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Post by yanmacca on May 21, 2017 15:20:18 GMT
Amateurs study tactics. Professionals study logistics - Remember that. It is important. Yes I agree and that is why Montgomery was a good commander, as his mantra was never over extend your supply lines. His army may have never covered the ground that the US Army covered, but it never ground to a halt either, but kept on moving at a slow but steady rate.
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Post by quincannon on May 21, 2017 15:41:13 GMT
Agreed. But also consider that never outrunning your logistics is only half of what is a two pipe problem.
McClellan, Burnside, Pope, and Hooker never outran their logistics, but they all had a case of the "slows" which in the case of each allowed their enemy to slip away, just as Montgomery did in the desert. December 42 to April 43 need not ever have been fought if Montgomery had a lot more hitch in his getalong. Montgomery was still thinking like the Somme, and not confronting the problems that were Cyrenaica.
Good commanders can do both. It's like walking and chewing gum. One must be joined at the hip with the other, or neither one fulfills the requirement. If you can't supply your people making speed, then you can't make speed work for you. If you can't make speed work for you, or you are not trying to make speed, then the opportunity for a swift decisive victory slips from your fingers, and you are back again on the Somme, well supplied perhaps, but nevertheless still stuck in the mud.
I want you to seriously consider this:
Logistics, and the distribution of logistics is actually based upon civilian methodology, and each countries military force is actually based upon what they see from the civilian sector of their own countries practices of transportation, storage, and distribution. The UK is geographically relatively small, and the strain placed upon transportation, storage, and distribution is not really all that great. Ours on the other hand is very large, and while your system is designed for Plymouth to Scotland, our is designed from San Francisco to New York. It makes a huge difference in how you must think about things, and I would submit that the logistical system that reflected civilian practices adopted by Eighth Army were not up to the standard that the situation in the desert called for.
Here is a small example of what I mean:
On Friday I ordered two model ships from a company in Claremont, California. This morning that package was in the Denver Post Office distribution center. Tomorrow before noon, it will be in my mailbox. The package was sent by normal ground transportation. No rapid delivery means were utilized. It was sent by the U S Postal System, which in this country is greatly maligned for its slow response. The cost of shipping was minimal. That would not be possible, but for a highly sophisticated system of logistics, that was purposefully designed to traverse long distances in minimal time, supported by adequate transportation, state of the art tracking, area centric and centralized distribution points, and a widespread and functional means of localized distribution to the end user of the product. Just in time logistics has been a great, century long struggle to accomplish for us, and it is still not as good as it can be, but it is all based upon the idea of how do you do it fast and reliably over great distances, and I fully believe that the expanse of our country has given us a leg up in thinking through, then executing these methods in a military environment. Most countries do not have that advantage.
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Post by quincannon on May 21, 2017 16:00:38 GMT
The answer to Montrose's question is YES.
At the end of the day the only thing that counts is the outcome.
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Post by yanmacca on May 21, 2017 16:18:56 GMT
I don't know Chuck, but I think that you are a little hard on the British there, we did have an empire to supply you know.
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Post by quincannon on May 21, 2017 16:45:31 GMT
Not really hard.
You supplied your empire by sea. That is a totally different dimension. than getting beans, gas, an bullets over a six hundred mile wide desert, trying to keep up with your forward forces.
I have no quibble with how you operated on the sea lanes. I do not believe your land supporting logistical operations were up to snuff, and I base that premise of mine on the fact that you never had to do any of this stuff at home during peacetime, due to the relatively small size of your country, so there is no basis of knowledge of how these things might be accomplished in time of war.
The Germans, the French and all the other Continental Powers faced the same difficulties. The Germans in particular in Russia. The Germans chose the opposite tact, of speed, and look what happened to the when their logistics could not keep up. You can't ever do it well if you have no basis of knowledge of how to do something, and none of the Continental powers ever got it right due to their own domestic geography and circumstances.
Case in point. The Germans based their whole logistics set up on the use of the railroad. They were masters at it. Probably the finest system in Europe at the time. When they got to a place where there were no railroads, Central Russia or the Western Desert for instance they did not know whether to shit or go blind. Moving from Central Germany to the coast of France on the other hand for them was a piece of cake. It is all in how you think about war, before you go to war, and if your thoughts did not entertain places to fight that were not in your strong suit, it might be best not to go.
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Post by quincannon on May 21, 2017 17:20:12 GMT
Back in the day Ian, we designed the light division, 10,000 strong to be able to move to any theater in the world in 72 hours and be able to fight when they got there, then sustain the fight for as long as necessary from any one of five places in this country from New York to Hawaii, Alaska, Virginia, or California. At the time there were people who did not believe it could be done, so we exercised it and proved the concept.
Today we have greatly added to that capability with similar methods designed to improve the responsiveness of our heavy forces.
