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Post by quincannon on Jul 30, 2020 19:22:28 GMT
But there was a sign of an organized defense in the south Dan, something that was probably unknown to Benteen when he made the comment. Specifically there were cartridge artifacts found in two distinct lines on the south face of Calhoun Hill, one at the bottom of the hill and one about halfway up, but below the military crest. These lines would suggest skirmish order, and the lower of the two lines, does not suggest a deliberate positioning before engagement, but rather the results of a meeting engagement.
You, I am very sure, would not have positioned your squad deliberately at the bottom of a hill, firing upward onto higher ground, if your intention was to defend. You might very well be forced to adopt the bottom of the hill position if that is where you met the enemy face to face. The bottom of the hill skirmish position suggests that there was no deliberate intent to defend from that place, and there was absolutely no time to prepare. Both suggest then that the Company L column was in motion southward when they were stopped and forced to deploy and skirmish with the enemy they had just met face to face. Later Company L retreated up the hill and tried to form a defensive perimeter. As you well know in the final stages of anything like this orderliness breaks down, and those that once were lines, resemble what, kernels of corn thrown haphazardly on a pool table.
Benteen only saw the aftermath, from which no conclusions may be drawn. Anything Benteen has to say is completely worthless, until what he has to say is put together with the other evidence and testimony. That goes for everyone else that had something to say too. One person's testimony taken alone brings no clarity to the battle. It is only by examining all that is available that a picture starts to emerge
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 30, 2020 19:28:01 GMT
If Benteen was looking for cartridge finds then he would have seen linear lines, but he was viewing bodies and I don’t think that any lines would have been visible because the lines broke and scattered leaving men to fall in a random pattern like scattered corn.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 30, 2020 20:00:58 GMT
You are exactly correct Ian. Benteen was looking at bodies, not for cartridges, and what he saw was the aftermath when anyone with only one brain cell that worked would conclude that he was seeing a mess created by the breakdown of whatever defense there might have been. It is when you put the cartridge leavings and the bodies together, that the true picture starts to emerge.
The same could be said for what was found on F-F Ridge. First off no company of thirty is going to charge mounted off of high ground down onto a lower ridge to clear away a few riflemen if they know that their force is greatly outnumbered and their chances of pulling it off and returning alive are next to nil. So there must be another, or at least an alternative explanation. The best one I have seen, is that Company C was trying to retrograde and break through to the south in a similar manner to Company L, although making a course correction, because they saw Company L already stopped and heavily engaged. Either that or they were moving down that way to extend Company L's line. Either way, they too formed a skirmish line in defense. That would not be apparent to anyone in those initial hours of discovery. It is only when you locate the bodies of the two sergeants and see they are located at the rear of the line of cartridges on either flank, and in the place that you would expect them to be on the skirmish line, that a picture of a skirmishing defense emerges.
Let's say this whole thing is a two hundred piece puzzle. No one can tell what the picture on the puzzle is with only one or two pieces in hand.
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azranger
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Post by azranger on Jul 31, 2020 14:44:40 GMT
Off to a good start.
My thought is a defensive site with 5 companies involved would have them within supporting distance of each other. Regardless of what they were doing before Benteen saw the bodies we know in fact that they were not 5 companies in mutual support of each other with overlapping fields.
I think the retrograde began north of LSH. CIL may have been on BRE and moved back from there. I believe E F and Custer were on Cemetery Ridge and moved toward Ford Ds. At the start of the retrograde it was a response to the Cheyennes. I believe was holding Cemetery Ridge and F holding Last Stand Hill. I believe you have to attempt to hold both. LSH is the high ground and Cemetery Ridge overlooks travel corridors.
I believe the F/F was the lead element in the retrograde. They were attempting to return by crossing MTC lower where E and F had crossed earlier.
Regards
Steve
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Post by quincannon on Jul 31, 2020 17:35:55 GMT
I am going to take issue with a lot of what has been said here Steve, not that what was said was wrong, but rather because it was incomplete and therefore confusing to layman and professional alike.
