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Post by quincannon on Jan 18, 2017 23:43:38 GMT
The lack of reconnaissance is the primary cause of defeat on the LBH. Lack of reconnaissance was brought about by both haste and a careless reading of the trail signs, and contributed to by failing to reconnoiter areas that he was specifically directed to do, and a failure to extend the screen of his march out far enough to pick up signs of Crook's action on the 17th and the trails leading both to and from the Rosebud battle site. Every one of these faults are both inexcusable and ultimately fatal. Colt, Tom, and I are not the first to relate these facts to you Greg and will probably not be the last. The man who fails to adequately reconnoiter the battle space in advance of the battle is usually doomed to die within it, or worse cause others to die at the hand of his personal failure.
Beth: It is said that no plan survives first contact, and indeed most do not survive crossing the line of departure. You must be ready to change your plan nearly instantaneously, BUT YOU HAD DAMNED SIGHT BETTER let those who are charged with executing it that the plan is changed. Shooting, Moving and Communicating are the only things military units do. Notice how communications is an equal partner to fire and maneuver.
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Post by Beth on Jan 19, 2017 0:19:13 GMT
By changed do you mean a bit of fine tuning or plan A won't work so we will go with B?
I can see how Custer made a mistake by not keeping his officers informed of the situation-it speaks of distrust of his officer's ability or of fear of his own shortcomings but how would another officer have handled having his regiment spread out over such distance? Or is the answer another officer wouldn't have gotten himself into that position?
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Post by quincannon on Jan 19, 2017 0:39:18 GMT
It means as each situation evolves you must evolve with it. What would work five minutes ago, might not work now, You adapt to and overcome each situation as it presents itself. Therefore your plan is nothing more than a broad outline, a set of parameters you stay within, but you must adapt to what the enemy is doing, because you can be sure that he is adapting to you. You cannot thin of everything in the planning stage. You try to, but it is impossible, because the other guy is thinking just as hard as you are, and maybe harder. So while you may have alternatives in mind at the outset a plan(s) B thru Z, you can never know for certain until you take incoming what your next move will be. Training and battle drills help, but they can never replace the intuitive decision you order you issue based upon an evaluation you make in seconds. Most of your communications in battle are either calls for fire or fragmentary orders changing your plan.
Ask Burnside at Fredericksburg how sticking to plan A in the face of Marye's Heights worked out for him.
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Post by Beth on Jan 19, 2017 1:19:40 GMT
I had to look up that one because I tend to associate Burnside only with the Battle of the Crater. I did not realize he was a West Pointer. Ironically, he seems to have had the post war career Custer wanted for himself.
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Post by dgfred on Jan 19, 2017 2:48:35 GMT
Greg, I think Custer thought Reno was going to be able to stay active in the valley for an hour or so, which would have been enough time for him to envelop the village. I also think he felt all the hostiles would do is fight a delaying action while the majority of the village packed and fled. Believing in his fairy tales, he saw no reason his envelopment plan would not work. Not until he got a bloody nose at ford D did it dawn on him this was not going to be the Army's best day. Again, he operated on a very bad set of assumptions and you know what happens when you assume. You make an ASS out of U and ME. That is a long time for Reno to hold vs so many estimated warriors. If he just makes Reno wait a bit he is in a position to hit if he wants to at about the same time or make an educated (?what?) decision on what to do next. An immediate withdrawal back to Reno with Benteen shortly making it back will still leave them with a strong force with many options. The Indians will still be withdrawing at some point way quicker than they ended up having to/ Warriors will have to protect the withdrawal and might not be so keen to attack most of the 7th Cav on the high ground near their village. And after ford D attempt was it about every man for himself to LSH (from Custer's group)? Were the civilians and doctor riding with the attack element there? I am having trouble with him hitting around ford D already without Calhoun/Keogh/etc (are they up at their line already?) and I guess the civilians and doctor held back a little? How many would have been making this envelopment? Or was it just a little recon/scout attempt to cross the river and finally figure out what the villagers/warriors were actually doing? Not only did he split/weaken his force from the very beginning... it seems he kept right on doing it until he was swarmed. Looking at other battles in the Sioux Wars the commanders don't mind withdrawing/retreating their guys if they seem to be getting in hot water... Custer acted like he was wearing blinders and earplugs.
