benteen
First Lieutenant
"Once An Eagle
Posts: 406
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Post by benteen on May 19, 2017 18:41:03 GMT
Mac,
Sorry. my fault. I was going by who Custer actually sent (Martini) which is not what you were asking, which was "what If" Custer had sent a competent messenger.
I believe Capt Benteen was a fine and competent Officer. Your choice of Sgt Major Sharrow is an excellent choice. He would be able to convey to Benteen exactly what Custer wanted and answer correctly any of Benteens questions. Between these two fine soldiers I believe they could have co-ordinated an attack in the valley with Custer.
If this happened, then yes Mac, I believe it would have made a world of difference. Your thought carries much merit.
The entire regiment in the valley at the same time could have caused enough casualties that that warriors would have been concerned about the village, to the point that they may have set up a rear guard and had the village flee. The only direction they go go with the 7th blocking the South would be North, exactly what Terry wanted.
As a side bar... I am in the minority but I dont believe any regiment , even under a competent commander, could have defeated these Indians, on this day, at this location, but I dont think there would have been the Cavalry disaster that it was.
Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on May 19, 2017 19:28:18 GMT
I am going to step into the role I often take, that of a contrarian.
Martini was a competent messenger. He could ride a horse, obviously had a pocket to carry the message in, knew by sight who the message was addressed to, and had at least some general idea where that person was, and the route he would have to travel to reach him. So he was a competent messenger.
A competent messenger though was not what was required in the situation Mac outlines for us. What was required was a liaison, preferably an officer, preferably one that had a complete knowledge of what Custer intended, and the ability to fully explain those intentions to Benteen. Had it been me Cooke would have been my choice. He was available. He had the adequate amount of knowledge. Benteen would have seen him as a peer or near peer. Much better fit I think than Sharrow, and I do not wish to take anything away from him.
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As to if any regiment could have beaten the Indians. I think the answer is yes, if the definition of beating is defined as forcing the enemy to displace, and to be in possession of the battlespace when the curtain closes on the day.
I think the type of unit should have been an Infantry Regiment, fully realizing of course that I will be accused of Infantry mindedness, and all that other gibberish that can be expected from Queens. I say this with some caution and with absolutely no pride of branch.
The overriding reason that the 7th Cavalry was defeated at LBH was because they were cavalry. They possessed mobility which allowed them to range much farther afield than the average foot mobile Infantry. In the hand of a steady, fully aware, competent and less rash decision prone commander, the effects of mobility could have been adequately managed. In the hands of a Custer it was both a battle loser and death sentence.
The average Infantry regiment on the other hand would have approached from the south in a compact formation, and even though they did not have the mobility advantage I believe the compactness of the formation would have been the prevailing factor. There would no longer be any need for a mobility advantage at the point of contact, and it would have in fact become a hindrance to the Indians for the long haul.
Numbers, I think are meaningless, when you factor in the Indian style of fighting, six to one maximum anticipated odds against would have been overcome by concentrated firepower. In fact a 500 man Infantry regiment would have more shooters than a six hundred man cavalry regiment, less vulnerabilities, and a better primary weapon.
Terrain in the valley favors Infantry over cavalry.
All in all I think an Infantry unit would have prevailed
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Post by Beth on May 19, 2017 20:02:27 GMT
That is a lot of food for thought QC. I can see why with a different commander that a liaison would have worked well but unfortunately we have no idea if Custer had an actual battle plan other than once he saw the village to get north ASAP and then see what develops. Also we are talking about Custer who despite being a General had little experience as a regimental commander.
Do you think Cooke at the time Martini was sent would know what Custer's battle plan was? Do you think he would have informed his inner circle of his plans more than 'we need Benteen and the packs". I was under the impression that Custer like to keep his plans to himself or was that only towards Benteen and Reno?
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Post by quincannon on May 19, 2017 20:09:58 GMT
Beth: The first part of what I wrote was addressed to the WHIFF Mac presented, the gathering together of the Benteen and Custer elements in the valley to support Reno.
To do something on this order Custer would have had to give instructions to Cooke, or whomever, so that definitive detail as to execution could be conveyed.
Any dumb ass could take Cooke's message to Benteen, and evidently it was type casting.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on May 19, 2017 20:59:59 GMT
Beth I was referring to the way GAC described his "little bride" and other sweet nothings. Personally I believe Libbie did not lead the glamorous life she envisioned while camped in the filed during the ACW. The social life they both thrived for was difficult to find west of NYC and without the glorious headlines he gained from the campaigns of the '64 and '65. Regards Dave
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Post by deadwoodgultch on May 20, 2017 11:29:09 GMT
My take away from the above is one phrase " concentrated firepower ".