Not far from me, one less than two miles away are facilities. that can move troops and supplies, and the long term ability to sustain that supply flow to any place on earth. That same facility has the ability to move heavy equipment such as tanks, IFV's and the transportation that supports them as well. Sometimes getting a heavy company team on the ground can be beneficial.
A few miles further way on Fort Carson there is a railroad marshalling facility that can accommodate a heavy or Stryker brigade at a time, each having a couple of thousand vehicles. From the time they are loaded until they reach the port of Galveston takes about 48 hours. From there, by sea on fast RORO's
None of this would be possible without these things being thought about and implemented before time of need, and most of the methods used come from the normal civilian ways of doing things, adapted to military use.
The people in the UK than planned the garrison of Egypt in the 20's and 30's never anticipated having to face the German and Italian Armies in the Western Desert. They were more concerned with local insurrection and the defense of the canal. Had it not been for a bunch of civilians that showed them how to operate motorized formation in the deep desert, the British Army would probably have been locked in place and relatively powerless. Read about the people who founded the Long Range Desert Group, and the influence they had on the British Army before you attempt to answer. I think you will find it enlightening "Providence Their Guide" "Popski's Private Army", and a few others are good places to start.
The bottom line in all of this is that technical innovation will not occur unless there is an overriding need for such innovation. For us a three thousand mile long and two thousand mile wide country such needs existed, and therefore developed. In Europe those needs did not exist, and more static means of transport and distribution, such as the railroads, served very well. No one in Europe was thinking about the possibilities of total land war outside of their own or immediately adjacent territories during the inter=war period, so there were no really existing civilian capabilities being developed that could be turned to military use. For us we had no choice on the civilian side and fortunately those same tools and methods had military usage.
Trace the development of the Higgins Boat as a good example of the thesis. Had it not been for some means of transports in the Everglades and the swamps and bayous of the south, what would we have done to land troops at Guadalcanal and Normandy? Had it not been for the pioneers efforts of the air mail system, how would we have developed the aircraft necessary to land troops for an airborne invasion? Had it not been for the deplorable state of our highways in the first forty years of the 20th century, what motivation would there have been for the development of the Six by Six Truck? These are but three examples, of things we developed from civil life to aide our mobility and logistical efforts, that there was no need for in the UK and the rest of Europe at the time.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on May 21, 2017 20:41:18 GMT
Amateurs study tactics. Professionals study logistics - Remember that. It is important. Yes I agree and that is why Montgomery was a good commander, as his mantra was never over extend your supply lines. His army may have never covered the ground that the US Army covered, but it never ground to a halt either, but kept on moving at a slow but steady rate. Ian,
"Market Garden." Deep-water ports were required; Cherbourg was useful, but far from the front. The massive port of Antwerp was captured virtually intact by Montgomery's troops on 4 September, but the Scheldt Estuary leading to it was still under German control. The failure to open the ports in Antwerp has been called "one of the greatest tactical mistakes of the war". The "Great Mistake" also included not cutting off the German Fifteenth Army of 80,000 men who were trapped on the coast west of Antwerp, and who were evacuated north over the Scheldt Estuary and then east along the Beveland Peninsula. These forces unexpectedly joined the battles for the bridges in the Eindhoven and Nijmegen sectors. Other important ports on the English Channel coast, such as Dunkirk, remained in German hands until May 1945.
Regards, Tom
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on May 22, 2017 0:13:35 GMT
Yes I agree and that is why Montgomery was a good commander, as his mantra was never over extend your supply lines. His army may have never covered the ground that the US Army covered, but it never ground to a halt either, but kept on moving at a slow but steady rate. Ian,
"Market Garden." Deep-water ports were required; Cherbourg was useful, but far from the front. The massive port of Antwerp was captured virtually intact by Montgomery's troops on 4 September, but the Scheldt Estuary leading to it was still under German control. The failure to open the ports in Antwerp has been called "one of the greatest tactical mistakes of the war". The "Great Mistake" also included not cutting off the German Fifteenth Army of 80,000 men who were trapped on the coast west of Antwerp, and who were evacuated north over the Scheldt Estuary and then east along the Beveland Peninsula. These forces unexpectedly joined the battles for the bridges in the Eindhoven and Nijmegen sectors. Other important ports on the English Channel coast, such as Dunkirk, remained in German hands until May 1945.
Regards, Tom
True Tom it was a risky tactic but with high reward, that is why Eisenhower signed off on it and later shouldered the responsibility. Life is like that, the one time Monty got fast......... Cheers
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on May 22, 2017 0:16:24 GMT
I am working hard on a LBH counter punch. Try this. Custer and Benteen reunite at Ford A just as Reno arrives having retreated down the valley trailed by warriors. Counter punch! Totally undoable but hey its a whiff. Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on May 22, 2017 10:28:16 GMT
How about this Mac, Reno draws the pursuing Indians right into Benteen's defensive line, once Reno and his remaining companies join up with Benteen and his four companies, they blunt the Indians advance, Custer then counter punches by hitting the Warriors from the flank.
