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Post by yanmacca on Nov 7, 2016 20:10:44 GMT
Hi all, just a bit of fun here, but if Custer and his five companies were trapped on Cemetery Ridge and Battle Ridge Extensions, then what defense plan could he adopt? I have stuck my neck out and choose a plan to defend both BR and BRE, now don't forget I have made this defense plan under the idea that Custer had no choice and he had to defend the area. link
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Nov 7, 2016 20:46:15 GMT
I think poor terrain and just not enough men Ian. Cheers
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Nov 7, 2016 20:52:17 GMT
He couldn't do much of a defense, and certainly not for very long. He didn't have the numbers, even with 5 companies to hold that open terrain, what with the area just full of good hiding places for Indians on foot to approach using stealth. BRE and CR, just like LSH, don't offer any good cover, let alone concealment. If surrounded, each trooper is vulnerable to direct fire, as well as indirect fire, due to the lack of any cover, other than using the horses as breastworks. That didn't work out too well on LSH, so there is no reason to believe those 2 areas could have been defended for any length of time by a dismounted, stationary defense. A mobile defense has the best chance to work, if the plan is to defend long enough to allow for an escape to the east before being surrounded.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 8, 2016 4:26:32 GMT
Concur. Not doable.
The only viable option is to conduct a mobile defense due east. Depending upon the time the decision was made to use a mobile defense, you are still going to lose one third to one half of your combat power executing it, but a third or half is better than all.
Ian, you are asking too much of too little here. Can't be done, unless the Blue has assault rifles and machine guns, and the Red has dime store sling shots.
Gross numbers are meaningless. Gross numbers at the point of contact have meaning.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 8, 2016 12:20:28 GMT
I know Chuck, that it is not a viable prospect and they would all succumb eventually, but I was thinking along the lines that they had no choice. Having said that it brings me to another point and that is the idea that if this all round defense by 210 was a bad idea, then leaving E and L Companies out on a limb is even worse, in the case of E, we only have around 28 men to form a firing line and this line was on cemetery ridge, which is a large area with many ingress points at 360%, so they were toast from the get go, but Custer probably ordered it so.
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 8, 2016 14:56:16 GMT
Have any of you heard about how a simple cartridge belt was blamed for ejection problems on the soldiers carbines? Well apparently the soldiers made their own cartridge belts out of leather and this along with dirt in the loops cause a corrosive effect called "Verdigris" This was caused by the copper on the cartridges making contact with the leather loops. Dirt and grime added to the effect and caused the empty cartridge to stick in the chamber.
The army originally issued Dyer cartridge pouches, which were disliked by the soldiers and this forced many to make their own belts out of leather.
The army was quick to remedy this by designing a cartridge belt which was lined with canvas, but this was after the BLBH.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 8, 2016 16:34:01 GMT
The issue Ian, is that they did have a choice, and they chose wrongly.
It is also a fundamental mistake in assuming that just because one side or the other stops and remains static for a time, that it constitutes a defense. It does not. It is stopping and fighting. There are hasty defenses to be sure, but hasty defenses develop over time to something of a more deliberate nature. The critical factor is time, and at LBH with your array or any other that presupposes that any place that Custer was driven would be allowed the time to turn hasty to deliberate just was not there. It would not be allowed to be. There was no time to integrate fire into a cohesive whole, and that lack of integration means that anyone who takes a bite out of the donut your positioning displays, means that the whole donut collapses upon itself
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 8, 2016 17:18:02 GMT
I don’t think they thought that they could stand there chisel chinned and holding firm, but rather they were led into a false sense of security, they would have been totally surprised at the speed in which the Indians corralled them and forced them to where they died, all of this was done by using the land to mask their movements and Custer probably only saw a small portion of what was hiding in those draws until it was too late.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 8, 2016 18:05:53 GMT
In battle wish and hope are poor substitutes for planning and execution. You can wish and hope in one hand and crap in the other and at the end of the day all you have is crap all over your fingers.
You never make your plans or base your decisions on what you think the enemy will do. You make them on enemy capabilities and what the enemy can do.
If they had a false sense of security, who perpetrated that falsehood on them? They did.
If they were surprised whose actions allowed them to be surprised? Their's did.
If they allowed the Indians to use the terrain to mask their movements, who allowed it? They did.
If one side loses a battle that should not have been lost, who caused that loss? They did.
If you go to the loo to wash your hands, and end up craping in your pants, who is responsible for making a bad choice? You are.
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Post by Beth on Nov 8, 2016 20:23:59 GMT
I find that in the last year or so I have totally reevaluated everything I have ever thought about LBH. Today it is on what a big F up it was for Custer not to have assumed that every inch of the terrain from FAL to LSH could have been used against him at any given moment--but that village should have put him on notice that it WOULD be used against him.
So was the failure on his part, over confidence in his ability? no situational awareness? Underestimating his opponent? (there is a term for someone who underestimates their opponents--loser). I suspect it is all of the above but what other factors am I missing?
Totally out of left field, even if you just ignore Custer's military training, shouldn't his hunting ability alone have made him more wary?
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Post by yanmacca on Nov 9, 2016 10:08:35 GMT
It should have Beth, but he underestimated his quarry to such an extent that it hunted him at the end.
All the signs were there for him, his scouts gave him reports and he would have noticed himself how big the trails were, but then the big mistakes were made on the 25th, with diluting his regiment, sending Benteen off left and then the two biggest of them all, Reno reports that the village is not running but coming out to get him and from 3411 he sees just how big this place was.
It took either a fool or a brave man to carry on, maybe a touch of both.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on May 15, 2017 11:53:56 GMT
Ian, I am going to use your thread to ask a question or two, sorry. It may or not be related. Are the best tacticians punchers or counter punchers? Where and when do you think a successful counter punch could have been laid on the NA's, to change the outcome of his battle?
Regards, Tom
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Post by yanmacca on May 15, 2017 13:24:40 GMT
Go for it Tom, as it is a very interesting question you pose.
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Post by yanmacca on May 15, 2017 13:32:48 GMT
I think that the Duke of Wellington was one of the best counter punchers of them all, but I would guess that in relation to the BLBH, the cavalry was too weak in number and would require the assistance of a couple of Infantry battalions.
But Custer didn't have any Infantry, so if he was going to adopt this strategy, then he must drag every last warrior out of that village and on to a ground of his own choosing, then have his enemy attack into concentrated fire in an attempt to break their will and fortitude, which I guess is something that they failed to do in the battle itself.
Bottom line is that he has to get them running and the best way to do that is to knock them down in large numbers and once they decide that this is not healthy and attempt to withdraw, he could catch them demoralized and in the open with mounted attacks from all of his companies.
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Post by quincannon on May 15, 2017 15:10:26 GMT
Tom: They had better be both or they do not meet the criteria definition of good.
To further the boxing analogy a good right cross is not worth much if you do not have a left hook to compliment it.
There is a time to sow and a time to reap. There is a time to laugh and a time to weep. There are also a time to aggressively attack, and a time to let an attack fall upon you on purpose, and when that attack expends itself, punch the other guy's frigging lights out. There is also a time to run like the Devil in a blue dress was trying to make love to you. LBH, for Custer's battalion was the time to do the latter.
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