am on this board almost everyday but do not sign in. I read all the “recent posts” and continue to be amazed at the knowledge and theories all the posters have. It only serves to remind me that, as I wrote originally, I am over my head on this. I wish I had more to add to the conversation. Thanks again for trying to ensure my questions got an adequate response. Going forward I will sign in. Thanks Terry Terry, Please never feel over your head. When you post an opinion, it's your opinion and open to discussion and sometimes it is knocked, but the knock is not personal. Short story, I have had an interest in this battle since the 1950's. It started when I watched "They Died with their Boots on", I then read George & Elizabeth's books, and other positive books. I then spent some military time, early mariage, children, and employment time. I did not get back to the topic until the 1980's with Graham and numerous others who raised some questions. I began having questions about GAC and his real abilities and judgement. Areas explored Included Trevillian Station, Washita, investments, turning down the opportunity to be the commander of a regiment of Black Cavalry, courts martial, social climbing, his actions before Congress, and numerous others. All the while meeting and interacting GAC fanboys. I continued my reading and met a Special Operator, who was also interested in the topic he gave me a balanced look at not only the man, but this battle as well. There were numerous better Indian fighters in the US Army. I like you began reading one of the boards and later joined. I was confronted with many traditional theorists, a person who called me out when I mentioned my former National Guard Commander, a real Dark Cloud on that board who said Indian testimony was not considered testimony as it was not under oath (he had a criminal background), then Ian's favorite Irishman who said those savages couldn't even count, I gave him the first 40 numbers in the Cheyenne language. Please remember there are no dumb questions, only periodic dumb answers. Regards, Tom
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 15, 2022 16:18:32 GMT
Hi Terry great you have come on board. Dark Cloud and Wild, two blasts from the past.
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Jan 16, 2022 0:40:27 GMT
I have been on this board for several months now but am not really a “poster” as I am in way over my head. I have been interested in the LBH for a number of years but have no military experience and am not a student of the LBH as are most who post here. I would be interested to hear what the thoughts are on some questions I have: - was there ever a time when all five companies were still together that they realized, or should have realized they were in real trouble? Should they have made a Reno type decision to “charge” and get out in force? Had they done so was their best route south toward Reno or west away from the river to distance themselves from the village and where Indian presence may have been less? - could some or many of them gotten away in a timely full scale, non stop, all at once retreat? Terry This poster was on the board last night, there are several questions that this poster asked about that I would like Mike R to look at see if he would have answered differently. I know they are old, but I wondered if we may have given him short shrift. Regards, Tom By way of answering, I'm going to discuss Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift. The 24th (-) was caught out in the open at Isandlwana. They weren't even standing too. No field fortifications. They were set up as an administrative halt rather than following their SOP of preparing at least a partially fortified camp. They were actually doing okay until either (1) the ammunition supply faltered and/or (2) the Zulu just pressed in. They had no cohesion. At Rorke's Drift, 100 soldiers with single shot rifles stood off 5,000 or so Zulu, some of who had the same rifle. What was the difference? Like Reno, they occupied a defensive position and fortified it better so they could withstand close combat. Second, they had bayonets. Third, I would say at least the two officers and the NCOs understand the commander's intent. I used to think Custer probably knew how to command a cavalry brigade and/or division. But now, for no good reason, I don't think he knew how to command anything. I think his only tactic was pretty much to charge and expect people to follow him. He certainly led from out front. If the first charge doesn't succeed, go again. And again. Until the enemy breaks or he runs out of troops. I am slowly starting to think about thinking about what would have happened had Reno been in command. He may have lucked into a defensive position (drunk, scared, inspired, or not) but I don't think he would have divided up the Regiment. He probably, but not necessarily, would have followed Terry's orders. The Indian's may or may not have moved out of the way because they apparently knew Terry was coming down from the North and that the 7th was moving down the Rosebud. I think they would have gone West or South, even though that was into Crow country. The US Army never really found them until the next winter. Heck, the Cheyenne and the Nez Pearce outfoxed the Cavalry for a long time. Klotzen, Nicht Kleckern. Custer didn't. Zuerst stanzen die Panzer ein Loch, dann sehen sie, was sich entwickelt. He didn't do this either. Custer did not have any ability for Fingerspitzengefuhl nor coup d'oeil. He was blinded by hubris, conceit, lack of leadership, tactical ability, and respect for his enemy. In death ground, fight.(If you don't know what the terms mean, look them up. I can talk in secret code too.) Edit: I forgot one. March Divided, Fight United.
