Outline of Events for the North to South Battle Flow

[colt45]

Let me say I agree with Chuck's assessment that Calhoun was advancing southward when he was engaged at Calhoun Hill. Custer most likely saw the size of the village around 3411 and he certainly knew it was quite large when he sent the note to Benteen. With 5 companies he only has a little less than half the regiment with him. He would certainly know he needs more troops than he has to handle the situation. So in continuing north to hit the village downriver, he would take every man with him. I believe all 5 companies were in the area of CR and BRE. L company most likely led the withdrawal, and as Chuck indicated, ran into hostiles on the lower slope of Calhoun Hill, where he was forced to engage with a skirmish line. With more pressure than he could handle, he began the move toward the top of the hill, and setup a second skirmish line.

At the top, C company arrives and most likely was attempting to secure the right flank. Probably Calhoun ordered Harrington to secure his right flank. I company was trapped pulling out of BRE. F company probably pulled back to LSH to fill in where I vacated. E was the company left holding the bag as the last company to withdraw, if the maneuver had succeeded. As it turned out hostile pressure forced E off of CR and into the ravine, F was trapped on LSH, I trapped in the Keogh sector, and C and L stopped on CH and FF ridge. This would give an after-battle appearance of a rout with people scattered like corn.

While I don't know this for certain, the evidence suggests that events happened in this way. It is ludicrous to think L was left behind as a rear guard, cutting Custer's firepower even more, and also dumb to think he went to ford D with only 2 companies, leaving the rest lollygagging around BR and BRE. Events transpired to foil the withdrawal plan, which I think Custer was attempting according to doctrine.

[azranger]

Aug 1, 2020 21:12:13 GMT benteen said:

Jul 31, 2020 17:35:55 GMT quincannon said:

. You might also wish to consider as you deliberate this, that Calhoun was an Infantryman, long before he joined the cavalry. Infantry, I would suggest, are much more attuned to selecting positions that strengthen the power of fire. Cavalry are no dummies in this regard, and I am not suggesting that, but for the Infantry it is a religion, and cavalry do not have to go to church as often.

So make what you will of what I have said, and I am going to go back to building my tank for the rest of the afternoon.  
  

QC,
I agree with you Chuck. If an Infantry Officer determines that his course of action needs to be one of defense, then unless the terrain allows for a superior location for defense, he will seek the high ground. Here is the dilemma.

In my theory (Keep in mind I dont and can never know what Lt Calhoun was thinking) I believe Lt Calhoun saw some warriors approaching the rear of the column and felt he was going to fire a couple of volleys, and the Indians would scatter back to their camp (They always run dont they). Then they would hop back on their horses and join up with Cos C and I and catch up with Custer. He never thought for one minute that he would be involved in a battle. As a result of this thought process he was not looking for the best defensive position.

Be Well
Dan

Hi Dan

The Cheyennes were a small number of warriors as compared to the Sioux. I don't believe that there is ever a time when  there was not Indians in all directions once they crossed MTC. The northern end had less Indians then those coming from the south end of the village. Since the Ford Ds have a flat to the north it was just easier to see the Cheyennes coming mounted. I believe the Cheyennes coming toward the 5 companies is what triggered the north to south movement. The artifacts on Luce and N/C indicate that the troops were firing in all directions as soon as they began to exit MTC. We know that Cheyennes came from 4-5 directions and the Sioux with superior numbers came mostly from Deep Coulee and MTC. 

I know a little more about the Cheyenne since they live right there and we have several good contacts.

The artifacts show at least 14 different carbines were identified on BRE based upon tool marks on the cases. Of those 14 4 of those  carbines were also identified by fired cases in the Calhoun area. So have a couple of possibilities if solders deposited the fired cases. Donahue believes that E and F fired at the Calhoun are on their way north and then went out BRE and fired at the position where at least 14  carbines were identified.  If you follow the 5 company movement to the north than CIL would fire at BRE first and then retrograde to the Calhoun Area. 

My concern with Donahue's theory is that E and F would have been engaged on BRE before moving north and then came back across Cemetery Ridge. It's certainly possible and fits within the current evidence. I think it is more likely that E and F were on CR and that CIL were on BRE.

