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Post by johnson1941 on Jun 5, 2023 14:31:26 GMT
Camp provides a lot of interesting information pertaining to his mapping, often inlcuding Odometer readings and "stations" (Telegraph stations? Camp mentions telephone lines - so maybe? USGS stations fire stations?? Anyone?).
Does anyone get/know the specifics of this stuff? How to read the odometer readings? (feet? revolutions? ??) What the Stations are? Telephone Poles? USGS things?
For example:
And...
THANKS!
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Post by Arresting Hero on Jun 6, 2023 8:09:53 GMT
Hi '41
There is a problem with Camp's understanding of the camp, which were camps. It was understood at the time by some, and remains the case today, that the camp attacked on 25th June 1876, subsequently moved downriver onto the terrain where the trail, then roads and fords are. Only a few of those present realised this in 1876 but it is there in the record. Camp, Godfrey and many others persisted the erroneous interpretation of the huge big village stretching from Garryowen for miles down the valley.
This caveat underlies all interpretations of the battel and undermines many past and present. If the theory is built arround the super-sized camp then it is flawed fatally from get-go and fares worse than the unfortunate stuff which dribbles from the reaeend of mangy curs which have devoured fly-blown caracasses and soldier's remains. Poop in - poop out. Particularly for those consumed by latent Ford D theories, the super-sized camp is central to thinking but it just was not so. Unraveling the thinking is fun and invariablyleads to theory of activity on the D fords and related super-sized village being unsupportable and floundering in unsupportable quicksands. It smacks also, of Washita and Custer's pre-determined tactics of attack from all four cardinals to surround the enemy in place regardless of their disposition.
The Cheyenne camp sat opposite the divide of Deep and Medicine Tail coulees, overlooked by Greasy Grass Hill, with the other tribes located adjacent or upriver onto Garryowen. Making what didn't happen, happen, has confused study of the battle for 146 years.
Regards.
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Post by herosrest on Jun 6, 2023 9:21:52 GMT
As given, the camp location when attacked is central to thinking about how the military engagement evolved. The village location was often researched on the ground and for example E.S. Curtis aand T.B. Marquis got it correct, following in the footsteps of Capt (later BG) H.B. Freeman whose notes and map did not become available until - 1976. I link to Marquis's map of the camps link Now, I realise that the Indian (Sioux/Cheyenne/Arapaho) war fighting capability is little appreciated and broadly considered as unsophisticated and intrinsically hunting, scouting, ambush type tactics utilising surprise, speed and overwhelming strength whenever possible. However, at Little Bighorn, unable to abscond from a camp as large as that gathered and as such backs to the wall defending family and property, it is beyond any belief that the following example of startegy could occur. The premise - Elements of 7th Cavalry strike west downriver beyond the current day monument and national cemetery, into the valley to attack either the camp or take hostages, whilst the balance of the regiment with seven companies and reserves concentrate at what became Reno Hill ad three miles from a good river crossing into the valley opposite the Cheyenne camp. Seeing Custer lead companies of his command downriver to lower fords, the entire hostile force gallop down the valley to block crossing Ford D. It didn't happen and no-one alive is that daft and certainly not the Sioux and Cheyenne war leaders. Deploy against Ford D and Cavalry sally out from Reno Hill across Ford B. Game over! It's a nice idea but completely flawed. You can see also link that a number of very deep and broad ravines run entirely across the valley upriver of Ford D, which funnel travel onto trails and the fords. These are no-go terrain features hindering and halting mounted advance, attack and manouvre in contact or charge.
