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Post by deadwoodgultch on Jul 9, 2016 10:57:15 GMT
Yes, and as to your comment regarding Ford B, read the synopsis of this book.
Sixty-six Years in Custer's Shadow - by Henry & Don Weibert ~ 174 Pages - Soft-Cover with the rare to find map
Sixty-six Years in Custer's Shadow, August 5, 2000
By Robert Snelson This review is from: Sixty Six Years in Custer's Shadow (Softcover) Henry Weibert is the first writer to use logic and physical evidence when writing about the battle athe Little Big Horn. Weibert lived in the area around the battlefield for sixty-six years and spent a great deal of his free time studying the fight. He points out that Custer never attempted to cross the middle ford to charge the village as every lazy historian claims. There has never been one shred of evidence that indicated Custer ever got within half a mile of the ford. Weibert used his knowledge of the battlefield and the archeological finds of others as well as his own to show Custer's true route to his final destiny. Any reader who wants to read the true history of this battle should read this book!
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Jul 9, 2016 11:03:19 GMT
I see that the original link finally worked sorry for the duplicate.
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 9, 2016 11:06:44 GMT
That's very interesting Tom, as all the data about crossing the river could easily be from ford D rather than B.
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on Jul 9, 2016 12:30:47 GMT
As you know Tom the 7th Ranch was owned by Weibert and is right along Reno Creek Rd and adjacent Ford A. Henry was within walking distance of the battlefield. My friend Gordie (Gordon Harper) who wrote The Fights on the Little Horn lived in Busby for a time and shared some of the same observations made by Weibert.
In his book the last chapter was not written by Gordie and its not what Gordie would have written in my opinion. I have personal letters and other correspondence that would indicate that he believed the flow of the battle was north to south.
I have several of the Weibert books and was impressed with his efforts to locate artifacts and record them. On some of our rides we went to the iron pins that Weibert placed to mark locations on the battlefield.
Regards
Steve
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Post by quincannon on Jul 9, 2016 14:05:52 GMT
Had a chance to talk to Tom on the phone last night at length, and one of the things we discussed was the open and relatively flat area west of battle ridge extension, north of Ford(s) D, that is cut through by both highway and railroad.
I said here that I was letting my ideas mature and gel before presenting them. Well the Jello has been in the fridge overnight so it is time for me to bring it to the table, so you may either eat it or pick the fruit cocktail pieces from it.
That relatively flat ground is ideal for a mobile cavalry force, whose TTP are based upon set piece drills, to operate in. It is also bounded (when Custer's force is facing south, by a river on the right, and high ground (BRE) on the left offering at least the illusion of flank protection. I find it very likely that this place would be what Custer may have been seeking, a place to use his strength instead of diluting that strength in the rocks and rills east of there.
I cannot be sure if he ever got there, and don't think anyone ever could with all the changes that have taken place. Artifacts must be found in groups for any meaning from them to be derived. A cartridge case here or canteen cup there may very well be outliers, and in themselves prove nothing.
If though we make the assumption that this ground is what Custer sought for battle, then the rest of the JSIT stands up very well. Custer goes toward this place with all five, in two not so widely separated columns (2 and 3). Custer is met on that ground and his first column is first halted and turned back. That would account for the finds at Putt's and those along battle ridge extension. It would also account for the skirmish line Steve recently mentioned. It would also give the opportunity to the Indians in splitting the two columns apart, and finally it would reverse the south to north battle flow (the approach to battle flow) to a north to south flow (the post initial engagement flow)
Pick out the peaches and pears, grapes and such, but leave those cherries alone, they are mine.
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 9, 2016 14:16:49 GMT
Chuck, I have had my five a day, but I agree with your analysis.
Ever since we started debating the JSIT map and accounts, I have had this vision in my mind of Custer rapidly moving across the high ground from LNC via Calhoun hill, behind battle ridge and sweeping down from the extensions, I can see his route every time I look at a map because it stands out so clear and obvious.
This is what a man like him would do, I don't think he had a "stop and lets scout first" bone in his body, especially if his blood was up.
Once he saw a route round the back he went for it with every thing he had.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 9, 2016 14:30:47 GMT
I suppose you Ian, and all here realize that this line of inquiry is heresy to those that have so much ink and effort invested in their concrete block opinions. We can afford to be heretics because we have no equity invested, that is liable to be thrown in our faces.
In my way of thinking, no book to defend, brings about honest open discussion, a type of free thinking that has been the hallmark of this board since its founding a year ago (this month).
We may be all wrong in the end, and convention may prevail, but the study of LBH is a journey not a destination, and those who write books have reached a place they consider a destination, and their vehicle stopped, never to move again.
Steve: Who wrote the final chapter of Harper's book? Are you saying that the final chapter reverses course from what came before, or just that it was incomplete as to its conclusions?
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 9, 2016 14:38:40 GMT
Chuck, it was Hunkpapa my English friend Gordon Richards, he told me a while back that the book needed an ending unless it would not be released and he was asked to finish it off (I think).
I haven't heard from him in ages, I always send him a message at Christmas but this year I got no reply, but he has not been too good lately so I hope he is ok.
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 9, 2016 15:27:38 GMT
Chuck, the two major factors are MTC and MTF, people look at these two locations and think, of course he would have ridden right down MTC and forced a crossing at MTF, BINGO job done.