There were only two known examples of defense in this whole battle, the Reno Hill portion of the fight, and the fight that Calhoun made on the hill that now carries his name. The rest is either pure speculation, or confusion about what defense is and is not. The Reno Hill episode can wait for another time and another thread.
Defending is a deliberate decision that is made to not only deny, but hold a piece of ground and prevent enemy occupation, Skirmishing, which was what was done on the rest of the northern field, is a disputing possession of ground, ground which in itself has no meaning, but if lost could tip the scale of advantage to one side or the other. Cavalry, of that era, was very week on defense, for a number of reasons that will not be gone into here. That has all changed with combined arms task forces and combined arms battalions of today, but that too is another subject. Cavalry defends in that era only as a last resort, but it would be a grave mistake to assume that when cavalry dismounted they automatically revert to defense, That is no more true than assuming that when cavalry dismounts they become Infantry.
When one thinks of defense, he thinks of positions that are in mutual support of each other, and whose fires interlock. That is true, but only partially true. Mutual support in a defense can also mean one portion of the defense holding a piece of ground, outside the cone of mutually supporting fires, that is vital to the defense of the whole force. Gloster Hill in Korea comes to mind, and I am sure Ian can tells us all about the best performance of British Infantry in the 20th Century and would be glad to do so.
If you think E and F moved to Ford D without C, I, and L, then I think you are gravely mistaken. If Custer was going to haul all five companies up there he was going to use all five of them, formed in a fist, and not play Patty Cake by dividing them at the distance your views portray. Those companies may have been arrayed as you suggest, but arrayed that way after they got to Ford D (if indeed they did) not before.
Anyone trying to deliberately defend that area must hold both Cemetery Ridge and Battle Ridge Extension. One cannot be defended without defending the other. The fly in the buttermilk is that they were not trying to defend, they were trying to dispute possession, prior to making the decision to either defend some area up that way, or to withdraw. Again defense is a deliberate decision, that assumes that some piece of ground MUST be held, not just fought over.
You are much too concerned with these so called travel corridors, which you have absolutely no knowledge of them either being used or even known. That is pure speculation on your part. You have been over every inch of that battlefield and have ridden most if not all of these corridors that you speak of. That is a leap of assumptive powers that confounds me, in that you have absolutely no knowledge of Custer either seeing, knowing about, or using any of them. There is but one known Custer trail, that being over the L-N-C-E Ridge complex. Anything else is complete guesswork based upon 21st, Century, not 25 June 76, knowledge of the area. You're better than that. Show it. More importantly it has no relevance to the subject at hand. When you are running from the other guys, you take what they give you, not what you want.
Whomever you intend F/F to be in your post, unless you are speaking about Company L, you are, in my opinion dead wrong. I must admit though that I struggled for a long time between C and L in the lead, and it was only when I looked at what each of these companies had done in the time they had available that I settled on L being in the lead.
Now to the Company L action. The artifact field of cartridges show three distinct locations where Company L placed fire on the enemy. The first is the most important, in that it is located at the bottom of Calhoun Hill facing high ground to their immediate front, in Henryville. That location is not indicative of defense, but a unit being forced to dismount, during a meeting engagement while moving southward, and meeting a hostile force moving northward toward them. This conclusion is based on no commander in his right mind deliberately defending that area, so the reason must be different than deliberate defense, and what I stated here is the only other logical alternative. That then brings up the subject of if that strip of ground was so poor why was it skirmished over. That is really quite simple. Had Calhoun tried to turn tail, and withdraw to the hilltop, those Indians, equally mobile, would have been on him before he could set up on the hilltop, offering him no time to prepare to meet them. By dismounting and skirmishing in that poor location though he was placing fire on that approaching hostile force, and that fire temporarily halting their forward movement.
The second cartridge artifact line half way up the hill, which is less distinct than the first, is most likely evidence that Calhoun withdrew from the first, moving back up the hill to his ultimate goal, but finding to necessary to keep the enemy to his front at bay, a little longer. He was buying time.
