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Post by quincannon on Feb 14, 2018 17:21:40 GMT
No, moving back is not an option. Do that and you have opened a mile wide doorway to the town of Bastogne with its seven road junction.
The normal (right) solution when facing a tank-Infantry attack is to engage as far forward as possible with everything you have in Infantry, anti-armor, and artillery fire power. What you want to do is separate the Infantry from the tanks. That is the completely wrong solution in this case. Remember it is dark, the ground is snow covered making walking difficult and time consuming, but the ground is frozen giving the tanks unrestricted mobility. Had the Infantry opened fire to stop the Infantry out front, the tanks would have stopped and picked off the Infantry Positions one by one as they would have exposed their location by muzzle flashes. Tanks are well prepared to do this in that they mount two machine guns along with HE rounds for their main guns.
The right solution in this instance.
What was done was risky. A/1/401 decided to let the tanks move over and through their positions without firing a shot. A/1/401 gambled on the snow delaying and separating the dismounts from the tanks, and in the darkness lose them. They let the snow and darkness do their work for them. Company A had been operating in the area for about a week and knew what a problem moving through the snow was.
Company A had already notified the TD's not to fire, and to wait until the tanks broke through, then take them in the flanks and rear. They also coordinated with the artillery battalion (463PFAB) to hold fire, until the tanks broke through, then on order fire into the panzergrenadiers that were still in front of Company A, and be prepared to engage any tanks that got through or past the TD's with direct fire.
The whole thing worked like a charm. Company A stopped the grenadiers cold with the help of the artillery. Most of the panzers were knocked out in Company A's rear by the TD's and those the TD's didn't get were killed by the artillery or hunted down on a one by one basis.
It was the last effort to take Bastogne, and the cost to the Germans in total was about half each of two different German regiments.
The company commander of A and the commander of the PFAB in fact set a fire trap. Had they done what proper technique and procedures demand (the right way) they would have been overrun and destroyed.
There were also very real problems and huge mistakes made by the Germans, brought on by haste. Patton was coming up and about to relieve Bastogne. The German flank that was supposed to be held by the 7th German Army was collapsing, and Patton was about 24 hours away. Haste, remind you of something?
The attack was designed to be conducted by two regiments with a third in reserve to exploit. The 77th Volksgrenadiers (26 VGD) were supposed to launch a supporting attack at Champs, facing the 502PIR. They jumped off early and the idea was to fix the 502 so they could not lend help to their neighboring 1/401GIR. As it happened they engaged the 502 for control of Champs and the 502nd kicked them out of town. The fight lasted all of the dark hours of Christmas morning. Just before dawn the 77th was spent and pulled back. Haste, supporting attack fails, are you starting to get the idea?
Meanwhile the force intended for the main attack, the 115th Panzer Grenadiers - Reinforced (15th PzGD) was new to the area, arriving midday on the 24th, and it had taken them all of Christmas Eve and the early hours of Christmas Day to move into position on the LD for the attack. There was no opportunity for reconnaissance. As a result the 115th was wandering around in the dark, not knowing where they were going, and what faced them.
These are the very reasons I chose this small action. It contains all the same elements as LBH, haste, the supporting attack that failed, no reconnaissance, and the art form of the fire trap. I guess the Germans never heard about Custer.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 14, 2018 17:35:50 GMT
Steve: The artifacts on the Donahue map appear to have been done by overlay. It's easy to mis-locate an overlay.
Regardless - there is no misinterpreting the fact that the Donahue map as now presented represents those artifacts being on the reverse (eastern) slope of BRE. If that is not the actual location and the actual location is on the top of BRE or on the forward slope, no tactical vs. artifact problem is present
I think we know that Crazy Horse Ravine is not accurate on the Bonafides. The Bonafides reference to CHR was done only to indicate to everyone having the map that that is the position the Donahue map puts those artifacts in. Contour lines tell the tale in this regard.
