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Post by Beth on Jan 17, 2017 17:31:34 GMT
A google has turned up that 'armchair general' may be considered derogatory to some. If anyone wants the title of this thread changed, let me know and I will gladly do so.
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Post by dgfred on Jan 17, 2017 17:55:20 GMT
Not really derogatory... but it is a website that I attend. Haha.
We are all armchair generals and armchair soldiers/warriors.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 17, 2017 19:03:39 GMT
One of the greatest of the Armchair Generals never got above the rank of Captain in the British Army - Basil Henry Liddell-Hart. His monumental work "Strategy" is still available and I commend it to your reading. Particularly impressive within that work is the Indirect Approach, which is the basis of all modern warfare, and I must admit the foundation of my preferred method of attack contained in the first paragraph in my post above.
His ideas were not new. He drew heavily upon the past, most notably John Churchill. What he did was absorb those lessons and present them in light of changing battlefield conditions in the 20th and into the 21st centuries.
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 17, 2017 19:30:40 GMT
One thing that I think may happen with the valley scenario, is that each Indian band would try and protect each circle, so we may have an effect that would see each circle reacting to the differing battalions and their line of assault.
The village would be stretched out along the river, so the Hunkpapa would react to Reno and the Oglala and Blackfoot reacting to any flanking move, and this would still leave five major tribal circles in the shape of the Cheyenne, San Arcs, Yankton’s, Brule’s and Miniconjou.
The only way around this is to try and mask the flanking movement until sufficient warriors have gravitated south towards Reno, otherwise each battalion may run into its own blocking force manned by the warriors from that particular area.
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Post by dgfred on Jan 17, 2017 20:58:57 GMT
Well... the Indians do discuss after the fact of how all the warriors were mixed up together as it was.
It really was a lot like a hornets nest. They don't care about the who or the where... they just attack.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 17, 2017 21:15:52 GMT
That is the reason that timing is so important Ian. You must dangle that bait out there in the form of Reno or whomever was in command of that first battalion going in. You must draw the Indians out of the village into the open ground south of it. Let them think they have easy pickings. When you get them at the point of trying to flank that first battalion, you slam them with the second, then repeat the process with the third if necessary.
At that juncture the Indians that have come out are fighting for their lives by virtue of being hit in the flank at least once and probably twice.
At the same time those that remain in the village have a whole lot more to worry about then blocking George Custer.
The plan revolves around hitting them where they might expect to be hit, in the south, and at the same time being hit by a helped along mother nature from the west.
One WILL NOT work without the other.
Absent the fire in the west, or the Army of the Potomac attacking from that direction, Custer's combat power plays out about where the Garry Owen Post Office is now. His shock action gone. His shock effect dissipated. His momentum stalled. It then becomes a losing proposition to stay there and fight it out. He must retrograde, and the assault becomes pointless.
When to conduct the assault is also very important. There is nothing that masks an approach march better than the hours of darkness, and there is nothing more expected than a dawn attack. That is why you would make your approach march at night, and wait until about an hour after dawn, when they have had breakfast and just settled down with the morning paper and that second cup of coffee. Winning the mind game is just as important as your kinetic energy component of your tactical vision for this battle. Remember gross numbers are not on your side, so you dump your trick bag out on the sidewalk and use them all.
All of this requires thorough reconnaissance, not as much as my preferred plan, but at least a full day. The selection of routes for that second and third battalions are extremely important, because you are going to bring those battalions into position on the night of the 25/26 and they must know both where they are going and where to stop. The route for the first battalion must be well reconnoitered as well, so you bring them down to a few miles south of Ford A and let them sit, About dawn you get that battalion moving northward making it appear that they are just wandering into the area. Crossing that river they make it look like a bunch of extras in a John Ford movie, guidons unfurled, trumpets a blasting away. Easy pickings, but in actuality bait dangling on the end of your hook.
Before anyone comments, it is important to understand two things. Everyone on God's green earth knew that there was a lot of Indians in the Valley of the Little Bighorn. They might not have know exactly where they were, but that is what reconnaissance is for. Secondly, the most expected direction that the attack would come from was the south. That trail could not be missed by a blind man, and the Indians were aware of that. Normally if you attack from an expected direction it is to your disadvantage, but it can be turned into an advantage with the prudent and active use of deceptive measures.