The third and final position shows evidence of a deliberate decision to defend that hill, and that was probably the longest elapsed time period of the whole affair. That defense was one of mutual support. It did not meet your definition of that term Steve, but it was mutual support none the less. It is my firm view that Calhoun decided to defend that position (in mutual support) of the rest of the battalion, because as far as he knew at the time the other four companies were still north of him, and he must then hold the back door closed. Could the other companies support him in that effort? Not immediately, ultimately they did, but he supported them from the onset of his making that decision. All this took some time. At least three separate movements. All the indications in the Company C area is that they barely had time to dismount before their skirmish line was overwhelmed. So had C been the first, Company L would not have the time to do what they did.
At this point it is best to insert a NOTE TO BENTEEN: Dan I know you favor the idea of Company L, being a rear guard and stopping to fend off hostiles from the rear while the other elements of the battalion continue to move north. Seeing what we see today it is hard to argue with that, UNTIL you consider the location of the initial Company L skirmish line at the bottom of the hill. Had Calhoun, as rear guard commander detected a threat from the south and deployed to meet it, certainly he would not have picked the worst possible position to do so, the bottom of the hill, when he could have easily taken to the top of Calhoun Hill which provided him excellent fields of long(ish) range fire. Look at what he did though his eyes, not your's. You might also wish to consider as you deliberate this, that Calhoun was an Infantryman, long before he joined the cavalry. Infantry, I would suggest, are much more attuned to selecting positions that strengthen the power of fire. Cavalry are no dummies in this regard, and I am not suggesting that, but for the Infantry it is a religion, and cavalry do not have to go to church as often.
So make what you will of what I have said, and I am going to go back to building my tank for the rest of the afternoon.
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azranger
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Post by azranger on Jul 31, 2020 18:32:07 GMT
Chuck
When I state travel corridor it is something one recognizes from riding horses. It may not have been used but it is there. In this case Mcguire draws the western corridor on his map using bodies to identify it. You can look from Weir and pick out egress corridors for a horse from MTC. The one across from Middle Coulee is an obvious choice for the egress. The turn to the right is a choice and not usually the preferred choice by riders on the preservation land. When my friend went to the right we came up on Luce and then continued north to Nye/Cartwright. Both trails are considered a travel corridor to me.
I think the warrior participant that placed the soldiers firing in two directions would indicate a defensive location. They fired toward BRE and also toward LSH. I believe the soldiers were pushed off the defensive position on CR and into Cemetery Ravine.
I think no matter where you are when you are fixed and destroyed you are on defense before you die. If that is not correct let me know what you call it.
Regards
Steve
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 31, 2020 18:43:24 GMT
One thing that slaps you in the face about this scenario is that it fits nearly everyone’s theory, just look at the ones who say that Custer was overwhelmed at the river and forced onto the high losing companies as they moved, well all they have to do is turn the map around and substitute Ford D for Ford B, Crazy Horse Ravine for MTC and BRE/CR for Calhoun hill/BR, all what they claim to have taken place could well have happened in the same order they say but at a different location.
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azranger
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Post by azranger on Jul 31, 2020 18:48:34 GMT
Chuck
I think the intent was to move all 5 companies to Ford Ds cross and attack the Big Village. From the artifacts found in the Willy Bends' area it could only justify a few soldiers. 5 empty cases does not indicate much. We do know materials were removed to build the new entrance and Scott thinks some artifacts may be in the roadbed. We also know that artifacts were found during the construction of the old entrance road. Those were found between the current administrative site and the end of the fork of BRE just above the old entrance gate. The Kellogg marker was along the old entrance road in a picture taken during the dedication of the new entrance road.
Regards
Steve
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Post by quincannon on Jul 31, 2020 22:08:51 GMT
Yes I understand all that, but I am still skeptical that they actually reached the river, as in reaching the river feet wet. The thing is that it does not matter, if they actually reached the river or only got close.
Whichever it was, they would have had all five companies in close proximity, and that is the point of importance. It does seem that at some point those five companies scattered away from each other and some ended up on Cemetery Ridge, while others occupied BRE. Fairly normal expectation I would say, the only question being were they scattered by being driven, or did the do that purposely. The first would indicate the start of a command breakdown. The second would tell us only that the battalion was still under positive control.
What Scott thinks does not matter a hill of beans. What anyone thinks does not matter a hill of beans either. What Scott or anyone can prove is all that matters, and there is no proving at this late date.
