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Post by quincannon on Oct 30, 2019 16:22:54 GMT
Simpson and Patch were OK, nothing outstanding. Patch was at his best when he had the Americal Division in the Pacific.
My favorite is Truscott. Don't have a lot of use for Patton as a man, but his combat record speaks for itself. I generally try to evaluate commanders on two levels, the person, and the commander, and find in most instances the person, and the commander intertwine.
Hodges was too antiquated in his thinking for my money. Middleton did well as the commander of the 45th "Thunderbird" Infantry Division, but as commander of VIII Corps he left a lot to be desired.
All this brings up the "Peter Principle", which according to that theory, every man at some time reaches the level of their incompetence. We had few standouts as corps commanders, and while the person may very well be a standout at regimental or division command, the corps command, which is a very difficult job that puts far more strain on management skills, is many times beyond their capabilities. We relieved a lot of division and corps commanders for cause during World War II. Sometimes that was because of personality conflict, like Wood and Eddy. Sometimes it was because the division commander and corp commander could not stand each other, like Terry Allen and Bradley. Sidebar:Terry Allen and Teddy Roosevelt Jr. (Allen's ADC) were two fighting sons of bitches, and Bradley thought they made him look bad. Sometimes it was because the commander being relieved was overcome by the strain of command. Others were just pure incompetence like the series of real Bozo's put in command of the 90th Infantry Division. As long as general officers are chosen from the human race these problems will exist.
I will be frank with you as to why I do not like Montgomery at all. Never will. As a general, and as a commander, I don't believe he learned one damned thing beyond 1918. In this he was not alone and that last sentence could be applied to many other British, American, Allied, and Enemy general officers as well, and be completely accurate.
Why I do not like Montgomery is Montgomery the man. He was personally ambitions, and that ambition led to disloyalty to his commander (Eisenhower) and to a rift in the alliance. Alliances are always difficult anyway. Eisenhower was given command in Europe by both Roosevelt and Churchill. It was a slight that Montgomery felt personally, thinking overall European command should have been his. He took his resentment out on Eisenhower, stabbing him in the back on several occasions. Perhaps Montgomery was a better field general than Eisenhower. We will never know because Eisenhower never held a command in direct combat. What Eisenhower was though is a perfect fit for the job of overall theater commander. He was more a diplomat and a manager than anything else. Montgomery became so insubordinate on one occasion that he was within an hour or so of being relieved for cause, and would have been if Monty's chief of staff had not personally smoothed things over. Your friend mentioned Simpson. After that almost relief episode, Eisenhower gave Simpson's Ninth Army to Monty during the Bulge, when he could just as well said screw you Monty, sit on the bench, the Bulge is an All American show. I think that tells all you need to know about Eisenhower, who was willing to put up with Bradley and Patton screaming to high heaven about Monty getting American troops after the debacle at Arnhem. Most Americans, historians and military professionals alike, completely ignore Montgomery's record as a soldier, and think of him only as a disloyal, back stabbing son of a bitch. Maybe that is not fair, but that is how it is, and that shared American opinion was Montgomery's doing. No one else.
Colonel John Boyd (of OODA fame) once remarked "If they demand loyalty, give them integrity. If they demand integrity, give them loyalty" Those are words to live by. Some one dig that son of a bitch Montgomery up and inform him of Boyd's words.
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Post by yanmacca on Oct 30, 2019 20:50:28 GMT
You do find that some US Generals didn't mind Monty, especially after they worked with him one to one, here is some examples;
Montgomery`s role is discussed objectively by Russell F. Weigly in his account, Eisenhower's Lieutenants.· The Campaign of France and Germany 1944-I945 .