No matter what opinions we have they must fit within known artifacts.  Carbine fired cases were found on the CA and at BRE that had the same tool mark identification for four carbines. I guess we could add that Indians recovered the carbines but I doubt 14 carbines were fired by Indians on BRE. There are Indian artifacts at he same site and from the photo of the kneeling infantry placed by a warrior they fired upon from Cemetery Ridge.

Semper Fi

Steve
 

[azranger]

Colt 

I am using your theory of the 5 companies in my current opinion of what occurred. I currently reject that Calhoun was waiting for Benteen to cross MTC, go through the ambush terrain of Nye/Cartwright and then drop into Deep Coulee and move through the Henryville area while slowed by mules. That area was filled with Indians that had fired upon the troops there causing the artifacts to be deposited on Luce and N/C.

If they were retrograding back to Weir could C have been toward the area where the gray horses were observed earlier. I think that there is a natural crossing area and its within 600 yards of MTF.  I think the current Butler marker location would be exactly where one could cross easily. There is a reason why the current road goes that direction and it is terrain related. I believe that E and F had been there earlier as shown on the Maguire map used at the RCOI.

We have reason to believe that Cheyennes were camped by warrior society and that if camped across the river from Deep Ravine they would not be visible from 3411.  The horses across the river in the Willy Bends area would be visible once Custer moves past Weir. JSIT states the Cheyenne saw Custer coming in what they believed was going to be an attack at their end of the village.

Sometime we should discuss what the markers around the deep gully area of Deep Ravine represent. I think they could represent two events occurring at different times.

Regards

Steve

[azranger]

Jul 30, 2020 18:43:49 GMT benteen said:

Jul 30, 2020 16:50:39 GMT azranger said:

So let's try something non political. Benteen stated the battlefield looked as if someone had thrown a handful of corn. There are a lot of comments that he was only slamming Custer. But what if he believed it and stated what he saw. Would a retrograde in progress that was stopped at all locations nearly simultaneous look like throwing a handful of corn?

Regards

Steve

Steve,
 My opinion is that if a retrograde in progress had been stopped, there would have been some sign of at least an attempt  at an organized defense . Benteen stated the following....

"I went over the battlefield carefully with a view to determine in my own mind how the fight was fought. I arrived at the conclusion then as I have now that it was a rout, a panic,till the last man was killed; that there was no line formed. There was no line on the battlefield; you can take a handful of corn and scatter it over the floor and make just such lines"

Capt Fred Benteen was as a man a cranky SOB and detested anyone who got rank above him, but he was a brave man and an excellent Officer. I dont believe he would ever say  a lie

about something that would belittle or defame the actions of his brother Officers and men just to get a slap at Custer. Just my opinion.

Be Well Steve
Good to talk to you again
Semper Fi
Dan


 

Dan 

I believe that Reno retrograded and did not form a defense until rallying on the hill. What I think we see on the battlefield is overwhelming numbers of Indians hitting the retrograde at every location almost simultaneous. The Cheyenne from all directions and the Sioux from the south and west. I think the retrograde was away from the Cheyenne in the north but moved the troops into the Sioux. I believe that if defense was the objective than holding CR and LSH with 5 companies would have been observed. 

I also think that battle readiness of these troops became apparent and a retrograde would be a preferred choice. I have had these discussion with Rini a lot. He thinks the superior ballistics of the carbine matter. I think only hits matter. What I believe probably comes from the Marines "My Rifle"

My rifle and I know that what counts in war is not the rounds we fire, the noise of our burst, nor the smoke we make. We know that it is the hits that count. We will hit

I think Reno observed battle readiness in the valley and chose to retrograde. Custer would have observed battle readiness  near MTF and all across the terrain toward LSH.  Keogh would have observed battle readiness at Luce and Nye/Cartwright. So actual under fire conditions were observable and could factor into the best available choice.

Semper Fi

Steve

[quincannon]

Battle Readiness? Observing battle readiness? Poppycock. If the senior commanders of the 7th Cavalry did not know their troops were not battle ready as they crossed through the gates of Fort Lincoln, they were insane, delusional, or moronic, take your pick.

No unit is battle ready until it actually engages in combat. They are likewise are not battle ready, if they have been out of combat for some extended period of time. Nothing, not even the best training for prolonged periods of time, ever prepares a unit, or the men therein, for the sting of battle. Training gets them through the experience, at least some of them, and training is what they fall back on once the initial shock starts to wear off, but they still are not battle ready until the firing stops, they drive the enemy, or the enemy drives them, and they take the moment of rest to comprehend what has happened, and steel themselves for what lies ahead. THEN THEY ARE BATTLE READY.

