Godfrey Tells a Tale

[colt45]

Yan,
I don't believe he went to Ford D with 2 companies to recce, leaving 3 behind, as the orthodox theory would have us believe. I think he took 4 companies to Ford D with every intention of crossing to attack. He could see the end of the village as well as the non-coms fleeing north. The resistance at the ford prevented a crossing with 4 companies, and the view of the number of hostiles and non-coms, probably caused Custer to move back to the cemetery area, set up a perimeter, and send for L company so he could consolidate 5 companies and then proceed with the attack. Only the quick and intense pressure from the Indians, both at Calhoun Hill and the Cemetery Ridge area prevented that consolidation from ever occurring, and forced the troops onto the defensive from that point forward.

[colt45]

I'm not sure Custer ever realized he was being surrounded while he was in the area of Ford D. With the high ground of Battle Ridge behind him, he could not see what was going on at Calhoun Hill, nor could he see the Indians that were east of Battle Ridge, flanking L company. I think he only realized he was in deep dodo once E and F had to begin falling back toward Battle Ridge due to the Indians crossing at Ford D, to his north and west, and the Indians coming up on his left through Deep Ravine. I think his OMG moment came when he got to LSH and saw all the action coming at him from the east as well as the other directions. I don't think he ever considered that the Indians would be so determined to fight and to fight with such extreme conviction.

[yanmacca]

I totally agree Colt, that's what I have been saying, he was probably doing recon as he advanced as this mission was to hit the village, he saw it from 3411 and went for it, the number of stragglers show that they rode hard and fast to get behind this objective, Martini even eluded to this fact. He hit the ridge line and his Crow scouts and Bouyer watched his left flank, the main coulee that cut through his advance and led to a hot spot (deep coulee and MTC ford) needed watching so he left one company behind and took off.

Yan.

[yanmacca]

Yes Colt, he made sure he kept his distance from the river, both on his approach and his move to cemetery, I would guess that this river bank was a shooters paradise and his men would be shot at all the way back to cemetery hill.

I have a feeling that I and C were following the vanguard, E and F would probably be the lead elements and any fall back or mission to get word back to Calhoun would fall to one of both of these companies.

Yan.

[dave]

Yan
I have a difficult time trying to determine or see what Custer's plans or actions were. Not being ex military I have little or no feel for tactics, strategy or correct military maneuvers. I am unsure of why he could not have stayed on LSH with his men and not descend to Cemetery Ridge. To my unskilled way of thinking I would have felt there is safety in numbers and with all the dust and constant motion of people seeking shelter and safety would tempt me to retreat and join with my separated companies. Custer's vision and anticipation of hostile actions must have convinced him to strew his command all of the Montana hillsides which I fail to understand.

I know that montrose, QC, benteen, AZ, Colt, Mark, Deadwood and others are far better equipped to visualize Custer's decisions but I opine they are as confused as I am as to the "why" he did what he did. I am inclined to believe that GAC developed tunnel vision and was just overcome by events. I realize he was a combat vet form the War but that was an entirely different manner of war and 11 years ago. Custer blinked and the Indians did not. Simple in conception simple in thought works for me.
Regards
Dave

[yanmacca]

Dave we are both in the same boat, as I know little about tactics and stuff, but I think that there was only one thing on Custer's mind that afternoon and that was a "Scrap"

[quincannon]

Matt is not alone in his opinion. He is joined by about 97 percent of those who look at this battle

When you think about it, not going to Ford B, really precludes a strong force, other than a one company rear guard to hang around Calhoun Hill. Not going to Ford B means no near instantaneous reaction to that move. There was a reaction of course, but that reaction could have very well been undetected, before Custer moved off.

Another thing we run into is knowing where the markers are gives us that posed toy soldier action figure syndrome again(last time I used it I fear no one knew what I meant - I'll try again). Toy soldiers are posed and frozen in place in time and space. We have a tendency, all of us, to see a marker, a photo, even a painting, or a graphic placement on a map, and think that the individuals and units they depict, were there. OK they were there, but they were also someplace before they were there, and most time someplace else afterward. It cannot help but effect our thinking on the matter.

Matt said, had all four companies gone forward they would have all died together. That is a leap into the land of complete speculation that I am not prepared to make. First off there is no reason to make that assumption. Second, the distances from an probable point of four company concentration to where they were ultimately found is not all that great, and they were a mobile force.

[dave]

Yan
I hope we both row in the same direction!
Regards
Dave

[benteen]

I would like to put this out to the forum for their consideration as another posibilty of what may have happened. If Custer was going to Ford D, he was going there for one reason. To attack. Why, because thats what Custer always did, he attacked. If he was going to attack he would do it with his entire command, all five companies. I have seen no reason (To me anyway) why he would leave three companies or one company or one soldier behind. 


Consider this. Custer is heading for Ford D. Line of march is HQ Co then E, F, or F,E followed by I,C,L in that order. Keogh sees that warriors are threatening the rear of the column and tells Calhoun to set up a skirmish line while I and C stay mounted, and fire a couple of volies to chase them back to the village (Indians always run dont they ) L would mount up and the three companies would quickly catch up to Custer. Only problem was that the Indians didnt run but kept coming, and Keogh was completly unprepared for the onslaught.

Now you may think and rightly so, how could Custer not know that three of his companies had dropped off. But if you think of it in real time, why would Custer have any reason to believe they werent with him.

