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Post by yanmacca on May 11, 2016 19:45:57 GMT
I agree with you and Colt, that cavalry horses were everywhere, some where taken by the Indians and paraded around in military formation, so a lot of these would have headed for the river and ford B would be a prime spot.
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Post by yanmacca on May 11, 2016 19:51:25 GMT
Is it me or does that patch of land between the bluffs and the timber on our banner, look like good cavalry country?
Would this provide another option for an attack?
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on May 11, 2016 21:42:02 GMT
Don't think so. That open space east of the river isn't that large. The village was on the west side of the river, at the northern part of the picture. All the valley area on the west side of the picture is where all the fighting should have taken place, if Custer had supported Reno in the valley, as he should have.
If you consult the google aerial view of LBH you can see that the eastern part of the picture isn't large, and the bluffs move westward toward the river so that by ford B, there is no open space. That area might be where some of the Indians that were on the east side of the river were located, and might be the band that Boyer and scouts fired upon in the intial action by Custer's battalion.
AZ can probably clarify that section better than I can.
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Post by chardvc on Oct 18, 2016 17:07:02 GMT
Aside from dissecting the Taylor piece, I was brought to reality on the size of the cavalry men of the day. One of Taylor's pictures showed him with a saber, he sure looks short! The "Participants" book lists him as 5'6"&3/4 that makes him about 67" tall and if memory serves me correct the saber is 35 or 36 inches. I realize this is not quite jockey size and I know because of the horses they were looking for lightweight troopers. I am sure that these were tough guys. I wonder if other nations cavalry's used the same size parameters. Regards, Tom Hi Tom,
Apologies if this has been answered later in the thread but as I'm new to the board and reading through I came upon your post but couldn't see a response. I think the answer is that cavalry regiments were generally split into types and light cavalry would be light fast horses mounted by smaller men, whereas heavy cavalry tended to be much bigger horses and therefore the men on them also bigger. However, cavalry in the 1870s was going through a rethink both in the states and South Africa. Recent conflicts had begun to show that the day of the horseman was being overtaken by the evolving technology of mechanised warfare. The Civil War had shown that cavalry was best used as a method of rapidly deploying fire-power either from the saddle or, even better, from foot.
It is interesting (and also sad) to note that the tactical battlefield lessons learned the late 19th century had not spread to those in charge in the early 20th.
Mark
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Oct 18, 2016 18:04:08 GMT
Mark,
Welcome chardvc, your points are very to the point. There were obviously exceptions in the US Cavalry of the day, many officers were well above the average and bought their own horses.
I like your take on the mistakes of the early 20th century.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Oct 18, 2016 18:24:15 GMT
The mounted arm, regardless of name applied cavalry, dragoon, lancer, hussar, or Armor, has three main ingredients, mobility, firepower (read weapon if in ancient times), and protection. If one of these ingredients is missing, because it is either substandard or ineffective, then the arm itself varies between less effective to non-effective.
I completely agree with both of your comments, particularly the one about the early 20th Century. Thinking about it though, was it the non-adaptation of thinking on the part of leadership, or was it the non-availability of protection that gave them no choice. The heavy part of the mounted arm would not resurrect itself until the advent of the armored fighting vehicle, and its companions the armored personnel carrier, and self propelled howitzer. The light part would be dormant and ineffective until the introduction of the Bantam Car, which we universally know as the Jeep.
You can only fight with what you have, and adapt what you have as best you can until something better comes along.
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Post by chardvc on Oct 18, 2016 18:34:47 GMT
Cheers Tom,
I'm still learning about military life on the plains but with a limited amount of reading I can't recall many documented occasions when cavalry "charged home" when fighting NAs. I guess it's partly to do with the nature of the engagement - nearly always skirmishing, and the NAs nearly always on horse-back. Even in cinema I can recall very few scenes where the cavalry units didn't dismount but charged home with sabre or revolver - the only one I can recall off the top of my head is the closing fight scene in The Searchers (which is a very good film but hardly a paragon of historical accuracy).
No doubt others will be able to enlighten me.
Thinking more on the subject although very numerous it could be argued that the day of the cavalry charge had disappeared with 4 shots a minute musketry and the real heyday was probably prior to the 18th century. By the Napoleonic period cavalry use against prepared infantry was largely useless. Against retreating or broken units it was always a force but then that was much more about the speed and mobility offered by the horse.