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Post by Deleted on Jan 16, 2022 0:49:28 GMT
Tom: Thank you for resurrecting my old post. I was very surprised to see it today. While I would be interested to hear Mike R’s thoughts on it, I never felt short shrifted in the replies from everyone else. That said, I am now embarrassed to say, I am on this board almost everyday but do not sign in. I read all the “recent posts” and continue to be amazed at the knowledge and theories all the posters have. It only serves to remind me that, as I wrote originally, I am over my head on this. I wish I had more to add to the conversation. Thanks again for trying to ensure my questions got an adequate response. Going forward I will sign in. Thanks Terry Terry, No need to worry about whether you have military experience or not or have not studied the subject a lot. People with military experience don't always make the right choice or even know what the right choice is. As far as studying the subject, start with one book and ask questions. I recommend Nathaniel Philbrook's "Last Stand". It's well written, heavily footnoted, and I think gives a clear view of the author's opinion of the battle. Whether it is "right" or "wrong" is immaterial. No one here knows what happened to Custer and why and we never will. Read the book. Then look at his bibliography and choose another one that looks reasonable. Compare them. Form opinions. Question everything. Ask questions. One of the best novels of the unfought World War III was written by Tom Clancy - an insurance salesman. The best analysis of the evolution of War Plan Orange was written by another insurance salesman. As long as you have the ability to question, reason, read, and think, you will form conclusions as valid as anyone else on this issue. Reno held off the Indians. Custer did not. The Indians won the battle, but lost the war.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 16, 2022 4:05:49 GMT
"As long as you have the ability to question, reason, read, and think, you will form conclusions as valid as anyone else on this issue"
AMEN.
One of the worst novels of the unfought World War III was written by a fellow who once Commanded the British Army of the Rhine, General Sir John Hackett. A real snoozer, chock full of wishful thinking. Insurance salesmen write better books.
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tja
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Post by tja on Jan 17, 2022 21:53:20 GMT
This poster was on the board last night, there are several questions that this poster asked about that I would like Mike R to look at see if he would have answered differently. I know they are old, but I wondered if we may have given him short shrift. Regards, Tom By way of answering, I'm going to discuss Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift. The 24th (-) was caught out in the open at Isandlwana. They weren't even standing too. No field fortifications. They were set up as an administrative halt rather than following their SOP of preparing at least a partially fortified camp. They were actually doing okay until either (1) the ammunition supply faltered and/or (2) the Zulu just pressed in. They had no cohesion. At Rorke's Drift, 100 soldiers with single shot rifles stood off 5,000 or so Zulu, some of who had the same rifle. What was the difference? Like Reno, they occupied a defensive position and fortified it better so they could withstand close combat. Second, they had bayonets. Third, I would say at least the two officers and the NCOs understand the commander's intent. I used to think Custer probably knew how to command a cavalry brigade and/or division. But now, for no good reason, I don't think he knew how to command anything. I think his only tactic was pretty much to charge and expect people to follow him. He certainly led from out front. If the first charge doesn't succeed, go again. And again. Until the enemy breaks or he runs out of troops. I am slowly starting to think about thinking about what would have happened had Reno been in command. He may have lucked into a defensive position (drunk, scared, inspired, or not) but I don't think he would have divided up the Regiment. He probably, but not necessarily, would have followed Terry's orders. The Indian's may or may not have moved out of the way because they apparently knew Terry was coming down from the North and that the 7th was moving down the Rosebud. I think they would have gone West or South, even though that was into Crow country. The US Army never really found them until the next winter. Heck, the Cheyenne and the Nez Pearce outfoxed the Cavalry for a long time. Klotzen, Nicht Kleckern. Custer didn't. Zuerst stanzen die Panzer ein Loch, dann sehen sie, was sich entwickelt. He didn't do this either. Custer did not have any ability for Fingerspitzengefuhl nor coup d'oeil. He was blinded by hubris, conceit, lack of leadership, tactical ability, and respect for his enemy. In death ground, fight.(If you don't know what the terms mean, look them up. I can talk in secret code too.) Edit: I forgot one. March Divided, Fight United.
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tja
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Post by tja on Jan 17, 2022 22:07:21 GMT
Mike
Seems like the gist of these translations would be …. Don’t knock with your finger, pound with your fist. You could say Custer spread out his fingers into divisions of his command and never pounded with his entire fist.
