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Post by yanmacca on Oct 27, 2019 20:12:23 GMT
Hi Dan, I would have answered your question earlier but I was swanning around enjoying myself on other web sites.
I have always said that in my view, the invasion of Russia did save us, mainly because Hitler aimed the bulk of his forces at this campaign. The German army invaded Russian with 104 infantry, 19 panzer and 15 motorized infantry divisions. They also had around 50 divisions based in the west too with a dozen or so in the Balkans and a couple in Africa. They did have more dotted about the place, but I won't bore you with that.
So, because of this, the British managed to hold them in Africa because Hitler couldn’t spare Rommel anymore men and equipment, the British however could funnel troops in from Britain and from all over the world mainly because of our vast empire.
I have said in the past about America keeping out of the war and the effect it would have on Britain, well my answer is that without the American armed forces, we would never be able to defeat Germany, but on the other hand Germany couldn’t defeat Britain once they went into Russia.
Imagine though if Hitler put off Barbarossa and gave Rommel another dozen or so divisions, plus re-enforce the Italians in eastern Africa, that would mean that the British would be fighting on two fronts and would have been beaten. That would have meant, no Alamein, no Montgomery, no Torch, no invasion of Italy.
Bottom line, if Hitler invades Russian and the US stays neutral but still sends lend-lease M3 and M4 tanks to Britain and Africa, then German and Britain would be at stalemate.
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benteen
First Lieutenant
"Once An Eagle
Posts: 406
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Post by benteen on Oct 27, 2019 23:28:46 GMT
Yes. I will expand this post after I return from church. Dan: I believe the production capacity of the United States is what won the war for the Allies. Once we entered the European mainland fighting would be much harder and the drive across France into Germany would take at least a year longer (my best estimate) but the outcome would never be in doubt. Chuck, The Germans committed 3 million troops, 3ooo tanks,19 Panzer divisions (Not sure if that is a part of the 3 million troops) 2500 aircraft, and 7ooo artillery pieces to operation Barbarosa. I agree that logistics is a main factor in the outcome of a war or battle, but I am nos sure that the advantage in supplies would make up for the Germans being able to use the above resources in a different manner. Perhaps Africa or the Western front. However, your point is a valid one. Be Well Dan
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benteen
First Lieutenant
"Once An Eagle
Posts: 406
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Post by benteen on Oct 27, 2019 23:45:51 GMT
Hi Dan, I would have answered your question earlier but I was swanning around enjoying myself on other web sites. Bottom line, if Hitler invades Russian and the US stays neutral but still sends lend-lease M3 and M4 tanks to Britain and Africa, then German and Britain would be at stalemate. Ian, I agree with your post. I would only want to ask you about this last line. I believe (And rightly so) that your main focus is on England itself. Remember that the British Empire had territories not only in India, Africa, etc, but also in Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore, and Burma. Unless the Empire was willing to give them up, they would have also had to fight the Japanese Army Not sure they could have handled both the Germans and the Japanese at the same time Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Oct 28, 2019 4:14:50 GMT
I think there may be a bit of moving goal posts afoot here
When I submitted my response, I was and am assuming that with the exception of Russia not being invaded, everything else happened in this whiff as it did in history.
How many of those German troops that you both listed would have still been there if Russia was not invaded?
How in the name of God could the Germans have moved and supplied those "dozen or so" divisions to North Africa and kept them supplied? They could not supply what they did have there. As long as both ends of the Med are stopped up, and Malta is in allied hands that was just not going to happen, nor could it be sustained.
Have either of you considered Russia attacking Germany? There was every bit as much chance of that taking place, as an attack in the opposite direction. Both of them wanted Poland. Both were in envy of the Polish territory each other had occupied in September 1939. They both desired Poland for the same reason, a buffer zone. So what makes either of you think that both sides would maintain considerable forces facing each other.