For your consideration

Be Well
Dan

[colt45]

Matt,
The initial resistance at Ford D (or Ford B), according to accounts, was a little more than token, but not a major instantaneous smackdown. It was however, enough to force a rethink on Custer's part. If he was at Ford D, as I think he was, he could see two things he was after: 1) the northern end of the village, 2) fleeing non-coms. He could also see warriors moving into the area. He has 4 companies spread from the crossing back to probably just east of the cemetery area. He also has a company way back on Calhoun Hill. The sheer numbers of non-coms, plus growing number of hostiles, would indicate the need for everyone he has available to be present at the crossing, so he sends C back to retrieve L company. That will take some time, so while he waits, it makes sense to deploy E and F as has been shown on Ian's map, and either have I company in the close rear to serve as a reserve, or maybe deploy them in the direction of Deep Ravine, on E company's flank.

According to accounts, there appears to have been some "waiting around" in the cemetery area. This amount of time ranges from 15 minutes to as long as 30 minutes, if I recall correctly. That would be the time Custer is waiting for C and L companies to join the rest. The only way you get 4 companies dying in the same place is if Custer gets surrounded in the cemetery area very, very quickly, or he decides to be an idiot and just stand and fight right there. Since he didn't get surrounded immediately, he has time to maneuver to some degree. I think it possible that as pressure built to his front and flanks, he sent I company back to the high ground at battle ridge to setup cover for E and F so they could retire from the area back to battle ridge. The big unknown to Custer was that C and L had collapsed and I company crossed battle ridge and ran into a buzzsaw.

If things happened that way, you get markers along SSL, LSH, and on the east side of battle ridge, and between battle ridge and Calhoun Hill. There were concurrent actions going on at Calhoun Hill at the same time E and F are fighting in the cemetery area, but there were no instantaneous wipeouts. Fred's timelines show about an hour to hour and a half for the Custer portion of the battle. That is plenty of time for some tactical maneuvers before the roof caved in on Custer.

It doesn't seem logical to me that if Ford B was where the initial crossing was repulsed, that you would leave 3/5ths of your combat power behind while you took 2/5ths and went on a site-seeing expedition. If you find the crossing you are looking for, you now have to go spend time retrieving those other 3/5ths, plus consolidating in order to finally attack. All during that time, the Indians are going to have a say in things. I think Custer, as action-prone as he was, would bring 4 companies to Ford D. If no one was there, he might have chanced a crossing and attack with 4 companies, leaving L on the hill. I don't think he would have tried crossing with only 2 companies, even if he found the door at Ford D completely open and unguarded. Again, just my opinion.

[deadwoodgultch]

Matt,
Your conventional view is fair, but did you read what Godfrey said about the shod hooves at Ford B, and the trail that he followed from Reno Hill on the 27th. The discussion is to think through an alternative to 140 years of amateur investigation. Also think this through GAC leads 4 companies toward Ford D, he is punched in the nose, he wheels the command. The advance becomes the rear, the rear becomes the lead they are hit and whipped where they are found some get further than others. A general rout takes place. That is a rather simplified explanation, as the command is struck from east and west front and rear. They are all pushed to where they died.

If you consider this model, it makes GAC look much smarter when taking 4 to attack/cutoff non combatants than he does taking 2 for a look see then call for support.
Time and distance,remember this is Reno's promised support and it is already late. Ok that was being cute but time is a wasting and having to send back for more to attack with is a waste of time and allows your adversary time to blunt your attack. Remember the NA's have the advantage of being able to use their interior lines.

Hold on to whichever theory you wish, most do.

Regards,
Tom

[deadwoodgultch]

Colt,
Yours is much more complete than mine above. GAC could finally see the end of the village, why would he attack the middle, not tactically sound.

Regards,
Tom

[yanmacca]

Apparently some Indian accounts say that the Women and Kids crossed at ford D and when Custer appeared they crossed back again, if Custer saw these people in this area then surly he would want to wrap up this soft target, so he took the opportunity but was beaten to the punch and over extended himself.

Yan.

[Beth]

May 13, 2016 16:13:59 GMT yanmacca said:

Dave we are both in the same boat, as I know little about tactics and stuff, but I think that there was only one thing on Custer's mind that afternoon and that was a "Scrap"

I too am not a military tactic person but I believe that tactics by their nature need to make sense-given the situation and location.  I also don't believe in just accepting things because that is the way it has supposed to have happened especially when it doesn't make sense and you hear things like it had to be that way because Custer was a fool or incompetent.  Even a fool believes his actions make sense. 

I do believe that Custer was just thinking about his scrap.  He also didn't have a clue about the size and location of the enemy until 3411.  He probably could never get a clue on his enemy's resolve plus he showed an extended disregard for his enemy's ability.

Personally I think that he would use a very simple tactic, because he doesn't feel he is matching wits.  He would keep his forces together as much as possible (after 3411) because he has to deal with size--so spreading himself so thin all over the field makes no sense. 

The more I read accounts like JSIT, those stories seem to make more sense 

[deadwoodgultch]

Beth,

Despite what some say, GAC was not a fool or incompetent, he was also a brave soldier. GAC had an agenda, he always had an agenda, maybe self serving, but on this day his agenda gave him tunnel vision. Someone earlier mentioned tunnel vision, it fits, it is appropriate, I have felt this way for quite sometime. I even mentioned it to Fred, as one of his chapters was "Into the Tunnel." This is not what he was saying, but I took it that way.

Regards,
Tom