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Post by dgfred on Jan 19, 2017 2:52:55 GMT
I had to look up that one because I tend to associate Burnside only with the Battle of the Crater. I did not realize he was a West Pointer. Ironically, he seems to have had the post war career Custer wanted for himself. Antietam and Burnside bridge is a good read too. Some Georgia guys held him from crossing the bridge/river/creek much like the warriors did at the LBH.
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Post by dgfred on Jan 19, 2017 2:59:52 GMT
By changed do you mean a bit of fine tuning or plan A won't work so we will go with B? I can see how Custer made a mistake by not keeping his officers informed of the situation-it speaks of distrust of his officer's ability or of fear of his own shortcomings but how would another officer have handled having his regiment spread out over such distance? Or is the answer another officer wouldn't have gotten himself into that position? He didn't inform anything tho. ? Benteen- see if hostiles on those hills (hopefully most were in that giant village ahead of him that his scouts told him about) ? Reno- attack the village... the rest (? not Benteen) of the outfit (?? maybe his guys) will support you ( WHEN/HOW) ? Scouts- disarm and leave (? Why would they act this way) Why not send them back with messages of what he was up to? Geez.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 19, 2017 3:05:26 GMT
Ambrose Burnside had one good day in four long years.
I have thought about Fredericksburg a lot over the years, and I am very familiar with the land that surrounds it. That is particularly true of the land to the southeast of the city, which is now Fort A P Hill. I believe if Burnside had tried to cross the Rappahannock at Port Conway, which is just across the river from Port Royal, the river being no more than 500 meters wide there, he could have established a secure bridgehead. The river is also navigable up to Port Royal.
If you could bring shallow draft gunboats and transports up there, with about a divisions worth of troops, I think you could position those gunboats to cover the crossing site, while you landed that division from the transports in a sort of bay like feature about 6000 meters east of Port Royal. Tom probably knows the place for it is where Essex, Caroline, and King George County Lines meet.
If you could hold Lee's attention by demonstrating on the Stafford Heights immediately north of Fburg, I think you could build a bridgehead at Port Royal in fairly short order, then cross the bulk of the AoP. Lee's line is then flanked, and if you could move quick enough, get to Bowling Green and cut the RF&P. At that point Lee must withdraw. You have the advantage of having only half the distance to go to Bowling Green than Lee would. I do not believe he would dare fight the AoP down near Bowling Green.
The idea is not original with me, Stuart patrolled that area before the Battle of Fredericksburg took place, and he was very concerned about just such a move. I believe he had every right to be. I also believe if the AoP executed well it would have worked. Remember the AoP did not want to fight at Fredericksburg, They wanted their fight in the vicinity of Ashland,
Burnside was not long on imagination and it showed, Custer was too long on imagination (returning to the thread subject) and that too showed. There must be balance in all things.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 19, 2017 3:17:03 GMT
Greg you really do need to read the Custer attacks Ford D thread, all 120 or so pages of it. Most of the questions you are floundering with now are addressed there. It is long and complicated, and any answer you get on one tiny thing will bring about fifteen more on things related. I know it is a chore, and keep in mind it is about ten people over a years time batting ideas, testimony, evidence and maps, lots of maps, back an forth until they reached consensus. I flat guarantee you that it is a vision of what happened at LBH like none other you have ever seen, or are likely to see. What I will tell you that the final product is not only feasible, but completely supported by evidence.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 19, 2017 3:32:14 GMT
The answer Beth is that another officer would not have gotten himself into that mess.
It goes back to the idea we have broached many times here, Custer never had to think for himself in the ACW. He did fairly well, but not without fault, when others did the thinking. He was incapable of operating without close supervision. As a Lieutenant Colonel, he would have made a dandy Second Lieutenant, for that is the place he started and never grew from. He had the intellectual capacity of Huntz Hall, or to be more accurate, his character Horace DeBussey Jones.
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 19, 2017 10:18:47 GMT
Beth, I think I did try to simulate how the bighorn river ran from 1876, but I also drew in the course today, which was wrong, but the emphasis was on the smaller creeks and ditches which ran down the left hand side.
