Custer's dilemma

[yanmacca]

Hi everyone, I don’t think I have started any new threads lately so I will amend that today.

Now the question I pose is this; would Custer try and take on the village without support? Now what I mean by this is that imagine Custer and Keogh had re-united and the Indians had kept their distance, Custer had lost faith in any support tuning up, would he had gone ahead regardless and formulated some kind of attack plan? Or would he abort the mission, head south, try to cross deep coulee and hug the ridgeline until he reached a point where he could view the valley to see what had happened to his supporting battalions.

Yan.

[quincannon]

Ian there is no way to answer that question with 100% certitude, based upon what we have.

My impression is that Custer had gone beyond the point of no return mentally, and he had gone passed it at 3411 or shortly thereafter.

[Beth]

I think that once he realized he was right on top of the village he decided to go for broke and take the village. But I don't think he realized what 'the village' entailed until it was too late. I think every time he viewed his goal he perhaps got 'selective vision' and only chose to see what supported his views--and perhaps a bit of selective hearing as well. Have you ever worked with someone who is so sure they know what they are doing they won't listen to anyone who tries to point out a fundamental mistake? They will not be dissuaded no matter how you try.

[colt45]

Once past the point of no return, Custer had to go ahead with an attack on the village. I think that was the intent at ford D. His ego and desire to secure a big victory would not let him consider any other option than to attack. If Keogh hadn't been wiped out earlier, I think Custer would have tried to attack with 5 companys from the ford D area.

[yanmacca]

Thanks everyone, yes it has always puzzled me why he hung around the area for so long and never make a serious attack, if ford D was his target then he could have placed one company on battle ridge to sit and wait and went forward with the rest, he still would have had about 150 men available for his next move which could have been done with his largest company (L) covering the area in skirmish and attempted a crossing with the 100 or so left, but I guess one of the reasons he didn’t leave only one company behind was that ford B was not so inactive as we may have thought.

Yan.

[mac]

It sounds crazy, perhaps, to us but Custer is "ahead of the game" the mayhem is all evloving behind him as he moves further and further north. In his mind I think everything was fine and he was mounting an assault as soon as he had the mass to do so. Maybe this is an argument for why the commander should not be riding point.
Cheers

[yanmacca]

Mac you make a good point there, in his haste to move north he left a fragmented battalion to do two or maybe even three tasks, cover the ford, provide a link for his support and cover one of the flanks, this left this battalion weak in every department and as it showed as none of the three companies under Keogh's command was large enough to do the job ordered.
So if Custer would have hung out a little longer on battle ridge he may have realized that the longer they stay here then the more dangerous it became.

Yan.

[dave]

Custer
He was a leopard who could not change his spots. His whole military experience was attack, attack. The He did not fight defensively but always attacked the enemy. His whole intention was to envelope the Indian village and the women and children. At Ford D he saw the village extended farther north than he realized and pulled back to go north.
Custer had attacked large enemy forces during the War but he had much larger units under his charge. He lead regiments and brigades where he had more than 210+ soldiers. White rebel forces did not melt into the terrain as did the Indians. If Custer had crossed at Ford B he would have exposed both flanks to the enemy and been destroyed which I believed he knew.
His only course of action would to continue going north and seek the end of the village.

My questions are: when did he realize there was no end of the village? Was it just past LSH? Did Custer expect Benteen and the packs to come to Keogh? or was his plan to envelope the village and circle back to Reno after cutting the village in half?
Just curious.
Regards
Dave

[yanmacca]

Hi Dave, I think that his initial plan was built around finding a way to the northern edge of the village and this would mean Bouyer finding a rout, my guess is that when they found a coulee that led down to the river’s edge that this would bring them out at just the right point, but he soon found out that this was wrong, and because of this it then became plain that he had to re-think on the hoof, now if he believed that his support was coming along the same rout he took then he had to find a way of keeping his men active until this support arrives.

If this map is accurate then it shows just how far out he and Bouyer’s calculations were and the village lay a lot further north than expected;

[quincannon]

What does command from the front really mean?

What does it mean to you?

What is the purpose of commanding from the front?

Why is Erwin Rommel roundly praised for commanding from the front?

Why is Custer roundly criticized (by the rational and sane) for doing supposedly the same thing?

Did Custer really command from the front?

[yanmacca]

This has nothing to do with the thread but I like it anyway;

[yanmacca]

Chuck I would guess that “commanding from the front” means that he as the commander has a visual on what was happening to his units at that point, and if his leading elements had engaged the enemy, thus being in LOS of the action he can make plans accordingly, now I don’t think that Rommel did this during the desert war, he may have been a mile or two at the very closest, but when he was a company commander during WW1 he may very have been right in the firing line, but this is what company captains do, Custer on the other hand was really only commanding around the same number of men that Rommel had during his WW1 days, because late in the piece Custer’s command went from 209 to around 50 in a short space of time.

Yan.

[quincannon]

That print has everything to do with this thread, EVERYTHING.

Custer's dilemma was how to fight all those soldiers in the background, how to keep them in the fight, and how to win, and at the same time expend as few of his soldiers as possible. He failed.

It is often thought of as a phrase that works at cross purposes to itself - Accomplish the mission and look out for welfare of your soldiers. How do you do both at the same time? You do it by being completely focused on the mission, Making plans that CAN BE executed, sticking to the fundamentals of battle, and exercising command, by remaining in control of your whole force.

[quincannon]

Very good Ian. What you are saying is that the definition of - from the front - is relative.

That is only a part, but a good part of the answer though.

Let's see what the others think.

[Beth]

To me at least I'm not sure Custer wanted to 'command' from the front. To me he seems to lead people to an area, point out place that everyone should attack and then he leads the rush to get into the fight.

He seems to have had two plans, run straight in and fight or circle them, then run in and fight. He might have been very brave at leading men into battle and might have impressed the heck out of people because he took the same risks as an enlisted man but when you are in the center of the fray, you can't tell really tell what is going on with the entire battle. Your focus your immediate surroundings.

Custer at LBH wasn't in the middle of the battle while he was on the bluffs but he was focused on his immediate surrounding and had no idea what was really happening beyond what he could see and hear. LBH's terrain means he could nether see or hear critical information and adjust his plans accordingly.