mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,800
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Post by mac on Jul 14, 2016 22:20:46 GMT
North to South Battle Flow is a topic discussed in bits around the board. I thought it might be good to have a dedicated thread. The main person researching this seems to have been Harper. Have there been other published proponents of the theory? Cheers
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Jul 15, 2016 1:26:28 GMT
Mac, Godfrey opened the door and JSIT says the Cheyenne indicate this. The obvious intent was not this battle flow, it became this, if you will, when Custer's master plan was cut off and he was forced to fight his way back toward support. There was never a battle fought on his way north. This is not a shot on my part. Battle flow moving south, in fact, happened even if GAC left some support on southern reaches of battle ridge.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Jul 15, 2016 9:41:49 GMT
I think south to north and north to south are both in error as they both leave incomplete pictures of what likely happened.
If we were to say that the Battle of the Bulge was east to west, and not east to west then west to east we would equally be in error.
The direction of the side that had the initiative initially was undoubtedly south to north. Both engagements Reno's and Custer's were fought by a side coming from the south and meeting a stationary block. At the point of engagement(s) the course of battle flow was reversed. The action, as in Newton's Third Law caused a reaction, and those reactions shifted the direction of battle flow.
It does not matter if JSIT, or Harper is correct or not, in the analysis of the Custer portion of the fight. The battle still flowed southward toward the Reno hilltop position and its climax after the initiative was lost on first contact. When you analyze the flow of battle it is the totality that must be considered, not just a portion. Had Custer been successful up north, and had there been no Reno hilltop, the battle flow then would be south to north, and the Reno setback in the valley would not even be considered in the totality of the picture.
You can not cherry pick portions of the fight and make definitive statements about total battle flow. You must consider all, or keep opinions close to your vest, lest some smart ass like me wander your way.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,800
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Post by mac on Jul 15, 2016 9:52:24 GMT
Point taken QC. I thought we could tease out the possibilities here in its own thread for future reference. Better perhaps to refer to the northern part of the battle. The first thing here is Custer's possible reasons for heading north. Once upon a time you and I discussed the desirability of that northern extension of battle ridge and I see you refered to it elsewhere as an ideal place for Custer to launch an attack. If this was his purpose I would expect him to go with his full force as in the JSIT account. If this was the case would he leave L as a rear guard on Calhoun. It seems a long way back and a small number to guard the space. Cheers
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on Jul 15, 2016 11:49:31 GMT
As far as north to south I believe that Gordie did a lot of talking with Weibert and Weibert wrote about it.
I agree Chuck that south to north and north to south leave a lot to be desired in actual detail. The key difference to me is did action take place north of LSH and could Ford Ds be the ford described where action took place instead of Ford B.
I think if there is a better description of the two theories it could be accepted. My personal belief is that there was fighting moving north but without the 5 companies being fixed. They moved north as far as the Ford D and then moved back to LSH.
South to North to South
Depending on where an Indian observation was made would influence the particular account flow direction. Where Custer actually moved to along with the 5 companies leaves a lot to be desired except for where they ended up.
Regards
Steve
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 15, 2016 13:12:54 GMT
I think to fully accept the prospect of the directional flow of this battle, we must first empty our minds of ford B, whether or not any attempt was made to recce the flats in front of the ford or even view it from the closest high ground, would have only been brief.
Remember what dark cloud said years ago, about the way he thought that these companies acted in a leaderless way, well he could have been right but got the direction wrong.
If any withdrawal was made from the area around ford D, then this could have been a frantic affair, with casualties being suffered as the rode, Smith could have been hit early on and they sought to reach the high ground (cemetery hill) to regroup.
If we say that L Company was stationed on Calhoun hill then this would be the next rallying point, but this was interrupted as four Companies were divided into two (Crazy Horse charge).
Now if L and C were being pursued by mounted warriors plus taken hits from long range fire from the river banks, then this would look like a leaderless route and these two Companies were corralled and hemmed in, with Keogh heading through Fred’s gap and Harrington being roughly handled before being deflected towards Calhoun.
I suppose that it is natural for men to move to higher ground and this could be what happened, with the remains of L and C falling back under pressure to the ridge line, were they saw Keogh.
Then men from all three Companies grouped together and once this place became too hot and Custer’s battle flag came into view over on LSH, some made a break for it, to reach Custer, thus the line of markers between the two positions.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 15, 2016 14:06:06 GMT
I am not much of a Bridge player, but let's borrow an expression from that game and review the bidding.
If we accept the views put forth by Wagner, and nearly all the others including the NPS, Ford B, waiting for Benteen, recon to D, and the rest of that complete package, we in fact box ourselves into a corner. Given that there are only so many things to explain what is presently there and only so many reasons for them.
On the other hand if we think outside that box Wagner (and I use him because he is the most recent) and others have built for us, and start looking in depth at JSIT and other Indian accounts then I am prepared to say two things, one of them to Mac specifically.
1) It was a five company attack problem, whole hog or no bacon at all, going north with everything you have.
2) No, no one company rear guard that far back. If Benteen was expected to follow a trail from the split to L-N-C, then he could follow that trail to wherever Custer was. No excursion to Ford B, means no apparent need for rear guard, means five companies forward, means the explanation of final positions, after initial engagement is a scattering of forces, where some made it back to the point of final stand in better shape than others, but still none were at a place where they could lend support to one another. It also gives a more well defined purpose to the Company C affair.