Germany attacking Russia is not what saved Britain in World War II. Britain was saved by the English Channel, the Royal Air Force, and the potential might of the Royal Navy in theater. Hitler looked upon Operation Sea Lion as just another river crossing operation. He did not understand certain fundamentals of warfare, starting with you need amphibious craft, not Rhine River barges to cross a substantial body of water against what would be stiff opposition. He could not control the sea, nor the air above the sea. As long as no control could be obtained Britain would not only be saved but grow stronger by the day
This posed question is an exercise in strategic logistics. Can you build it? Can you transport it. Do you have a suitable base on the operational end of the logistics pipeline? If the answer to all of these things is yes, and the enemy cannot match you in capacity, then you win. The time it takes to win is up to the willingness of the enemy to sustain punishment. The only thing I see changing between Dan's question and history, is it would take until late 1946 before VE Day, and that could be measurably shortened were we willing to use the A Bomb on the European mainland. Roosevelt would not have. Truman would.
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Post by yanmacca on Oct 28, 2019 12:20:53 GMT
I am talking about late 1940 early 41, in reality the initial job of the Afrika Korps was to act as a blocking force and that is why it only consisted of 5th light division, which itself was just formed from units after they arrived on African soil.
Look at the number of units they had in Tunisia in 1943, they managed to get these across the med even when the USAF was in the area, plus we had broken their codes too and to top it all, Hitler was fully embroiled in Russia.
15th Pz 21st Pz 10th Pz Herman Goring Division 501 Heavy Tank Battalion [Tigers] 164th Light Div [Mot] Ramcke Brigade 334th Infantry Div The British only started to break the German codes in the second half of 1941, so if Germany had decided in late 1940, to finish off the British in North Africa, then just a portion of that total above would have been enough, just three panzer divisions plus the 164th light motorised division would be well enough. They would have hit the middle east, knocked Britain out of the area and captured the oil. Gibraltar and Malta would still be there of course, but all the bases on the Mediterranean coast would be lost, including Tobruk would be helpless once the Germans had reached Suez. In the horn of Africa, Italian units already fought various campaigns in the area and were fully established, so imagine if Hitler diverted troops to the area. Britain was really weak around this area with Wavell’s 30.000 being the main force, so Hitler would have to strike fast, whilst this force was still weak. Another thing too is the Alamein line was not even built in 1940, if it was it would be nothing like is was in 1942. The Alamein line could have stopped the Germans in 1940, only if it was fully manned and operational. The only way a line this strong could have been taken, is how Monty did it, with a set piece attacks with various phases like Operation Lightfoot, Operation Bertram and Operation Braganza and so on.
Monty planned this assault with phase one known as ‘the break in’ followed by ‘the crumbling’ and then ‘the counter’ then Operation Supercharge with the final phase five ‘the breakout’. The main problem we have here is Hitler himself, in 1942 he was still feeding German troops into lost causes with Tunisia and Stalingrad, he never thought of shortening his lines or getting out whist he still could. Every commander should have the sense to know when to give ground, Monty knew this and Rommel too, Hitler no way. if he would have given Rommel these forces in 1940 and not in 1943, then we would be looking at a different ball game.
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Post by quincannon on Oct 28, 2019 16:13:59 GMT
When convoys supplying German and Italian forces in North Africa was losing seven out of ten ships, and that was the average losses between February 1941 and when they stopped trying in the Spring of 43, there was no way on God's green earth that those forces could be sustained. Amateurs study tactics, Professionals study logistics.
I don't know how many times I have heard that if Rommel captures the oil field of the Mid East then the game is up. Tell me should he capture what was left of them that the British had not blown up in advance, who would they get to operate the oil fields, how would they transport the oil to the refineries, how are they going to transport the product to depots so that they may be further transported to the end user? Did the Italian merchant marine have the ability to do this?
I tell you what I will do. You pose this dozen or so German divisions postulation to any professional British officer of your choice, preferably a graduate of the staff college at Camberley and see if he thinks what you propose is possible given the prevailing conditions of mid 1941 to Spring 1943. I am perfectly prepared to live with their answer.
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Post by yanmacca on Oct 28, 2019 19:48:48 GMT
I don’t need a dozen, three out of the six I posted up above would do, don’t forget we are talking of January 1941, not mid-1943, If Germany could get three new divisions to Tunisia in 1943, then why couldn’t they do it in January 1941, they managed to get enough units to form two Pz Divs in this time.