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Post by yanmacca on Feb 14, 2018 19:33:30 GMT
No, moving back is not an option. Do that and you have opened a mile wide doorway to the town of Bastogne with its seven road junction. The normal (right) solution when facing a tank-Infantry attack is to engage as far forward as possible with everything you have in Infantry, anti-armor, and artillery fire power. What you want to do is separate the Infantry from the tanks. That is the completely wrong solution in this case. Remember it is dark, the ground is snow covered making walking difficult and time consuming, but the ground is frozen giving the tanks unrestricted mobility. Had the Infantry opened fire to stop the Infantry out front, the tanks would have stopped and picked off the Infantry Positions one by one as they would have exposed their location by muzzle flashes. Tanks are well prepared to do this in that they mount two machine guns along with HE rounds for their main guns. The right solution in this instance. What was done was risky. A/1/401 decided to let the tanks move over and through their positions without firing a shot. A/1/401 gambled on the snow delaying and separating the dismounts from the tanks, and in the darkness lose them. They let the snow and darkness do their work for them. Company A had been operating in the area for about a week and knew what a problem moving through the snow was. Company A had already notified the TD's not to fire, and to wait until the tanks broke through, then take them in the flanks and rear. They also coordinated with the artillery battalion (463PFAB) to hold fire, until the tanks broke through, then on order fire into the panzergrenadiers that were still in front of Company A, and be prepared to engage any tanks that got through or past the TD's with direct fire. The whole thing worked like a charm. Company A stopped the grenadiers cold with the help of the artillery. Most of the panzers were knocked out in Company A's rear by the TD's and those the TD's didn't get were killed by the artillery or hunted down on a one by one basis. It was the last effort to take Bastogne, and the cost to the Germans in total was about half each of two different German regiments. The company commander of A and the commander of the PFAB in fact set a fire trap. Had they done what proper technique and procedures demand (the right way) they would have been overrun and destroyed. There were also very real problems and huge mistakes made by the Germans, brought on by haste. Patton was coming up and about to relieve Bastogne. The German flank that was supposed to be held by the 7th German Army was collapsing, and Patton was about 24 hours away. Haste, remind you of something? The attack was designed to be conducted by two regiments with a third in reserve to exploit. The 77th Volksgrenadiers (26 VGD) were supposed to launch a supporting attack at Champs, facing the 502PIR. They jumped off early and the idea was to fix the 502 so they could not lend help to their neighboring 1/401GIR. As it happened they engaged the 502 for control of Champs and the 502nd kicked them out of town. The fight lasted all of the dark hours of Christmas morning. Just before dawn the 77th was spent and pulled back. Haste, supporting attack fails, are you starting to get the idea? Meanwhile the force intended for the main attack, the 115th Panzer Grenadiers - Reinforced (15th PzGD) was new to the area, arriving midday on the 24th, and it had taken them all of Christmas Eve and the early hours of Christmas Day to move into position on the LD for the attack. There was no opportunity for reconnaissance. As a result the 115th was wandering around in the dark, not knowing where they were going, and what faced them. These are the very reasons I chose this small action. It contains all the same elements as LBH, haste, the supporting attack that failed, no reconnaissance, and the art form of the fire trap. I guess the Germans never heard about Custer. I had written two different scenarios, I gave you that one because I thought that if I choose to stand my ground and A Company got overrun then as a commander I had let my men die. The second one was a stand and using the artillery to force the infantry to go to ground, once the infantry took cover I would position my anti-tank teams close to the roads because tanks favour roads rather then deep snow and are blind without their infantry, once they get under fifty yards then use my rocket launchers to knock out the lead tanks, then I can order my infantry support weapons to open up on the infantry. Once the enemy tanks are strung out on the road, they have two choices, either try and force a way past the knocked out tanks or leave the road and go cross country, this would give my tank destroyers time to get into position and earn their corn.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 14, 2018 19:52:19 GMT
Actually Ian the problem for Company A was simple. They have only 73 men left, and their frontage is nearly a mile wide. So what you actually have in that mile of width are nothing more than several squad (-) strong points. It therefore was very easy to let those tanks move through the position without betraying the strong point locations.
For this to work though, you can't be screwing around in the dark with any of your assets, and especially the TD's. The trap was set twenty four hours before the Germans appeared. Everyone knew what they were going to do, and the only thing remaining was to execute.
They also reasoned that the attack would come well before dawn. That is the only time the Germans could maneuver and try and get into Bastogne, before the supporting fighter bombers would arrive, and not be able to touch the Germans who would by then be closely entangled with American troops, plus all those civilians in the city itself. The Germans were trying to play beat the clock.
Forcing the German Infantry to go to ground early defeats the whole purpose. If you force them too soon, the tanks still in your front, will eat your lunch. Forcing them too late and that German Infantry is into your forward line. That's why we call it orchestration of the battle, where every instrument plays its assigned part in the right sequence and the right time.