I like this more and more folks. It makes a heck of a lot more sense then Custer up there unseeing and unaware. His mistakes were still in the multiple multitudes, but there is no deer in the headlights feel about it.
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 15, 2016 14:13:50 GMT
Chuck, the only reason that I keep reverting to a position held by Calhoun is the way they were positioned in relation to the others, I and C look like they were in disarray, while Calhoun seems to be a cohesive stand, but why after being pushed back from ford D would this company opt to form a skirmish line with nothing only broken units to protect its rear and flanks?
Does anyone think that L was in position before I and C reached the area? Would it be a good idea to set up two skirmish lines on Calhoun and FF Ridge? Why would you defend the area facing ford B when you have just been chased from the opposite direction?
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Post by quincannon on Jul 15, 2016 14:22:04 GMT
As a post script. Leaving a rear guard in place or to follow at some great distance gives you, the force commander, the obligation of being responsible for extracting that rear guard in the instance where their situation becomes untenable. Four companies in attack with the probable area of that attack being in the vicinity of Ford D or immediately north of it makes extraction of a rear guard in place impossible.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 15, 2016 14:42:23 GMT
Ian if Company L was the first to turn around and back track, there is a very good possibility (in the scenario we are presently discussing) that they reached Calhoun Hill in good order found their way blocked and started disputing the issue with the blockers. I find that highly possible, as I do with Company C coming in somewhere behind them, then moving down toward F-F Ridge to open a pathway south, only to have themselves blocked. Then a bit later Company I moving south along battle ridge, seeing what is happening to Company L's left flank moving off into the low ground to address it and being struck and stuck like the rest.
Meanwhile Crazy Horse and his merry men come up through Deep Coulee and get between E/F and C/I/L.
Under that circumstance E and F are the intended last to pull out, and they can't maneuver, except for some very local stuff, like cemetery to LSH.
Everything I just stated fits most if not all of the evidence, artifacts, and accounts that I am aware of, and it is to me far more logical than Custer again splitting in close proximity. No one (from complete novice to a seasoned board vet) thinks that makes any sense, but that does not stop them (including myself from time to time) from making excuses for it.
There was a time folks when the accounts of the Alamo had the Mexicans attacking with 5000+ all around the perimeter, overwhelming the defenders after three separate attacks, and every defender dying within the compound. Study and a lot of intense work over the last sixty years have conclusively proven that there were not 5000 but rather 1500 or so. That there were no three assaults but only one, and that assault was specifically directed at certain weak points in the defenses with enough deception thrown in to make the defenders uncertain of the location of the main attack. And finally the defenders did not all die at their posts, but at least half broke out to the east in two, and possible three places and the final hour of the battle was fought in the now parkland and built up area immediately to the east of the compound. And further it is quite likely the possibility of that breakout was by Mexican design.
There is more still to be learned about the Custer battle, lest we fall into the same trap set for us by Walt Disney and Davy, Davy Crockett.
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 15, 2016 18:59:24 GMT
That certainly is a possibility Chuck, but have you noticed how some Indian accounts mention the soldiers keeping their mounts in a ravine, now there are two places were horses were kept, horse holders (Calhoun) and cemetery ravine (Smith), which brings us nicely to the other twin localities at both fords, along with a slope for the soldiers to come down to, and a high point to which the soldiers ran to. In fact all of the accounts could easily relate to both fords.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 15, 2016 20:14:58 GMT
Ravine.
Calhoun was a fairly bright lad we can assume. He moves south, knows that the rest are coming behind him at some little distance, comes up over the rim of Calhoun Hill, and sees those Indians in, or soon to be in the Henryville area. He decided that he probably could not break through them so dismounts and forms a skirmish line, sending his horse holders back to a place of safety (horse holders ravine) and in his mind is staking out ground to fight on when the other four companies arrive.
Harrington comes up with Company C, not knowing what Calhoun's decision and intentions are, and veers off to F-F to break through, instead of joining Calhoun and starting to build a defensive ring. By the time Company I arrives, the whole business is well past its sell date, and he tries to make bricks without straw, and the rest is history marked in marble.
Calhoun was in a position, if this scenario is anything close to correct, of being the one with the most situational awareness, a fairly complete picture of the fact that their collective asses were apple butter.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 15, 2016 20:21:51 GMT
Give me one good reason why, considering that we mostly agree here that JSIT has merit, and that Harper was on to something, that Ford B should ever be mentioned again. I can't find any.
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Post by BrevetorCoffin on Jul 15, 2016 20:53:57 GMT
Give me one good reason why, considering that we mostly agree here that JSIT has merit, and that Harper was on to something, that Ford B should ever be mentioned again. I can't find any. For me because this is still in the plausible not probable realm. I will need to go back over participant comments but I believe there is still ample testimony that something, however minor occurred there. Certainly not the wholescale effort to relieve pressure on Reno that Count von B argues, but very possible the 7th did not ignore it. Just sayin'.
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Post by Beth on Jul 16, 2016 0:43:15 GMT
We tend to look at Ford B happening before anything else. Is there anything that locks it into that time slot? Could it have been troops trying to find a way to back to Reno and repulsed back up the ravine?
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