I also failed to add that ditch or ravine which the Indians occupied to block Reno and if I am right then this obstacle would be located across that natural funnel between the loop and the creek on the left.
If I had added that obstacle to the map, you would see that this village was ringed by natural defenses, which may not have stopped an infantry assault, but they would break up a cavalry charge.
Makes you think why the Indians choose this place, very clever choice.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Jan 19, 2017 11:56:55 GMT
The answer Beth is that another officer would not have gotten himself into that mess. It goes back to the idea we have broached many times here, Custer never had to think for himself in the ACW. He did fairly well, but not without fault, when others did the thinking. He was incapable of operating without close supervision. As a Lieutenant Colonel, he would have made a dandy Second Lieutenant, for that is the place he started and never grew from. He had the intellectual capacity of Huntz Hall, or to be more accurate, his character Horace DeBussey Jones. Hurrah, a Bowery Boy quote, is that a tribute to the basement dwelling New Yorker who lives not far from there, and thinks he knows all about this battle and it's US commander?
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 19, 2017 12:12:43 GMT
Sometimes you can be forgiven in thinking that Custer didn’t have a scoobie do about what to do that day and amended his plans as he went along, and that’s why his officers were never kept in the loop because no loop existed, I can imagine that the decision the detach Benteen was made on that morning sometime after the command moved off and then the plan to send Reno down the valley and himself to go right was also made when he reached the flats near Reno creek.
Up to then Custer would be riding and formulating on the fly and maybe, just maybe musing stuff with both Tom and Cook, and some major decisions were probably made as reports came in from Varnum, Hare and whoever else was out in front.
It does seem incredible that an officer who fought at such engagements during the ACW like;
Chickahominy Bull Run Gettysburg Yellow Tavern Winchester Cedar Creek Appomattox
And take the field against the Indians at Washita could be so slap dash on the 25th June.
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Jan 19, 2017 14:29:24 GMT
By changed do you mean a bit of fine tuning or plan A won't work so we will go with B? I can see how Custer made a mistake by not keeping his officers informed of the situation-it speaks of distrust of his officer's ability or of fear of his own shortcomings but how would another officer have handled having his regiment spread out over such distance? Or is the answer another officer wouldn't have gotten himself into that position? Beth, if you remember, Benteen asked Custer if perhaps they shouldn't keep the regiment together, when Custer sent him on the left scout. He realized that keeping combat power all together was going to be the right move, but Custer informed him "you have your orders". I doubt Benteen would have done the same things Custer did, given that he was in command instead of Custer. I also don't think Reno would have made the same decisions as Custer. It doesn't take a genius to figure out that if 1500 warriors, by estimate, are the target, and you only have 600, that you are outnumbered almost 3 to 1, therefore, splitting your combat power only makes those odds worse. I also think Reno or Benteen, or any of the other senior captains, for that matter, would have reconned the battle space on the 25th, and would not have cut short the scout to the headwaters, let alone rushed to the attack on the 25th.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 19, 2017 14:43:18 GMT
Him being compared to a certain person who lives in his mamma basement is an insult to the intellect of Horace DeBussey Jones Tom. That is like saying Vivaldi could not compose above the Spike Jones and the City Slickers level.
The difference Ian, is that in all those ACW battles you listed Custer did not have to do any thinking. All he had to do was fight. He was always told what to do and where to go. Unlike Custer, Stuart thought out what he was going to do before he did it. He always had his time distance factors worked out. His Chambersburg Raid was a classic example of independent operations in hostile territory. Everything the man did was thought out well in advance of taking action. He fumbled a time or two, but always recovered, but all of his fumbles were as a result of what the enemy did which was unexpected. The fact that he adapted to the enemy, recovered, and carried on is what Custer did not have either the brain or experience to do. Also take Dave's favorite Forrest. Brice's Crossroads did not happen by accident. Forrest looked at what weather and terrain gave him, calculated time and distances (reaction time and ability) to the two parts of the Union force, and struck at the time and places of his choosing and destroyed them, all this while operating completely independently.
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