Custer's tactical approach to Ford D

[mac]

The 5 companies thread is getting very long. Anyone wanting to understand reasoning for the 5 companies theory can get a good idea by reading on from around page 38.
These are, in brief, my current thoughts on what Custer was trying to achieve and why he took his 5 companies to Ford D. I will explain my reasoning in detail in later posts.
Most analysts believe that Benteen was sent on his oblique left scout for two reasons, first to satisfy Custer's orders to feel to the left and second because Custer felt the village may be quite close to Ford A.
Again most believe that Custer sent Reno into the valley as an Advanced Guard with every intention of following on after him.
Custer then heard that the warriors were coming out to Reno and made the snap decision to move right with his 5 companies and to bypass the warriors and drop back into the valley behind the village.
From the bluffs above the river he was able to get his first sight of the village, perhaps at the point known as 3411 which features in the banner photo on our home page. It was at this time that he sent Martini and the famous note to Benteen.
The situation Custer sees in the valley is that Reno has too few men to prevent the warriors moving around his left flank. There can be only one tactically meaningful reason for the order. Custer wants Benteen to know that the NA are all in one village in the valley. He also wants Benteen to take control of the packs as they come on towards Ford A. Custer has seen that Reno cannot hold the valley and so will have to retire. Custer assumes Reno will retire along the approach route and back to Ford A, dragging many warriors with him, to where Benteen will be able to support him and protect the packs. I can see no other tactically meaningful answer.

Custer then moves on to the north content that his 5 companies are enough for the job. There is no reason why he would ever want to go to Ford B. He makes every effort to stay well east and out of sight. When he enters MTC he can see the village extends further north and so he heads off further north behind Battle Ridge with all 5 companies.

At Ford D Custer deploys in the valley with Company E dismounted but he quickly realizes that he will not be able to cross so he withdraws to Cemetery Ridge (CR) and the Battle Ridge Extension (BRE). From here he must break contact and move back to the south along his approach route. He has many warriors around him now and he believes the other mass of warriors to the south are well down the valley engaging Benteen and Reno at Ford A; so he expects the route back south to be fairly open.
From here there is a movement of Companies L, I, and C that leaves them all dead at the south end of Battle Ridge after they are stopped by warriors from the village and returning from the Reno fight.
More Later
Cheers

[mac]

The Note
The note is often interpreted in "interesting" ways but it must be examined only in the context of what is actually happening and what makes tactical sense.
The concentration is really on two things:-
The location of the NA in one big village. This tells Benteen that he is not needed out to the left.
Custer's desire that Benteen bring on the packs. To suggest that Custer thinks that the packs can actually be brought to him over that terrain before Christmas shows little regard for Custer's intelligence I think.
The situation must, as always, be considered.
Custer has looked into the valley and seen Reno's situation with a skirmish line that has a badly exposed left flank and lots of warriors coming on. He must conclude that Reno cannot hold the valley. Custer is still committed to attacking in the north; we know this because he goes on. He knows Reno must retire and so uses Benteen to safeguard the packs. I am sure he also sees a value for his own northern attack in dragging the warriors further down the valley.
Custer was observed by some to be waving his hat. My thought is he was waving them back down the valley. The other direction was suicide and Custer knew it.
Cheers

[yanmacca]

Mac, I have reservations about Custer being on the bluffs at 3411, why? Well the only person I can recall who witnessed this event was DeRudio. Quite a few of Reno’s men saw Custer’s battalion on the bluffs, and these sighting where made between Ford A and Sharpshooter ridge, or maybe Reno hill. I can’t find any other references after that, except DeRudio’s.

If you pick out what the Crow scouts said, Hairy Moccasin, Goes Ahead and White Man Runs Him, they all claimed to have sat on the bluffs and witnessed Reno being defeated. This was after they were released by Custer. Bouyer and Curly could have also been on the bluffs, so these figures could have been these men. Plus DeRudio was probably skulking in the timber looking after number one.

If by any chance Custer saw Reno on the verge of collapse, and being confronted by hundreds of warriors, then this would mean that not only Reno, but Benteen and the pack train would be virtually took out of the fight because if Reno fell back and met Benteen, they would have to reorganise or even fight a defensive battle before they could continue north. That would leave Custer and 200 men to subdue this huge village on their own.

[colt45]

Yan and Mac,
Good posts based on logic and common sense. But one point sticks out, and that is the assumption that Custer saw Reno in trouble with an open left flank. We don't know this for a fact. It is quite possible he saw Reno during his march to contact and before the skirmish line was deployed, or he saw the skirmish line deployed before the move to the timber.

