mac
Brigadier General
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Post by mac on Apr 15, 2021 2:05:00 GMT
The thing to note in the Rain in the Face map (posted above) is that it does not show Custer going to the river opposite the village (Ford B), but is rather like the JSIT map in that respect, and also the Hardy Horse map, page 238 Ian. Cheers
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Post by mhoyt on Apr 15, 2021 11:26:56 GMT
Questions for Hoyt. 1) Who says Custer ever went to Ford B? What proof can be offered? I won't put the list here, but the proof is in numerous accounts (implied by Martin although no terrain feature had a name during the battle), because its the first point to flank the village. I am neither a Ford B or Ford D person though. I think about 4 scenarios are fairly plausible; I just listed the one I think is more likely given the end result. What has never made full sense to me is Why if Custer saw the Village (Benteen - Big Village Bring Packs), did he cross over MTC going north. He had to know it was far to much for his force. So either he saw 1. A part of the village, 2. He saw something to chase north, 3. He was forced north. The scenario I prefer (didn't say it was right, because all are unprovable) was one where #1, #2, #3 above are all somewhat satisfied, with being forced north with Keogh's battalion results from #2 and the massing of warriors.2) How do you know Custer divided his battalion into two battalions? The only guy with direct knowledge of the task organization that day who wrote about it afterward says that there was only one battalion, and that battalion was directly under Custer's command. Anyone else that has commented on the issue bases their comments on the way the forces were found, and evidently pays no attention to determining how they got there. I don't know this. The massive distribution of casualties implies that Custer went to the defensive far to late. The defense makes no sense at all if you have 5 companies. A good defense on this terrain is to form a rectangle along Battle Ridge to prevent being flanked -- you stay away from the ends to prevent warriors from being in Arrow range. So this implies (again I can't prove this), that he was still offensive far to late, and that his force was not connected (thus the gap between Keogh and LSH). The point is he didn't know he was done for, until far too late.
I know that some Native American accounts have 5 stands, 3 units, 2 units, and some all together, some say he never left the ridges, some say he approached the river. I believe as the Regimental commander, Custer could and would have maneuvered his companies and companies and not as a mass. I also know that most the warriors had a very primitive understanding on Cavalry movement techniques - and what they saw could be explained just from the angle they saw it.
I think it makes sense to keep a reserve if you have a massive village, and are chasing something. The reserve should tie into Benteen coming up. But then again, if Reno is still fighting in the Timber, Benteen would naturally support that. 3) If you were going to set up a skirmish line or defensive position in advance of an anticipated or possible attack, would you place that line at the bottom of a hill, where you are forced to shoot uphill to the high ground in your immediate front? That's exactly what Calhoun did. You set-up a skirmish line in offense or defense depending on what terrain you occupy. The goal of the skirmish line in these cases were primarily suppression, and to minimize casualties, with a place to protect the horses (just like Reno did initially). So wherever you establish it, it should allow for suppression, and minimizing casualties while protecting the horses for late movement. Calhoun looks like he got flanked.
4) If you intend on attacking why attack with two companies, leaving 3 companies, 60 percent of your available force, in reserve a mile away from your intended point of attack? Because you are chasing something (this is a big maybe), and/or you are feinting. If Custer was feinting to the big village to draw the warriors off of Reno, he shouldn't of allowed himself to be forced north away from Benteen and the packs. I don't see the feint as highly likely, I see it as a force going down there, and seeing 1000 warriors coming at them, and withdrawing away OR chasing something they see, with Custer being with the attack on Ford B. Again I am going with probability in my mind, I have several scenarios I think work.