While critical of Monty's arrogance, Weigley acknowledged that Montgomery "took hold on the north flank with the energy and verve that were as characteristic as his peacockery." Weigley defended Monty’s tactic of giving ground the better to build up his reserves, or where the benefits of holding on would no longer match the cost. He withdrew the U.S. 7th Armored Division and the 82"’ Airborne Division from their forward positions. General Robert W. Hasbrouck, commander of the 7th Armored Division, reported on December 22 that the time had come to abandon St. Vith. The defense of St Vith had dealt a crippling delay to the German's 6th SS Panzer Army drive on Liege-as important an action as Bastogne’s stand, though not as dramatic, Hasbrouck’s corps commander, however, General Matthew B. Ridgway opposed withdrawal. He was decisively overruled by Montgomery. Soon a message reached Hasbrouck from Monty, "You have accomplished your mission, a mission well done. It is time to withdraw." Hasbrouck would later go so far as to say that Montgomery "saved the 7th Armored Division."
On Montgomery’s order to withdraw, Hugh M. Cole, wrote in his volume, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge , "and here [Montgomery] showed the ability to honor the fighting man which had endeared him to the hearts of the Desert Rats in North Africa: "They can come back with all honor. 'They come back to the more secure positions. They put up a wonderful show."
A useful source on the epic American stand at St. Vith is that by W. D. Ellis and T. J. Cunningham, jr., Clarke of St. Vith, The Sergeant's General. General Bruce C. Clarke, commanded Combat Command "B" of the 7th Armored Division during the critical defense of St. Vith. Montgomery paid several visits to the 7th Armored front: "General Montgomery was impressive to me," Clarke later said, “Very cool in battle" Before Montgomery's order to withdraw, Clarke said, “lt looks like Custer`s last stand to me."
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Post by quincannon on Oct 30, 2019 21:21:12 GMT
I am aware of Hasbrouck's opinion of Montgomery, by virtue of the fact that my first company commander as an officer was Hasbrouck's former son in law. I remember discussing the Bulge, Hasbrouck, Clarke, and the 7th Armored Division at St.Vith with him many times. He was also related somehow to someone that had been in the 110th Infantry in the Bastogne corridor during the Bulge. He would agree with Montgomery concerning that it was time to go for the 7th Armored. He also opened my eyes to what the 110th Infantry did, and that they far from deserved the reputation they had in being destroyed. Also it would not do anyone well to mention the 106th Infantry Division to him, for you were in for an hour's lecture on just how bad they were. This fellow, Dick Thompson, was hell on training, and the worst thing he could say to you if you screwed up, is that - You belong in the goddamned 106th. Dick was a former First Sergeant before he was commissioned, and was known for using historical examples in conducting all his training exercises. He has long been gone to cancer. He retired as a Captain, and when I would see him once in a while as a Lieutenant Colonel, I would still call him sir, and he would still call me wise ass. The best officer I ever knew.
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Post by yanmacca on Oct 31, 2019 12:09:37 GMT
Thinking back, just how much the last three months of 1942 and the first five months of 1943, actually took its toll on the German army, The Germans alone, left nearly 160.000 men in Tunisia and a lost a further 600.000 in the battles and surrender at Stalingrad. That is a lot of troops to lose in eight months, plus the were also suffering losses in other theatres too and in other parts of Russia. The losses in Africa and Staligrad really hurt the Germans, as they were seasoned troops, and these would be hard to replace.
A year later in June 1944, the landings in Normandy plus Operation Bagration broke their backs in Russia and in France.
As I have mentioned a while ago, I have started a blog section on the website, just waiting for the lads to do a bit of tweaking before anyone can post. A blog is really just a message board, not much different to what we are doing on this board. To get the ball rolling, I may write a section on the Charles B. MacDonald book ‘company commander’, I will add a basic outline to the book and a link to Amazon in case anyone wants to buy it. One interesting fact that you told me about that book is that MacDonald turned down offers to turn the book into a movie, so if this is correct then I will certainly add this.
If you don’t mind I will let you read it before I post it on my site, just I case I missed anything.
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Post by quincannon on Oct 31, 2019 14:21:02 GMT
I was told about the movie and MacDonald second hand from someone else. I believe it to be correct, but as he did not tell me that directly, I cannot swear that it is true.
Sure post it.
I tried to register for your blog, and all I got after pushing what I think were the appropriate boxes was a blank screen. Is it operational yet.
