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Post by yanmacca on Feb 14, 2018 0:10:25 GMT
I have tried many times to locate a really good map of the area, so far google offers the best views. Contour maps in the scale you ask for are hard to get hold of and usually they demand a fee, which is daylight robbery [if anyone once to know what daylight robbery means, I can post it on the founders thread]. I have always thought that a company of say thirty men in skirmish [leaving out officers and horse holders], would only have a max of 1500 rounds on their person, with another 1500 in their saddles, so I always thought claims of thousands of army cartridges as a bit fanciful. But that area in question really intrigues me, I have highlighted it below on both maps and I wonder if F Company could have held off the Indians whilst say I Company got away, then it was forced back to LSH. Then it fired on warriors coming up from the river.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 14, 2018 0:56:16 GMT
Well Ian there are several possibilities, and I don't think Mac would mind if we digress a bit seeing as though this thread is about the tactical approach to D.
ACTION ON THE WAY TO D:
As I understand it Donahue surmises that this artifact field on the reverse slope of BRE was the result of two companies (E and F) moving toward Ford D.
The location on the reverse slope in what looks like a skirmish line of at least two companies appears to be using an excellent route for their approach, having presumably transited behind BR and BRE, and are about to mount the ridge top of BRE and descend into the flat basin one must cross to reach the ford. So far so good on Donahue's theory. Here though is where it starts to unravel for me. There was obviously heavy fighting there judging from the amount of debris. The elongated oval suggest a skirmish line, which in turn means dismounted fighting. Fighting that skirmish line uphill gives me a case of the terminal vapors. I would like Colt's opinion on this. A mounted column containing two or more companies when confronted with resistance to their front on higher ground, would I would think hold that resistance by the nose and maneuver to one or both flanks depending upon the size of the mounted column. The last thing they would do would be to dismount and try and assault that position on foot.
Regardless of how they overcome the resistance there would be a time gap which would allow the hostiles coming from Ford D to rather rapidly reinforce those that were contesting the ridge line. Assuming that is then correct, my judgment tells me the forward motion of that column would end then and there. Even if the Indians were driven, you have used up a lot of ammo, surprise is in the toilet bowl, and that ford crossing is still a little more than a mile away. So a two company force, as Donahue has it, getting past that ridge line on the way to D, seems very unlikely.
If they do not pass that point with a two company force, then there would be no artifacts found at D, and there would be no returning via Cemetery Ridge, both of which are vital events in the scenario Donahue paints for us.
ACTION RETURNING FROM D:
The action indicated by the artifact found on Cemetery Ridge speak for themselves. At some point that place was occupied by cavalry and a heavy fire fight occurred.
The artifacts at Ford D are also equally explainable in that we, us, everybody, all God's children, assume that was the objective. Artifacts there confirm that at least some element of Custer's battalion reached that place.
That leaves us again with a Sherlock two pipe problem. How do we explain an artifact field indicating heavy fighting on the reverse slope of BRE. Ordinarily a force adopting a reverse slope posture does it to prevent the enemy from knowing they are there, or at least trying to confuse the enemy as to exact location. A reverse slope disposition takes a bit more time to set up as well. So we have a situation again when all of God's red children knew where that cavalry was, and the chances of them being surprised by being skylined as the come over that ridge top was the wish only a foolish idiot would have.
So the only answer I can come up with regarding this map, is that I believe the artifact field occurred after Ford D, and that the one on BRE did not occur during the approach march. As to why the artifact field was found on the reverse slope of BRE only two answers come to mind
DAMNED IF I KNOW or THE ARTIFACT FIELD WAS MIS-PLOTTED ON AN INACCURATE MAP
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Post by yanmacca on Feb 14, 2018 1:07:55 GMT
Oh I agree Chuck, that any cartridge cases would have been ejected after any move to ford D. The problem I have is that to have defensive fire that far east, would suggest warriors incurring from any advance through Keogh's men, unless they managed to flank Keogh and get right around the eastern flank. The other option is if they managed to cut around BRE, which would be some feat.
There is a knoll which is spoken about as a Indian firing position which is not on that map, but this position was crucial position, it was located to the east of LSH but when the warriors at what phase the Indians occupied it is unknown.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 14, 2018 2:29:12 GMT
Well Ian, that is my problem too. The only answer I can come up with is the map and that on it are both in error, by some mischance and the artifact field on BRE was actually on top of the ridge and not on the reverse slope. That is strictly a guess. I have no way to either prove or disprove at this date.