5) Are you familiar with the vast artifact field found north and west of Last Stand Hill on terrain that was much too large to be skirmished over by only two companies? I am familiar that there is an artifact field that is NW of LSH (14 carbines or so identified) and that the entire battlefield is too large to be skirmished over by 5 companies without being wiped out. However, I also believe that about 1% of the bullets/cartridges were recovered (there was an article on it) so concentrations of artifacts probably demonstrate the majority of the fight; but don't demonstrate the amount of the fight, and that the surveys done by Scott/Fox and others were limited by the vast area they had to cover, and the amount of private property that borders the battlefield. I think Scott/Fox did a great job, but they made assumptions based on the amount of the battle they believed they recovered, and I believed the battlefield was completely scavenged before hand. I have all of their books though.6) Are you familiar with the John Stands in Timber map? Yes. I have seen numerous maps and thanks to Herosrest about another 200000 on the battle (I am very familiar with the terrain (not to Steve's or Bill's level), but I have walked it - have 30 books on the battle. Read my first book at age 6 (Custer's Last Stand by Quentin Reynolds), visited the battlefield for the first time at age 10. Had Custer's Last Stand the Avalon Hill Board game by age 12 (the old one). Have gone through the National Archives in DC for family related artifacts to an attack on a mule resupply terrain that they made a claim against the government for (fun fact - my family was in west in the 1800s, and my 4th and 5th grandfathers are buried in Mankato Kansas).
7) Are you familiar with the statement of Red Hawk, a Sioux who fought Reno in the valley, who upon returning to the Ford B area, states that he observed three divisions moving south along battle ridge, and when they were stopped the three divisions (which we take as being companies) all collapsed backward one upon the other? I am familiar with dozens of Lakota and Tsisistas accounts. I believe they refer to Fords and not necessarily which one, and that interviewers can limit options on maps. I don't disagree with your scenario, as much as I think you can have other accounts disagree with the account you are referring to. Memory on events is a tricky thing. If you take the most dramatic event that happened in your life, you probably remember where, you may remember how you moved, you probably don't remember the exact date (unless it was linked to something), and you may remember the participants. 8) Was the LBH staff ride conducted while you were at Leavenworth or is that something they added later? If so did you participate? I read a bootleg copy that the 3rd ACR used for similar staff rides they conducted by squadron. I found that it was pretty conventional, lacked quite a bit of imagination, and was quite dated in the data content. Yes, and Yes. I was the person disagreeing with the narrative. However, what was great is that we went to the Crow's nest and approached the battle the way the 7th Cavalry did; and I got paid to go walk the battlefield (awesome). Any staff ride narrative is just bullet points. Most Army officers have very little to no familiarity with the battle, and the degree is Military History, not a degree in one battle. I am sure I was a great pain in the ass for the instructor as he approved of what Reno did, and I don't. He was well versed on the battle though, and it made our discussions probably enjoyable for the class. We also toured the Rosebud, which was a bonus, as I hadn't walked over that land before.As you drive along this highway of ours please recall that to the Sioux a ford means Ford B, and to the Cheyenne it means Ford D, and when these stories of Custer at a ford are told, that the Cheyenne actually fought Custer at a ford, and the Sioux only heard stories about it later. I think this varies actually on which warriors got to the early fight with Reno, and chased them; and which took time to get their horses. Yes, the Cheyennes were down river, and how down river or if they were more spread out then most maps depict. IF Reno could cross the river where he did, the superior horsemen of the Lakota and Tsisistas did not need a ford. I don't necessarily believe that all Ford references can be defined by which tribe you were affiliated with; more in reference to when and how you got to the fight.Now you do not have to answer these questions here, and frankly when I joined the LBH boards I though pretty much the way you do now. I just wanted to give you some food for further head scratching, and contemplation. I love the debate on this battle. Just understand I don't have a scenario that has to be right. I can believe many of them... the Ford D attack with withdrawal back would not be at the top of the village in 95% of these maps. It also implies the Cavalry were moving in formation much faster than I think they probably did. If that happened (which it could of), then Custer strung his force out significantly; and it may be it got split while pursuing north. Then a flight back to LSH down to CH is not odd, but could have the lead companies getting past LSH, with the rear companies cut off and going up Calhoun Hill area, but no warrior saw the whole battlefield with that dust and smoke. They saw their portion.Now what I would suggest we all do is get back on topic and address the problem posed a withdrawal from Ford D. And thus moving to the COG thread. And thanks for taking the time to post. VR Mhoyt
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Post by quincannon on Apr 15, 2021 15:33:32 GMT
Outstanding post. Professional. What I would expect. Don't agree with some of it, but in those instances I think it was I who failed to communicate what I was really saying. Will deal with that later. For now, I have a T55 to finish and mount, and a call to make to my daughter on her birthday.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 15, 2021 17:00:39 GMT
Hoyt: Some quick random thoughts on your post.