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Post by herosrest on Jun 6, 2023 10:00:48 GMT
From Marquis, The first Indians to go across the river and fire upon the Custer soldiers far out on the ridge were two Sioux and three Cheyennes . These three Cheyennes were Roan Bear , Buffalo Calf and Bobtail Horse . (p381 - Woodenleg) Buffalo Calf...... was this the Girl who saved her Brother? It certainly seems so, and, was it Buffalo Calf whom the Ogalala fighter 'White Cow Bull' had the hots for, rather than Meotzi? Black Kettle's daughter. As Gillian Andersen believes, The truth is out there, somewhere. The initial Cheyenne defence occurred nowhere near the river and involved a small party who went across the river from the camp and fired at troops far out on the ridge. Maybe, just possibly, they hit someone. Maybe not. There are yet living (1930) among the Cheyennes more than twenty men and about the same number of women who were full - grown people with us in the camp beside the Little Bighorn. I suppose that each tribe of the Sioux have, in proportion, the same numbers . We have many more who were children in the camp and who remember much of what was done at that time. Last Bull, leading chief of the Fox warriors , took his family and joined the Crows after the days of peace came . His two daughters married Crow men. The scared and screaming girl I took upon my horse when the soldiers burned our forty lodges on Powder river has become an old woman, a Cheyenne - Crow woman . She is known to the white people as Mrs. Passes . Judge R. Woodenleg
I firmly believe that Mrs. Passes has passed. and who knows what record hasbeen left by her for family and history.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Jun 6, 2023 14:13:39 GMT
Hi '41 There is a problem with Camp's understanding of the camp, which were camps. It was understood at the time by some, and remains the case today, that the camp attacked on 25th June 1876, subsequently moved downriver onto the terrain where the trail, then roads and fords are. Only a few of those present realised this in 1876 but it is there in the record. Camp, Godfrey and many others persisted the erroneous interpretation of the huge big village stretching from Garryowen for miles down the valley. This caveat underlies all interpretations of the battel and undermines many past and present. If the theory is built arround the super-sized camp then it is flawed fatally from get-go and fares worse than the unfortunate stuff which dribbles from the reaeend of mangy curs which have devoured fly-blown caracasses and soldier's remains. Poop in - poop out. Particularly for those consumed by latent Ford D theories, the super-sized camp is central to thinking but it just was not so. Unraveling the thinking is fun and invariablyleads to theory of activity on the D fords and related super-sized village being unsupportable and floundering in unsupportable quicksands. It smacks also, of Washita and Custer's pre-determined tactics of attack from all four cardinals to surround the enemy in place regardless of their disposition. The Cheyenne camp sat opposite the divide of Deep and Medicine Tail coulees, overlooked by Greasy Grass Hill, with the other tribes located adjacent or upriver onto Garryowen. Making what didn't happen, happen, has confused study of the battle for 146 years. Regards. "The Cheyenne camp sat opposite the divide of Deep and Medicine Tail coulees" This position still makes Ford B a no go zone. So how does it change anything? Cheers
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Jun 6, 2023 14:26:11 GMT
The premise - Elements of 7th Cavalry strike west downriver beyond the current day monument and national cemetery, into the valley to attack either the camp or take hostages, whilst the balance of the regiment with seven companies and reserves concentrate at what became Reno Hill ad three miles from a good river crossing into the valley opposite the Cheyenne camp. Seeing Custer lead companies of his command downriver to lower fords, the entire hostile force gallop down the valley to block crossing Ford D. It didn't happen and no-one alive is that daft and certainly not the Sioux and Cheyenne war leaders. Deploy against Ford D and Cavalry sally out from Reno Hill across Ford B. Game over! It's a nice idea but completely flawed. You can see also link that a number of very deep and broad ravines run entirely across the valley upriver of Ford D, which funnel travel onto trails and the fords. These are no-go terrain features hindering and halting mounted advance, attack and manouvre in contact or charge. " Deploy against Ford D and Cavalry sally out from Reno Hill across Ford B." Come on. (giddy up?) They could not even sally out to Weir successfully. " These are no-go terrain features hindering and halting mounted advance, attack and manouvre in contact or charge." Precisely why the Indians constructed the camp as and where they did. They knew what would be coming, hence the Rosebud action and the defensive village. No lack of thinking here. Underestimation was one of Custer's problems. Stop channeling him so hard . Cheers
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Post by herosrest on Jun 6, 2023 15:07:24 GMT
I was being even handed. Red Force did not, I repeat NOT, have an awareness of the Benteen Reno force's condition and capability. Sure, the valley attack bugged out but the hostile leaders knew only that the threat in the valley was deterred. There's a bit more to it, for sure but the sweeping Indian left hook across the lower fords is a fantasy. It really is that simple. Had the Benteen battalion been Custer instead, what do you think would have happened? Added, I'm thoroughly enjoying this read link which I popped up earlier on't another topic. I love the way its done and have that buzz from the early read of Gray's opus. Bloody well done.... An American who understands combat.... www.tankdestroyer.net/things/articles/156-operations-of-task-force-qaq-gen-earnest-aprvd
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Post by johnson1941 on Jun 6, 2023 23:00:52 GMT
Nice link - watching Band of Brothers...again...lately. OK ANYONE KNOW a thing about Camp's odometer readings or "stations"?
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on Jun 7, 2023 16:14:06 GMT
Camp thought Thompson was below LSH.
