Custer Moves to Ford D with Five Companies Part A

[quincannon]

OK: I see where Mac is going with this coming off of BRE into the position of Company F as displayed on Ian's latest map.

I am still not ready to dismiss that second arrow already there though. That second arrow follows a natural avenue up from the gravel pit to the cemetery.

Ian let's do one more map but this time add another red arrow, coming from the top center of the map to the point where the entrance road lanes divide. If memory serves that is the place that the gate is, where they take your money and give you the brochure. You might also draw another dashed red arrow straight up the entrance road as a conjectural avenue of approach. I add the word conjectural because no Indian in the right mind would use that if two companies of cavalry were sitting on BRE.

[mac]

I am fine with the second arrow if it is coming up from the gravel pit area. I thought it represented movement along the crest of BRE. I am delighted with this train of inquiry and the discussion of BRE. I also like the notion of Company L as a reserve.

The mechanics of breaking contact and withdrawal will be very interesting indeed. 
Thanksfor the graphics Ian...Invaluable!
Cheers

[deadwoodgultch]

Let me ask a dumb question here. As HQ, E & F approach the ford (D) Custer has C, I, & L have remain on BRE to keep Wolf Tooth at bay with C oriented to the southwest to keep any encroachment from the south and west contained. Now as warriors from the Reno sector and the village begin to converge, Keogh sends C to meet the first group from the south and L to stop he incursion from ford B while following up himself as support for both. This hangs HQ, E, & F to save their own bacon. Keogh has already seen Custer retreating from ford D and thinks he is opening an retreat avenue south.

Just a thought. I may have gone more in depth, but I hope you get the idea.

[quincannon]

Have someone come up BRE and either firing over to or crossing over to the Company F position, or both is essential to the understanding that blob of Indian casings that you pointed to early in this game Mac. We may as well assume it was both as indicated by the arrow from the top of the page, until we can prove they shot, they came across or did none of the above that would concern Company F. If it is none of the above that we conclude we must look elsewhere for the object of Indian affections.

All this stuff has a tale to tell. Granted a lot is missing, but we must be about piecing those corners together as best we can.

[quincannon]

Tom: That sounds something like trying to stop a break in the Hoover Dam with your index finger alone.

Had that been seen, the only credible response would be to run like hell to the east as fast as you could with all five companies. Otherwise it was over and over would be readily apparent. The only thing that makes sense is not that it was not over, but it was not apparent to Custer or any of them that it was.

[mac]

A couple of things to add
1. The blobs are not necessarily contemporaneous. There are firing points over near the Highway generally assumed to be Wolf Tooth firing at Custer as he moved north. Could they be firing points at C,I,Las they move south down BRE. That is the beginning of a warrior move along the BRE crest to where the blob we are discussing is? I feel it likely that pressure built faster on the E,F formation as they were a more immediate target closer to the village.
2. I could imagine that E and F withdrew as accounts say and, as described, the warriors followed them. Not a hot pursuit but more trailing. We know Wolf Tooth was at Ford D so he had got there before Custer (hence the highway firing may be later) and that means at least 40 with him plus Lame White Man and other older warriors who were protecting the women and children.
Tactical
Could the Custer pause after withdrawal be to observe the strength of what was coming over at him in case he could reverse on them, clear them, and then cross the river?
In short the timing here will be a key factor.
Cheers

[quincannon]

Tactical ---- Very doubtful. If what was there was enough to keep him from crossing in the first place, drawing them over to the Custer side of the river, and having a fight there as a prelude to both beating them, then crossing over after them in pursuit toward the village does not stir the Tabasco sauce in my tomato juice.

[quincannon]

This is a sidebar comment, not directly tied to the subject at hand, but dealing with the discussion of the scientific approach mentioned over the last twenty four hours.

When Mac posted that link to an earlier conversation the one with the pictures there was a comment by Wagner dealing with the Sharrow marker and a fourth escape attempt. I can see three possibilities here, the fourth eludes me, Foley, Sharrow, and Butler, Does it not seem odd that of the three mentioned all were noncommissioned officers, one a First Sergeant, and another the Regimental Sergeant Major.

It would not surprise me one bit for a private here and there to panic and run. Completely understandable. But, for at least two of these three known to do that goes against everything I know about NCO's

Now the science part. Admittedly two of the three known locations make them outliers, Butler and Foley. The location of Sharrow's body is completely consistent with the scenario we have been discussing today, and only becomes an outlier if you are in whole hog for the conventional theory to the exclusion of all else.

I take it as making excuses because they do not wish to accept any deviation to what they consider holy writ. I am glad we do not engage in this practice. Not even considering the damage a statement like that makes to the reputations of dead men, it seems to me that the people making them do not approach this in a scientific manner as described above. They were where they were for a reason, and we must attempt to find that reason, instead of taking some easy way out that may preserve the LBH social order but does nothing for finding truth for its own sake.