I make the assumption, that despite who is in command, the rules of combat are generally followed. Once and awhile you see deviations from what is expected, but not often. Therefore that is why when talking these events, I think that cavalry would move in the prescribed open formation manner with the appropriate security out front, rear, and flanks. I don't think they would deviate from the norm, when it is obvious security/secrecy/surprise was what they sought the most. I expect them to deploy in line at the appropriate times and places, and maintain the norms of tactical operations. Can I prove they did at LBH? No I cannot. It is only what I would expect of professional soldiers at all times, using the proper techniques and procedures. None of this mind you speaks to how hair brained that scheme was to move north on the bluffs in the first place. That can only be laid on a commander, whose hubris trumped common sense. It's back to something I have said here many times - You can do the wrong thing the right way, and you will always get your ass handed to you, BUT, you can often do the right thing the wrong was and come away a winner. Custer was doing the wrong thing,(Tactics), but we must presume that he was doing it the right way (Technique and Procedure). Have I lost you and everyone else yet?
I recall noticing a slight knoll and it nixed anyone on LSH. It was a very good position for what it was used for.
My belief is that those five companies after returning from Ford D were like rocks along the shoreline of the ocean during incoming tide. It was then only a matter of time before those rocks were consumed by the incoming water, and while some managed to get away before being drowned, they only got as far as another incoming tide, coming from the south.
Custer only had one chance and he chose not to take it. That choice was when he got up on that ridge overlooking Ford D. Had he said OK boys today is not our day, let's go home, turned and went south to join the rest of the regiment. He would have gotten clean away. He hesitated, and once hesitating his afternoon was ruined more decisively as Brady's afternoon was ruined by Eagle shit a week ago.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 14, 2018 2:56:08 GMT
Ian: Here is a little wrong way - right way problem for you to solve.
You command 1/401 GIR. Your front is extended three times the size it should be. One of your companies, Company A, has a strength of 73 soldiers and is strung out on nearly a mile of front. Behind you well to your rear is a platoon of tank destroyers sited so as to be able to provide enfilading and rear shots to any tanks or armored vehicles that penetrate Company A's front. There is also a battalion of 75mm pack howitzers about a mile and a half to the rear of the TD's.
You opposition is a fresh reinforced battalion of panzergrenadiers, mostly dismounted with some riding on the attached panzer company and the platoon of assault guns accompanying the panzergrenadiers.
It is the early morning hours of Christmas 1944, still very dark, and as the weather has warmed a bit, very foggy. The ground is snow covered and frozen. Tracked vehicles have unrestricted mobility.
The German attack is aimed directly at Company A, and Company A is outnumbered about twelve to one.
You command 1/401 GIR. What are your actions and orders?
Answer by PM if you wish, I have really stolen enough of Mac's thread.
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mac
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Post by mac on Feb 14, 2018 10:43:06 GMT
I would like to hear the solution!
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mac
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Post by mac on Feb 14, 2018 11:20:51 GMT
Can I reference the accounts..the village knew Custer was heading to Ford D and so warriors had already crossed the river before he arrived and they say they were being quickly reinforced. This plus the demographic note points to a much faster build up of warrior strength at Ford D than is generally acknowledged. Perhaps Ian can post the Wolftooth (JSIT) map. This map shows Custer coming down off CR and to Ford D then retreating north and ascending BRE.
Custer reaches the north end of Battle Ridge thinking Reno is moving back towards Ford A in the valley and dragging the bulk of the warrior force with him. That is why he continued north, he thinks he will face a fairly uncontested river crossing at Ford D. He does not know:- The true size of the warrior force (including older men) That Reno has stayed too long and consequently has had to break out of the valley thus releasing a portion of the southern warrior force That may be why Custer feels that from Battle Ridge he can move Company E straight down along the river to the railway bridge with no time lost in crossing the river. The rest of his force will be further back after sweeping around and over BRE.
The river geometry is disastrous for Custer as it loops around and back on itself west of the railway bridge. His thoughts of a crossing must be very short lived, which is what the warrior accounts say. Custer was quickly pushed back by a growing warrior force. Again consider the google map Ian posted. I do not doubt that the warriors would quickly move along the west bank of the river to challenge Custer's right flank. The artifact field suggests a move over time towards and around the right flank of the skirmish line being discussed with the position ultimately being occupied by warriors.
Wolftooth says that his band were on the ridge but moved east off the ridge (I suspect to about where the Indian monument now is) when the cavalry re mounted the ridge. Could the firing from the skirmish line being discussed be a covering fire for the retreat of Company E (and one other perhaps) towards CR after their brief attack at the railway bridge? Company E moving up CR leading their horses as some accounts suggest. Cheers
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Feb 14, 2018 12:43:12 GMT
Anyone reading here for the first time, please be assured that the railroad bridge was not there in 1876, trust me on this. And, Mac knows this too, it is simply a geographical point of reference.