If we go with the assumption he saw Reno unable to hold and being flanked, he would have to know that Benteen would run into Reno somewhere along with the Indians, and that neither Reno, Benteen, or the packs would be able to reach him any time soon, if at all. So why would he consider it prudent to push on north with 5 companies, cut off from the rest of the regiment? If this is the case, the extreme hubris of thinking 5 companies are going to handle the situation indicates Custer was an extreme idiot. I don't believe any commander would be so foolhardy as to push on, armed with that knowledge. Turning around and going back to ford A to support Reno is the logical response to what he saw.

Since Custer did push on, I believe what he saw from 3411 or wherever led him to believe the valley situation was going according to plan, and that means before Reno got into trouble. If he saw Reno before things went to hell, he could reasonably conclude that moving north would allow him to envelop or flank attack and that there was enough time to complete this maneuver before Reno would have to retire, presumably back to ford A, where Benteen would most likely be arriving. As we know, pushing on proved to be a huge mistake, but at the time moving north would have seemed a good plan if he saw Reno before things got tough.

[quincannon]

Concur Colt.

Custer had no knowledge of Reno being in trouble. He most probably saw him advancing to contact,if he saw them at all, and the note was sent for two purposes, 1) consolidate the two battalions, with Benteen being a back stop for Reno in the event things went sideways, and, 2) get cover for those packs by placing Benteen's battalion between the pack trains and any possibility the Indians could break through or around Reno's battalion to place those trains in grave danger of being lost.

I believe that Custer determining the size of that village was enough to conclude that Reno would not do well in that valley. He did not have to see Reno. All he had to do  is see the size of that village, to prompt him to send that note. The note itself is a study in the nonspecific. What does it really say, nothing more than there is a big village, Benteen stop what you are doing and get between those Indians and the packs.  Having done that get up and in action ASAP. It does not tell Benteen where to get in action, leaving that to Benteen's judgment.

Don't believe Custer had any thought of Benteen and the trains coming to him. D25 showed us yesterday that the distance between those two forces was opening not closing. 

Mac: You said Christmas. What year did you have in mind.

All this goes back to the trains being a tactical millstone, and having influence on how the three battalions maneuvered. Would actions and orders have changed if the trains were not a factor. Probably so.

Most of us agree in hindsight that Benteen's mission to the west was a waste of time. I suspect most of us would come to the same state of agreement using foresight as well. This only proves that there are times to disobey orders given, when the on the ground situation has changed. Had Custer won, no one would have asked those questions. In the event he lost no one would care.

[mac]

Good points all.
Colt I agree with your valley assessment and I think what Custer saw (or didn't see eh Ian) is unknowable and unimportant in that ....he did go on. The note does tell us that he felt that he could go on successfully as long as Benteen was pulled back into action.
The fact that Benteen would be back at Ford A would not be lost on Custer and I think becomes part of his developing strategy at this time. That is to have the warriors from the village pulled away down the valley towards Ford A clearing the way behind them for him.
Cheers

[mac]

Ford B
We do not know Custer's intention when he moves on after sending the note. We do know he stayed east to conceal his movement and we do know he encountered Wolftooth and friends. Eventually he reaches Medicine Tail Coulee (MTC).
It makes no tactical sense to me for him to actually approach the village here for any purpose.
He can see the village extends beyond the ford so he cannot cross here. Therefore he must go further north to rejoin the action.
The archaeology in MTC does not reflect a battle zone. Deep Coulee does but this is related to later fighting on FF ridge.
There are credible accounts that say Custer came down MTC and then turned right behind battle ridge.
The accounts often quoted for an approach to the village are sourced from warriors who were known to have fought Reno and so are very unlikely to have been anywhere near Ford B at the time. I view these as hearsay that has been misinterpreted geographically (see the 5 companies thread as mentioned above).
The main suggestions for an approach at Ford B are:-
To cross and attack the village. Madness and a death wish!
To attract attention away from Reno. Greater love hath no commander than that he will sacrifice himself for...nothing really!
To make an observation of what is happening further north. I cannot see that it matters to Custer what is happening as he is already committed to doing something in the north. He must go there, there is no alternative with Ford B blocked.
Custer has stayed east this far I can see no reason not to do as Wolftooth and others say he did and move on behind Battle Ridge.
Cheers

[quincannon]

I am amused at those who maintain the Custer needed to go to Ford B to see through the dust and smoke. If there is dust and smoke there, then that is the reason you don't go near the place with a ten foot pole. Silliness run rampant.