The fact that something of Custer was on both of those ridges is a generally accepted fact these days due to artifact finds, except for some. Just how much and exactly where is now subject to dispute and always will be I'd wager, and there are those that will still deny that anything of the kind ever happened. That is especially true concerning the northern most end of BRE where it touches the highway (212). There are some horses that you can neither lead OR make them drink. Ignorance, arrogance, and stupidity are the three impediments to having the eyes see and the mind open.
With regard to your insistence on telling me about travel corridors and McGuire's map Steve, you are looking at this with a horseman's eyes. Try looking at it with a commander's eye. The fact that some trail corridor is good from a horseman's perspective, is the very reason any commander worth his salt would avoid those trail corridors like the Bubonic Plague. They would not go near them with a ten foot pole. You stay off the beaten trail. You avoid the easy way. You take the hard road less traveled if you wish to stay alive. Didn't the Marine Corps teach you anything.
You are right on target Ian. They make an ass of themselves by assuming, and have been doing it for a hundred forty four years.
Why is it that when someone does not KNOW something they are afraid to say I don't know? Does it make them less manly? Are they lying to themselves to cover up their own shortcomings?
READ THIS CAREFULLY - ANYONE WHO SAYS HE KNOWS WHAT HAPPENED AT THE CUSTER PORTION OF THE FIGHT WITH ONE HUNDRED PERCENT CERTITUDE, IS A F**KING LIAR. They are lying to you, and even more telling about their character, they are lying to themselves. That includes a lot of people that are considered friends by people here. Do your friends lie to you? If so, why are they your friends? That's why I have so many friends in that community.
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mac
Brigadier General
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Post by mac on Aug 1, 2020 12:46:15 GMT
On Benteen can I add that his mental state may not have been especially conducive to analytical thought at that time. Also his statement is an accurate enough description on first glance at the field. As to the rest I need a bit of think time. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Aug 1, 2020 16:37:42 GMT
I would think you are correct here Mac. It is one thing to be defeated by a military force who you to believe to be your peer in battle. It must have been quite another to be defeated, and so badly, by a force that you have been led to believe to be your inferior all of your life. Anyone can rationalize a small force of cavalry (or anyone) being beaten by a much larger number of Indians. There were just too many of them, but an entire regiment, when the United States possessed so relatively few regiments, is another matter that had to give, not only them, but the entire military establishment pause.
The immediate aftermath of defeat is a well known thing in military annals. The books are full of such incidents, and they all share one thing in common - - despair. What was and what can be again, is put aside, analysis is left for another day. What matters most is recovery, restoration, reorganization, and most of all a revitalization of the spirit. It is this last that I do not think came quickly to the 7th Cavalry if at all.
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azranger
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Post by azranger on Aug 1, 2020 17:25:00 GMT
Yes I understand all that, but I am still skeptical that they actually reached the river, as in reaching the river feet wet. The thing is that it does not matter, if they actually reached the river or only got close. I agree. I think if all five companies were down there they would not go back to LSH and CR. Whichever it was, they would have had all five companies in close proximity, and that is the point of importance. It does seem that at some point those five companies scattered away from each other and some ended up on Cemetery Ridge, while others occupied BRE. Fairly normal expectation I would say, the only question being were they scattered by being driven, or did the do that purposely. The first would indicate the start of a command breakdown. The second would tell us only that the battalion was still under positive control. Tom and I know the terrain really well from the BRE point adjacent the old gate location to where it opens and you can see the Ford Ds. We see Cheyennes there almost every year. We are talking less than two minutes for for the horses and Tom in his younger days could run it in five minutes. I think the positions an CR and LSH show an intent to slow the Cheyennes.