Two Battalions: Godfrey says in specific detail what the task organization was, including the assignment of officers. For instance he has Tom Custer commanding his own company, which might not be significant, were Godfrey not so specific about other company officers with special assignments, such as Varnum, Hare, and Hodgson. Now that being said there is no limitation on what Custer may have done later, but when you look at where Tom Custer's body was found, and stipulating that Godfrey is correct in what he has to say, it would lead you to believe that Company C was at one time much further north then where the bulk of that company was found. Now both of us have commanded troops. I don't know about you, but if I had a junior officer brother commanding an element in my battalion, I would not relish, or even contemplate, telling him that I was relieving him of command of his company temporarily, so as he may be my "horse holder", in the upcoming battle. Had I done that I am sure I would not be at all welcomed at his house for Thanksgiving and Christmas dinners.
Calhoun's position: I am sure you are quite familiar with the conventional theory of three companies being left behind by Custer in the general area of Calhoun Hill, presumably to watch over the Ford B crossing. Wagner goes so far as to associate a time they were there unmolested by any threat, that time being around fifteen minutes. If that is so then, and many, many folks believe that to be the case, why would Calhoun place his initial skirmish line down in a coulee, at the bottom of the hill that later carried his name. The Bonafides Map clearly shows cavalry cartridge artifacts indicating such a skirmish line. The correct course would be to place that line on the military crest of Calhoun Hill. So, one explanation is that Calhoun was not attempting to skirmish over or defend that area, but rather the artifacts at the bottom of the hill may well indicate a meeting engagement between Company L and the surprise appearance of Sioux returning from the Reno fight, having crossed at Ford B, meeting Company L at Henryville. In my estimation Calhoun put in the best performance in a day of generally bad performances. I don't think the man would make such a gross error deliberately, so my only fall back would be that he was forced to dismount and fight down in the low ground, gradually working his way back up hill.
Paint is dry. more later.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 15, 2021 19:27:34 GMT
Random thoughts for Hoyt, Part II:
Disagreeing with what Reno did: That's is one I really want to see you fleshed out, especially now in light of Wagner's new book, which I understand Colt has just finished reading and enjoyed.
Talked with that instructor once over the telephone many years ago. I can't recall his name, but you are correct, he was very knowledgeable about the battle, and he was the one who put me onto the 3rd ACR having and using copies of the LBH staff ride.
Personally I look at Reno's breakout from encirclement, as Bir Hacheim in miniature.
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Post by mhoyt on Apr 15, 2021 20:32:46 GMT
Outstanding post. Professional. What I would expect. Don't agree with some of it, but in those instances I think it was I who failed to communicate what I was really saying. Will deal with that later. For now, I have a T55 to finish and mount, and a call to make to my daughter on her birthday. I started as an Armor Officer in an M60A1 Rise Passive, going to an M60A3 with TTS, and then M1 Abrahms. World War II is of great interest to me, especially the war in the east....so interesting.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 15, 2021 20:35:06 GMT
WRT to the COG being the horses. As I was reading today, I somehow thought of "She Wore a Yellow Ribbon" and thought, "Huh! Ford must have agreed with Hoyt, even though Ford had no idea of what he (Hoyt) was going to write. But Biddle Brittles* appears to defuse the whole thought of the Indians going on the warpath by running the horses off and winning the battle without a big fight. And he did it before he was retired!"
At first I was somewhat skeptical of the notion, but as I pondered the paper, it kept making more sense. It has a certain sense of the B.H. Liddle Hart's "Indirect Approach" as well as Sun Tsu's "Winning Without Fighting." One of my wargames allows for the capture/stampeding of the horse herd, but restricts capture to Indian Scouts, but they also stampede when Scouts or Cavalry get close. I often sent the Scouts to stampede the herd, but never used the Cavalry. Doing so might surprise the Indian player at least once. Silly me, I usually focus on the force on force battle. Geeze.
* Thanks Chuck!
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Post by quincannon on Apr 15, 2021 20:35:48 GMT
Random thoughts Part III:
You state that you believe Custer went on the defensive far too late. I would like you to flesh that one out as well, and provide you views on the difference between skirmishing and defense. Keep in mind here that my felling on the matter is that skirmishing is disputing possession of terrain, and part of skirmishing, not all, is suppression. With defense on the other hand, and how it differs from skirmishing is that when you decide you must defend, there must be a reason to defend, and normally that is because the place you are trying to defends has some value to you. I do not believe there was anything of value to defend in the entirety of Custer's immediate battle space, and the reason, many of us here think that Custer was attempting to withdraw was to find something of value to defend, and/or break contact, to find some place that was defensible further south.
