Ford B: Prelude to Destruction

[herosrest]

Jun 26, 2023 11:36:23 GMT yanmacca said:

Jun 26, 2023 8:53:49 GMT herosrest said:

The marksmanship training is a moot point at best because of the limited allocation of ammunition. I was just reviewing 'Boots On' and the massacre seems more based upon the opening than the end we understand.

m.youtube.com/watch?v=-q-FMq-jlNg

Still, it was 1941 and Japan had conquered a half of China. m.youtube.com/watch?v=Rz2ZQHirE-A&pp=ygUJSmF2YSAxOTQy

HR, was it true that these men had rode two days including a night march to fight this battle?

Is it also true that they had no cartridge belts?

So the avenue you should go down is, would these carbines be still clean after two days on a dusty trail and would these cartridges be clean after they had stuffed them into their dirty, dusty pockets.

That will save you the trouble of being chasing around the mulberry bush being subjected to battles before and after this one.

Elton was great by the way, the old ones never let you down.

Ian

It was quite a swan song. n regards the training to prevent dirty weapons and ammunition one might imagine that was run of the mill military pratice undertaken at company level by the NCO's who understood its importance. One might imagine such procedure was and is drilled into troops until second nature. That was and is the way military works as I have always understood it. Of course this was 7th US Cavalry in Lala land and rivrn since it momentous day of bad luck by interests of those far beyond the realm of reality. The guns in the valley were jamming during rapid fire. That being, 8-10 rounds in rapid fire, as per Lt. DeRudio at Chicago, then Company A's shoot ran into trouble in the first minute after starting to shoot. The valley fight was therefore brief and the departure in earnest happened quite quickly and the consquence was the five companies downriver being cut off and isolated. 

It's a very simple solution which smacks loudly with the rings of truth. That's what happened. Then, as Maj. Reno reached the bluffs, the hostile forces in that area disengaged and moved over the bluffs east of the river, below Weir Peak to attack the five companies across Medicine Tail Coulee. This is broadly the scenario revealed to Edward S. Curtis by his informants in 1905, but giving the reality to the duration of the valley skirmish. 

The purpose of training is competence. Anyone who does not know this or understand it is unfortunate. Those who assume that others do not know this, are equally unfortunate. How do you learn to ride a horse? How many large actions had 7th Cavalry undertaken since and including Washita. 

The could and should have had clean untarnished ammunition to hand in saddlebags. In fact they did but by the time they got back to the mounts, the decision to leave was underway. Disaster begot disaster. One might reasonably expect a similar difficulty for the companies downriver in rapid fire engagement. Then their horses were run off. 

[herosrest]

There you go again. My impression is that you feel 7th Cavalry were untrained, unmotivated and basically and quite broadly useless. That's not so and you should be ashamed.

[quincannon]

That's about it in a nutshell HR - UNMOTIVATED and UNTRAINED and QUITE BLOODY USELESS. Don't know about Mike but I am not ashamed, and were I part of the 7th Cavalry in 1876 I would be ashamed, and have every right to be. There is not a professional soldier I know that would not say the same thing. Anyone who differs does not know what they are talking about. They are far too busy drinking Kool Aid

Some of the volunteer Union regiments that served at Antietam had been in the Army all of two weeks. Many, not all, did better against what was the arguably the best Infantry in the world at the time than the 7th Cavalry did at LBH. The difference is that those outfits that stayed strong and well in hand had good leadership, they certainly were not what anyone in his right mind would call trained on the morning of 17 September 1862, by evening they could hold their own against anyone. Those units learned the hard way and paid the price, some with 40 percent casualties. That's not the way to do it though HR. You train, and make that training harder than combat, to give your people an even chance. Leaders know how to do this and they do. Pretenders, pussies and potentates say its to this or to that to train. They make excuses about cold or hot, dust or dry. Train. Lead. Work with what you have, and don't complain about what you don't have. Get the job done.