What Scott thinks does not matter a hill of beans. What anyone thinks does not matter a hill of beans either. What Scott or anyone can prove is all that matters, and there is no proving at this late date. I disagree. Scott presents his findings and the findings of others and forms a professional opinion. Have you read his book Battlespace 1865? I think he is qualified to render an expert opinion. An expert opinion has a greater value and even courts recognize that experts can testify to opinions/The fact that something of Custer was on both of those ridges is a generally accepted fact these days due to artifact finds, except for some. Just how much and exactly where is now subject to dispute and always will be I'd wager, and there are those that will still deny that anything of the kind ever happened. That is especially true concerning the northern most end of BRE where it touches the highway (212). There are some horses that you can neither lead OR make them drink. Ignorance, arrogance, and stupidity are the three impediments to having the eyes see and the mind open. The warrior participant put solders on CR. My thought is there are some who have an agenda, there are some ignorant, and there are some who have published who remain firm to their belief. Fred is the only author I know that changed his mind. He now believes Custer went down Middle Coulee.With regard to your insistence on telling me about travel corridors and McGuire's map Steve, you are looking at this with a horseman's eyes. Try looking at it with a commander's eye. The fact that some trail corridor is good from a horseman's perspective, is the very reason any commander worth his salt would avoid those trail corridors like the Bubonic Plague. They would not go near them with a ten foot pole. You stay off the beaten trail. You avoid the easy way. You take the hard road less traveled if you wish to stay alive. Didn't the Marine Corps teach you anything. I think if you qualified it with a horse mounted commander of cavalry it would be more accurate. A commander has to look at what his troops can do not just himself on a well mounted horse. I do not believe "the fact that some trail corridor is good from a horseman's perspective, is the very reason any commander worth his salt would avoid those trail corridors like the Bubonic Plague. They would not go near them with a ten foot pole. " Custer follows the travel corridor used frequently by Indians up the Rosebud. He follows the travel corridor up Davis Creek and down Reno Creek, He sends Reno to the crossing and travel corridor at Ford A and he uses the travel corridor to get to MTC. He then moves down MTC which the Indians used in the battle. He sends some straight across and they egress at the most widely used travel corridor. MTC has mostly banks the prevent horse from egressing. The place where they exited MTC straight across goes directly to Nye/Cartwright or if you turn as my Crow friend did you come up onto the Luce artifact sites and if you continue north almost in a straight line you move through N/C. The Realbirds and my Crow Friend are horsemen and they both use the same egress. My friend Chip Watts uses the same egress and he knows a lot about the battle.
Benteen's scout to the left is the only command Custer gave to not follow a travel corridor for an extended distance. Battle Ridge is such a good travel corridor it was used by the NPS to move vehicles. I would agree that the terrain from Luce to the Calhoun area was not a good travel corridor to move under fire because it had too many ambush sites. For that reason I don't believe that Custer expected Benteen to go that direction.
You are right on target Ian. They make an ass of themselves by assuming, and have been doing it for a hundred forty four years. Why is it that when someone does not KNOW something they are afraid to say I don't know? Does it make them less manly? Are they lying to themselves to cover up their own shortcomings? READ THIS CAREFULLY - ANYONE WHO SAYS HE KNOWS WHAT HAPPENED AT THE CUSTER PORTION OF THE FIGHT WITH ONE HUNDRED PERCENT CERTITUDE, IS A F**KING LIAR. They are lying to you, and even more telling about their character, they are lying to themselves. That includes a lot of people that are considered friends by people here. Do your friends lie to you? If so, why are they your friends? That's why I have so many friends in that community. I don't know anyone that states without a doubt that they know what happened with the degree of certainty that you suggest. Myself I follow Gordon Harper's position. He believed what he believes until other evidence appears he saw no reason to change. I think at lot of author are like that. For me its a matter of what makes sense to me. I don't care what others think just as you say Chuck unless they have convincing evidence to change my opinion. I also don't exclude others opinions without proof. Donahue thinks only E and F went north uses the same BRE and CR artifacts. He has E and F moving out BRE and returning CR. The closest person to what you describe would of course be Rini but he is certainly not ignorant. He does misrepresent things but not out of ignorance.
I would like to see your discussion on defense. I am firm believer that Custer was on defense on Last Stand Hill. I get that my law enforcement view may use of defense differently. We have mandated defensive training every year and none of the training is offensive tactics. The Marine was no help for me since we were mostly on offense with defense surrounding the perimeter of the bases at night. I think I was on defense when I was in a sandbagged position outside a General's bedroom window. More likely the early warning device.