Personally, I agree with you, in the sense that Custer had the opportunity to correct his earlier mistake in turning onto the bluffs, before he crossed Medicine Tail Coulee. He had another chance before he crossed Deep Coulee. He did not turn back on either occasion, and it was probably because he was chasing something. We will probably never know, but what we do know is that both Martini and Kanipe reported that Indians were running, and they sure as hell were not running from the villages. Well maybe they were doing that too, but neither Martini or Kanipe would have ever been in a position to know that. Both of them obviously saw something to cause both of them to make those statements, and more than likely that something was Wolf Tooth, or some other band of Merry Men out for a Sunday drive.
I have an A1 in the stash somewhere. Never built an A1, but have built an A3. Finished mounting the T55 on a wooden base that I pick up at Hobby Lobby, then stain and varnish the base before mounting the tank. Waiting most of the day for the darn varnish to dry.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 15, 2021 20:41:38 GMT
Outstanding post. Professional. What I would expect. Don't agree with some of it, but in those instances I think it was I who failed to communicate what I was really saying. Will deal with that later. For now, I have a T55 to finish and mount, and a call to make to my daughter on her birthday. I started as an Armor Officer in an M60A1 Rise Passive, going to an M60A3 with TTS, and then M1 Abrahms. World War II is of great interest to me, especially the war in the east....so interesting.I was an Armored Cavalryman, starting in 1977 in D CO and B TRP 1/11 ACR with M60A1 Rise, then Rise Passive, then M60A3, but then spent most of the rest of my time in the 1st INF DIV (M) serving in all three brigades, commanding 3 tank companies (C/1-34, A/4-37, and C/2-37), in the G3 (Armor Training Officer and ASST OPS Officer during Desert Storm) and as S-4/2nd BDE with other assignments as BMO, BN S-4, S-3Air. Also got to play with the IPM1 and the M1A1 as well as Sheridan's a little.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 15, 2021 20:50:12 GMT
BRITTLES Mike.The best of the Bellah stories involving Captain Brittles was bastardized later on film as "A Thunder of Drums". Ford and Wayne, with the usual Ford Stock Company, could have made that one into a much better movie than even Yellow Ribbon. In that story you find out why Brittles was still a Captain at age 60.
Two other Bellah stories "The Devil at Crazy Man" and "Spanish Man's Grave" never made it onto film, and both a great, just awaiting someone to rediscover them and western movies to ascend once again.
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Post by mhoyt on Apr 15, 2021 20:53:35 GMT
Random thoughts for Hoyt, Part II: Disagreeing with what Reno did: That's is one I really want to see you fleshed out, especially now in light of Wagner's new book, which I understand Colt has just finished reading and enjoyed. I like Fred, and have chatted with him a few years ago. I did read his Strategy of Defeat book, and look forward to the movie. His scenario is certainly plausible, as a few are (I don't just pick one, maybe that is because I am a little flexible on what may have happened). For the Reno issue.
He was good when he deployed in skirmish line. I accept that as smart when outnumbered and the 7th Cav average trooper could not fight mounted - especially with a single shot carbine, and lack of experience both in using their weapons, and firing from the mounted position.
He was good when he pulled his left flank, as the Ree Scouts left it in the air, and falling back to the timber to cover and where the horses moved makes good sense.
Mistake #1. Making any movement against the Lakota mounted when you don't use a part of your force to suppress the Lakota and keep them back. Reno should know they are faster (they are not encumbered by formation), and you know your force can't fight mounted. Mistake #2. Not ensuring all 3 company commanders got the command, and then waiting for them to respond that they are ready to move. Reno abandoned numerous troopers - who had enough cover to hide from 1000 passing warriors going by them both ways. The commanders didn't all get the order, and therefore the troopers did not all get the order. This is the responsibility of the commander, and it seems obvious his company commanders didn't get the order, or hear the bugle call "To Horse". Mistake #3. Leading a charge with no objective. Well its not really a charge, because when he was about to ride into those Lakota that had earlier rode around his left flank - he did a 90 degree turn to avoid contact. Mistake #4. Avoiding contact, exposing your flank and fording at a non-ford location (he didn't know how deep the water was), and he did that knowingly with a lot of untrained horsemen. Mistake #5. After fording, not immediately dismounting and getting the men to put down covering fire to prevent his men from being massacred in the water. He went to the top of the hill. This is really the most unforgivable. Mistake #6. After watching the Lakota leave the battlefield, his men watched the Lakota women mutilate the dead. Talk about demoralizing.