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Post by quincannon on May 20, 2017 15:30:33 GMT
The ultimate purpose of all maneuver is to bring concentrated firepower down upon the enemy.
Maneuver may have side effects as well, some being forcing the enemy to displace, or forcing the enemy into such a situation as to make further resistance range from ill advised to hopeless.
Regardless, the formation used to maneuver is the key ingredient in the concentration of firepower you seek as and end state.
What you see at LBH is maneuver run amok, caused by a commander who forgot the basic principles outlined above.
The result of maneuver, was not concentration, but rather dispersion, allowing the Indians to defeat two small forces who could not concentrate firepower, rather than one large force that could.
I am convinced that an Infantry force could have approached that village from the south, as Reno did, without much trouble. They may have been able to get much closer, if they had taken advantage of the cover of darkness, during the pre-dawn morning hours of the next day. At that point you form your lines and invite the enemy to your party. They would have come out to screen, perhaps even flank, all the time exposing themselves to the concentrated firepower of the whole body. Inevitably they would find that they could not break up that concentration or displace it. Had the Indians chosen to pursue their various adventures mounted, all they would do is present larger targets. Eventually the Indians, both warriors and camp, would be forced to displace, and as Benteen points out there was only one direction to go.
Miles proved these things at Wolf Mountain several months later, so there is nothing new, strange, or even controversial about this approach, save in Queens.
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Post by yanmacca on May 20, 2017 15:41:44 GMT
If there any difference between a infantry firing line and a cavalry skirmish line? would the cavalry be more widely spread compared with a infantry line? Is so then the infantry would be able to deliver a more concentrated fire pattern compared to the loosely formed cavalry, but having said that, infantry would probably be trained to fight like that, where as cavalry were not supposed to fight it out, as pitched battles were not their forte.
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Post by quincannon on May 20, 2017 16:19:25 GMT
During that period I suspect the Infantry company formations would be much more compact than a cavalry company in skirmish order. For cavalry the skirmish line was how they did business, for as you point out, they were in the business of normally disputing territory in the front of others. The Infantry were the "others"
Infantry units, normally when cavalry was not around, could also use a portion of their force for skirmishing purposes which was the same general idea as that for the cavalry. In this instance, the example I presented, there would be no real need for skirmishers. You have invited the enemy to your table, and your companies represent how you have arranged the plates, knives, forks, spoons, cups, and saucers, in a orderly intimate setting for dinner. You don't spoil the thing by placing your dog's food dish, on the chair of the guest of honor.
If the terrain in the valley, south of the village, was more broken, then there would be a need for an Infantry unit to place skirmishers to their front for early warning, and an early disruption of the enemy attack. Just like Brother Sharpe did it in the novels. Ultimately you would pull these people back and allow the enemy to hit your main line.
Keep in mind than in the 19th century the only advantage that cavalry had over Infantry was faster short term mobility, but for that they had to pay the price of also being a lot more vulnerable.
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Post by yanmacca on May 21, 2017 10:27:05 GMT
Crook had an infantry force included in his column [5 x companies I believe] and 10 x companies of cavalry, this force also had around 100 x armed civilians plus 250 x Indians, but these were stopped dead in their tracks by these same Indians that roughly handled Custer and according to some sources the Wyoming column would have lasted as long as a CIA man in China if it wasn't for their Indian contingent.
This force of over a 1000 in total, was virtually intact and not spread over out of supporting distance like Custer's 7th.
You could say that Crook should have known that a large force of Indians was heading his way much sooner then he did, so didn't he have scouts out ahead?
These Indians were pretty cock sure of themselves and had no worries about fighting so far from their families in the village. If Crook had adequate warning, could he have sought good ground, possible one of his own choosing, with the thought of stopping these hostiles in their tracks and then initiated a counter punch?
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Post by deadwoodgultch on May 21, 2017 11:39:08 GMT
Ian,
You answered your own question. You even addressed my puncher question, this was a display of counter punching, Crook's NA's bought him time and he threw a number of counter punches. He even pulled a punch when he needed to. This pulled punch was when he recalled his cavalry from sure doom when they were following the Indians to continue the battle or locate the village.
