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Post by yanmacca on Jul 5, 2016 12:02:13 GMT
Tom it is fine were it is.
There could be a discussion here that Custer panicked, because of the bread box incident. Someone said a while ago (may have been Fred) that 600 men and a pack train would leave enough evidence for any passing Indians to work out that there was a large military presence that had passed through this area.
But never the less Custer did bring forward his attack date and not only that he also lost the chance of an early morning attack.
So could Custer be thinking that he was walking into an alerted village which was wide awake and ready for him?
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on Jul 5, 2016 16:33:55 GMT
I think the question should be can an order require specific tasks to be completed and also allow latitude to use judgment?
Terry addressed two items that he gave details for in the written order. Tullocks and the Rosebud had specific requirements. Those he addressed as being non compliant in his letter. His latitude to Custer's judgment was when Custer moved close to or into contact.
Myself I see two different requirements within the order some specific and others the use latitude in judgment. Also I do not believe it would be a defense to state it would not change the outcome. If that were the case if I were ordered to be on guard duty in tower 9 from midnight to 4 AM and I did not go then if nothing happened that night I could defend myself by stating it would not change the outcome that night if I were there or not. To a lesser degree falling asleep on guard duty would be another example.
I would have never tested that defense that it would not make a difference in the Marine Corps.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by Beth on Jul 5, 2016 16:49:49 GMT
I expect so since Custer's battle plan seemed to be made on the fly without even knowing where exactly the village was nor it's size. It's like there were two battles that day, the one that happened and the one Custer thought was happening.
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on Jul 5, 2016 17:21:21 GMT
I believe Custer did not consider that the Indians would cross the river in sufficient numbers to fix and destroy his 5 companies.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 5, 2016 18:38:02 GMT
Apart from taking the Indians for granted, Custer organised his battle formation without even laying eyes on his objective, which I find astounding because he choose to hit the place from two directions, but to hit what from were, the man was blind to what lay up ahead of him, yet he formed his combat formations with the hope that they would both stumble across this village at different angles and defeat it.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 6, 2016 3:34:02 GMT
Can anyone point to a specific proximate cause, a but for without which it would not have happened, for not only an organized resistance at the south end of the villages, but also a deliberate spoiling attack on the part of the Indians as evidenced by their ability to come out and meet Reno's advance head on. Then, utterly defeat him by massing forces in the very short space of about half an hour.
You answer that question, and it also speaks to the ongoing conversation on the private thread concerning Wolf Tooth and Cheyenne readiness for battle, and you will know the effect of those incidents on the other side of the divide.
I look at the bread box as a usable excuse. Any Indian coming across that trail would know its ramifications.
In hind sight it is probably a good thing for the survivors of that battle that Custer attacked on the 25th. Had he waited until the 26th the survivors would not have to worry about surviving.
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 6, 2016 9:43:34 GMT
Here is an edit of Custer’s orders;
Colonel: The Brigadier-General Commanding directs that, as soon as your regiment can be made ready for the march, you will proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days since. It is, impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not impossible to do so the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them. He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn towards the Little Bighorn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the escape of the Indians passing around your left flank.
The column of Colonel Gibbon is now in motion for the mouth of the Big Horn. As soon as it reaches that point will cross the Yellowstone and move up at least as far as the forks of the Big and Little Horns. Of course its future movements must be controlled by circumstances as they arise, but it is hoped that the Indians, if upon the Little Horn, may be so nearly enclosed by the two columns that their escape will be impossible. The Department Commander desires that on your way up the Rosebud you should thoroughly examine the upper part of Tullock's Creek, and that you should endeavour to send a scout through to Colonel Gibbon's command.
These sound like conflicting orders to a lay man like me, look again;
You will proceed up the Rosebud in pursuit of the Indians whose trail was discovered by Major Reno a few days since He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn towards the Little Bighorn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left.
So really he is saying if you find the trail then don’t follow it, but carry on as far as the River Tongue, but this would radically alter his course and take him away from the trail and initially the Little Bighorn River too.
So in reality they want the 7th to be a large scouting force which has four missions; A: Find the main Indian trail. B: Scout as far south of the Tongue. C: Scout Tullocks Creek. D: Contact Crook.
So apart from these four orders (out of which he only fulfilled one), there is no mention about finding the Indian trail, then following it and finally engage.
Yan.
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 6, 2016 9:53:23 GMT
I have tried to move the posts from the message thread to their own thread, but I cannot find any access to PMs so I couldn’t move them.