[yanmacca]

When I use to give guitar lessons, the biggest complaints were my fingers are hurting and does it get any easier, well my answer was, no it dosent get any easier but you get better.

Ian

[quincannon]

Exceptional analogy. Training is training. Good instructors are a plus, but the bottom line is that you do get better at anything you train for when you do it, and do it, and do it again. Some of the classical musicians and composers practiced 12 to 14 hours a day.

[miker]

I want to correct some errors or bad assumptions (in my earlier posts on these subjects) concerning manning, training, marksmanship, etc.  I have indicated edits in this post with italics, underlines, or strikethroughs.  I placed a heavily rewritten section and the battle of the Rosebud in the quote boxes.

The corrections are from A Terrible Glordy by James Donovan: You can get it for from 11.99 - 16.50 depending on used books, Kindle, Paper or Hardback. It has the virtue of being extensively footnoted.  I do not have the resources to go check the footnotes for accuracy.

Maps.  They had crap for Maps.  Donovan says they used the Raynolds-Maynadier Map from 1859-1860 although some think there were more up to dat maps.   Many, of not most, of the river courses are made up.

Manning:
October 1875: 7th Cavalry Received 150 recruits. Of these, 60 hads prior experience in the Army. 63 more arrived on 1 May, 1876. Reno ordered 4 - 6 weeks of drill, centered on company or battalion drill and little if any work in horsemanship or marksmanship.
p.220 in the book, The footnote is reference Reno's testimony from Robert Utley's "The Reno Court of Inquiry.)

Training at Jefferson Barracks, MO was centered on close order drill and fatigue duty. p.121, foot noted to Forty Miles on Beans and Hay and Custer, Cavalry, and Crows.

MajorMaror Lewis. Merrill reported, also on page 121, that Recruits are sent with practically no knowledge whatever of their duties, footnoted from The Old Army

Terry apparently decided to use mule trains prior to departing Fort Abraham Lincoln dispatching Reno.  This  Apparently there was no training in garrison had not been planned while in garrison and so it was first undertaken at the Powder River Depot (p159)  Footnoted to Centennial Campaign.

Fighting Outnumbered and Winning

pp127 - 128

On the Bozeman Trail, 30 soldiers/civilians held off 600 attackers for several hours from a rudimentary corral  from the Hayfield Fight (1:20)

Battle of Beecher's Island  50 soldiers/civilians held off 600 attackers by digging in in the middle of dried out fork of the Cheyanne River (1:10)

Wagon Box Fight 32 soldiers/civilians held off 500 Indians for 6 hours from the Grinnell Papers (1:15.6)

Herrendeen told Custer where he and 149 other prospectors had fought off 400-500 Indians (p.196) (1:3).footnoted to Custer in 76.

I believe this demonstrates the reason why the Army thought they could defeat the Sioux, but notice none of these were offensive actions but force with hasty or semi-prepared fortifications to fight from. This is also indicative of the success of the British at Rourke's Drift vs Isandalwana.

Let's look at the Battle of the Rosebud.  Crooke had 1311 troops, Indian Scouts, and armed civilians vs 1000-1800 Indians resulting in odds of 1.3:1 to 1:1.37.  They were unprepared taking a break when the Indians attack.  Fortunantly, the Indian Scouts were providing a screen and alerted the command and delayed the enemy approach.   1:1 attacks in 432 battles result in 271 attacker wins, 35 draws, and 126 defender wins.  We can call the battle a draw, but to me it looks like an attacker win.  The Indians decided to withdraw, leaving Crooke on the field, but then he pulled back to Wyoming for 6 weeks.  Crooke had better command and control then Custer, and his force was not divided.

If the 7th had stayed together and fought the whole 1500-2500 hostiles present at the LBH the odds would have been between 1:2.3 to 3.78.  It is difficult to say what would have happened, but I think Custer would likely have been driven to the defense.  Whether he could get to favorable ground is difficult to say.