So to say that Custer, or Reno, or Joe the Rag Picker based their decisions on the observation that their troops were not battle ready during the battle is sheer nonsense. If they were commanders, and there is some grave doubt in many quarters that they fit that description, they knew what they had to work with long before the first shot at LBH was fired.

Commanders based their decisions at LBH, and all battles,  on what the enemy was doing to them, and what they in turn could do to the enemy. When the enemy can do more damage to you, then you can do to them, that is the time for the trumpet to sound retreat.

Hits count. Not always, but I will let you have your fun based upon some inspirational poem. By the way, that line you chose to post is by the very words contained therein, BULL SHIT. The number of rounds fired, the noise, the smoke, and the confusion they cause, contribute to success in battle more than hits, or killing people, ever do. Will you ever get your head out of San Diego, and yourself become battle ready?

[azranger]

Your law enforcement view is not relevant here per say. The defense is a deliberate act designed to HOLD ground.

Is  that something you know or just something you think?

Regards

Steve 

[quincannon]

It is something I know unless law enforcement routinely defends positions on the battlefield.

Is that the best you've got? I fully expected you to challenge me on battle readiness. It would not work of course, because I have thousands of historical examples to cite supporting the position I have taken. Your rifle poem is not battle readiness, and even if you take it literally, and ignore the two precepts of battle, fire and maneuver, all these quaint little expressions of purpose are nothing but quaint little expressions of purpose. It is the very same thing as thinking battle readiness is expressed by obnoxious grunting in the manner that those that have never been in battle are prone to do, trying to show how tough they think they are. Not a whole lot of poem reciting and grunting done on the part of those who are truly battle ready. They are just frigging scared and hope the enemy is more scared than they are.

[azranger]

Aug 2, 2020 17:11:56 GMT quincannon said:

Battle Readiness? Observing battle readiness? Poppycock. If the senior commanders of the 7th Cavalry did not know their troops were not battle ready as they crossed through the gates of Fort Lincoln, they were insane, delusional, or moronic, take your pick.

You are beginning to bore me Chuck. Everything you gave as a choice has numerous persons making those same claims. Col. Bender did a great presentation on delusional and suggested reading the book Blink. 

As far as battle readiness this is easy. You need to have basic skillsets which were quite observable on the battlefield. You need to make hits on the enemy forces. The 1874 Expedition understood this and had shooters and not just noise makers. French and Ryan were shooters and maybe a few other but the majority didn't hit anything. Even a lowly USMC Cpl knows that:

  My rifle and I know that what counts in war is not the rounds we fire, the noise of our burst, nor the smoke we make. We know that it is the hits that count. We will hit

Common sense would tell that a cavalry soldier should know how to ride a horse and fight from horseback with an independent seat. Sgt Ryan states that even Custer would not fight these soldiers mounted. So Custer did know that and there is no evidence that tried to fight mounted. Private Taylor states he never fired his revolver horseback. Is that something Custer should have known? Ryan suggests that Custer knew that. 

I would think that following orders and using proper tactical procedures would be a part of battle readiness. French had to threaten to shoot his company because they were running to their. Godfrey had to do the same thing.  I don't think battle readiness should exhibit those behaviors.  So if French doesn't recognize the  problem does  he have a problem with battle readiness. Is he "insane, delusional, or moronic".  Take your pick?


No unit is battle ready until it actually engages in combat. They are likewise are not battle ready, if they have been out of combat for some extended period of time. Nothing, not even the best training for prolonged periods of time, ever prepares a unit, or the men therein, for the sting of battle. Training gets them through the experience, at least some of them, and training is what they fall back on once the initial shock starts to wear off, but they still are not battle ready until the firing stops, they drive the enemy, or the enemy drives them, and they take the moment of rest to comprehend what has happened, and steel themselves for what lies ahead. THEN THEY ARE BATTLE READY.

I have to call BS in that statement since if the officers know  the troops don't have basic skillsets than there is not need to wonder how they perform under fire. They went into battle without the basic skillsets. There is a difference between battle ready and battle hardened. You can't be battle ready if you don't have the basic skillsets. 