So yes, I believe Reno made many errors. He didn't need to leave the timber. Benteen alludes to that in the Goldin letters. And when Weir retreats back, Benteen dismounts two companies, Weir passes through and then Weir dismounts his company and Benteen passes through him back to the defense. This is the way to retreat properly with maintaining some fire power. If not, they should have led horses. However, I don't believe they need to flee the timber as so many were unobserved in there. I believe Fred believes, and he somewhat convinced me that Reno's men were starting to rout -- but then that is Reno's fault to. He should have worked ammo resupply in. He should know Custer is on the other side of the river -- some argue that, but Custer didn't go traveling to New York City. He should know that Benteen should be up. He didn't really know where he was charging too -- but stupid to eliminate all firepower against the Lakota. Hell why not cross through the timber dismounted, cross at that non-ford; and assault up the bluffs. He wouldn't have lost 30 men doing it.
And I am not saying cowardice, just stupidity from someone that actually was on the approving board to replace the 7 shot Spencer with the single shot trapdoor 1873 Springfield carbine. And oh by the way Terry was on that board too.
Talked with that instructor once over the telephone many years ago. I can't recall his name, but you are correct, he was very knowledgeable about the battle, and he was the one who put me onto the 3rd ACR having and using copies of the LBH staff ride. He was on my Master Thesis board, Jerold E. Brown, Ph.D. He did have a very interesting theory of compound warfare -- very good stuff there.Personally I look at Reno's breakout from encirclement, as Bir Hacheim in miniature. I would disagree here. The breakout did not go back to the main defense; and certainly by leaving the fight, not notifying the commander, and not delaying the Lakota significantly enough to affect the outcome of wiping out Custer's forces; which if they a 2 hour delay then Custer and his troops may have lived. However, I don't believe Custer could have won without targeting the right center of gravity....THE HORSE.. (smile, had to throw that in for the thread). VR Mhoyt
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Post by Deleted on Apr 15, 2021 21:11:01 GMT
BRITTLES Mike.The best of the Bellah stories involving Captain Brittles was bastardized later on film as "A Thunder of Drums". Ford and Wayne, with the usual Ford Stock Company, could have made that one into a much better movie than even Yellow Ribbon. In that story you find out why Brittles was still a Captain at age 60. Two other Bellah stories "The Devil at Crazy Man" and "Spanish Man's Grave" never made it onto film, and both a great, just awaiting someone to rediscover them and western movies to ascend once again. Thanks for the correction. I think I've read Spanish Man's Grave (long ago), but don't think I've ever read any of his other work. And at the prices on Amazon, I am not likely too. Maybe need to see if the library can get them. Perhaps than we should credit Bellah with understanding the COG?
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Post by mhoyt on Apr 15, 2021 21:15:52 GMT
I started as an Armor Officer in an M60A1 Rise Passive, going to an M60A3 with TTS, and then M1 Abrahms. World War II is of great interest to me, especially the war in the east....so interesting. I was an Armored Cavalryman, starting in 1977 in D CO and B TRP 1/11 ACR with M60A1 Rise, then Rise Passive, then M60A3, but then spent most of the rest of my time in the 1st INF DIV (M) serving in all three brigades, commanding 3 tank companies (C/1-34, A/4-37, and C/2-37), in the G3 (Armor Training Officer and ASST OPS Officer during Desert Storm) and as S-4/2nd BDE with other assignments as BMO, BN S-4, S-3Air. Also got to play with the IPM1 and the M1A1 as well as Sheridan's a little. Very impressive, I was branch transferred after 5 years, and sent to the Signal Corps (3 years), but oddly ended up as a NTC OC Tarantula (Light Infantry), and then became a FA 24, which put me running communication networks for years. So you have crushed me on the experience. I never got on a Sheridan, but my Platoon was designated to go to Panama (I was 5th ID as the first M1 Tank Platoon to be used in combat, and they didn't want to use them and went with Sheridans). I spent some time in 2ID in Korea also. I have been in Afghanistan/Iraq and then 4 years in USCENTCOM. I have been in Libya as a contractor (briefly though). I was also an S-3 Air in the 1-70th Armor Battalion. Did 23 years and retired.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 15, 2021 21:44:06 GMT
Oh well, I suppose we will have to agree to disagree.