I have not done an analysis of US Army attacks on Indian bands.

When the 7th Left Abraham Lincoln, out of about 660 officers, men, scouts, contracted citizens, 80 troopers were left to walk to the Little Bighorn , p. 135,

Training

pp. 139-140 Custer apparently ordered Reno to get the regiment in shape for prolonged service in the field.  Reno, as I pointed out, appeared not to follow these orders.  Before previous campaigns Custer is said to implement a routine of morning and afternoon skirmish drill and target practice and he finished by conducting a 2 week field exercise.  Footnoted in general orders in 1874 and 1876. 

Reno instituted daily hour long marksmanship on March 6, but on April 3rd cut it back to 30 minutes.  So it would appear that Reno did better in marksmanship training than I posited from memory, likely exceeding the 15 rounds/month allotment for monthly target practice.  FAL Circular 21 & 45 1876.

When Custer left, the band (17 men) and 150 other soldiers were left behind at the Powder River Depot for lack of horses.  About 660 men departed the Camp for the remainder of the campaign. Page 190 footnoted to Gray, the Centennial Campaign.

Ammunition

Each soldier carried 100 rounds of carbine ammunition (66,000 total) and 26,000 more in the trains for a total of 92,000 available rounds.  Page 190, footnoted to The Reno Court Inquiry.

Size of enemy force/odds

Before departing for the mission to find the village, Custer opined to his officers there were about 1500 hostiles in the camp.  Of course, they had no information as to the actual enemy stregnth. (page 193)

Custer asked Gerard how many he thought they would face and was told 1500-2000.  (p204) footnoted to The Custer Myth.

Donavan says Custer did not tell his officers of the overall plan for a pincer or encirclement of the camp along the LBH, but opines that many/most officers has discerned it from other officers and discussions. (p193)

As they moved out, Custer, as we all know divided his command (pp211-216):

Custer:  220 men for 22,000 rounds of ammunition
Reno:  140 men and 35 scouts, for 175 and about 17599 rounds of ammunition
Benteen:  118 Men Total and 11800 rounds of ammunition
Trains:  130 men, including CO B and civilians, 130,000 rounds of ammunition
            26,000 rounds in reserve.

When Reno is ordered to attack the group of 50-75 fleeing Indians (NOT the village which had not been seen close up yet), he crossed the river and as he crossed Ford A, some troops claim they already saw Custer going up the ridge to the right (p.217) Footnoted in Custer in 76.

Reno subsequently orders a charge and when he spots the Indians boiling up from or around a dry creek bed that is 5 feet deep and 10 feet wide, he determines if he continues he will dehorse most of his troops in the creak bed amongst the Indians and so checks the charge and forms a skirmish line.  (p229).  As a point of reference, modern rectangular anti-tank ditches are 1.8 x 3.3 meters or 5.9 x 10.8 feet, so it would require a tank/mech infantry team about 30 minutes to breach or lay a bridge, not including minefields.

Analysis (not in any particular order)

So, somewhat to my astonishment, Custer apparently did plan a pre-operation training program.  Reno tried to, but failed, due to lack of cooperation from the company commanders, plus weather, other preparatory actions needing to be taken and perhaps housekeeping of the fort.  It appears there was no mule-pack training conducted causing the regiment to have to figure it out prior to Reno's reconnaissance.  This is a serious, but not fatal, failure of leadership to schedule proper training before movement.

Revised section here.
There is a rule of thumb, for an attack to be successful, you need a 3:1 combat power ratio.  I have not found any documentation of that thinking in books of the era.  Even today, there is no real verufication of the "rule".  Defense is the stronger form of combat and the corollary of the 3:1 attack, is defense can win at 1:3 odds.  Defensive combat power is modified by the use of field fortifications and barriers, giving it a combat power boost.
  
There is little or no statistical documentation that verifies the 3:1 rule for attack nor any of other "rules of thumb".  Here is a graphic from an army field manual listing the planning guidance for various operations.