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Post by herosrest on Jun 7, 2023 18:08:14 GMT
Hi '41 There is a problem with Camp's understanding of the camp, which were camps. It was understood at the time by some, and remains the case today, that the camp attacked on 25th June 1876, subsequently moved downriver onto the terrain where the trail, then roads and fords are. Only a few of those present realised this in 1876 but it is there in the record. Camp, Godfrey and many others persisted the erroneous interpretation of the huge big village stretching from Garryowen for miles down the valley. This caveat underlies all interpretations of the battel and undermines many past and present. If the theory is built arround the super-sized camp then it is flawed fatally from get-go and fares worse than the unfortunate stuff which dribbles from the reaeend of mangy curs which have devoured fly-blown caracasses and soldier's remains. Poop in - poop out. Particularly for those consumed by latent Ford D theories, the super-sized camp is central to thinking but it just was not so. Unraveling the thinking is fun and invariablyleads to theory of activity on the D fords and related super-sized village being unsupportable and floundering in unsupportable quicksands. It smacks also, of Washita and Custer's pre-determined tactics of attack from all four cardinals to surround the enemy in place regardless of their disposition. The Cheyenne camp sat opposite the divide of Deep and Medicine Tail coulees, overlooked by Greasy Grass Hill, with the other tribes located adjacent or upriver onto Garryowen. Making what didn't happen, happen, has confused study of the battle for 146 years. Regards. "The Cheyenne camp sat opposite the divide of Deep and Medicine Tail coulees" This position still makes Ford B a no go zone. So how does it change anything? Cheers
At the time the Cheyenne White Shield made it back to his lodge, the camp was deserted save for a few souls including his mother. He painted up and in doing so observed soldiers opposite across the river and making for the ford, before they halted and dismounted. He described the location of the ford which is given in Grinnell. I don't have reference handy. I guess this was around the time that either of Custer, Cooke Keogh or Yates, maybe all - learnt of the setback in the valley. The B fords are those from Maguire's B on down to south by a little west of Greasy Grass Hill. I have no reason to doubt White Shield's information which is on par with the information about his action against Crook, also told to Grinnell and published in 'The Fighting Cheyennes'. Where the Cheyenne fighting bands were is moot, Two Moon went after Reno and arrived with the retreat vanishing across the river. American Horse, Spotted Wolf, and others were more guarded. I believe that Little Hawk rode with Crazy Horse but disussing this has always been inconclusive. So..... I know where troops were when White Shield was getting himself up for the fight. Reno was in retreat and Custer's men were seen to halt and dismount and that was viewed from the Cheyenne camp. White Shield was certain the soldiers would cross into the valley butthey halted. Fire away.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Jun 8, 2023 7:46:26 GMT
I shall only hit one part of White Shield's extensive account to Grinnell (1908) because I am too lazy to repeat this stuff. He was at the Northern Valley and there can be no mistake.
"All the soldiers retreated back from the river; but the Grey Horse Company stood their ground. The Grey Horse Company stood where the monument is now."
At the monument from Ford B. No way.
Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on Jun 8, 2023 10:10:07 GMT
Hi Mac, when you say the monument, you do mean the one near the fenced in area on LSH? Strange as it rules out a stand on cemetery or BRE. I agree a retreat from ford B dosent sit well, how could White Shield see this, sure if he was at ford B he could see them heading to the high ground but am I right in saying that LSH would be out of view from ford B? Plus, what happend to the other four companies, obviously this White Shield fellow dosent mention either FFR or CHalhoun Hill.
Ian
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Jun 8, 2023 12:21:27 GMT
He has quite a bit to say Ian, including seeing soldiers in seven groups...not two companies as often claimed for Ford B. The monument is often mentioned in Indian accounts as a general area reference I think, rather than as specifically right at the monument site. Cheers
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Post by johnson1941 on Jun 8, 2023 13:18:48 GMT
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Post by miker on Jun 8, 2023 13:23:28 GMT
7 groups is confusing since there were five companies in the Custer Battalion. 6 if you count the headquarters element. Thus there would have been 6 flags. The five troop guidons and custer’s Flag, the regimental colors having been left behind.
2, 5, 7 who knows? Reno was the only person commanding 7 companies after Benteen linked up.
Stragglers could have been confused for separate units or detachments or loose gaggles of troops not maintaining formation.
I doubt the Indians had an intelligence section well acquainted with US Cavalry organization, doctrine, and general knowledge. They may or may not have known they faced the 7th Cavalry since it seems until the crows nest there was little contact between Indians and the regiment.
Does anyone know of documented Indian sightings of the 7th during the journey from FAL to the link up with the other column? I don’t believe there are any reports from the 7th until then.
Edit. Reading the above reference I see several issues.
1. He reports after the fact knowledge identifying Reno and Custer. 2. Says Custer was wearing a buckskin shirt. 3. Says Custer had a saber. We know apparently only Derudio (spelling) carried a saber. 4. 7 companies vs 7 “groups” again indicating lack of knowledge of US organization. Probably not very significant. (Edit: I would not place any importance of this number. Other reports of observation lead one yo think several hundred rather than the 200-300 people. We were trained to report number/type of vehicles at a particular location. We were discouraged from and chided for reporting platoon, company, battalion, or regiment unless providing an informal assessment rather than a report. ) 5. (Edit) His description of his whereabouts is not definitive. It can describe Ford B orFord D.
Notice he reports a deserted village seemingly confirming Martini’s description.
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