In fact the more you think about it using a cavalry charge into a village was never going to be a great plan unless numerical superiority was on your side - look at the number of times you would be split into ever smaller knots of men. After your six shots or less and without any other close quarters weapon the first 3 opponents to get to you would be enough to unhorse you and kill you. Little wonder that Reno made the decision to stop and concentrate what little fire-power he had to hand.
Sorry, gone well off the point from where I started!!!
Mark
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Post by chardvc on Oct 18, 2016 18:45:05 GMT
The mounted arm, regardless of name applied cavalry, dragoon, lancer, hussar, or Armor, has three main ingredients, mobility, firepower (read weapon if in ancient times), and protection. If one of these ingredients is missing, because it is either substandard or ineffective, then the arm itself varies between less effective to non-effective. I completely agree with both of your comments, particularly the one about the early 20th Century. Thinking about it though, was it the non-adaptation of thinking on the part of leadership, or was it the non-availability of protection that gave them no choice. The heavy part of the mounted arm would not resurrect itself until the advent of the armored fighting vehicle, and its companions the armored personnel carrier, and self propelled howitzer. The light part would be dormant and ineffective until the introduction of the Bantam Car, which we universally know as the Jeep. You can only fight with what you have, and adapt what you have as best you can until something better comes along. Very true, 'protection' for the mounted arm I guess could be got through speed - too tricky a target to hit. If you're firing 20, 30, 70, 150 .... rounds a minute then speed has lost it's protection. In my opinion, rather than the non-availability of protection for the mounted arm the issues of the great war were more about the inability by leadership to recognise (certainly in the 1915-16 period) that formation (even loose ones) infantry charges against prepared positions was no longer a viable way of conducting war, even if you soften the enemy up with a couple of hours of heavy bombardment.
Pickett's charge or the first day of The Somme... not a huge change in tactics.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Oct 18, 2016 19:01:57 GMT
Mark,
Cheers to you as well. Your point regarding Reno actions are a major crux of the debate/discussion on this battle. I once had a rather heated go around/debate with a fellow who claimed that Custer could have won the battle if Reno had carried on into the village and brought his full firepower to bear. The fellow is a board member of the LBHA. Fred Wagner witnessed this go around and told me to save my breath. This fellow is a fine guy, just slightly delusional.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Oct 18, 2016 22:36:42 GMT
Your basic argument then is by the 1914-1918 war, technique had not managed to catch up with the increase of direct and indirect firepower. If you are looking for an argument, even a teensy weensy hiccup like burp or belch of derisive statement, you will be pleased to note that you will not find one from me.
Armies by their very nature are conservative. Leaders of armies, the general officers of the present, are still thinking and intend to fight in the same manner they first learned as Second Lieutenants thirty years before. Free thinkers do not go far. Perhaps upon reflection, that is the reason I never made - Field Marshall, and Dictator of Military Affairs for Life.
Seriously though, you get tagged as a reformer, and you can consider your career, above field grade, in the toilet. There was a guy I know, who wrote a book advocating brigade combat teams and combined arms battalions back about 1993. His book pissed off the then Chief of Staff so badly that this officers name could not be mentioned in the CofS presence without the Chief going into an apoplectic tirade. Fifteen years later we reorganized into BCT's composed of combined arms battalions, and the officer who wrote the book had been retired for ten years.
That is the atmosphere you are working within, so it is absolutely no surprise that the third day at Gettysburg or the Somme happened.
For that matter it is also no surprise that even today the solution for the conventional (and obsolete)thinker in Iraq and Syria against ISIS is stated in terms of armored brigades, supported by high density firepower, when the real answer for a lasting solution is in providing enablers, such as special forces, as well as communications and intelligence support, along with airpower applied with a degree of precision never before attained, then let the locals sort out their own mess. The caution there is that it must be done their way, the messiness has to be put up with, and the requirement for an infinite amount of patience is paramount.
Starship Troopers cannot be led by someone with the mental agility of Brigadier General Jubilation T. Cornpone, Confederate States Army and lackluster member of the Dogpatch branch of the Cornpone dynasty, and one known for no notable accomplishment during the late misunderstanding here in the Colonies.
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