Here is a graphic from another Army Field Manual that says a successful attack needs a 9:1 odds ratio to be successful.



Note the main attack has 6 armored brigades, 2 Stryker Brigades, and an Artillery Brigade attacking a single OPFOR leg infantry brigade. The battalion at the very tip of the spear as it breaks in has to have an 18:1 combat power ratio.  The northern supporting attack at 3:1 has two armored brigades and a Stryker Brigade attacking an OPFOR Motorized Rifle Brigade while the southern supporting attack has a single infantry brigade attacking an infantry brigade.

This totals 12 US Brigades in a single attack.  Remember the entire US Army has 31 brigades.

In contrast, during Desert Storm, the 1st Infantry Division with three brigades (3 battalions each), a cavalry squadron, an attack helicopter battalion, the support of our DIVARTY, the 1(UK) Armor Division DIVARTY, and 3 FA Brigades conducted a penetration against the Iraqi 26th Infantry Division consisting of 3 infantry brigades and an armored brigade, which was unable to halt the attack.  We broke through them in less than six hours and stopped through the night to consolidate and clearn up the penetration, after which the 1 (UK) passed through us.

The engagements reported above being fought at odds ranging from 1:2 to 1:20 (in favor of the Indians) seems to lend credence to the attitude of the Army that they could take on the Indians at high odds.  However, it must be understood the engagements above were defending with semi-improved positions and Reno and Custer were supposedly "attacking" and they failed to have the odds ratio necessary to win in the attack.  

Let us assume that the Indians devote 500 shooters to each US Cavalry attack.

Thus,

Reno (175 troops/scouts) attacking 500 advancing hostiles is a 1:2.85 attack.  Usually not successful.

We will call Reno's movement to the timber and his "breakout" to Reno hill a delay.  The rule of thumb for delay is 1:6, thus we can believe that Reno could be successful in conducting that operation.  He lost about half his men killed, wounded, or mission, so by the time he got to his Hill, he was down to probably less than 87 people and would still have been outnumbered at a 1:5.7 ratio.  He was not dug in at that time, but the hostiles broke off to go after Custer.

Skirmish Line and Delay

Let's model what happens if Reno stays on the skirmish line.  Could he have caused enough casualties to convince the Indians to break off?

For fun, we will give Reno the ph at Rourke's Drift of 1:13 or 0.07 and a Pk of 0.7 which yields a combined Ph/Pk of around 0.049.
The cavalry gets off 6 rounds per minute
We will use the canter at 15 MPH or 1320 feet/minute.
Let us have Reno dismount and form skirmish line 500 feet away from the "ditch".  The Indians could close on him in about 20 seconds (If I did my math right).  Each trooper would be able to fire 3 times for a total of 525 rounds fired.

With the above Ph/Pk that gives 25 kills, I determine Reno is probably unable to stop the Indian charge and would be destroyed in hand to hand combat.

To escape this, Reno has to discern how long it would take him to mount, move to the timber, dismount, deploy, remount, move out, and reach his defensive position.  He did this soon enough.  When he did his, to be generous, break out, he did not have so much distance to trade for time, so this is where he lost most of his men.

Benteen arrives with his battalion of 118 men and then consolidates with Reno increasing the strength to 193 and a ratio of 1:2.5.  it gets even better, and then  When the trains arrive, it grows to something on the order of 323 men and the odds improve to 1:1.5. They get time to dig in, so their combat power could have been further calculated to be about 323*1.5 or 485, or 1:1.03. Even if we increase the enemy on the 2nd day to as much as 750, the odds are still highly favorable to the defense at 1.54. As we all know, Reno/Benteen saved the 7th Cavalry(-) to fight another day.

The Indians - probably - realize they can't dig out the 7th in a frontal attack given the position and amount of ammunition they have available and the best thing to do is keep them pinned down with fire and let thirst take its toll. Reno cannot break out of his current predicament because he would have to leave his wounded behind, but he can work to improve his position.

