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Post by Beth on Apr 20, 2016 9:21:52 GMT
There are a lot of 'first hand accounts' of the events at LBH that seem to have share the same homogenized history. Sometimes I wonder if some of the accounts were just sort of prewritten then handed to old men and asked if that is what happened.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Apr 20, 2016 10:47:10 GMT
Aside from dissecting the Taylor piece, I was brought to reality on the size of the cavalry men of the day. One of Taylor's pictures showed him with a saber, he sure looks short! The "Participants" book lists him as 5'6"&3/4 that makes him about 67" tall and if memory serves me correct the saber is 35 or 36 inches. I realize this is not quite jockey size and I know because of the horses they were looking for lightweight troopers. I am sure that these were tough guys. I wonder if other nations cavalry's used the same size parameters.
Regards, Tom
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Post by BrevetorCoffin on Apr 20, 2016 13:11:38 GMT
Well put Matt and you have been following your Montrose on the distance Reno advanced (taking note of Montrose's wisdom is a very good thing btw).
Reno staying is a matter of the situation as it was to his experienced mind. Reno was no military slouch much as some have tried to present otherwise. The keys to the extra 30 minutes being useful are: will Custer show up? Will it do any good against this mass of Indians if he does? I am not convinced Custer had any intention of supporting Reno after he turned up the bluffs and any thought of Benteen providing support is a pipe dream.
Custer's actions and intentions at Ford B are debatable and Benteen did not have the man or firepower to ride 2.5 miles down the valley and thru 500-900 Indians to get to Reno. Now about those packs.
As things unfolded, had he stayed, Reno and his battalion would have been surrounded and slaughtered much as Custer's would be later IMHO.
Thank you for your viewpoint, Matt. IMHO your reasoning is good. Custer did not hold or was not able to hold up his end.
Best,
David.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 20, 2016 14:17:44 GMT
Agree fully with Matt's last paragraph, and your analysis David.
The problem with the timber revolves around he place Reno dismounted. Where he dismounted gave him no choice but to use that portion of the timber along the river that was nearest, thus available.
Had Reno dismounted when the Indians were first detected it would have been at a place closer to Ford A. Same timber, but a look at the map will note that the valley narrows at that point due to higher ground to the west. That high ground would have most likely protected Reno's left, or at least protected it for some time. Had Reno been subsequently forced into the timber, he would have been much closer to A, and chances are very good I think that Benteen approaching that ford would have been drawn into Reno's battle, probably at a time when Benteen coming across could strike into the flank of Indians that were then devoting their attention on Reno. A change of timber location, changes the dynamic of the battle.
I don't believe Custer had any intention of crossing to support Reno at Ford B.
You will be supported by the whole outfit is an open ended statement. Reno took it to mean that Custer would be right behind him. Custer may very well have meant - You get in there and mix it up, and I will look for some place to support your efforts. In the card game of pitch, that type of thing is referred to as bidding on the come, in other words bidding without the required cards, hoping that those cards would show up in the pass, or that your partner across the table has the cards to help support your bid . Poor way to play pitch. Poor way to plan, and conduct a military operation. All this compounded by Custer not telling Reno of his specific intention something like - You go there, I am going here. We will consolidate at.
So returning to the timber, perhaps what we should be saying, and should have said all along is that the timber migt have been held, just not that piece of timber that was readily available to Reno.
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Post by BrevetorCoffin on Apr 20, 2016 19:07:04 GMT
Great points QC. I believe the determining factor to consider is when did FUD set in for Reno (Fear, Uncertainty and/or Doubt) as to the wisdom of continuing his charge or dismounting. I believe the first priority was to protect the horses. Men getting to the timber may have been to get to the horses, not to set up a defensive position. Food for thought.