The oil fields would affect Britain too, if the Germans capture them, I have read tons of books stating that Germany needed oil. The middle east was also a base for Vichy French forces mainly in Syria, who were sleeping with the Nazi’s.
If Hitler was serious about the middle east, he could have sent Rommel there six months earlier when Wavell was not in any state to halt a couple of panzer division, but he didn’t, but again it is all as you say a WHIFF, so know one knows which makes this a pointless debate. Everyone has their own opinion about WW2, that is why there are so many sites which cover it. You yourself don’t like Monty, but there were some US Generals who did, many people like Rommel, but some other German officers didn’t think he was not that good and took too many chances.
To be honest I have only met one British officer and he was a captain, who married my Niece, I was unfortunate enough to be in the company of him and few of other officer pals, for around ten minutes and in that time I made up my mind that these six young men where childish and arrogant, which was sad because I thought they would be bigger than that.
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Post by yanmacca on Oct 28, 2019 20:15:06 GMT
Hi Dan, we both know that the Japanese overrun Burma, Malaya and Hong Kong, plus many other British held places, which brought the Japanese Army to India's eastern border. But without air support or supplies, they eventually became exhausted, and the British soon pushed them out of Kohima and the hills around Imphal. So I don’t think they would have been able to throw us out of Indian, in the same way as Rommel couldn’t throw us out of Africa.
Take care and it is great to see you around.
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Post by quincannon on Oct 28, 2019 20:37:52 GMT
Several of the units you listed did not exist in January of 41.
It is stone cold fact that Rommel could not adequately supply the German/Italian forces he had. When German reinforcements arrived in Tunisia late in 1942, they could not be adequately supplied either.
It is very easy to move a counter around a game board. It is far different when you have to supply and sustain those same forces in real life.
It rather irks me that you disregard what I say. I spent a good part of my life doing this stuff. I try very hard to relate to you that experience, and it is if none of it makes any difference to you at all. Do you think I do this to hear myself talk? I am not always right, and made my share of mistakes and misjudgments, but I can take my experience and understand what your own historians tell me, and you are still bean counting the numbers of units and the types and numbers of tanks. It is very frustrating, but you go ahead and live in Fantasyland, and I will continue to live in the land of the real and possible. You get more like Rini every day. Is that what you want or are you here like the rest of us to learn from each other?
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Post by yanmacca on Oct 28, 2019 20:48:19 GMT
There are times that you get more like DC then the bloke I used to know, which is a shame.
It doesn’t matter which divisions they are, Germany had thee in Africa in 1942 and they gave a strong British and commonwealth army a real scare, the point is they got them there and this was when Germany was concentrating its full might against Russia.
Dan asked could Germany win the war if they didn’t attack Russia and what I was saying is that, if the Germans don’t go into Russia, then sustaining three divisions in 1940/41 in Africa would be easier because the resources would be available. And we would not be as strong as we were in 1942, so it is not rocket science.
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Post by quincannon on Oct 28, 2019 21:36:44 GMT
The resources Rommel depended upon was the Italian merchant marine. They did not get any stronger between February of 41 and the Spring of 43. They got weaker. They would not be stronger if Germany did not invade Russia, and would have become just as weak regardless. So supplying the German/Italian army in North Africa had nothing to do with Russia at all.
Yes they did get two divisions there in the Spring of 41 (5th Light/21st Panzer and 15th Panzer) and added another later that year (90th Light Afrika). Those divisions were never up to standard equipment tables. They never had enough fuel, food, or ammunition, and the only reason they remained in the fight was using captured British stores of all three classes of supply from the British that ran away leaving them behind. During 1941 alone 70 percent of the ships trying to supply Rommel were sunk by the Royal Navy or aircraft operating out of Malta.
Weren't you just the other day sort of bragging that Montgomery while in France subsisted most of the time through over the beach logistics at the end of a four hundred mile supply line? That itself is a remarkable achievement, but what if that supply line had been several hundred miles across the Med, unloading at a port that had been bombed to shambles, then another four hundred miles for the most part across roadless (there was one road) desert, all with British naval superiority in the Med, then no better that air parity over land. Recall that Montgomery in France had air domination on his side, and was never short of trucks or the fuel to move them, and the roads to move them on, to get his supplies where he needed them.