Regards, Tom
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Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
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Post by Deleted on May 21, 2017 14:57:27 GMT
Crook had an infantry force included in his column [5 x companies I believe] and 10 x companies of cavalry, this force also had around 100 x armed civilians plus 250 x Indians, but these were stopped dead in their tracks by these same Indians that roughly handled Custer and according to some sources the Wyoming column would have lasted as long as a CIA man in China if it wasn't for their Indian contingent. This force of over a 1000 in total, was virtually intact and not spread over out of supporting distance like Custer's 7th. You could say that Crook should have known that a large force of Indians was heading his way much sooner then he did, so didn't he have scouts out ahead? These Indians were pretty cock sure of themselves and had no worries about fighting so far from their families in the village. If Crook had adequate warning, could he have sought good ground, possible one of his own choosing, with the thought of stopping these hostiles in their tracks and then initiated a counter punch? Okay, let's cut to the chase. Yes or No answer, no quibbling. Did Crook have a better outcome fighting Indians than Custer? Yes, or no.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on May 21, 2017 15:04:31 GMT
Montrose.
Yes, in several climates and terrain. He also used his resources in a better fashion, generally. You I am sure have used those same or similar resources at one time or another.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on May 21, 2017 15:12:28 GMT
Montana Column:
According to some sources Mary's little lamb went everywhere Mary did. If you take that literally Mary slept with that lamb, bathed with that lamb, ate with that lamb, took a pee with that lamb, and took that lamb with her to the senior prom. Does anyone think that the some sources citing the nursery rhyme really meant everywhere? Maybe they did or maybe:
Some sources never heard of the phrase - Depends upon the situation.
Wyoming Column:
Crook was not tactically stopped cold, at least not stopped cold because of anything the Indians did. Crook was surprised, in a not so good place. A back and forth ensued. He fought his battle to a draw. What stopped Crook was his logistical situation at the end of the battle. He could go no further with his combat trains being fifty miles from his field trains. His field trains were secure, but not secured well enough to move them forward. He had to fall back upon them.
Amateurs study tactics. Professionals study logistics - Remember that. It is important.
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Post by yanmacca on May 21, 2017 15:17:34 GMT
Crook was an experienced Indian fighter. Here is a document written about him;
Considered the army's greatest Indian fighter, General George Crook earned that reputation by developing a respect for his enemy that carried over into his relationships with Native Americans off the battlefield as well.
Born in 1828 into an Ohio farming family, Crook graduated from West Point in 1852 near the bottom of his class. He spent the first part of his military career in Northern California and Oregon fighting several Indian peoples and learning how to operate under frontier conditions that left his troops short of supplies but well-provisioned with hair-trigger, often hare-brained local volunteers. The outbreak of the Civil War in 1861 brought him back east, where he served in guerrilla actions in West Virginia and at the battles of Second Bull Run and Chickamauga.
After the war, Crook returned to the Pacific Northwest, waging a two-year campaign against the Paiute. His success led to President Ulysses S. Grant personally placing Crook in charge of the Arizona Territory, where beginning in 1871 he waged a successful campaign to force the Apache onto reservations. The hallmarks of this campaign, as of his broader general career, were his extensive use of Indian scouts, his relentless pursuit of Indians on their own territory and his readiness to negotiate rather than force conflict.
Having accomplished his mission in Arizona, Crook was transferred to the northern Plains in 1875, where he was first given the impossible task of removing a rapidly growing hoard of gold miners from the Black Hills. By 1876, he was part of a coordinated attack designed to drive the defiant Lakota bands gathered around Sitting Bull back onto their reservations. In this campaign his troops were forced to retreat from Lakota and Cheyenne warriors led by Crazy Horse in a battle at Rosebud Creek, a defeat that denied reinforcements to George Armstrong Custer and may have contributed to his devastating loss at the Little Bighorn.
In 1882 Crook again returned to Arizona, where the Apache had fled their reservation and resumed their guerrilla war under the Chiricahua leader, Geronimo. Over the next four years, Crook repeatedly forced his adversary to surrender, only to see him retreat into the mountains. Finally, in 1886, Crook was relieved of command and saw his long-time rival, General Nelson A. Miles, bring an end to the long Apache war by exiling Geronimo and his band to Florida.
The campaign against Geronimo was the last in Crook's military career. He remained a senior officer, but during his last years campaigned vigorously on his lifelong enemy's behalf, speaking out against white encroachments on Indian land and attempting to persuade the Lakota to accept allotment of their reservation, which Crook (like many others) believed would speed their entry into the American mainstream. According to the Lakota chief Red Cloud, a one-time adversary, Crook "never lied to us. His words gave the people hope." Crook died on March 2, 1890.
So my money is on Crook as the better soldier, officer and Indian fighter then Custer.
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