Regards
Steve
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Post by quincannon on Aug 1, 2020 18:29:49 GMT
And I do not include Gordon Harper among those who tell us they know. Gordon Harper tells us what he thinks. There is a difference, and the difference is more from the human condition then knowing about this battle or any other. I think, is far different from I know.
Scott, is a recognized expert, but unless he can see underground he has no reason to say anything about artifacts EXCEPT, there may be some there. You do not base an entire theory of what happened on Scott, because Scott is still in a - There may be - state, and not yet in a state of - there are. Until that changes from may be to there are, and I found them where I thought they might be, then any theorizing is premature. Wait until some future discovery is made. That is the time to change or modify a theory, and not before.
Your law enforcement view is not relevant here per say. The defense is a deliberate act designed to HOLD ground. Absent the intent to hold, actions such as we mostly see at LBH are something else. I chose to use the word skirmish in its literal form, meaning the disputing of some place or piece of ground. Disputing and the intent to hold are two different things. The disputing of ground may be for one of a number of reasons. There is only one reason to defend, that being to hold for an extended period of time. The essential factor in the defense is that the place you intend to hold must have both value and meaning. There is no place on the Custer portion of that battlefield that has any meaning, save one. There is only one place that has value, that being Calhoun Hill. The value of Calhoun Hill, is brought about by circumstance, and that circumstance was only in the eye of the commander, Calhoun, who made the decision to hold it. He reasoned and based his decision upon, his then knowledge that four companies were north of him, and had Calhoun Hill fallen, the rear of those four companies would be compromised. That then is the meaning.
We have no knowledge that any similar circumstance existed in the Custer portion of the fight, and until we do we may not properly say they were defending. Even your example of defending LSH is invalid. There was no deliberate decision to hold that ground. It had no value, nor did it have meaning. It was just a place where they were run down and destroyed. If they had their choice in the matter they would have been anyplace else then there.
The above is far different from what faced Custer's decision making process in the north. He had, at one time, all his companies in hand, and the requirement he had was not to hold anything in the way of terrain. None of it was vital to what he was then about. All he had to do was dispute possession of the terrain, to buy time so he could figure out the best course of his future actions. To stay and defend something that he could place value and meaning on, or to go, and perhaps look for other opportunities in the hours and days that lay ahead. Ultimately we think that his decision was to go, but that decision came too late.
Now to corridors: You are absolutely correct that Custer used well known, well traveled movement corridors on his approach march to LBH in the days preceding the battle. That is not the question here at all, and no conclusions would be drawn from it, anymore then anyone could conclude my future course of tactical route choices, by citing the fact that I took Interstate 25, then Interstate 90 to the battlefield, from my home. From that point ,in the presence or near presence of the enemy, I am going to chose the route that makes the most tactical sense, in light of what I intend to accomplish. That route will usually be the one I least expect the enemy to guard, or the one that is the least visible to my enemy, so that I might mask my movements. Always, at least in my experience, those "best practice" tactical routes turn out to be the hardest to travel. As far as you pointing out the greater possibility of ambush on the ridge route, that is a concern, no doubt about it. In that circumstance the commander would weigh his need for say stealth, against the possibility of ambush. That is his decision to make.
The total truth here is that only one "Custer Route: has been documented. That one is across the ridges. It does not matter what you, McGuire, or Joe Shit the Rag Man thinks, the fact still remains that only one Custer route has been documented. When you bring me proof that he used Cedar Coulee, Middle Coulee, Medicine Tail Coulee, or the river route, PROOF I SAY, NOT YOUR'S OR ANYONE ELSE'S CONJECTURE, then that too can be examined and entered into the depository of knowledge about this battle - not before. Until then you may think what you wish, but without provable knowledge you are just blowing smoke up people's ass.
Short of bringing that proof, which will never happen now, you must evaluate what you think may have happened in the light of - was there a tactically sound reason to use it. With the river route, only a certifiably insane lunatic moron would use that route for a tactical approach march, under that prevailing set of circumstances.