As Terry closes, the Indians decide they have had enough.

Custer's actions

Custer does a lot of running around and is apparently split into two separate wings.  For the sake of argument, we will put C, I, and L together (at about 120 men and E and F at about 80, with some staff and such split between the two of the wings.

Thus, it appears C, L, and I are opposed by about 500 attackers thus battalions odds are 500/120 or 1:4.16 not a good day, particularly if you are not dug in.

I do not think E and F were simultaneously engaged, but we know stragglers got to LSH, so we will say that E and F grow to about 110, but are opposed by 600 (to make up a number) hostiles (because Custer is now getting it from at least two sides while some Indians are going to lunch) , so the odds are 1:5.45.  Definitely not a good day, especially considering the  the Custer Battalion was not mutually supporting.

Summery

In my view, the 7th failed to accomplish its mission due to:

Poor command climate, especially in disseminating orders
Lack of training prior to deployment, particularly marksmanship but also in lack of training as to using pack mules.
Lack of horses
Division of forces and attacking outnumbered.

It seems to me, the attack may have succeeded had he attacked up the valley with the whole regiment and broke into the village.  Odds at best:  660:1500 or 1:2.2.  Probably lower because more people would have defended the village than left it to attack Custer's divided force.  I do not think Reno could have beat his way through all the Indians by himself.  Perhaps a hammer and anvil with Benteen attacking up the valley with 5 companies and Custer/Reno attempting to flank the village with 6 companies.

I think if Custer had taken the whole Regiment up the valley, it would have been a tough fight for him to win if the Rosebud is any example.

[quincannon]

I generally agree with your summary. I read Donovan and had that same sickly feeling about his sources when I read it, as I do now in you using Donovan here.

Not your fault. I had that same sickly feeling when I read Donovan's sources on his Alamo book and I know a hell of a lot more about the Alamo than I do about LBH, a hell of a lot more.

By the way I reached just about those same conclusions about sixty years ago when I first read Stewart. Custer lost because of arrogance, hubris, malfeasance, and criminal level negligence, coupled with being a complete jerk.

[johnson1941]

If I recall correctly a fave - The Killer Angels, for some reason it sticks in my mind Longstreet came up with the 3:1 rule.

[miker]

I would not use the killer angels as a reference, But it is a rollicking good story. I don't recall such a thing in KA or in any book I have read about the civil War or LBH.

[quincannon]

Three to One is a rule of thumb. I don't ever recall seeing it in any manual. I would rather have fifty to one, perhaps even sixty.

Do people attack with a numerical disadvantage, or at less than three to one advantage? Every goddamned day of the week and twice on Sundays.

Killer Angels is probably the second best Civil War novel ever written in my estimation, The Scarlet Patch being the best. The research is quite good in both although Lancaster's (Scarlet Patch author) did his best work on the revolution, the Secret Road being his best in that era, I think Lancaster is a titch above Shaara. All that to say read doctrine not novels when you are looking for cold hard tactical information.

[miker]

Added the figures showing the rules of thumb for various operations from Army Field Manuals and a discussion of the Rosebud, along with clarifying some statements, and correcting some grammer and spelling errors to my post slightly above this one.

[mac]

Very good Mike!

I do not have a reference but somewhere in my mind I recall seeing that the Army at that time considered they could take on Indians at up to 1:5. Sorry but all I got is that. You may find it somewhere???

Cheers

[miker]

Jul 3, 2023 22:24:49 GMT johnson1941 said:

If I recall correctly a fave - The Killer Angels, for some reason it sticks in my mind Longstreet came up with the 3:1 rule.