So to say that Custer, or Reno, or Joe the Rag Picker based their decisions on the observation that their troops were not battle ready during the battle is sheer nonsense. If they were commanders, and there is some grave doubt in many quarters that they fit that description, they knew what they had to work with long before the first shot at LBH was fired.

Sgt Ryan was there and stated they didn't have the basic skillsets. He stated the reason for not having the saber is  that they refused to learn how to use it. He does not speak well of these immigrant troops. The US Army did things that support Sgt Ryan's opinion. They increased an emphasis on marksmanship and started the school for cavalry officers. Godfrey and Edgerly were instrumental. 

Commanders based their decisions at LBH, and all battles,  on what the enemy was doing to them, and what they in turn could do to the enemy. When the enemy can do more damage to you, then you can do to them, that is the time for the trumpet to sound retreat.

Agreed and if you can't shoot and can't ride it doesn't take much to reach that decision point threshold. I firmly believe that was part of the decision making by Reno to retrograde.

Hits count. Not always, but I will let you have your fun based upon some inspirational poem. By the way, that line you chose to post is by the very words contained therein, BULL SHIT. The number of rounds fired, the noise, the smoke, and the confusion they cause, contribute to success in battle more than hits, or killing people, ever do. Will you ever get your head out of San Diego, and yourself become battle ready?

Then you should read about the 1874 Expedition and see if hits mater to those same Indians that destroyed Custer. I know I was battle ready even by the standards you suggest. So I am not sure what you mean about become battle ready.  i think there are lots of commenters here that have not met the criteria of "No unit is battle ready until it actually engages in combat" if you can insert soldier in place of unit. If you read Peter Thompson you can see what you are talking about and he becomes a soldier. So do you think individuals are not battle ready without engaging in combat?

I did respond to your battle readiness but the computer locked up so here it is.  Mastery of the necessary skillsets is part of battle readiness. I am sure you know that.

Regards

Steve

[yanmacca]

That move from the bluffs across MTC and the group of ridge lines pryor to reaching battle ridge, is littered with groups of cartidges which would suggest that a move across this area had its fare share of firing, now we don't know if the firing was from the saddle or boots on the ground but firing was conducted, so if any company was ordered to shoot at encroaching warriors, I would guess that it was done in the same fashion as done on the approach.

[quincannon]

You could use a little more boring Steve and a lot less talking. You do not know beans from a bulls ass about what I am trying to say here, simply because you do not read, listen, and comprehend what is said and written. You have no experience at the level I have had in the military, so you calling anything I say Bull Shit, is just a display of your ignorance, nothing else.

You don't have the foggiest understanding of what Bender (Lieutenant Colonel Bender to be completely correct) says either. I don't agree with him often about this particular battle, because of his blind prejudice toward Custer and many of his officers, but in general he knows what he is talking about, and you do not have anywhere near the experience to comprehend what he says either. Bender is not for the common man.

No one ever said that training, and in particular marksmanship training, does not better prepare you for battle. Of course it does, as does discipline, in everything from resisting the impulse to put your head up under fire, to the discipline to use a slit trench latrine rather than crapping behind a tree, and it is all gained in training. If you think the Marines that crossed the beach at Guadalcanal, or the divisions that hit Utah and Omaha were battle ready though, you are just plain full of shit. They were not, nowhere near it. They were only as battle ready as they could be made without battle, and the Marines weren't even that ready, according to the division commander, and many of the officers, and non-commissioned officers, both junior and senior, who commented on it in writing, and in after action reports, later. 

[azranger]

Chuck 

I get you don't like what Marines are taught in boot camp but its all part of being a Marine and it sticks with you.  As I  pointed my handgun at a felon that I stopped I heard in my brain breathe relax aim slack squeeze. Another time we had warrant for a convicted felon who had murdered someone. A deputy asked for assistance from the more than 10 G&F officers at a checkpoint. No one except this old Marine volunteered to take this felon down. I yelled at him and he turned I racked the shotgun and it was game over. I have no issue with that because I know I will shoot. I am sure he believed it.

Marines are different. At the Flagstaff strip mall I saw a truck and in the back window I saw a lot of words and a large Marine Corps EGA I wanted to see what it said. A large Navajo got out of the truck as a took a picture.