Donahue can think what he wants to as well, but unless he comes up with a reason why that enormous piece of ground was only occupied by two under strength companies that were actually the size of a platoon, when the size of the ground alone calls for a full strength, period appropriate, battalion, or more, his tactical bucket has a howitzer sized hole in the bottom. It will not hold water. Tactics, like politics, is the art of the possible.
If Rini misrepresents things it is out of ignorance. You must think ignorance is only the absence of knowledge. It is also the misapplication of what knowledge the person does have. Rini is like the guy who has all the pieces of a puzzle in his possession, and does not know how to properly assemble them. Worse yet, he assembles them as he thinks they should be, without first consulting the picture on the front of the box, or taking a course in Puzzle Building 101. That is ignorance too. Sort of like my latest tank project. I have all the pieces, but putting them together confounds me.
Do you not think it strange that all these people who spout their theories from Donahue, to Wagner, to Montrose, to Gray, and even to Rini, who adores the man to the point of sexual attraction it seems, all present this man Custer as a tactical moron? He was no Bonaparte, but he knew battle, and whatever his personal, political, and professional failings were, he had a basic understanding of what needed doing, and a concept of how to do it. To conclude that he would make every mistake possible in the book, just so it would fit the aforementioned person's theory is just beyond ignorance so far, that one can only conclude that the purveyors of this junk are themselves stupid.
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benteen
First Lieutenant
"Once An Eagle
Posts: 406
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Post by benteen on Aug 1, 2020 21:12:13 GMT
. You might also wish to consider as you deliberate this, that Calhoun was an Infantryman, long before he joined the cavalry. Infantry, I would suggest, are much more attuned to selecting positions that strengthen the power of fire. Cavalry are no dummies in this regard, and I am not suggesting that, but for the Infantry it is a religion, and cavalry do not have to go to church as often. So make what you will of what I have said, and I am going to go back to building my tank for the rest of the afternoon. QC, I agree with you Chuck. If an Infantry Officer determines that his course of action needs to be one of defense, then unless the terrain allows for a superior location for defense, he will seek the high ground. Here is the dilemma. In my theory (Keep in mind I dont and can never know what Lt Calhoun was thinking) I believe Lt Calhoun saw some warriors approaching the rear of the column and felt he was going to fire a couple of volleys, and the Indians would scatter back to their camp (They always run dont they). Then they would hop back on their horses and join up with Cos C and I and catch up with Custer. He never thought for one minute that he would be involved in a battle. As a result of this thought process he was not looking for the best defensive position. Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Aug 1, 2020 21:59:21 GMT
And to your surprise I am sure, I agree with 99 percent of what you have said above Dan Will wonders ever cease?
Lets take aside for the moment that you and I disagree on what Calhoun and Company L were doing back there. You think he was a rear guard of a column moving northward intended upon attack, and I think he was the advance guard of a column moving southward from a battalion that was fast descending into disarray. Your general theory is every bit as good as mine or anyone else's.
The only point where you and I differ is that you have Company L dismounting in low ground to fire off a few volleys to, as you say, scatter the Indians back to camp. You point to the widely held at the time theory that the Indians would not stand and fight in the face of firepower. We both know that was not true, but nevertheless those people probably thought that, so true or not, that must be considered in the evaluation of their mindset. Let's for a moment say that we do not disagree, but rather I fully subscribe to your theory expressed above, save one thing. I fully believe that had Company L been the rear guard, Calhoun would have not stopped in that low ground to fire those couple of volleys, but rather taken to the high ground at the top of the hill to do the very same thing. Had he done that he would have accomplished two things not one, in an effort to dissuade the Indians following. He would have put the greater distance between L and the Indians and had the Indians followed him they would have to cross low ground to get at him, thereby making Calhoun's fire from the top of the hill much more effective. There is nothing more disheartening than being fired on from above. It has both a material and psychological effect.
There is another thing to consider. In times of adversity and confusion, it is an automatic reflex of a soldier to fall back on his training. I don't know how that would specifically applied, but you can be sure that - fall back on training - was applied here somehow.
You are quite wise in stating you do not KNOW what Calhoun was thinking. No one else does either, but very few will admit it. All we can ever do is try to deduce from what little we know of his actions, and many times those deductions are dead wrong.
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