Best,
David
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benteen
First Lieutenant
"Once An Eagle
Posts: 406
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Post by benteen on Apr 20, 2016 19:20:01 GMT
Great points QC. I believe the determining factor to consider is when did FUD set in for Reno (Fear, Uncertainty and/or Doubt) as to the wisdom of continuing his charge or dismounting. I believe the first priority was to protect the horses. Men getting to the timber may have been to get to the horses, not to set up a defensive position. Food for thought. Best, David David, I have always thought that a good commander when caught in the open would try to get his men cover and concealment which is why I thought Reno went into the timber. However, what you say is no question, food for thought. I had never thought of it. Good post. Be Well Dan
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 20, 2016 19:21:55 GMT
The other day I said that Reno had three options and he choose to hold his ground, which out of the three would be the right choice as he was under the illusion that Custer wouldn't be that far away, but because he was riding out front with Hodgeson, he missed seeing E Company moving over the bluffs, now a few of his men saw this unit, but I wonder if it would have changed how he acted in the valley if he knew that Custer had place these obstacles between the two commands and these terrain features ruled out any direct support.
Before we go down this road, I don't want to start the old argument about cavalry units being able to support each other at distances of three miles, we have done that and got the t-shirt on the Bill and Clare show.
Yan.
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benteen
First Lieutenant
"Once An Eagle
Posts: 406
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Post by benteen on Apr 20, 2016 19:23:32 GMT
Brother Tom The perfect round peg for the round hole. The thought of those poor innocent officers being had by a slow walking, slow talking Virginian without ever knowing what happened. Wow, makes a native born Virginian proud. Being that I hail from a large city, 20,000 folks, I'll worry about little brother since he is from rural New Jersey and try to look out for him. Regards Dave Dave, Anyone who lives in new Jersey needs all the help they can get Be Well Dan
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Apr 20, 2016 21:55:38 GMT
The Montrose position I recall is that Custer probably thought the village was closer to Ford A than it actually was. Reno thought he was an advance guard. This, I think, makes it hard for Reno to know when to stop. Question...When Custer realizes that the village is well down the valley, further than he thought, how does this play in the decision for Custer to not enter the valley at Ford A? Cheers
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Post by BrevetorCoffin on Apr 20, 2016 23:21:40 GMT
Brother Tom The perfect round peg for the round hole. The thought of those poor innocent officers being had by a slow walking, slow talking Virginian without ever knowing what happened. Wow, makes a native born Virginian proud. Being that I hail from a large city, 20,000 folks, I'll worry about little brother since he is from rural New Jersey and try to look out for him. Regards Dave Dave, Anyone who lives in new Jersey needs all the help they can get Be Well Dan Past tense. 1979-2012!
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Post by Beth on Apr 20, 2016 23:28:43 GMT
It's kind of ironic that if Custer had been the type of commander who shared more with his officers and told Reno that he thought the village was x miles ahead we would have had a whole different battle. Once Reno reached the point where it was obvious that the village wasn't where Custer thought it would be, Reno could have sent a message back for further instructions. I can understand why commanders don't want subordinates questioning every order but at times having a clearer idea of the objects has to be more helpful than harmful.
An order like Reno states he got from Custer leaves no room for any other action but charge the village no matter where it was located.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 20, 2016 23:51:57 GMT
Getting under cover negates the mission. The mission was to develop the situation. You cannot develop the situation, by giving up on the mission, and immediately seeking safety. It is only when you find out that you cannot do anything more toward the mission goals, and enemy fires or maneuver makes your present location untenable, that you must take further action. That is what Reno did, and the fact that he remained out there trying to regain the initiative may not prove him a "good" commander, but it proves that he was focused on the mission given him, until it became apparent that he could no longer accomplish it
Good commanders know that it is an unfortunate fact of life that eggs must be broken if you wish to make breakfast. Good commanders know that mission of making breakfast is first. The mark of the good commander though is to do it in such a manner that you break as few eggs as possible, while still retaining mission focus of making breakfast. In this politically correct, nothing bad should ever happen world of ours, we do not wish to comprehend that in battle men get killed. Maybe if we did the old men that make wars, would not be allowed to make so many.
The horses went into the timber for protection. Upon withdrawal the soldiers rallied on the horses. That is standard procedure THEN and NOW. Cover and protect your mounts putting them in the closest place of safety, that is hopefully not too distant from your dismounts.