By the way my home town baseball team , The Nationals, won the World Series last night, so I am in a blissful mood today. First time in ninety five years. The fellow that owns the team, Mr. Learner, is 94 years old and he was born the year after the great Walter Johnson pitched the winning game in 1925.
First in war. First in peace. First in the National League.
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Post by yanmacca on Dec 3, 2019 20:20:53 GMT
Here is some info on how the US Army went from the Experimental Mechanized Force (EMF), to what later became mechanized cavalry units. I found this whilst searching for info on the evolution of US recon units, I was hoping to find an era when these recon forces were equipped with Jeeps, M3 Scout Cars and M1 and M2 Light Tanks [or combat cars].
In 1931, General Douglas MacArthur became the new Army Chief of Staff. As such, MacArthur saw the value of the mechanization experiments, now being organized by a successor organization to the EMF, the Mechanized Force. However, he believed that the decentralization of such testing on a branch basis was a better way of maximizing results. Therefore, the Mechanized Force was disbanded shortly after it was established. However, MacArthur thought that both horses and mechanized vehicles had a place in the cavalry, a vision he shared with the Chief of Cavalry, Major General Guy Henry. After the demise of the Mechanized Force, MacArthur directed Henry to mechanize one regiment of cavalry.
On the termination of the Mechanized Force, the War Department transformed its headquarters into the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized), a force to control Henry’s projected mechanized cavalry regiment. The 1st Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized) joined the brigade in 1933 and remained the nucleus of the brigade until a mechanized cavalry regiment, the 13th, and a motorized field artillery battalion in 1936 were added. A motorized infantry regiment was also frequently attached to the brigade.
The mechanized cavalry regiment had 2 squadrons of combat cars (a euphemism for tanks) and a troop of 15 armored cars. As in its experimental predecessor organizations, the armored car troop was the cavalry regiment’s reconnaissance element. The troop’s vehicles were only lightly armored. It was not designed to fight but to obtain information through a combination of stealth and speed. Operationally, the troop was usually divided into five vehicle platoons or two vehicle sections.
Through a series of maneuvers, reorganizations, and equipment upgrades, the 7th Cavalry Brigade developed into a combined arms mechanized force whose primary missions included the former cavalry ones of providing shock action and of being an all-purpose mobile combat force. In addition, it was also to be a main battle force similar to the infantry. Therefore, although nurtured in the Cavalry branch, by 1940, the brigade became the core of a new combat arm, the Army’s Armored Force, the brigade itself becoming that force’s 1st Armored Division. This resulted in the de facto transfer of the cavalry’s former combat missions to the new Armored Force.
Although the mechanized cavalry brigade eventually evolved into a separate combat arm, its armored car troop provided the antecedent for all the separate mechanized cavalry reconnaissance units developed in the US Army in World War II and for the armored reconnaissance battalions found in its World War II armored divisions. The latter will be discussed in the next chapter. Mechanized cavalry units developed in a parallel manner in the bulk of the cavalry with that in the 7th Brigade. When the Army fielded the M3 scout car, a light armored car, in 1939, the first 64 vehicles were sent to the 7th Cavalry Brigade.
While the armored car troop in the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) came from the second armored car troop raised as part of the 1930 mechanized force, the Cavalry branch had retained the original armored car troop from the 1928 EMF and attached it to the 1st Cavalry Division. By 1938, the use of armored cars in that division and in none divisional horse regiments was extended when a troop was added to each cavalry regiment in the Army. The new unit, similar to the revised version in the mechanized cavalry regiment, had 17 armored cars divided into 4 platoons and a section of 5 motorcycles. Through technological advances and testing both by the 7th Brigade and the horse cavalry, the Cavalry branch now considered the armored car to be superior to the horse in the reconnaissance role.
In addition to the armored car units, the cavalry embraced mechanization in the late 1930s with a hybrid organization, the horse-mechanized (H-M) cavalry regiment. Created as a response to German success using mechanized forces in Poland in September 1939, this unit contained two cavalry squadrons, one horse mounted and the other with armored cars and motorcycles. The concept for the H-M regiment was that it would be used at the corps level to provide operational reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance and that the horse squadron would be moved operationally by specially designed horse-carrying trucks and offloaded and used tactically in places more accessible to horse and rider than to armored cars. The truck-horse combination was referred to as “portee” cavalry. The armored car squadrons in the H-M regiment were the US Army’s first squadron-sized mechanized reconnaissance units.