So this made me look.  As combat modeling was my job from 1991 - 2015 or so and as a wargamer, I have run across references to various force ratios.   I stand somewhat corrected.  While searching my e-mails for something else, I ran across one to a friend about a 3:1 reference in a book about Longstreet.  Thanks to Kindle, I brought up the three books I own about him, searched for "three to" and in the 2nd I found this:

Technological changes prior to the American Civil War from 1840 to 1860 had a tremendous impact on the battlefields and the course of the war. The introduction of the infantryman’s muzzle-loading rifled musket as standard armament, concurrent with the invention of the “Minie Ball” in 1849, drove the cavalry and artillery from the open field of battle and made it extremely hazardous for infantry to take the offensive in a frontal assault. Previously, the rifle had been too slow to load. However, Captain Claude A. Minie of the French Army perfected on the invention of a cylindroconoidal bullet by Captain Norton of the British army. Minie’s bullet, smaller in diameter than the bore, could easily be dropped down the muzzle of the rifle, making for efficient loading. As the hollow base expanded on firing, to fit the spiral grooves of the barrel, it produced a horizontal spin, which resulted in long-range accuracy, higher velocity, and greater penetrating power. With the introduction of the rifled muzzleloader, the defense, especially behind field fortifications, had at least three times the strength of the offense. Lieutenant General James Longstreet was well aware of the impact of this new technology—the rifled musket and cannon—on the battlefield and was a strong proponent of defensive tactics. Longstreet favored the use of intrenchments and terrain to shield his troops from exposure to the enhanced long-range accuracy of the improved weaponry. He preferred turning and flanking movements to frontal assaults. He did not believe in fighting battles unless there was a fruitful outcome with a minimal loss of life to his troops. This is evident again and again in his advice and recommendations on the conduct of battlefield tactics and strategy. Prior to the battle of Chancellorsville, Longstreet had discussed strategy with General Lee in case Hooker advanced against the Army of Northern Virginia while Longstreet’s divisions of Hood and Pickett were gathering provisions around Suffolk. The plan was for Lee to strengthen and improve his existing trenches on interior lines, which would make his army of 60,000 on par with Hooker’s 113,000. That would have provided time for Longstreet to return to Lee with his two divisions; Hooker would be compelled to attack or retreat. Longstreet was surprised that General Lee went on the offensive, losing 21 percent of his forces while inflicting only 15 percent casualties on Hooker in desperate fighting. Longstreet felt that the South had to conserve its manpower and resources to win the war against the North who had a much larger manpower pool and industrial capacity. He believed that battles like Chancellorsville would so bleed the South that it would not be able to field armies to meet the Northern incursions.


Toretta, F. Gregory. Lieutenant General James Longstreet: Innovative Military Strategist (p. 213). Casemate. Kindle Edition.

The author does not footnote where that figure comes from.  But the 2nd part I highlighted indicates Lee attacked at a force ratio of 1:1.83, suffering 17,287 casualties to the US Army's 12,764 (Wikipedia has the Confederate Army with a strength of 60,298 to the US Army's 133,868), a casualty ratio of 1:1.88.   A Pyrrhic victory of sorts.

A little searching of my library and e-mails led me to this:

'The first of the great civilian analysts, Ivan S Bloch, calculated a superiority of eight to one in favor of the attackers was needed for a successful assault and that 100 men in a trench would be able to put out of action 336 of the 400 men attacking them.

He then references Tim Travers :Technology Tactics, and Modern War: Jean de Bloch, the Boer War, and British Miltary Theory in the Journal of Military History 51 no 2 June 1979 pp 280=181.

Robert Citino's Quest for Decisive Victory, p.54

and then

Let us look at an attack over a 1200 meter free plain which takes 35 minutes to reach the defenders position, with two opposing lines mached man for ma. As the attacking man crosses 1200 meter of open plain, he will have to expose his entire body for 8 minutes. As a target, the attacker will appear as a complete figure for 8 minutes and as a prone infantryman for 27 minutes. The defender, however, presents only a probe target for entire 35 minutes; however he serves as a target only for 27 minutes, since he can't really be shot during the 8 minutes the attacker is rushing forward... Now the vulnerable area of an unprotected probe infantrymen has been reconked at 0.189 square meters and that of a running man 0.396 square meters.