It becomes more apparent every day to me that Montrose's views on the presumed location of the village is correct, Custer believing it was much closer to Ford A. Today with radios and secure text we would use phase lines, which both monitor and limit forward (or perhaps rearward, as the case may be) movement. Custer did not have radios or secure text, BUT that fact does not limit the use of a phase line. One such order to Reno might have been - I think the village will be found about a mile north of the ford or less. Move across the ford, and if you go a mile without contact stop and await my orders. Just that indicates or should indicate to anyone above the age of potty training that the Charge and pitch in was a moronic military sound bite, not an order that was thought out beyond the distance between what passed for his brain, and the end of his nose.
Village location I do not believe had anything to do with Custer's decision Mac. Movement onto the bluffs was Custer being Custer in one of his more erratic moments.
Another thing about "good" commanders making breakfast, they tell everyone concerned what is on the menu.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 21, 2016 1:56:20 GMT
I think you need to reread what Benteen said Matt.
The distance from Ford A to the skirmish position is a little better than two miles as the crow flies. The twists and turns of the river, and the timber along that river, coupled with the rolling terrain between those two points make it impossible for the skirmish position to be seen from the south side of Ford A. In fact I think it is highly suspect that Benteen saw anything of Reno crossing the river an onto the bluff, except possibly the very last stages of reaching the bluff tops
I know he said the latter, but I never recall seeing anything about Benteen viewing the skirmish line.
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Post by BrevetorCoffin on Apr 21, 2016 3:00:38 GMT
Matt: QC has provided great advice above and I acknowledge your question was directed to me. I say "Pipe Dream" because I do not believe there was any possibility that Benteen,with his force of 115 men could have made much of a dent in the N/A's attacking Reno.
-- Remember that 7 minutes prior to arriving at Ford A, Benteen had been handed the responsibility (the note via Martini) of the Pack Trains which were anywhere from 30-90 minutes behind him. I believe he stated that he would not have entered the valley without the packs which, if accurate, this negates the extra 30 minutes Reno was hypothetically to remain in the timber. Perhaps at RCOI and can be looked up, just not right this minute.
-- Additionally, many of the attacking N/A's had turned Reno's left flank and gotten behind him to the south. Benteen would have had to ride through that growing mass as he would have traveled roughly south to north. Blocking force? Scatter and envelope Benteen's small force trying to get to Reno/Custer (which Benteen believed could be the case)? Remember, Benteen had no idea that Custer had separated his force from Reno. I believe that mass to the South of the timber position would have at best thwarted Benteen's efforts, at worst annihilated his battalion.
-- Even if he stops to form a skirmish line he needs to be within 200-300 yards of the N/A's to the South of the timber position in order to provide any support. I'm looking at the effective range of the 1873 Springfield Carbine. This is still a sizable distance from Ford A. With an even smaller troop than Reno's, he was subject to possible flank turning and N/A's getting behind him a la what happened to Reno. He would have also been a long distance from Ford A, making it difficult to provide support for the pack train and vice versa.
-- The other option is to follow Custer's route up the bluffs, then try to ride down those steep bluffs, cross a fast flowing river, ascend 6-10 foot banks on the other side then have to deal with N/A's. This also cuts into Reno's hypothetical 30 minutes. Now about those packs?
I know I've provided hypotheticals based on what I've studied about the situation. You have provided excellent food for thought, I am providing what I hope are sensible counter arguments as to why any attempt by Benteen to join the fray in the valley would have been too little, too late and possibly catastrophic. Doesn't mean I am right.
We may not agree but I do acknowledge that the views you provide tend to be anywhere from plausible, possible all the way to probable/factual. I'll add well thought and your flexibility regarding these sometimes divisive topics is appreciated. Thank you, Matt. Did at all this answer your question as to why I made my statement?
Best,
David
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on Apr 21, 2016 12:11:54 GMT
What legend in his own mind made this statement?
Assuming Reno's troopers had a 6 cartridges a piece at the start of their retreat -- and assuming an inability to reload -- there would be a potential of roughly 850+ cases laying along their retreat route.
AZ Ranger
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