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Post by BrevetorCoffin on May 13, 2016 23:06:24 GMT
Matt, Your conventional view is fair, but did you read what Godfrey said about the shod hooves at Ford B, and the trail that he followed from Reno Hill on the 27th. The discussion is to think through an alternative to 140 years of amateur investigation. Also think this through GAC leads 4 companies toward Ford D, he is punched in the nose, he wheels the command. The advance becomes the rear, the rear becomes the lead they are hit and whipped where they are found some get further than others. A general rout takes place. That is a rather simplified explanation, as the command is struck from east and west front and rear. They are all pushed to where they died. If you consider this model, it makes GAC look much smarter when taking 4 to attack/cutoff non combatants than he does taking 2 for a look see then call for support. Time and distance,remember this is Reno's promised support and it is already late. Ok that was being cute but time is a wasting and having to send back for more to attack with is a waste of time and allows your adversary time to blunt your attack. Remember the NA's have the advantage of being able to use their interior lines. Hold on to whichever theory you wish, most do. Regards, Tom Not holding onto either theory as both are valid hypotheses. Now it is time to re-read Godfrey and JSIT and Strategy's section on Ford B. I do not think anything major happened at B, not much more than a probe, but this all still hammers home Custer's negligence on providing support for the attack in rhe valley. Best, David
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Post by Beth on May 14, 2016 2:19:17 GMT
Beth, Despite what some say, GAC was not a fool or incompetent, he was also a brave soldier. GAC had an agenda, he always had an agenda, maybe self serving, but on this day his agenda gave him tunnel vision. Someone earlier mentioned tunnel vision, it fits, it is appropriate, I have felt this way for quite sometime. I even mentioned it to Fred, as one of his chapters was "Into the Tunnel." This is not what he was saying, but I took it that way. Regards, Tom It's been a lot time since I've thought of Custer as just a fool or even fool hardy. I do though believe he was 'off' that day and believe that tunnel vision was probably a big factor. I will always though believe that the extreme temperatures, exhaustion and poor condition of men and beast is not a factor that can dismissed when it comes to poor choices--not a deciding factor but a factor. People weren't as sharp or as aware of their surroundings as they should have been and it's easy to just micro focus on something or as you say develop tunnel vision.
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Post by BrevetorCoffin on May 14, 2016 3:30:01 GMT
Beth, Despite what some say, GAC was not a fool or incompetent, he was also a brave soldier. GAC had an agenda, he always had an agenda, maybe self serving, but on this day his agenda gave him tunnel vision. Someone earlier mentioned tunnel vision, it fits, it is appropriate, I have felt this way for quite sometime. I even mentioned it to Fred, as one of his chapters was "Into the Tunnel." This is not what he was saying, but I took it that way. Regards, Tom It's been a lot time since I've thought of Custer as just a fool or even fool hardy. I do though believe he was 'off' that day and believe that tunnel vision was probably a big factor. I will always though believe that the extreme temperatures, exhaustion and poor condition of men and beast is not a factor that can dismissed when it comes to poor choices--not a deciding factor but a factor. People weren't as sharp or as aware of their surroundings as they should have been and it's easy to just micro focus on something or as you say develop tunnel vision. When one is exhausted one tends to focus on one thing such as putting one atep in front of another, getting thru the next 60 seconds only to start all over again, etc.
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Post by quincannon on May 14, 2016 5:14:22 GMT
There are more than one way to exhibit incompetence.
I will start at the beginning of Beth's third sentence and carry through the remainder of the paragraph. Someone is responsible for that, and that person is incompetent.
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Post by yanmacca on May 14, 2016 12:00:36 GMT
Does anyone consider 6 ½ miles to be a long distance? Well I do because it is the same distance between Widnes and our neighbours Warrington, St Helens is a bit further at 7 miles, but enough of this.
The distance from Reno creek to ford D is about 6 ½ miles, so if we split this into stages then we can try and see why Custer kept extending his lines of communications.
First off he must have decided to swing behind the village and this is evident in his move over the bluff, once he reaches 3411 and sees the size of village, he seems to give it a wide berth and this could be down to the fact that he wants to keep low, which is understandable if he wants to achieve a surprize attack. Now when he gets on the high ground he sees that it stretches further then he thought, so he progresses on to Calhoun hill, he then sees activity further up the valley, which he perceives as the women and children, these are making a break for it so he goes after them.
Now I know that they are cavalry but 6 ½ miles is too far for any support to reach them and this extension of his lines of communication was brought on by a sequence of events which accumulated in the mission to capture of destroy those non-coms.