The defender fires against a target of 0.396 square meters and 27 minutes against one of 0.189 square meters. The attacker, by contrast, fires for 8 minutes only, and in fact at a target of just 0.189 square meters. Accordingly, the relationship of the attacker to the defender as on offered target is (8 * 0.396)/ (27 *0.189) or 8.27 to 5.10, rounded to 1.6 to 1.

In addition, since the defender was averaging 3-5 shots a minute during the entire 35 minutes while the attacker was more or less placing the emphasis on getting forward over firing for 8 of those minutes, defensive fire supremacy stood at something like 4:1. Multiplying the ratings for each side as target and rifle, we arrange at a total of 6.4 to 3, or roughly a 2 to 1 superiority for the defender."

on page 195 we have the following statement or assertion.

"...Virtually every history mentions the case of Ivan Bloch, a banker of all things, who wrote the Future of War. In it..."

"There's only one thing wrong with it; it isn't true, including his famous dictum than nothing less than an eight to one superiority would do for an attacker to get across the fire swept zone of the defender".

From Robert Citino, The German Way of War p. 193

That led me to The Future of War which you can download if interested.  Chapters 1 and 8 appear to be the most relevant.

[quincannon]

Lee was quite foolish at Chancellorsville. His decision to send Longstreet with two divisions to southside Virginia was a decision forced upon him by piss poor logistical support. The dictum is "Disperse to feed, concentrate to fight". Defending at Fredericksburg (more generally the Rappahannock/Rapidan Line) and sending General L to Suffolk was stretching the dictum more than a wee bit. At the minimum it would take three days to concentrate. A better figure would be five or six days, giving L some time to disengage. Longstreet was laying siege to Suffolk not just on a camp out eating hot dogs.

Lee was expecting Hooker to be a push over. Hooker was no push over. His plan to flank Lee was masterful. Had it worked, and it did not because of poor subordinate execution and reliance on new technology for communication, Hooker would have displaced Lee from Fredericksburg without firing a shot (almost). Stoneman was to cut the Virginia Central and RF&P Railroads cutting off Lee's driblets of supplies. Hooker crossing to the river(s) south side would be standing on Lee's left, with Lee outnumbered nearly three to one.

Don't let anyone ever tell you that no one ever stole the march on Robert Lee. Hooker did, and for two days Lee did not know if he should shit or go blind. More Lost Cause bull shit, a trip down Fairy Tale Lane, along with the icon of the Lost Cause - "The Last Meeting" It was a last meeting between two second rate general officers, one who lived in the tactical past, and the other who would not ever show up on time. Fairy Tales

Maneuver is superior on offense to firepower. Firepower is superior on the defense. Those were Longstreet's lessons that Lee never followed. That's why we don't spend Confederate money today.

[herosrest]

I bumped into a thing and thought of you guys.

It may be your thing but probably not everyone's Kampfgruppe Chill 400 pages is a tease but there'a a lot of reference listed. 

'One day in the late summer of 1944 the Allied armies were thundering across

Northern France and Belgium, sweeping aside all German resistance and leaving

dazed enemy units in the wake of their advance, almost literally the next they faced

the same dogged defence they had such a tough time cracking in Normandy. It was

an amazing feat, because, ‘Retreat does not build a strong fighting spirit in a unit…’5

This book is the result of seven years’ research into a particular Kampfgruppe (Battle

Group) that played a key role during the final stage of the Second World War in

Western Europe. The background is the result of a long time fascination on the

author’s part with events during the first weeks of September 1944. For a time the

Allied troops were surging forward across France and Belgium, seemingly invincible,

covering 250 miles in six days, then the situation was back to what it had been in

Normandy, a slow, grinding and costly advance.'

You may whistle!