I liked your “ I am slowly starting to think about thinking about what would have happened had Reno been in command.” Thanks for your reply. Terry
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Post by quincannon on Jan 17, 2022 22:56:26 GMT
Terry: Mike looks a lot to Europe for his expressions of tactical wisdom. So do I, but I also dip into some of the real giants of strategic and tactical thought on the other side of the world as well
One such expression is "One stroke of the armored sleeve". As translated from the Japanese into a vernacular English the meaning is "We'll mow them down"
Now I will refer you to a fellow named Ichiki, and the misnamed but still popular Battle of the Tenaru. It should actually be The Battle of Alligator Creek, but it seems that either the Marine Corps or the reporter (Richard Tregaskis) who gave the first in depth report of the battle, could not read a map.
Now I am not suggesting that you divert your studies away from LBH, far from it. What I will suggest is that you look at this battle, and find just about everything that occurred to Custer in June of 1876, occurred again to Ichiki in August of 1942. Everything is there, arrogance, hubris, trying too much with too little, same tactical errors, interior lines, and poor terrain, including a river that needed crossing.. There is even a 1942 counterpart to Wolf Tooth, a fellow named Brush. It's like reading about a complete redo of LBH with the names of the principle characters changed.
There is nothing new under the sun, when you are talking about human beings. Custer and Ichiki both thought they had armored sleeves, and found out that their armor was made of gossamer.
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Post by Deleted on Jan 17, 2022 23:11:25 GMT
Mike Seems like the gist of these translations would be …. Don’t knock with your finger, pound with your fist. You could say Custer spread out his fingers into divisions of his command and never pounded with his entire fist. I liked your “ I am slowly starting to think about thinking about what would have happened had Reno been in command.” Thanks for your reply. Terry Terry, you pretty much nailed it.
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 18, 2022 10:26:33 GMT
Hi Terry. Maj. Reno had a couple weeks earlier, been issued orders by Gen. Terry, to find the main Indian trail, which he did along with six companies of cavalry, he then reported back to Terry, much to the distain of Custer, who thought he should have followed the trail to the end. So really Reno stuck to his orders, but Custer didn't, he never scouted areas named in his orders from Terry and went for the village. So I guess if Reno had been in command of the whole regiment, he would have kept to his orders. Don't know how this would have panned out or if the Indians would have found him and attacked the regiment like they did with Crook but that is another story. But what if Reno had followed Terry's orders, did he have a date set to meet Terry, was there a meeting place? If not then it was either Terry who was going to get a surprize or Reno, as it was only a matter of time before one of them got engaged in battle.
Ian
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Post by quincannon on Jan 18, 2022 17:07:50 GMT
Personally I believe that anyone who would have expected a dramatic, or even marginal change in regimental performance had Reno been in command vice Custer is caught somewhere between wishful thinking and Peter Pan's trip to Never Never Land.
Command is a human undertaking, and the ability to transform a substandard route step outfit, that was the 7th Cavalry in 1876, would require a strong commander, who was exacting in his standards, and ruthless in the execution of those standards. Reno was present in Custer's absence and made no attempt to impose standards of discipline and training on the regiment. To be fair there were only five companies at Fort Lincoln that Reno could have imposed those standards on. The rest were scattered over half the country. Those five companies were also the worst performing units in the battle of June of 1876, more than proof that Reno did nothing, just as Custer would have done nothing.
Reno would not have made the mistakes Custer did were he in command of the regiment. Then again those that are afraid to make mistakes are not really commanding are they? Mistakes go with the territory of being a commander. Doing things totally by the book will prevent mistakes of commission, but they open up all new vistas of making mistakes of omission, which are just as serious, and just as deadly.
A regiment is a finely tuned instrument. The 7th Cavalry was badly out of tune. Anyone who thinks they can play Beethoven's Fifth with the 7th Cavalry, without a complete restoration of the instrument's tonal qualities, has been flying far too close to the sun, and like Icarus will end up in the toilet of hubris of another kind. Reno was not the man to win victories. I am not sure he was even the man who could by his own skill avoid defeat. The problem the 7th Cavalry faced in 1876 was one of command climate. That disease left unchecked destroys any military unit, like cancer destroys the body, and a change from one weak doctor to another often makes matters worse, instead of better.
The object of the exercise is winning. If what you command is not capable of winning, it is time to do two things. Give up the position of command, and turn it over to someone who is capable of doing so. Secondly, stay home, you can do no good by taking the field, and all you will do is cause people to die needlessly.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Jan 18, 2022 18:08:27 GMT
Maybe GAC was just another Lt. Col. looking for carryout Death Burgers, for 210, he was at least heading the right direction, after leaving Reno. He did account for that.
Sorry about that.
Regards, Tom
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