You guys are building a very fair scenario and you have not even mentioned the two sets of human remains down low near the river or the remains found across the highway in the area of the trading post. At one time there were markers for them.
Regards, Tom
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azranger
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Post by azranger on Feb 14, 2018 12:59:27 GMT
I must admit to being skeptical of the amount of army cartridges found so near Highway 2, they appear to be way out from any known position held by the cavalry. Ian within the last couple of years they found the metal parts of a carbine in that area. In fact when we rode out to highway 212 we were real close to it before it was found. There is a little hill there that was an Indian site.
As far as comparing both maps you guys are better than I am. I would line up the road going into the park and across Crazy Horse Ravine . With it rotated 90 degrees from each other as posted it is harder to see the differences. The labeled Crazy Horse Ravine is way off on the Bonfedes map. Crazy Horse Ravine would be between CR and the Fork of BRE moving toward the river.
Regards
Steve
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Post by yanmacca on Feb 14, 2018 13:19:29 GMT
Ian: Here is a little wrong way - right way problem for you to solve. You command 1/401 GIR. Your front is extended three times the size it should be. One of your companies, Company A, has a strength of 73 soldiers and is strung out on nearly a mile of front. Behind you well to your rear is a platoon of tank destroyers sited so as to be able to provide enfilading and rear shots to any tanks or armored vehicles that penetrate Company A's front. There is also a battalion of 75mm pack howitzers about a mile and a half to the rear of the TD's. You opposition is a fresh reinforced battalion of panzergrenadiers, mostly dismounted with some riding on the attached panzer company and the platoon of assault guns accompanying the panzergrenadiers. It is the early morning hours of Christmas 1944, still very dark, and as the weather has warmed a bit, very foggy. The ground is snow covered and frozen. Tracked vehicles have unrestricted mobility. The German attack is aimed directly at Company A, and Company A is outnumbered about twelve to one. You command 1/401 GIR. What are your actions and orders? Answer by PM if you wish, I have really stolen enough of Mac's thread. Is moving back an option? I would guess that leaving A Company to fight until the last round is not the way to do it, they would however thin out the enemy before succumbing, but why waste them. A platoon of tank destroys give me four SPGs and a battery of pack hows would give me around sixteen howitzers. So I would hit the enemy with artillery fire and order A Company to retire. The tank destroyers would position themselves in an enfilade position and take their toll as of when, but I would certainly try and shorten my lines and hopefully meet up with re-enforcement's in a stronger position further back.
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Post by yanmacca on Feb 14, 2018 13:41:14 GMT
Steve, I have tried to match a google map in line with the Donahue one, I have added the old river course and placed in the two main area's of army cartridge finds. BTW; Just where a bouts on the field would you find the Sharrow marker, could it be in the top area around those finds? If so then it would show that the command element could have past this way as I don't think the RSM would do a bunk. Tom, do you have any known positions on those missing markers, I would like to add them if possible.
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Post by yanmacca on Feb 14, 2018 13:44:01 GMT
Mac, here is the JSIT map;
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azranger
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Post by azranger on Feb 14, 2018 13:56:01 GMT
Well Ian there are several possibilities, and I don't think Mac would mind if we digress a bit seeing as though this thread is about the tactical approach to D. ACTION ON THE WAY TO D: As I understand it Donahue surmises that this artifact field on the reverse slope of BRE was the result of two companies (E and F) moving toward Ford D. When we walked to the site it was on top of BRE and across from the visitor center. That site also had Indian cartridge cases indicating occupation at different times. That location gave us direct view of the filled in area of Crazy Horse Ravine. The problem with the maps is anything representing artifacts on is huge as compared to their actual size. I would think the best way to represent this would be GIS map overlays.The location on the reverse slope in what looks like a skirmish line of at least two companies appears to be using an excellent route for their approach, having presumably transited behind BR and BRE, and are about to mount the ridge top of BRE and descend into the flat basin one must cross to reach the ford. So far so good on Donahue's theory. Here though is where it starts to unravel for me. There was obviously heavy fighting there judging from the amount of debris. The elongated oval suggest a skirmish line, which in turn means dismounted fighting. Fighting that skirmish line uphill gives me a case of the terminal vapors. I would like Colt's opinion on this. A mounted column containing two or more companies when confronted with resistance to their front on higher ground, would I would think hold that resistance by the nose and maneuver to one or both flanks depending upon the size of the mounted column. The last thing they would do would be to dismount and try and assault that position on foot. When Tom and I went to the old entrance road the gate we hit was close to the end of BRE. When I say BRE it is the left fork of BRE when traveling toward the Trading Post. BRE also continues straight toward the Trading Post. From the artifacts found in numbers they appear to mostly contained within the end of the left fork ridge of BRE and the old river channel. There are numerous artifacts that were found when making the old entrance road. Those findings are reported in Scott's book.