Initially, three Regular Army regiments were converted to the H-M structure. When the National Guard’s cavalry was mobilized in late 1940 and early 1941, the Army converted seven of these regiments to the H-M regiments. The hybrid organization lasted until after the United States entered World War II, but in 1943, the 10 regiments were converted to mechanized or armored units as the horse was completely eliminated from the US Army’s combat force structure.
With the approach of war in 1941, ground reconnaissance had become the exclusive realm of the Cavalry branch and its none divisional cavalry regiments with their mix of horses and light armored vehicles. When the US Army ultimately went to war in 1941–45, its cavalry deployed 91,948 troops. Except for the dismounted troopers fighting as infantry in the 1st Cavalry Division in the Pacific, these forces were found in 73 mechanized cavalry units whose primary function was to conduct reconnaissance.
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Post by quincannon on Dec 3, 2019 22:11:49 GMT
That is a very sanitized version of the truth Ian.
What it does not say is that cavalry leaders that favored the horse, had their heads locked in concrete. It also does not say that had had it not been for the recon mission, the cavalry itself would have been out of business by 1942/43.
The original plans for the Armored Force was to convert all of the horse cavalry regiments to armored regiments, and organize a battalion sized unit in each armored division, called a armored reconnaissance battalion, part, and under supervision of the Armored Force (not the cavalry), and let those in the cavalry that did not like it shovel horse shit for the duration of hostilities. That would have been the way to do it in my estimation, but George Marshall had a particular liking of horses, and gave the cavalry the recon mission, partially to sooth his conscience about putting the horses out to pasture, and partially to shut John K. Herr's fat mouth. Herr had a lot of friends in Congress.
Up until late 1941 it was the kiss of death for any cavalry officer to transfer to the Armored Force. Your career was over as far as Herr was concerned, and as the Chief of Cavalry (the last, thank God) he could make that happen. Cavalry today is the red headed step child of the Army. We keep the names alive of course, and they still think they are slicker than snot, but the reality is they are just another under-armored, under-armed unit that cannot do a hell of a lot beyond looking and running.
Branch politics, if left unchecked can be the death of any Army Ian. You have got it your Army, although it is down echelon a bit, regimental politics. What it does is inhibits new organizational constructs designed for now and the future, in favor of doing things the same old way. Were it me I would organize our armored units back into regiments, instead of brigades. Regiments have a history that can be used wisely as a combat multiplier. Each of my armored regiments would consist of three combined arms battalions, each having two tank companies, two Infantry companies and a howitzer battery. There would be three such regiments in a division. In addition the division would have a reconnaissance battalion, an engineer battalion, an attack aviation battalion, along with a maintenance, supply and transportation, and medical battalion. Each of these separate battalions would be very robust organizations, capable of operating as a battalion or splitting off into company sized packets to support one of the regiments deployed separately away from the division. If I proposed that today to the Army's leadership, I would be horsewhipped, pilloried, and run out of the Continental United States on a rail, exiled to some place very far away. The problem is that this organization I just described would work well in this century, but it would never work for all the vested interests inside the Army and in Congress.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Dec 7, 2019 13:51:43 GMT
This was one of my favorite "Cavalry" units. My youngest son as a member of the Virginia Army National was a part of replacements, spare parts, and augmentation to this fine unit.
Moving on with Chucks history. This will bore many.