As I said before amateur, you go ahead and count your tanks and number of divisions, and I as a professional know that the best tactics, the best divisions, the best tanks cannot do squat without the logistics and logistical systems in place to support and sustain the fight.
Ian it is time you faced facts, two of which are these:
a. There was no army in Europe that was designed to operate effectively (by overall structure) outside the continent of Europe. The only exception was the British Army, but they too could not do it without the Royal Navy and huge British merchant marine. Germany had no merchant marine in the Med, and had to depend upon the Italians, and they in turn could not build and man ships as fast as they were losing them. It baffles me that you cannot understand this.
b. Rommel was a very good general, but he was not nearly as good as your folks made him look, by the overall absolutely miserable performance of the British Army from just after Compass, until First Alamein. That is a two year period of having your ass handed to you on a platter, and building your chief adversary into a Superman to disguise the fact that your generals and senior leadership could not find their ass with both hands on a modern battlefield. How many reliefs for cause of Theater and Army commanders do you need to realize that your Army stunk to high heaven, because your leaders were mentally unprepared for modern battle. It is no damned wonder Churchill was so livid when faced with the repeated non-performance of his generals.
Ian, I do not enjoy taking you to task like this, but something I enjoy even less is putting out pure unadulterated crap so you can get a warm fuzzy feeling about your country, its army, and all things associated with British martial achievements. Your army is no damned better or worse than anyone else's. All of them are flawed. All of them depend upon the culture of the country itself when they formulate priorities and structure. All of them have good and bad leadership. Hell we had two years of complete idiots running the U S Army from 61 to 63, and some of our early generals in WWII were much worse than your own. This is what comes from taking sides. You, by doing so, miss the chance for realistic appraisal of what you do have. Just remember that you can't learn a damned thing from what you do well. You only learn from what you do badly.
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Post by yanmacca on Oct 29, 2019 16:39:50 GMT
I have no problem with what you are saying, as I said the other week, we have been through this before and I probably agreed with every word you said. The problem was that I posted a up something, mainly to keep the board rolling, which was just a token comment about radios and you gave me the same lecture as you did a while back. It brought a reaction out of me because it came out of the blue and seemed like you wanted to repeat the process again, showing how bad the British were and how good the US Army was. I know how bad we performed in the early stages of the war, it is noted in loads of books, some which I own. So, I didn’t need a repeat of what we have already discussed before. Dan asked a random question about Germany not invading Russia and I gave my answer, you responded and again tried to explain myself, which didn’t go down too well, but I still have a right to my opinion that in late 1940, the Italian’s and Germans could have put a force in Africa, which was strong enough to drive all the way to Suez, if Hitler would allow the resources to be released. At this point in the war, Egypt was badly garrisoned in both weapons and troops, so a strong force well supplied axis force could have had a field day, especially if it coincided with Axis invasion of the Balkans and Greece. That is my take on things as I see them, but Hitler had his sights on Russia and Africa was just a sideshow, which is understandable because he was making plans to invade the USSR and Musolini was letting him down in Yugoslavia and Greece as well as North Africa. The Germans had to postpone Barbarossa in an effort to support the Italians who got badly mauled again!
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Post by yanmacca on Oct 29, 2019 16:52:26 GMT
I forgot to add, that a few days ago, I went on one of my other sites and posted some of the statements you made and a friend of mine from USA posted this answer in five stages; 1. Even though the September 1943 revised division TO&E had three battalions each of tank, armored infantry, and armored field artillery, it does not mean they were designed to be used as balanced groups of one each or that that was the way all the divisions employed them on. The division has organized had only two operational combat commands, A and B. Reserve Command most emphatically was not intended for or organized and manned to be an operational combat command. If it was, it would have been designated CCC. Of the four divisions initially available in Normandy, only the 5th and 7th employed non-doctrinal balanced combat commands, the 4th and 6th AD employed two task-organized commands, one typically armor heavy and the other infantry heavy. Later, the practice of attaching an armored group headquarters to the armored division became common as a way to augment the capability of CCR and make it a full operational command, but getting three combat commands into operation required considerable improvisation. Only 5th Armored Division took the balanced team concept to its extreme initially, with one tank company and one armored infantry company "married" as a tactical unit. It was much later before other divisions began following similar patterns. All of this was the result of organizational improvisation in the field, rather than a well thought out doctrine.
