Ford B: Prelude to Destruction

[quincannon]

Where Deep Ravine hits the river is where anyone would expect to find the last holdouts/escapees. I wonder if some of them obviously ran down the ravine to the river, why is it not equally plausible that some would run south along this so called western corridor, or for that matter why some caught on F-F Ridge would not try to run northward along that same pathway.

Every time he says Semper Fi do or die, I am reminded of how childish that expression is.

It's not Semper Fi Do Or Die. It's Do and Don't Die people. That's why we study the Art and Science of War and take it seriously, so soldiers (and Marines) can do, (accomplish the mission) and do not die in the process. Childish Marine Corps Poppycock Drivel, and all this time I thought the Corps recruited adults. Of course, they also belch in public when they attempt to make those animal noises to prove how manly they are. Children playing at being serious adults. What a shame for the country.

[Elwood]

Jul 10, 2023 4:31:08 GMT quincannon said:

So let's review the bidding. Custer with only 210 ten soldiers deliberately exposes himself with about half of those soldiers in front of a village containing somewhere between 1500 and 3000 warriors by going to or past Ford B, then to compound the idiocy he rides in front of high ground chock full of those warriors and suffers casualties, and still hopes to get north and attack that village across the river.

Over on YouTube, the Custer Apollo fellow believes that from the moment Custer separated from Reno and rode onto the bluffs, he was fixated on one thought and one thought only. Not to confront and fight the Indians but to capture non-combatants and force the Indians to capitulate. Some of his stuff (CA) I dont buy but it would explain some of Custers actions (or non-actions). What the hell was Custer doing? Weir Peak, MTC, reconn at some level Ford B, Ford D, Cemetery Ridge, companies scattered and cut to pieces along BR. LSH. Custer looking for a fight or a good spot for a picnic? Just rambling here folks . . .

[quincannon]

Custer Apollo drinks far too much Kool Aid left for him by those who came before.

When you figure out what Custer was doing be sure to let me know. Remember I am 80 years old so make it soon.

Hostages, bull shit, he did not have the combat power. Being an immoral bastard the taking of hostages and shielding himself behind the skirts of the womenfolk were not beyond the scope of his world view, but not here, not then.

Custer failed to reconnoiter before he launched his attack, starting that attack at the divide. In many ways he was like a blind man trying to travel where he had never been, and had incomplete knowledge of.

In June there is no good spot for a picnic on the bluffs above the Little Big Horn.

[miker]

Custer WAS  blind due to lack of reconnaissance, BUT had he NOT took counsel of his fears NOR worried about his flank, he MAY have been able to attack with the full regiment and done severe damage to the Indian cause and held out until Gibbon came up.

[quincannon]

As I remarked in the PM to you I just posted Mike, all Custer needed to do was put the fear of God into them and insure they could not use the route that led to the Big Horns, and escape. He did not have to win. He had to scare the shit out of them and block their potential egress with maneuver.

Here's the deal from an operational focus Mike, as I see it. The tribal circles banded together following the fight on Saint Patrick's Day with Reynolds. They did it for the safety in numbers factor. That was a very good move from the standpoint of security, but at the same time the women, little kiddies and old folks were a ball and chain the warriors had to contend with. The banding together was not a problem at all when the opposition was quite a distance away. We see that with the large Indian sortie that smacked Crook around on the Rosebud. As long as the opposition could be kept at a distance, the large village alignment could provide a base of operation and supporting infrastructure. Let the opposition get close though and that base and its contents become a millstone. They are forced to fight to protect, and they lose their only real operational advantage the initiative. 

All Custer needed to do is maneuver them into a position where their options for withdrawal were limited to nonexistent. Smack them about a bit. Let them know their days are numbered. Cut them off from where they would like to go. This is all Sun Tzu shit. Make them think you own them. Make them think you are in great strength or soon will be. Put the scare in them. With that ball and chain village around their necks, you have them by the operational balls.

[Elwood]

Jul 11, 2023 15:40:37 GMT quincannon said:

When you figure out what Custer was doing be sure to let me know. Remember I am 80 years old so make it soon.

I will expedite.

[quincannon]

Thanks.

[miker]

Re-readings my books on Longstreet, I found this comment:

After the war, Union General Jacob D. Cox claimed: “One rifle in the trench was worth five in front of it.”

LTG Longstreet: innovative military strategist, Page 12 on my kindle edition.

We can infer then that rifled muskets provided the defense a 3-5:1 advantage to the defense meaning that to get to a 1:1 attack, the offense needed a 3-5 advantage to hope to beat the defense. Rifled cannon were a factor too.

[quincannon]

The key words though are "in the trench". Cox only reinforced what Caesar said in "Commentaries" two thousand years before.