[mac]

Just thinking about that last night. The Sharrow marker was originally placed out near the Indian memorial and he was found with an unidentified soldier.  That is very consistent with what we are saying.
From the markers the sergeants and officers seem  to be where one might expect.The outliers you mention may require later thought.
To press on with the current study...When Custer has E and F at the river where would one expect the other 3 companies to be to support them? 
Cheers

[quincannon]

Well if you take the conventional approach there were only two companies up there, and there was no support.

The true answer is DUTS, meaning where was the detected threat.

I do not believe Wolf Tooth was anywhere else but the ford area, so that to me would eliminate any detected threat except from the front of the cavalry formation.

That is about as far as I can do trying to discern the historical situation.

Now if you rephrase that question and ask me how I would most likely deploy I would say:

I would move behind the two leading companies, with three companies in support, probably at a distance of no more that four to five hundred meters. My movements would conform to the direction and speed of the lead elements. Two of my companies would be to the rear and offset on the flank where I perceived the most danger. My third company would be similarly disposed on the flank where the less or lesser danger was expected. Mobile forces have a tendency to get sucked into fire traps. If they are moving quickly they do not always detect the cleverly laid fire trap. The only way to guard against that is to echelon and stagger. That should provide all the support the situation demands.

If you are looking for a specific piece of terrain from which to provide some manner of stationary support, the situation does not call for that, and the capability to do it does not exist within the organization. 

Given the same tactical problem today I would support a river crossing at Ford D all day long without moving as long as you give me a platoon of M-1 tanks.

The above is neither joke or smart comment. Stationary means you can support by fire alone. The 7th Cavalry did not have the means to do that in 1876.

[mac]

So we are back to the main advantage of cavalry is their mobility (making a nonsense again of the stationary deployment of C,I,L in the conventional theory). 
How do we interpret the earlier description of 3 companies coming over a hill?
Gotta go
Cheers

[chardvc]

Coming in late after the last 48 hours discussion a couple of things occur to me reading through the posts. In no particular order and aiming to challenge or support rather than dismiss or decry:

The 3 "companies" can be regarded as 3 groups. 2 companies and a HQ group could fit that description.

Just because cartridges have been found in a particular place we should be cautious about assigning them to a particular side let alone a company. There are levels of statistical probability or possibility but there is NO certainty.

I can only think that there is no general flee to the East because: a) Custer believes that he is on top; b) the area to the East of the troopers is blocked by NAs; c) one of the devastating attacks sweep in from that direction; d) a combination of any or all of the above.

Those who said that the Crazy Horse attack (the earliest accounts) came from the North or North East could just about be correct.

[mac]

I think the most likely answer to Crazy Horse is he attacked though the gap in Bettle Ridge and fell upon Company I from the north.
Excellent point about HQ, E and F being 3 groups.
QC
Your deployment to approach the northern ford sounds quite wide. Do you think you would use the ravine between Cemetery Ridge and Battle Ridge Extension?
If so then some elements would presumably be high on Cemetery side and BRE side.
Yes I am still thinking 3 groups over the hill.
Cheers

[yanmacca]

Mark, I don't think Crazy Horse managed to sweep around that far north, if he had around 200 mounted braves with him then this is almost as many men as Custer had, so their ability to cross the river would just as limited as the cavalry.

This would limit him to two fords, B and D, unless we go along the possibility that he cross near the Reno retreat crossing and then went over land to MTC and down to deep coulee.

If we say that he did cross at the norther ford (D), then this force of 200 would stand out like a sore thumb and would have a big impact on what Custer did next, as this would give him one hell of an headache as he would be facing rapidly growing bands of Indians on foot, plus the Wolftooth fifty and now Crazy Horse two hundred.

If you ask me then I would say that Crazy Horse crossed at ford B, as he would have known about this ford before hand and this would allow him quick access to the fight and not Rommel type sweeping left hooks.

But this is only my opinion and yours is as good as the next person.

[yanmacca]

Nov 29, 2016 21:01:18 GMT mac said:

If Company C were on the right flank of Company F and they had thinned their line and slipped away down the back of Battle Ridge then that would cause the Company F line to have to also cover more of the BRE action. Then when Company I thinned and withdrew, the split would be generated as Company F was even more intent on BRE.

Mac, if this is true then Company C may have caused two major shifts in fire power, because that would mean that F Company had to swing a portion of its line to cover C s move back south and later L Company had to do the same to cover Cs demise on FFR.

I would expect that any lessening in incoming from both of these two companies would be picked up on by the Indians and would be taken advantage of.