The problem with tanks using roads is that the penetration is on a much too narrow front. The fields were frozen, there was no mobility restrictions on the tanks. created by snow. The principle is maximum firepower forward. Had they stayed on the road it would have been like Reno attacking in a column of twos or fours. Maximum firepower forward --- ALWAYS.
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Post by yanmacca on Feb 14, 2018 20:05:29 GMT
I didn't know that I had been warned 24 hours before Chuck. I was trying to think along the lines of MacDonald in company commander and how the German's came out of nowhere and surprised the hell out of them. I had read accounts about Pieper and how his mobility was restricted to roads. I was even fighting the wrong engagement, I thought it was the opening phase of Wacht Am Rhein and not the defense of Bastonge, but I should have realized that when you mention airborne troops.
I would have liked to know what type tank destroyers I had, M36 would have been great as they would chew up assault guns. I would also guess that the German tanks would be Mk. IVs.
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Post by yanmacca on Feb 14, 2018 20:20:36 GMT
Steve, I would guess that if they found over a thousand cartridge cases on BRE or cemetery ridge, that more than one company would be in the firing line as if we take a firing line of thirty troops all firing one round per minute with a full basic load of fifty rounds per trooper, then it would take fifty minutes for the firing line to eject 1500 cartridges, but I cannot see such a line hanging around for nearly an hour on any of those locations, never mind keeping up that rate of fire.
Even two companies would take around thirty minutes, so could we be looking at all five having a pop before moving?
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mac
Brigadier General
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Post by mac on Feb 14, 2018 21:13:18 GMT
Thanks for solving some of the geographic issues. The thing that strikes me now is that we can see why the Custer attack at Ford D was so short lived. I also am thinking of maps I have seen (NP map I think) that recorded a sweep around the north end of BRE and was attributed to Crazy Horse. I do not think it was CH but I can see that such a sweep would match warrior tactics and aspects of the artefact extent. I think from AZ's input we are perhaps seeing evidence for mutual fire support from locations on CR towards BRE and also as I proposed earlier from BRE to support the movement to CR from the valley. Obviously the latter will be before the former. Sorry must go. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Feb 14, 2018 23:55:28 GMT
Peiper was in a completely different area of the Ardennes Ian. The country around Bastogne is a mixture of open farm lands and small wood lots.
The roads were generally good in the area, wher as in Peiper's area not so much. Once you get past the area that the 28th Division was defending, which was in front of Bastogne the trafficability improves greatly.
MacDonald's area was close to what was found by Peiper. Peiper was just to MacDonald's south, and Charles was involved in the backstoping of the 99th Division by the 2nd, and in the early stages of the fight for the Twin Villages. The Twin Villages fight was much smaller than the other well known big events, but intense, the subject of a good yet to be written book.
The TD's were M18's of the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion which is today the 75th Cavalry, and the 75th provides a squadron to one of the brigade combat teams of the 101st ABD, so the connection between these units that started at Bastogne is still maintained.
I actually left off purposely something in U S doctrine you would have found valuable in you firguring of a solution. Had I given it to you the solution would have been too obvious. I don't know if any other army in the world does it this way, ignorance on my part. We have something in our fire support doctrine called final protective fires. Generally speaking when FPF's are called for, every small arm fires at an individually predesignated place, and the artillery and mortars fire the FPF at predetermined locations. The result is a wall of steel in front of your Infantry. When I say mortar's and artillery, I mean every tube in range gives that unit in trouble everything they have fired at a maximum rate of fire. If air assets are available they join in as well. If you remember the "Broken Arrow" sequences from Gibson's "We Were Soldiers" that is what the Broken Arrow meant - Fire the FPF.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Feb 15, 2018 0:00:11 GMT
Chuck,
It is Steve's and my intent to visit David in Ft. Collins on the way to the LBH in June. I would be more than glad to pick you up on the way, you could see the several areas we are talking about, additionally we could show you the 1874 sites, I think you would enjoy. If you have to stay in a hotel, there is a haunted one in Buffalo, WY or a place in Hardin, MT. If you come east in early June to visit your daughter I could save you the return flight. That is if you stop trying to get me to support Hilary in 2020. We can drop in on David. Just consider it a later day annual deployment.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Feb 15, 2018 3:09:29 GMT
Actually I am supporting the Al Sharpton and Mother Jones ticket in 2020. It is an independent party, newly formed, and features a cartoon version of Guy Fawkes setting a match to 30 barrels of gunpowder as a mascot.