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 6, 2016 10:03:13 GMT
Chuck, I wonder if the Indians initial thoughts was only to spoil any attack by soldiers through the valley, and that as their numbers grew and the soldiers relented, that this gave them the impetus to go for the kill, and the same thing could be said concerning Custer, initially Wolftooth and the bands of Cheyenne’s were only acting in a similar way to those who took part in the valley fight. And this was initially to blunt any attack. Once their numbers grew and they hit their straps, then momentum would play a big part in surrounding the soldiers.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 6, 2016 14:14:44 GMT
Turnip picking, nose picking, sleeping off a drunk, swimming down by the old mill stream. These peaceful folk were being molested by the big bad boys in blue and they only took up arms as a last resort to save their kinfolk from rape and rampage. That is how those innocent waifs of red men would tell the tale.
What I am saying is that this vision that is portrayed by them is totally inconsistent with how quickly they reacted, launched a spoiling attack, then surrounded and defeated Reno's battalion. Remember had Benteen not showed up, that fight was not over, and had he not shown up Reno would have been completely destroyed.
So to put it in more modern terms there are conditions of alert status, ranging from, not at all as portrayed by these peaceful folk, and the NPS and anyone else that believes that crap, to the high state of alert that it would take to pull something like that off. When you have to maneuver over an area of several miles it takes time, and that time exponentially increases as your level of alert decreases. The time involved here is 30 to 45 minutes, very short considering all that transpired.
Caution here, I am not saying that the Indians were waiting in ambush. All I am saying is that they were at a higher state of alert and readiness, then normal and higher than they wish you to believe. Something caused that. What was it?
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Post by quincannon on Jul 6, 2016 15:09:31 GMT
Wolf Tooth and his merry band were not out there for a Sunday morning joy ride. They were there for a purpose, and there very well may have been more we don't know about covering all points of the compass.
I do not think is was by accident that every ford except A was covered, by some manner of security force either. There were only so many venues to get from the east side of that river to the west and the Indians were aware of them all.
That leaves only A, and the ground between A and the south end of that village was ideal for a force at say a medium level of security to quickly react to incursions over the ford. In fact it is the only piece of ground that adds depth to their battle space, where they could bring an enemy to battle, not be comingled with the villages themselves, and if successful pin their adversary back on the river, at what was still a difficult fording place, especially if you were forced to retrograde over it under fire.
Maybe we should give these peaceful, family oriented values folks a little more credit than that has heretofore been given.
You might also note that all of the fords B to D had an advantage for the Indians. Any one that was used to cross the river east to west. exposed the crossing force to envelopment and attack from the flanks and especially the rear. All except A. No accident then. but looking more and more like purposeful array of forces.
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Post by yanmacca on Jul 6, 2016 15:38:29 GMT
Custer was first alerted to the Indian presence when Fred Girard said those fateful words “Hear are you Indians General, running like devils” and also White Man Runs Him told him about dust clouds ahead and it could be the Sioux running.
You could of course take the word of some of the over blown web sites that are out there on the net, one of them called “Astonisher” says this around the time Custer was on the crow’s nest;
The scouts came in and reported that he had been discovered, and that news was then on its way to the village that he was coming. Another scout said that two Sioux war parties had stolen up and seen the command; and on looking in a ravine nearby, sure enough fresh pony tracks were found.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 6, 2016 16:39:54 GMT
When I visited I purposefully ask a ranger about what I consider an astonishing lack of local security, that nearly all the accounts tell of. He goes into, for my benefit, that same old turnip picking crap and tells me that they were all going peacefully about their various pursuits. He then tried to sell me some moon green cheese, a bridge in Brooklyn, and an autographed menu from the Malevolent Musketeer's cavalry colonel dinner.
It defies belief that these people who had so many natural enemies, beside the U S Army, would not have wide awake alert security well out from their camp, especially in light of the Crook affair only a week earlier. You learn fast that in that country, even today, there are more things out there that can harm you, than would naturally take you into the folds of their bosom.
You should also be reminded that the optimum security is that which discovers the enemy without the enemy knowing that he has been discovered.
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Post by quincannon on Jul 6, 2016 17:07:29 GMT
No it did not take thirty minutes or so. They were coming out at him as he was approaching, and far enough away from Ford A that they could not easily turn. That is nothing more than an old fashioned suck in and stomp.
The pony herd was so large that it probably could not be adequately secured by some sort of human corral. The best way to secure that herd in my estimation was in outposting well beyond that perimeter.
It is also fairly well known that the warriors in camp, most of them kept a horse near at hand.
Define imminent.
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Post by Beth on Jul 6, 2016 17:24:13 GMT
I have always thought that the village location was carefully selected for defensibly--maybe not in 1876 but at some point when the tribes wandered and first set up camp points they were selected both for resources and defense. I believe that area traditionally belonged to the Crows so not only would they be on alert for the army but also the Crow or other tribes they were at war with.
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