But I think MTC was a death trap and MTF was no use him.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 9, 2016 15:49:02 GMT
Agreed. The Highway of Death ending in the Bridge of No Tactical Consequence.
I don't give George a lot of credit, as you know, but moving down low ground with high ground on three sides (the definition of a valley, or in a smaller scale,a coulee)is something even he would not be likely to try in broad daylight. You might have gotten away with it after dark, as the NKPA and CHICOM's did in Korea, but only because night vision devices had yet to be invented. The way the CHICOMS did it especially was the reason we developed GSR and similar capabilities so soon after the close of the Korean affair. If you cannot own the night you have only a half capable army.
There was no earthy reason, including abject stupidity, that would cause anyone to walk into the terrain trap that MTC/MTF is, smoke, dust and other mediocre level excuses notwithstanding.
We have often had somewhat heated discussions about MTC and Ford B with Wagner. We have discussed the right way to recon that ford, that being leaving three back as deep cover, moving forward with two, have one in close cover while the other looks about. That is how an operation of that sort is conducted - doing things right. But that is not the question. Doing the right thing is the question, and going to that ford was not the right thing. I think Wagner still does not know, or more importantly understand, the difference between the two. Of course our other friend, unmentioned and unlamented, the one who lives nearer you than me, could not comprehend it either. To him if you got off your horsey you were Infantry, the one who had Indians everywhere at the same time, giving no consideration to the time it took to get there.
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 9, 2016 16:16:26 GMT
I have not seen hide or hair of the person you are referring to for quite a while, he has not wrote on the black board for some months now, maybe a far back as February.
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Post by Beth on Jul 9, 2016 18:20:53 GMT
A bit off topic here, but there is talk that Capt. Weir may have saw some startling stuff on Weir point and that he took this information to the grave, because he was the first to over look the area some think that he saw things that the follow up solders missed as events change pretty rapidly, but wait a minute he had an orderly with him named Private Sanders, so surly what Weir saw Sanders did too right? Shall I move this to its own thread? I'm going to try something new and see if I can leave the post here while moving it also to the Weir Point topic. If it doesn't work we will at least have the above quoted message here. ETA The post was moved To "To Weir Point" into the thread "Captain Weir"
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Post by Beth on Jul 9, 2016 19:07:10 GMT
Chuck, I have had my five a day, but I agree with your analysis. Ever since we started debating the JSIT map and accounts, I have had this vision in my mind of Custer rapidly moving across the high ground from LNC via Calhoun hill, behind battle ridge and sweeping down from the extensions, I can see his route every time I look at a map because it stands out so clear and obvious. This is what a man like him would do, I don't think he had a "stop and lets scout first" bone in his body, especially if his blood was up. Once he saw a route round the back he went for it with every thing he had. The more I read about Custer, I have to agree with you. After all we can take a clue on how Custer would act by looking at how he was scouting from Power River to the Divide-only with added urgency. Custer would move quickly towards his goal, the problem is did he know where his goal was? Could Boyer have known the area well enough that he was directing Custer towards Ford D area?
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Post by quincannon on Jul 9, 2016 22:02:16 GMT
I suspect Boyer would have known how to get above the village circles. I fully believe that had he been one of the people at 3411, he should have been, but I am not saying he was, he would have concluded that the village would extend past Ford B. That is complete speculation on my part, because I can not view through his eyes. Even if he could not see all the way to B though, the sound advise of a scout would be not ford close to the village, but further away, so that you may ford, shake everything out, then proceed onward, without the possibility of making an opposed crossing.
So based upon that speculation, if it is indeed true, the next logical place to cross would be at D. Custer at that point was in a good place, He could maneuver well back to the east, use the terrain to mask his movements and move relatively fast. If he had a brain in his head he would realize that Reno could not hold out on an indefinite basis. He also knew that if Reno broke, and no further action was taken, the trains were toast. Combine this with all else we know transpired, and I think it a good bet that Custer did just what Ian postulated above.
Everything in Custer's resume points to a fast movement, followed by hasty attack, and hasty ain't a bad word in this context. It is a good word, one associated with decisive action taken in view of a fleeting opportunity. The only thing then that Custer did wrong following this line of reasoning, is in not realizing that the window of opportunity slams shut, just as fast or faster than it opens. Putting it bluntly, if you fiddle, your bound to be diddled.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 10, 2016 0:20:33 GMT
OK, here is another question for Steve and Tom. Custer is beating feet going north. He transits L-N-C, then the back side of battle ridge through the swale and onward.
Why would he not then keep on a straight line which would lead to a point where the present park boundary's northeast corner nearly touches highway 212, then turn using the present roadbed of 212 as a route over BRE and down to the open area. That would put him going right past Putt's Place, instead of screwing around in those draws and gullies around cemetery ridge, particularly the one that leads of LSH past the park headquarters and cemetery. That could not have been a good route to take with contact imminent.
I am beginning to think that the critical to understand part of this fight was on the present access road, Putt's parking lot, and the area just to the west of all this. That is where things went into the toilet bowl, not cemetery ridge and all those places so near and dear to the heart of those without imagination. Again completely consistent with JSIT.
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