The 6th Cavalry ("Fighting Sixth'")is a regiment of the United States Army that began as a regiment of cavalry in the American Civil War. It currently is organized into aviation squadrons that are assigned to several different combat aviation brigades. These guys have been everywhere and every configuration,
Civil War Reconstruction Red River War Apache Wars Ghost Dance War Johnson County War Spanish–American War Boxer Rebellion The Philippines Mexico and World War I
During the years between World War I and World War II, the 6th Cavalry participated in the Army's experiments to modernize the cavalry force and it became a "horse-mechanized regiment" with modern vehicles supported by horse trailers for operational mobility. However, once America became involved in the war after the Attack on Pearl Harbor, the 6th Cavalry shed its horses and became solely a mechanized unit. Because of this pre-war experimentation, the 6th was not broken up like many Army outfits, but retained the majority of its original personnel allowing for added stability and training continuity. The 6th Cavalry Regiment was renamed the 6th Mechanized Cavalry Group (MCG), and was organized into two squadrons; the 6th SQDN and the 28th SQDN. The 6th MCG was assigned to General Patton's Third Army and arrived in Normandy between 9–10 July 1944. GEN Patton wanted an Army-level reconnaissance unit in order to bypass traditional reporting channels and enable quicker decision making at the field army level; this was to be called the Army Information Service (AIS), and the 6th MCG was chosen for the role.
World War II Of interest to Ian = Brittany to Belgium
One squadron would fulfill the duties of the AIS, while the other, in conjunction with the associated parts of the AIS squadron not needed for that role (the tank company and assault gun troop), would serve as a security force for the Army headquarters and “hip pocket” reserve for the Army Commander. Tthe two Squadrons would rotate duties on a 21-day cycle, with a reconnaissance Troop being assigned to every Corps HQ, and platoons detached for every Division. When necessary, Sections (typically 2 Jeeps with an M8 Greyhound) could be detached down to the Regimental level. These detachments all reported to the Squadron operations center, which directly reported up to Third Army HQ, speeding up information flow to the Army level. During Operation Cobra in 1944, the 28th SQDN (supplemented by B TRP, 6th SQDN) provided 15 detachments spread out across the 4 Corps and 11 Divisions in the Third Army, and an additional detachment to provide command and control for AIS nodes in the Brittany Peninsula. The standard time for an AIS message to go from battlefield to Army headquarters averaged two hours, twenty minutes, while the conventional channels took eight to nine hours.
While continuing to provide reconnaissance and security for Third Army units during the Brittany Campaign, on 27 August 1944 A TRP, 28th SQDN was dispatched South to reconnoiter the Loire River from Orleans to Saumur, a distance of 100 miles. The Troop successfully completed this mission in two days, and ensured that all bridges over the river were destroyed so no German counterattack could drive into the Third Army's southern flank. Although Third Army operations covered some 475 miles at the beginning of September 1944, the 6th Cavalry moved information so quickly to Army HQ that GEN Patton was afforded an unprecedented amount of flexibility and battlefield awareness. On 5 September, LTC James H. Polk was replaced by COL Edward Fickett to command the 6th Cavalry, and LTC Polk would go on to command the 3rd MCG. On 18 September, GEN Patton ordered the creation of a Task Force consisting of the assault gun Troops (E/6th and E/28th SQDNs) and the tank Company of the 6th SQDN (F CO), with minor supporting elements to assist TF Polk in operations along the Moselle River. During these operations, the tanks and assault guns provided fire support and gained valuable combat experience until 30 September.
During the month of October, rain and mud slowed AIS communications by hindering the mobility of motorcycle and Jeep couriers. In repsonse, the 6th MCG used carrier pigeons beginning 8 October. Although slower than motorized vehicles, the birds provided a useful alternative when radio communications failed. At the beginning of November, the 6th MCG was ordered to only keep one Squadron on AIS duties to enable to other to be used for direct action. TF Fickett was created by attaching 5th Ranger Battalion, C Co 602nd Tank Destroyer Battalion, and B Co 293rd Engineer Battalion to 6th SQDN. TF Fickett was committed to XX Corps during the attack on the Saar River, and prepared to engage the German 36th Infantry Division on 2 December 1944. Advancing on a two mile front against the towns of Carling and L'Hôpital, TF Fickett met fierce German resistance but managed to clear their objectives on 5 December. This action destroyed a salient in the American lines that threatened the advance and prevented any Corps level forces from being drawn away from the battle.[19] On 8 December, TF Fickett relieved the 11th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Infantry Division and eventually relieved the entire division. The Task Force covered the frontage of an entire division in an economy of force mission. On 16 December, 6th and 28th SQDNs switched their duties (6th went to AIS and 28th went to TF Fickett), and the TF was reassigned to support III
These guys even had some guys involved in the Bulge!