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Post by yanmacca on Jan 18, 2017 13:20:07 GMT
Why I mentioned about the circles was how late the Cheyennes entered the battle. Apparently it seems like there was enough of them still hanging around in the north of the village to face Custer and probable deflect him. Now this battle for the northern ford could have taken place after Reno had been defeated, so this shows how big this village was and hitting it from the south and southwest would still be a big task. Has Chuck said reconnoiter in the days prior to the attack would be the way to go, because if you look at the area in question, we see that around the Garryowen loop we have a natural funnel and also a creek or ditch extends right the way up the left hand side of the village area; Please see my map below to view the funnel plus the obstacles formed by creeks or ditches (yes another map);
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Post by dgfred on Jan 18, 2017 21:02:08 GMT
That is why I find it so hard to believe that Custer's force was still thinking offensive at that point.
Obviously (I would think): The village is giant. Still barely near the northern edge even at ford D. There are waaay more warriors than was expected at one point (village). Reno's attack did not cause the warriors to flee at all. At that time he was likely already smashed.
What could he have been thinking? At that point does he still think his 'plan' is working ok?
It does seem he was only thinking of glory for himself at that point... what else could it be? Sent Benteen off, had Reno attack with zero support from 'the rest of the outfit', and starts on a long/complicated flank march. Should not the flank march been done first, attack with Reno, then the flank attack by Custer with Benteen right there for support of either attack???
He made the entire operation one big cluster-you-know-what from the moment he split his force up into three wings.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 18, 2017 21:46:23 GMT
If you are asking me or indeed anyone else what the man was thinking or IF he was thinking, I just can't tell you.
If he had a plan, it is pretty obvious that he was thinking about going in against only one tribal circle. When he found out that he was up against something much larger, something unplanned for, and far above his present capabilities, it somehow descends into a fog. From that point you can't make any real sense out of what he is doing.
Made it a clusterf**k, and knowing that you have made it a clusterf**k are two different things. If everyone who made their battle a clusterf**k knew what they were doing in advance, there would be no clusterf**ks.
My personal belief is that Custer thought he was in complete control of events, nearly to the end. He was wrong, simple as that. He would not have been the first, nor will he be the last to harbor those beliefs. If you try to understand it, you will drive yourself crazy. So don't try, it's fools errand, unless somehow you can dig him up and ask him
I think before you go much further in this journey you should read the Custer attacks Ford D thread. You may change your mind about the flow of the battle, and perhaps become as convinced as most of regulars here have that Custer did not go anywhere near Ford B, and that Companies C, I, and L were where they were for a far different reason and in quite a different circumstance than the conventionalists theories have it. As Beth said there is little to no evidence that anyone went there. There is much in the way of evidence that they did not go there at all. Ford B is a duel agenda proposition in the Wonderful World of Disney that is the vested interest holders in the LBH Saga.
To answer your specific question concerning the flank march, the answer in the abstract is yes and no. It really depends upon the situation. If it is a contain-bypass-haul ass your lead element hits and contains and your follow on (your main effort) skirts around the flank of the contained, and keeps on going until they achieve the objective. On other occasions you may do a infiltrating penetration, then start the party by say a frontal attack. At some point in the festivities your infiltrated penetration force jumps up and yells surprise its your birthday, and have we got a party for you. If you wish to know more about how this latter is done let me refer you to Section II, Chapter 3 Field Manual 7-72. I and about two hundred fifty or so of my nearest and dearest are rather proud of that. Of course we stole it from the German Jaegers, but I don't think they minded all that much.
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Jan 18, 2017 22:46:40 GMT
That is why I find it so hard to believe that Custer's force was still thinking offensive at that point. Obviously (I would think): The village is giant. Still barely near the northern edge even at ford D. There are waaay more warriors than was expected at one point (village). Reno's attack did not cause the warriors to flee at all. At that time he was likely already smashed. What could he have been thinking? At that point does he still think his 'plan' is working ok? It does seem he was only thinking of glory for himself at that point... what else could it be? Sent Benteen off, had Reno attack with zero support from 'the rest of the outfit', and starts on a long/complicated flank march. Should not the flank march been done first, attack with Reno, then the flank attack by Custer with Benteen right there for support of either attack??? He made the entire operation one big cluster-you-know-what from the moment he split his force up into three wings. -------------------------------------------------- Greg, He hadn't seen the village, he just knew it was close, until he went up the bluffs. He sent Benteen off to the left believing there were outlying village circles, much like what he found at Washita, and when he received reports the Indians were fleeing, followed by reports they were coming out to meet Reno, he assumed a screening force only and that the majority were going to flee north. The reason he screwed the pooch was the total lack of effective recon of the battlespace. If he had done proper recon before moving against the village, he would not have needed