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Post by quincannon on May 22, 2017 13:51:13 GMT
Timing -
Where was Company B, and what makes anyone think that by the time Company B gets on that firing line that anyone from Reno is still alive?
Why would Custer launch a counterattack, and how, before the situation is stabilized? Benteen does not have the combat power to stabilize the situation with or without Company B. It is highly doubtful that the situation would be stabilized even with Custer's presence on that firing line for some little time.
In Mac's WHIFF scenario, Custer and Benteen rejoining in the area near Ford A is going to take time. Time is the one thing Reno does not have. In all probability based on what we know of where both Benteen and Reno were, not to mention Company B's location, Benteen will be the first to arrive, followed by Custer, and probably fifteen to twenty minutes later by Company B.
The best that could be hoped for is that Reno sees Benteen's arrival (and that itself may be doubtful - no one is going to tell Reno he is there)and Reno falls back to him, probably taking even greater casualties in the process. Custer shows up, perhaps ten minutes later and by this time Benteen is up to his eyeballs handling both an Indian attack and trying to restore what is left of Reno. Custer is not going to do any counterattacking this day. He will be lucky if he does not lose his ass trying to defend a poor position with a river to his back.
Counterattacks/Counterpunching
The counterpunch is a counterattack with a slightly different purpose than what one normally thinks of when the term counterattack is used. To the best of my knowledge you will not find the term counterpunch in any of the appropriate manuals, but the term is generally understood.
A counterattack is an attack, normally conducted by the designated reserve to restore a situation and regain ground that has meaning to you, after you have first withstood an attack. The words "has meaning" are very important in this context. If ground has no meaning - why counterattack. If ground has meaning then you must counterattack, if you have the combat power to do so.
A counterpunch is a counterattack launched to achieve decisive results, generally the destruction of an enemy force, and is something that goes far beyond the mere restoration of ground.
How Do These Terms Apply.
1) When Custer did not enter the valley in full force, he ceded the decisive battlespace, the area between the south end of the village and Ford A to the enemy. Reno's attack was not capable of wresting that area away fro the enemy and retaining it.
2) The decisive battle space had no value to Custer after it was lost, and it had immense value to the Indians.
3) You do not counterattack to regain an area of no value.
4) You cannot counterpunch if you do not have, or no longer possess the means to do so.
Custer's previous maneuvers had lost the battle for him. His best case was to reunite and save what he could, then conduct a defensive battle near Ford A for the remainder of the day. There was no reason to counterattack, and no means to counterpunch
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Post by yanmacca on May 22, 2017 13:58:52 GMT
Well Chuck, its a WHIFF and quite a big one at that, that's all a couple of blokes [Mac & Mc] just playing soldier.
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Post by quincannon on May 22, 2017 14:19:38 GMT
If you play any game you must play by the rules.
You can't launch a tank counterattack if the rules say you have no tanks.
We cannot violate the rules, ignore the time space continuum, and dismiss the laws of physics, while still being critical of those that do, pointing to arrow dodging horses, carbines that outrange howitzers, and three mile supporting distances. We ourselves must stay within the parameters of the rules, and abide by their many constraints, lest we become just like those we are most critical of.
A WHIFF is nothing more than another possibility that must be examined for validity. That is the purpose of WHIFFING, to examine alternative possibilities, to see if they are indeed possible.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on May 22, 2017 17:45:30 GMT
My original thought with this punch/counterpunch stuff was to bring us to this area of the field. To do punch/attack counterpunch/counterattack scenario it is generally done with some forethought and planning, by a competent commander. Plans should be shared with your subordinates. You may remember two years ago I shared with you a picture of some high ground less than a mile south of Ford A(a fallback point). Steve and I visited this location.
To continue to use the boxing analogy Reno is sent forward to jab at the opponent, than fall back as required by the pressure against him. At this point GAC has recalled Benteen to join him at Ford A, he has also ordered the packs forward toward that rise. At this point the retreating Reno, the unseen Custer, and unseen Benteen are between the NA's and the packs. Additionally the needed spare ammunition is at hand. The counterpunch is waiting for the NA's at Ford A. If the counterpunch effective great, if not so much the packs are at hand as is the fallback point of high ground. This high ground could have easily been located by GAC's scouts, it is visible from Crows Nest, it is obvious from lower Reno Creek, and Ford A. This high ground is better than Reno Hill, the NA's will lose too much manhood attempting to rush it, if they pull up stakes, Custer uses his mobility to hurry them north.
Alas this is a WHIFF.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on May 22, 2017 19:16:25 GMT
If this is the high ground I am thinking of, the one bisected by Interstate 90, then it has a great deal of possibilities for such use. A bait and switch, defense, then a kick in the pants.
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