It stated adjacent the USMC emblem : We are the ultimate in body piercing, and underneath that, Once a Marine always a Marine. 

Do I know that Marines miss, absolutely, but the mindset keeps you in the fight. Keep shooting until there is no threat. The "This is My Rifle Creed" does not say you won't miss but it does say only hits count. The members of the 1874 Expedition proved it almost every day against these same Indians. They weren't Marines but they had the same thought process along with the skillset. 

Law enforcement is taught to keep shooting until there is no threat which is the same thing as the Creed. Only hits that stop the threat count. 

I think the only way I will ever forget what the Marine Corps taught me is when I get like Joe Biden. I saw my dad go through it and it is sad. He was WWII veteran of the Army. 

Regards

Steve 

[azranger]

Aug 2, 2020 19:43:22 GMT yanmacca said:

That move from the bluffs across MTC and the group of ridge lines pryor to reaching battle ridge, is littered with groups of cartidges which would suggest that a move across this area had its fare share of firing, now we don't know if the firing was from the saddle or boots on the ground but firing was conducted, so if any company was ordered to shoot at encroaching warriors, I would guess that it was done in the same fashion as done on the approach.

Ian 

What was exciting for me is that we had called the artifacts a running W. When my Crow friend went that way I could see why it was bluffed up and the shape was determined by that terrain feature. I suspect they dismount and went closer to the edge to shoot. I would think the horses were not in that W shape because it you are not near the edge it is a straight line to travel. Just my two cents

I think it was suppression fire, since the Indians could not climb the ledge the troopers were on. There is also east and west soldier sites which indicate to me they may have sent troopers to flank the Indians.

Regards
Steve

[quincannon]

I neither like or dislike what Marines or anyone else is taught in basic training or boot camp. It sticks with me too, but I am also adult enough and experienced enough to know that what is taught in boot camp has very little to do with preparing a soldier or Marine for combat, and has much more to do with preparing them to transition, and transitioning them, from the life of a civilian, to the world of a soldier. All that poem reciting and grunting is fluff, designed for that one purpose alone.

I would venture to say that your police war stories would have turned out the same, if you had never heard of the United States Marine Corps. "No one volunteered" has nothing to do with Marine Corps experience. It has to do with your character, and devotion to duty. The Marine Corps did not teach you that. Your Mamma taught you that. The Marine Corps only helped.

"Only hits that stop the threat may count" - in police work. In the military, and in battle, every round you throw down range at the enemy counts in some way. Those rounds either hit the enemy, or suppress the enemy, and in battle suppression is ten times better, for fire and maneuver, than hitting.

When you get like Joe Biden, people will be calling you Mister Vice President, at least for now, and he still has more smarts on how to run government on his worst day, then you have on your best. We had this discussion about talking about peoples health before, and only a lily livered, poorly bred, piece of shit, would disparage a man in that way, in public. Is that what you are? If you want to talk about him, talk about his policies that you don't like. That's fair game. Your last remark is not.

[azranger]

Aug 2, 2020 18:52:03 GMT quincannon said:

It is something I know unless law enforcement routinely defends positions on the battlefield.

Is that the best you've got? I fully expected you to challenge me on battle readiness. It would not work of course, because I have thousands of historical examples to cite supporting the position I have taken. Your rifle poem is not battle readiness, and even if you take it literally, and ignore the two precepts of battle, fire and maneuver, all these quaint little expressions of purpose are nothing but quaint little expressions of purpose. It is the very same thing as thinking battle readiness is expressed by obnoxious grunting in the manner that those that have never been in battle are prone to do, trying to show how tough they think they are. Not a whole lot of poem reciting and grunting done on the part of those who are truly battle ready. They are just frigging scared and hope the enemy is more scared than they are.

I stand by my BS call because I clearly stated the skillsets, one of which is weapon systems. Of course its not just  firing since you have to know how to clear malfunctions without thinking about. You need to know proper maintenance. In Vietnam we were constantly field stripping and making ready. There are numerous skillsets that pertain to a particular job or MOS. It would seem obvious to me that riding a horse would be a skillset that a cavalry troopers should have. Included in that skillset  should be firing a weapon horseback. If you are going to charge mounted with revolvers drawn you should have the skillset to do it.  Do you really think they were surprised that some of the troopers could not ride their horse at speed with an independent seat?