to send Benteen to the left, he would have known there were far more than 1500 warriors in camp, and he would have known the location of the village and its length. He probably would have known where the fords were and their condition for crossing enmasse. He didn't do proper recon, therefore a cluster**** resulted. Had he known all of the above, he probably would have sent Reno and Benteen across at ford A, but not until he had time to get north with the other 5 companies. He could easily have had them hold on the east side for, say 1/2 hour, to give him time to move unobserved to ford D. With him hidden behind battle ridge, when Reno attacked with 6 companies, the Indians would have had to respond with at least as many as they historically did, and while they were doing that, Custer could have crossed at Ford D and had a very nice two-prong attack going on, even though he was outnumbered. And if he had Reno start fires and spook the ponies, running them north, so much the better. As it was, he grossly underestimated their strength and what they would do in response to Reno, and how long Reno could continue with his charge. He didn't have enough time to get north before Reno broke. About the time Reno reached the hill and Benteen joined him, the Custer fight was pretty much already over. By the time Weir saw the northern action, all he saw was the massacre of the dead and wounded, the fight was over.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Jan 18, 2017 22:47:59 GMT
Sadly GAC never shared his plans. I fault him for that. Recon was at best poor to non existent from the divide on. I fault him for that, I do understand that he felt he had been discovered, that morning. The facts are, Custer had been seen as early as his first evening away from Terry, he, however, was not shadowed. He was spotted at his first camp on the 24th. The following quote is from Gall through James McLaughlin, Indian Agent. "We knew where the soldiers camped on the night of the 24th. Buffalo scouts brought this word to us late at night on the 24th. We were surprised at this information because we did not expect any soldiers unless they came from the south where we knew Crook was. The Buffalo scouts reported these soldiers northeast of us."
Regards, Tom
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Post by Beth on Jan 18, 2017 22:49:14 GMT
That is the reason that timing is so important Ian. You must dangle that bait out there in the form of Reno or whomever was in command of that first battalion going in. You must draw the Indians out of the village into the open ground south of it. Let them think they have easy pickings. When you get them at the point of trying to flank that first battalion, you slam them with the second, then repeat the process with the third if necessary.
Personally I think that idea supports that Custer might have called Benteen up so he could support Reno in the valley while he (Custer) rode north to be the hammer to their anvil. Perhaps the biggest failing of BLBH was Custer's timing, even going back as far as Powder River.
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Jan 18, 2017 22:52:16 GMT
Greg, I think Custer thought Reno was going to be able to stay active in the valley for an hour or so, which would have been enough time for him to envelop the village. I also think he felt all the hostiles would do is fight a delaying action while the majority of the village packed and fled. Believing in his fairy tales, he saw no reason his envelopment plan would not work. Not until he got a bloody nose at ford D did it dawn on him this was not going to be the Army's best day.
Again, he operated on a very bad set of assumptions and you know what happens when you assume. You make an ASS out of U and ME.
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Post by Beth on Jan 18, 2017 23:22:39 GMT
Sadly GAC never shared his plans. I fault him for that. Recon was at best poor to non existent from the divide on. I fault him for that, I do understand that he felt he had been discovered, that morning. The facts are, Custer had been seen as early as his first evening away from Terry, he, however, was not shadowed. He was spotted at his first camp on the 24th. The following quote is from Gall through James McLaughlin, Indian Agent. "We knew where the soldiers camped on the night of the 24th. Buffalo scouts brought this word to us late at night on the 24th. We were surprised at this information because we did not expect any soldiers unless they came from the south where we knew Crook was. The Buffalo scouts reported these soldiers northeast of us." Regards, Tom I think that even if Custer had shared his plans with Reno and Benteen, he totally altered them at some point. Perhaps one of the reasons that he never shared his plans was so he was at liberty to change them on the fly-- a stupid reason that perhaps might work on other occasions when he would have had better recon but he had too much missing information to start spinning off huge chucks of his regiment to distances beyond his ability to communicate and control.
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Post by Beth on Jan 18, 2017 23:27:41 GMT
Why I mentioned about the circles was how late the Cheyennes entered the battle. Apparently it seems like there was enough of them still hanging around in the north of the village to face Custer and probable deflect him. Now this battle for the northern ford could have taken place after Reno had been defeated, so this shows how big this village was and hitting it from the south and southwest would still be a big task. Has Chuck said reconnoiter in the days prior to the attack would be the way to go, because if you look at the area in question, we see that around the Garryowen loop we have a natural funnel and also a creek or ditch extends right the way up the left hand side of the village area; Please see my map below to view the funnel plus the obstacles formed by creeks or ditches (yes another map); Cool map but can I suggest that you should also highlight the areas were the river used to run and have left behind oxbow type lakes/ponds, they too would have been a natural barrier or at least change how you would move around them.
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