After WWII= On 20 December 1948, the former 6th Cavalry Regiment was reorganized and redesignated as the 6th Armored Cavalry. Inactivated in 1963, the regiment reactivated four years later at Fort Meade, Maryland. In April 1968 the regiment was deployed to assist the suppression of the 1968 Washington, D.C. riots. On 31 March 1971 the regiment was reduced to just the 1st Squadron, which departed for Fort Bliss. The 1st Squadron was inactivated there on 21 June 1973.
While there were many minor changes in between the designation "6th Cavalry" remains. In February 2003 2nd and 6th Squadrons were deployed to Kuwait to prepare for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The units were accompanied by their group command unit, the 11th Aviation Group.
Regards, Tom
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 10, 2020 13:28:33 GMT
I thought that I would share with you a story I read on another board, it is a tale told by a US soldier during the second world war.
This is a true Truscott/Patton story that happened in North Africa or possibly Sicily before they went their separate ways. The person who told me the story was in the Army in the Mediterranean during the war and I don't remember if I asked him what unit but he was probably under Truscott as Patton was a Corps commander in North Africa (and then 7th Army in Sicily). It could have been in either place; Truscott was appointed commander of 3rd Infantry Division in March 1943. Anyway, Wade was an observer one night when he saw Patton thrown bodily out of Truscott's tent. He picked himself up, looked around, brushed himself off and walked away. Wow someone tougher than Patton and with two stars he was safe from Patton making a big deal of it because it would have been embarrassing. They were probably drinking anyway.
Ian
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Post by quincannon on Apr 10, 2020 18:33:46 GMT
I don't know if that story is true or not, but it sounds like something both of them could have been involved in. Chances are that if it is true it happened in Africa, when they were both involved in prepping for Sicily. Patton and Truscott were old friends from horse cavalry days, as was Terry Allen. All three liked a drink or two or ten, but it never effected their performance and none of the three were alcoholics.
There is a even better story about Patton taking a pee in Terry Allen's foxhole, when Allen had the 1st Infantry Division. Patton had a disdain for such protective measures for a general officer, which adds a slightly moronic tarnish to his brain in my opinion. Corps and Army commanders do not need them, but at division level, a division headquarters is usually within artillery range.
You did not ask, but my opinion is that Truscott was a far superior overall commander than any Army commander we had in the European/North African Theater including Patton. Had Truscott been in France with an Army people would today say - Patton, who was that, in much the same way Hodges, Simpson, and Patch are today relative unknowns.
Truscott wrote two books "Command Missions" and "Twilight of the U S Cavalry". Both are autobiographical. The second "Twilight" was published posthumously, by his son, but was a prelude to "Missions". I love both of them, and both are mandatory reading as far as I am concerned, but truth be told I like "Twilight" the best.
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 17, 2021 19:03:03 GMT
Just sending a "find me" post to bring this thread into focus.
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Post by Elwood on Apr 5, 2023 13:52:41 GMT
Figured I'd post this question on this thread, some great reading on it.
Was watching a short Patton piece on TV. What appeared to be a tank destroyer, open top, but barrel was very short, (8 inches or so?). Self propelled howititzer? What advantages, if any over regular barreled Tank destroyer? Forgive my ignorance, just don't recall seeing this type.
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Post by miker on Apr 5, 2023 14:15:36 GMT
Probably the 75mm howitzer on a M3/M5 hull, I think it was called the M8, but am too lazy to go look right now.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 5, 2023 15:43:03 GMT
Concur. It was called an M8 Howitzer Motor Carraige and was used by cavalry reconnaissance squadrons equipping Troop E (Assault Gun Troop). There were six M8's in a troop and operated in platoons of two vehicles. Sometimes the three platoons operated together, but on most occasions a platoon (two guns) would be attached out to the three reconnaissance troops.
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Post by Elwood on Apr 5, 2023 22:01:58 GMT
Thanks for your responses!
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