As far as moving past the end of BRE and toward Willy's Bend the artifacts drop off. In a previous years tour that was supposed to go to Ford D but got rained out Doug Scott discussed why artifacts in the Ford D are scarce. The materials to build the road bed across Crazy Horse Ravine came from the Ford D area. So it quite possible that artifacts are buried in the road bed. Also the could be contamination of artifacts dropped when moving them.
As Mac pointed out the two cases and two metal arrowheads near Ford Ds it could be that others are removed. If not that to me would not indicate 5 companies in action there. Two arrows should not have stopped 2-5 companies from crossing. I think the removal of materials forever impacted our ability to form opinions based upon artifacts alone. I believe the same for LSH with all removal of artifacts. Regardless of how they overcome the resistance there would be a time gap which would allow the hostiles coming from Ford D to rather rapidly reinforce those that were contesting the ridge line. Assuming that is then correct, my judgment tells me the forward motion of that column would end then and there. Even if the Indians were driven, you have used up a lot of ammo, surprise is in the toilet bowl, and that ford crossing is still a little more than a mile away. So a two company force, as Donahue has it, getting past that ridge line on the way to D, seems very unlikely. I agree but following the artifacts alone would appear that there is movement to the end of BRE and then movement where the old entrance road was located toward CR. The Indian bullets found indicate shooting toward BRE all the way to the end near the the old entrance gate. I think we need to address when did the Indians occupy the BRE location.If they do not pass that point with a two company force, then there would be no artifacts found at D, and there would be no returning via Cemetery Ridge, both of which are vital events in the scenario Donahue paints for us. There are more artifacts found toward the more upstream Ford Ds but not as close to the river. ACTION RETURNING FROM D: The action indicated by the artifact found on Cemetery Ridge speak for themselves. At some point that place was occupied by cavalry and a heavy fire fight occurred. Once you remove the 800 - 1,000 Army cases that were fake news then the CR area has a lot less fire going on it. We know from and Indian participant that soldiers on CR were firing at the Cavalry/Indian location at BRE.
So I would like keep up with soldiers moving out on CR and BRE and it was lots of Indians willing to fight that changed the plan. The artifacts at Ford D are also equally explainable in that we, us, everybody, all God's children, assume that was the objective. Artifacts there confirm that at least some element of Custer's battalion reached that place. Two cases indicate what? I think if there was removal of artifacts we can opine on what happened but two bulletsThat leaves us again with a Sherlock two pipe problem. How do we explain an artifact field indicating heavy fighting on the reverse slope of BRE. Ordinarily a force adopting a reverse slope posture does it to prevent the enemy from knowing they are there, or at least trying to confuse the enemy as to exact location. A reverse slope disposition takes a bit more time to set up as well. So we have a situation again when all of God's red children knew where that cavalry was, and the chances of them being surprised by being skylined as the come over that ridge top was the wish only a foolish idiot would have. So the only answer I can come up with regarding this map, is that I believe the artifact field occurred after Ford D, and that the one on BRE did not occur during the approach march. As to why the artifact field was found on the reverse slope of BRE only two answers come to mind DAMNED IF I KNOW or THE ARTIFACT FIELD WAS MIS-PLOTTED ON AN INACCURATE MAP I am not sure which back slope you are referring to on BRE. The site is on top of BRE and looks straight toward the new entrance road where it is filled in crossing Crazy Horse Ravine.
I think we should all meet there sometime and see it on the ground.
Regards
Steve
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azranger
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Post by azranger on Feb 14, 2018 14:05:00 GMT
Here is a picture taken from along Highway 212 at the location of the army cases and the resent carbine barrel action find. At this point is a little hill with Indians artifacts including cases found on it. It would be in the same general area that Wolf Tooth had moved to. I am using the zoom of course but I think the Indians were firing at LSH from this location. The distance from the Indian site hill along 212 to LSH is approximately 640 yards.
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Post by azranger on Feb 14, 2018 14:42:22 GMT
Using the ruler feature in Google maps it is around 500 yards from the BRE site to CR where the picture has placed infantry soldiers shooting toward BRE. It was to represent where he observed Custer's soldiers shooting at Indians.
Regards
Steve
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