I think your analysis of Reno's many errors of execution are spot on , but not all.
He had probably expended fifty percent of his ammunition on the skirmish line before he went into the timber. Resources available are always a factor in what decision you must make.
Were he to know that help was on the way, the correct decision would have been to say. He had no such knowledge. He was surrounded on all sides in the timber, including Indians on the east side of the river firing, probably blindly, into the timber. He was outnumbered about 7 or 8 to one. To then defend that timber in that situation for any extended period of time was suicide. Benteen did later say the timber could have been held, but folks sometimes forget to mention that Benteen went on to say that they would all have been dead holding it. Can't recall his exact words, but that was close enough.
As far as not having an objective when he broke out, I do not believe that is accurate. He was heading back to Ford A, and getting there and crossing that river was his intention, thus objective. In the attempt he was flanked and cut off from the ford, so he was forced to change direction and cross at a less than desirable place. Damned good thing though, because that trek up the bluffs slowed down pursuit probably by seconds, certainly no more that a moment or two allowing him to reach the top, draw a breath, and turn.
If they had stayed and tried to give Custer a two hour delay, they would have fallen short of that objective by an hour and a half, and Custer would have still faced what he faced even with little or no Sioux attending his surprise party. Every Sioux in Montana could have been fighting Reno and the Cheyenne were more that enough to deal with Custer by themselves. Remember the old expression - The Cheyenne did the fighting, the Sioux got the credit, and the Crow got the land. That was an Indian expression, not a white man's. They were in a position to know.
So my bottom line, and I do not know if it is in agreement with your professor or not, is that it was the most poorly executed correct decision, in American military history, at least I can't think of one quite that bad.
Reno's best day as a commander was on Saint Patrick's Day of 63, at Kelly's Ford. After that it was a down hill slide, and some caring superior should have in my opinion seen that and given him a job as Quartermaster of the Washington Military District, or some other hot spot of supply or transportation, and let the man serve out his time. He would have probably ended up very respected and retired with honor.
Now you being an Armor officer explains your entire Center of Gravity, get the horses thing. We, the King's Children, the Queen of Battle, go for the whole hog of COG, not just pussy foot around the edges of the issue.
Great stuff Mark. You add a hell of a lot here, and I do hope you will stay for a damned long while. I am going to the basement in a few moments to dig out that A1. I believe the model has link and link tracks and I am not a very big fan of them especially at 1/72 scale, but we will see.
Mike, Colt was a M60A2 man, and I an sure you both have missile stories you would love to share.
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 16, 2021 5:51:49 GMT
Forgive my intrusion into the officers mess "lol"
Chuck mentioned skirmish lines, well they are a means for a cavalry troop to temporary hold ground but if you have two or three working together, you could advance by bounds.
I suppose they could also be used to support mounted units too, holding the enemy while a mounted attack can roll the enemy up from a flank.
The other points is Reno holding the timber position. They had limited ammo, which is not a good thing when you are stuck in a defensive hole. Sure Benteen may have turned up along with his 115 men and a pack train moving up behind, which would give him a choice to make.
Would he send word for the train to halt and take up a defensive position south of ford A (fort Apache), thus try and push back the Indians to allow for Reno to withdraw.
Anyway, I don't think any move towards the village would have taken place and if they got Reno out and back south, it would be too long before they could head north again to find Custer, as the Sioux would maintain pressure in an effort to keep at a safe distance.
Custer was getting mauled by the Cheyenne, he was in the same shape as Reno, maybe with out the Sioux incursions at ford B and deep ravine, they could have pulled back a few elements, but on large, the mission was finished.
What ever units got back from the Custer battalion, the command was tactically beaten and still under attack.
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