Yan.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on May 14, 2016 13:49:51 GMT
Off the top of my head, before anyone gets too excited, there are two things to consider. Why the firing from LNC. Were there enough warriors at Ford D to force Custer away. Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on May 14, 2016 14:51:29 GMT
Mac, I would have to read the Wolftooth (or JSIT) account again to verify this, but if I remember he mentions about two bands of Indians on either side of the Custer column as it moved from LCN to battle ridge.
But he does get a little vague, his reckons that there was around fifty in his band and they split into two with one shadowing the column and another moving north-east (I think) to cut them off.
But he doesn’t make it clear if his band of fifty were on the eastern side of the column and another band was on the western side, the band on the western side looks like they were in MTC, so if any band were engaged by the soldiers then it looks like it was the western one.
A lot of accounts claim that the whole eastern bank was used by the Indians and by the sounds of it, these defenders stretched from ford D to deep ravine, ford D could be clearly seen from the cemetery area and vice versa, and some accounts mention about Cheyenne and Sioux lining the benches with a clear view of cemetery and LSH, so they could have been strong enough to force him wide of the mark.
Yan.
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on May 14, 2016 17:22:22 GMT
Mac, there were some Indians on the eastern side (Wolftooth) and the firing from the LNC area was probably aimed at those warriors. The firing there would not have been to totally destroy them, but rather to make them keep their distance. Custer had all 5 of his companies at that point, unless some were sent down MTC toward Ford B, as the conventional wisdom says. 50 or so warriors would not have presented a dire threat to 210 troopers, but certainly could have been a nuisance if allowed to approach too closely.
Of course the firing there could have been no more than a signalling volley, as was sometimes used in battle. Maybe a signal to Benteen, saying "here we are, come this way"?
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Post by yanmacca on May 14, 2016 17:58:43 GMT
I have taken the liberty of adding place names to the JSIT map, and I find it remarkable how the Custer's suppose rout covers all the main locations;
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Post by Beth on May 14, 2016 19:38:07 GMT
There are more than one way to exhibit incompetence. I will start at the beginning of Beth's third sentence and carry through the remainder of the paragraph. Someone is responsible for that, and that person is incompetent. Reading my whole post today makes me wonder if I am the one who is incompetent. Seriously--I can write things coherently when I try.
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Post by quincannon on May 14, 2016 21:55:30 GMT
Don't think so Beth.
The point is that we mostly look at decisions made and not made, actions taken and not taken. A person, a commander, may make all the correct tactical decisions and actions, but if he has not prepared those in his care for battle, or has overtaxed his people and equipment to the point of complete exhaustion and malfunction, then he too is incompetent.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on May 15, 2016 11:39:31 GMT
Colt and Ian I had considered Woltooth and he is certainly a viable reason. Equally in a fluid situation with interior lines the warriors could quickly move to Ford D. There was a suggestion some time ago of archaeological finds on private land in the general Ford D region suggesting a cavalry firing position. I never heard more of it. If Companies C and I are recalled to Company L and if C arrives first, likely in view of marker positions, Harrington maybe acted quickly on limited intelligence. Maybe this goes to the soundness of his decision making. Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on May 15, 2016 12:44:37 GMT
If these two companies were sent to recover L company, then it sounds similar to what we were discussing a while ago on the “black board”, and that was saying that C company undertook a sweep to allow Calhoun to withdraw, but botched it up forcing L company to stay in position to help cover their retreat. But this does not explain why I company were out of sight over the ridge line, the only reason for this would be to protect that side of the ridge to allow for a withdrawal.
But if Custer was forced to retreat and had hostiles nipping at his tail, then would he want to undertake a fighting withdrawal? I don’t know the ins and outs of this manoeuvre, but I am sure that if they had four companies then two cover while the other two withdraw, then these halt and cover the withdrawal of the other two, but once the first two companies reach their positions, a mounted charge up deep ravine could have cut off the retreat of the two left behind.
Yan.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on May 15, 2016 22:23:54 GMT
Ian The sticking point for me in this discussion is Company I. If they have just arrived to retrieve L then I can see them caught in the swale. But if they were not already in the swale then it is hard to see why L had not already been surrounded. This is where the timing becomes very important. Factoring your response above where you suggest, I think, that Custer may have been trying to withdraw back to the south this becomes an interesting thought. Is it retrieve L or the start of a movement south? Cheers
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Post by deadwoodgultch on May 15, 2016 22:43:17 GMT
Mac,
When hit broadside from the west, maybe up through the gap, where would they go? Just asking.
Regards, Tom
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