2. The British went through a similar period of organizational improvisation, typified by the 11th Armoured Division (the Guards Armoured Division battlegroup appears to have been more a way to keep the cap badges together than a well-thought out organizational improvisation.
3. The March 1942 TO&E American divisions were different still. They had no Reserve Command, but occasionally improvised one based on either the Armored Infantry Regimental HQ or on the headquarters of the attached TD battalion.
4. The American Army could and did frequently send unsupported tanks into the attack without infantry and frequently without coordinated artillery support. Doing so correctly was a matter of careful practice and learning on the battlefield...everyone had problems with that at times, the initial employment of the German Panzer Brigaden is a good example.
5. The British division was simply bigger, by far, than the American 1943-pattern division. It had one more infantry and one more armour battalion (well, armoured reconnaissance, but effectively not much different), but only had two artillery regiments with 12 troops (48 guns) versus the American three battalions and nine batteries (54 howitzers) so that was pretty much a wash.
Never give up, never surrender. For his Montgomery I raise him a Courtney Hodges or Troy Middleton.
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Post by quincannon on Oct 29, 2019 17:29:59 GMT
1. Had you posted what you just did I would have agreed and we would have moved on.
2. He should note though that the headquarters companies of several of the Armor Groups we had were attached to many of the armored division, to reinforce the extremely small headquarters of the reserve commands, so that they too could become operational headquarters for the three combat command set up. Originally the reserve commands were intended to be a headquarters for those units of the armored division that were temporarily out of the line, resting, refitting, whatever. It only consisted of a couple of officers and a few enlisted personnel.
3. The 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions used the Headquarters Companies of the 41st and 36th Armored Infantry Regiments as their Combat Command R (or sometimes referred to as C)
I take issue with some of his task organization comments. They should not be considered all inclusive. While Wood had the 4th AD for instance they operated with two combat commands. Later they operated with three, and then two again. It was very much a learning work in progress.
WHEN, cite me date and place where U S Armor operated in Europe alone, meaning without Infantry and Artillery.
I won't argue the point about Hodges and Middleton. Neither of them should have been where they were. You might throw Bradley into the same bunch.
I disagree about his "well thought out doctrine" comment. The doctrine was well thought out, and it was also flexible enough for each armored division commander to mix and match forces as the situation dictated. In other words the doctrine was - Here it is use it as you see fit. There was absolutely nothing in period armored division doctrine that said you had to operate in a certain manner. That is why the organization itself was so damned good we are still using it.
Generally speaking though you friend is given you pretty good information.
Let me cite for you Correlli Barnett's "The Desert Generals" where he takes the opportunity to record for us Auchinleck's thoughts, post First Alamein on British Army organization. He was totally dissatisfied and wanted " the distinction between armored and Infantry divisions abolished in favor of an all mobile Eighth Army made up of each division with its ratio of tanks, guns and lorried Infantry. In this way the cooperation of all arms would be made permanent through the very structure of the division, under its divisional commander. Auchinlech this set in motion the complex machinery of training and organizing a new model army. It's a very good book and should be the first book one reads as he sets out to study the Desert Campaigns in my opinion. I am sure if Auchinlech had access to half traced personnel carries he would have replaced his trucks in favor of something much more mobile that could keep up with tanks as they jointly maneuvered. My main beef with the British Army was that they had observed for three years how the Germans operated in all arms armored formations, and did not adapt their own organizations and doctrine to both emulate and then defeat their opponents. Auchinleck comments on that too in a letter written three days after First Alamein where he says "We were not as well trained as the Germans - a fault of our pre-war training. We did not really train for war in peacetime in England - we play at it"
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Post by yanmacca on Oct 30, 2019 15:21:58 GMT
Well the main thing is that we at least kept things to some kind of decorum with is an improvement on last time.
My American friend [Rich Anderson from Bremerton, Washington] also asks if you are a fan of General William Hood Simpson and Alexander McCarrell Patch.
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