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mac
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Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Feb 15, 2018 11:19:10 GMT
The river approach White Shield (Cheyenne) "When the Gray Horse Company got pretty close to the river,they dismounted, and all the soldiers back as far as I could see stopped and dismounted also". "the soldiers back as far as I could see" does not sound like 2 companies.
Yellow Nose (Ute/Southern Cheyenne) Crossed the river "where a small stream entered from the east" then "ascending a promontery formed by this gulch and the river". Saw the soldiers advancing along the crest of a divide running back from the Little Big Horn. The troops were coming at a gallop.
Sounds like Ford C (Gibbon's Ford) to me. Opinions? Cheers
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azranger
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Post by azranger on Feb 15, 2018 12:24:22 GMT
I have tried many times to locate a really good map of the area, so far google offers the best views. Contour maps in the scale you ask for are hard to get hold of and usually they demand a fee, which is daylight robbery [if anyone once to know what daylight robbery means, I can post it on the founders thread]. I have always thought that a company of say thirty men in skirmish [leaving out officers and horse holders], would only have a max of 1500 rounds on their person, with another 1500 in their saddles, so I always thought claims of thousands of army cartridges as a bit fanciful. But that area in question really intrigues me, I have highlighted it below on both maps and I wonder if F Company could have held off the Indians whilst say I Company got away, then it was forced back to LSH. Then it fired on warriors coming up from the river. Ian
You still have the Bonafede map rotated different from Donahue. Look at the Bonafede where it has Cemetery Ridge and you will see the Indian site location that have marked on the Donahue map.
Tom
That is right at the end of the old entrance road where it meets the NPS boundary fence. Its that elevated area.
Regards
Steve
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azranger
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Post by azranger on Feb 15, 2018 12:46:19 GMT
Steve, I have tried to match a google map in line with the Donahue one, I have added the old river course and placed in the two main area's of army cartridge finds. BTW; Just where a bouts on the field would you find the Sharrow marker, could it be in the top area around those finds? If so then it would show that the command element could have past this way as I don't think the RSM would do a bunk. Tom, do you have any known positions on those missing markers, I would like to add them if possible. I think that looks betters. I had to open it in PPT so hope this link works. If you can see it the blue arrows they are close to the red encircling. The difference is I am working from memory from walking to BRE with Donahue and the old entrance road with Tom. I don't know the technology that Bonafede used to place his various markings.
If I had to guess the best work out there now should be Scott's. His book came out about 6 years after Donahue did that paper presentation for CBHMA in Hardin.
PresentationLBH1.pptx (154.59 KB)
Regards
Steve
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Feb 15, 2018 13:15:53 GMT
That tells a tale, Steve.
Regards, Tom
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azranger
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Post by azranger on Feb 15, 2018 13:46:22 GMT
Steve: The artifacts on the Donahue map appear to have been done by overlay. It's easy to mis-locate an overlay. Regardless - there is no misinterpreting the fact that the Donahue map as now presented represents those artifacts being on the reverse (eastern) slope of BRE. If that is not the actual location and the actual location is on the top of BRE or on the forward slope, no tactical vs. artifact problem is present I see a line of circles on the top and I see the others that you refer to. So are you leaving out the line on top of BRE at that location. I am not sure how the circles for Army Cases were placed on the map but I am reasonable sure they were not found in a line as represented on the maps either by Donahue or Bonafede. I think they are putting the numbers of each kind of artifact rather than an exact location of each artifact. I think we know that Crazy Horse Ravine is not accurate on the Bonafides. The Bonafides reference to CHR was done only to indicate to everyone having the map that that is the position the Donahue map puts those artifacts in. Contour lines tell the tale in this regard. I think we are spending to much time on map done for a paper presented to the CBHMA. Seems to me that even Highway 2 is wrong and it should be 212 or 8. We don't know how much work the CBHMA does when they publish these papers.
The bottom line is that we don't even know if the triangle representation of an Indian bullet recovered is an exact GPS location or a general location at the BRE site. There is also the possibility that even if correct that soldiers were firing in both directions. Some toward CR and some toward the highway Indian location. For me those circles for Army cartridge cases are the total number found in a general location rather representing every exact location found.
I know when I took the metal detection class from Douglas Scott in Buffalo Wyoming we had the exact location for every artifact found. I have no clue what the level of recording locations was for all artifacts in any given paper or book. What we learned is that some were verbal and less than accurate.
What we have to work with is not always what would be desirable. Regards Steve
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