Mac, you should have found another calling early in life, in the Queen's service.

[mac]

Feb 8, 2018 23:48:24 GMT quincannon said:

Mac, you should have found another calling early in life, in the Queen's service.

Too kind...I fear you and Colt et al would eat my lunch.

It has been said before that Custer had lost before he began because of his poor scouting prior to the attack. I think what we see, as things develop, is him depart from his original intent to enter the valley and then launch a speculative attack that is being developed "in the saddle" as the battle space reveals itself to him. We cannot be sure of his thinking but his actions do speak for themselves.
More later
Cheers

[deadwoodgultch]

Mac, I will be having lunch with a gentleman who was involved with landings near your native land, early in the Pacific War. The man made numerous landings and spent some time in your country, he also worked with a number of your vets. He claims that those vets were some of the toughest fighters he was ever around. Maybe it is in the genes. Higgins boats.

Regards,
Tom

[yanmacca]

Feb 8, 2018 23:26:54 GMT mac said:

There are credible accounts that say Custer came down MTC and then turned right behind battle ridge.
The accounts often quoted for an approach to the village are sourced from warriors who were known to have fought Reno and so are very unlikely to have been anywhere near Ford B at the time. I view these as hearsay that has been misinterpreted geographically (see the 5 companies thread as mentioned above).

I think that any advance north or north east from sharpshooter ridge, would mean that he would have to enter MTC. At which point is hard to figure out and a lot of authors name Cedar coulee as the most likely route, so apart from Cedar, which other route could he have taken?
If his destination is Nye-Cartwright ridge then he needs to access MTC, the same would also go for Luce ridge.

[quincannon]

Time for another "volley"

"Come down" in American usage of the English Language could well mean "followed the direction of" and would not be limited to actually being in the terrain feature itself.

[mac]

I read the accounts as being "in the terrain feature" but not for a long way. It is relevant here that he was sighted in the feature (MTC) and word of his presence and direction of movement quickly reached the village.
Ian the debate over his route is a worthwhile one but is not on my interest list at the moment because I am just putting general known positions together as a tactical interpretation. You will be interested to know that I am going to reference the Drawing Battle Lines book soon. Stand by !
Tonight I would like to make a point about the village and Ford D.
In discussing the capability of the village to respond to Custer reaching Ford D we often do a warrior calculation. A commonly accepted number of warriors for the village is 2000. This means that even if 1200 went to Reno there are still plenty left in the village, and probably as the main Reno response group were from the southern end of the village, then the remaining 800 in this case are probably not far from Ford D.
Let us consider demographics.
This is a village and so is a population of not just women, children and warriors. There are also older men (former warriors),  who will respond in the north of the village and probably are in that area very soon after the Reno action begins.
The population pyramid for the village will typically be broad at the bottom age and tapering uniformly as age rises reflecting a non industrial hunter gatherer society.
From this model we could perhaps be fair in suggesting that if there are 2000 men in the 16-35 group then the 35-50 group may be as much as half that, so up to another 1000 men who will be capable of a defensive response. Let's bear that in mind when we get to Ford D.
Cheers

[azranger]

Feb 9, 2018 15:39:04 GMT yanmacca said:

I think that any advance north or north east from sharpshooter ridge, would mean that he would have to enter MTC. At which point is hard to figure out and a lot of authors name Cedar coulee as the most likely route, so apart from Cedar, which other route could he have taken?
If his destination is Nye-Cartwright ridge then he needs to access MTC, the same would also go for Luce ridge.


I think that red line is down the top of SRR with Cedar Coulee in the drainage to the west. I think Donahue believe the drainage is one more west of Cedar Coulee. You start down Cedar Coulee and as you pass Weir you hook west at the top of the loaf and follow that drainage to MTC. As far as timing wise either drainage reaches MTC about the same time. Unlike riding down SSR which would be further east.RegardsSteve

[azranger]

My belief is that Benteen was sent to scout SFRC. If you continue in a straight line to the river the pack train would arrive before Benteen and the battle may have been over.

So below is the route we rode following Darling's map. The high point above SFRC is where Gibson marked on a map as his location. Benteen and the three companies would be below this and they turn down Noname toward Reno Creek. You see the approximate line Benteen was following from the separation point below the divide. So continue that line to river and it is far south of the Big Village. The Benteen on the map is a railroad sign along the tracks and that straight line would put Benteen a lot further south before he hits the LBH river.