Knowing a tactic does mean your troops have the skills to do it. You also have to know the abilities of your immediate command. So lots of examples are meaningless if the battle we are discussing has troops without basic skills.  I think horsemanship and firing a revolver would be skills that someone participating in a mounted charge should have. I also think any officer worth a damn would not select a tactic that required skills the soldiers didn't have. I think it is exactly why Sgt Ryan stated even Custer wouldn't fight these soldiers mounted.

I can't say how the Army trains since I did not attend their training. What I know is that in Marines were taught skills and expected to perform them under stress. We were also taught tactics which were a choice of whomever was in charge and we would use our skills during implementation of a tactic. If you can not ride and shoot than a charge with drawn revolvers does not appear to be a best available choice.

Regards

Steve

[quincannon]

Steve: I really hate to say this because it sounds like I am degrading you. That is not my intention.

You do not have the required knowledge and experience to compete with me in the military arena. Your's is limited to a very basic, the most basic level. while mine is far more advanced. That is not trying to blow my horn, it is simply stating the facts as they exist. You show little to no understanding of tactics, and military decision making. It is exactly what anyone would expect of a Marine Corporal, having been in a combat zone, but not in combat at its most basic level. Dan, who was the same rank as you, and who served during relatively same period, was at least a rifleman, and experience as such in a rifle squad, and at one time led that squad. He will be the first to tell you that knowing everything you need to know about a weapon is not nearly enough. You must know how to employ that weapons, and at the same time be proficient in maneuvering others.

All this is evidenced by the fact after this all day session you still have no frigging understanding of what battle readiness is. It is IN THE MIND, and it only gets there after one has experienced combat. You do not understand that, for if you did you would not fall back constantly on your gun stories.

To use your example "Marines were taught skills and expected to perform them under stress" That is true in the Army too, but you cannot judge performance under stress and say it prepares you for combat, that you are battle ready, unless the stress you are under is combat itself. Training helps, the harder the training the better you prepare yourself, but you never know how battle ready a soldier, Marine, or military unit is until they are in combat.

"You were taught tactics" No you weren't. You were taught tactical technique. You weren't high enough in rank to be taught tactics.

You are also very limited in being able to chose the "best available choice". You have had absolutely no military experience that equips you for making such choices, above those of the best available choice for the individual. I agree that if you can't ride or shoot, a mounted charge with a revolver is a poor choice. But if, a mounted charge with a drawn revolver, by people who cannot ride or shoot, was the best available choice in furtherance of a higher purpose, by the entire command, telling people who cannot ride or shoot, to charge with a drawn revolver, may be the absolute best choice for accomplishing the command's overall mission. I feel sorry for the poor bastards who are told to do it, but I would order it in a heartbeat if it meant the rest of my force would accomplish the mission assigned to them. You see what I mean? The best available choice is in the eye of those that make decisions, not necessarily in the eye, or general welfare of those who have to carry out those choices. That's where you and I are worlds, no light years, apart. You are still looking at the little shit with the vision and scope of a worms eye view, while others must look at it through a much different lens. You forget I was an enlisted man at least as long as you were, I was a Staff Sergeant when commissioned, and I saw a lot of what I thought then was dumb shit, that I later found out was completely justified.

By the way Steve, the next time you are tempted to lecture me about best available choices, Blink or no Blink, I suggest you consult the history of your own Corps. Most of the lower ranking Marines that fought in the Pusan Perimeter battles (5th Marines) and most of the lower ranking Marines that invaded Inchon (1st Marine Division) did not even have the benefit of one hour's training at either of the two Marine Corps Recruit Depots before they were thrown into combat. So much for soldiers who can't ride or shoot conducting mounted charges. A good many of them died because they were untrained, untrained by your own Corps. Was that the best available choice? You bet your ass it was. It was also the only choice available to be made by some commander in August and October 1950, and they carried that burden of guilt with them until the day they died. Even then they would not have changed a thing, if they had to make that choice all over again. They were not battle ready, even by battle readiness standards available before they stepped ashore and into fire. By November those Marines, the ones that survived were battle ready.  The carnage that this lack of training caused, forced a change in the law, and that change prohibited any deployment of any member of the military into a combat zone, without at least six months of prior active duty training.

So Steve, when you play in my ball park,  bring a bat.