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Post by quincannon on Apr 16, 2021 15:28:02 GMT
Ian: I believe the ammunition supply was the critical issue in deciding to hold or break out of the timber. I stated above that he was probably down by fifty percent when he first entered the timber. He had already seen that there was no support coming from his rear, and possibly had knowledge that Custer had passed him by on the bluffs. Don't know that for certain. He had no idea where Benteen was, nor that Benteen had already turned around. As far as he knew Company B, with the trains, was on his back trail.
I think then the best he could hope for is to make a break back to Ford A, somehow hold up pursuit keeping the Indians from crossing the river after him, then if successful, fall back a join Company B, and the trains
As it turned out he could not even do that, and I do not think that comes as a surprise to anyone.
All that though, while they are factors in the decision making process, still point to the fact, I believe, that the decision to break out was the correct one. Had he waited any longer he would soon have nothing to fight with, and all his options, few as they were, would be gone.
I am not a Reno fan, nor a fan of anyone else that participated in this ghastly affair, except maybe Godfrey, who kept his head when everyone else seemed to be losing theirs, but I really, down to the bottom of my gut feel that Reno gets castigated for his execution, and rightly so, but his correct decision, seems to get thrown out of consideration, like the baby being thrown out with the bath water.
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Post by mhoyt on Apr 16, 2021 19:48:56 GMT
Ian: I believe the ammunition supply was the critical issue in deciding to hold or break out of the timber. I stated above that he was probably down by fifty percent when he first entered the timber. He had already seen that there was no support coming from his rear, and possibly had knowledge that Custer had passed him by on the bluffs. Don't know that for certain. He had no idea where Benteen was, nor that Benteen had already turned around. As far as he knew Company B, with the trains, was on his back trail. I am sure that in most Armies, fire control and fire discipline is key and should be controlled by Officers and NCOs. Yes, the other ammunition was with the horses, but they had already refused the flank back to the timber. I don't read a ton of accounts saying they had all ran out of ammunition -- a little redistribution, and I am sure that they hadn't shot a quarter. But hey that is just me, where are those 100 men x 50 .45/55 shells (5,000)? I remember many of the abandoned men talk about not having a horse, but none of them complain about not having ammo -- why is that???I think then the best he could hope for is to make a break back to Ford A, somehow hold up pursuit keeping the Indians from crossing the river after him, then if successful, fall back a join Company B, and the trains Reno didn't try to keep the Indians from crossing the river after him, that was a happy accident when Benteen was seen to be coming up. He provided Zero covering fire after he crossed the river, he put his "rally point" outside of being able to cover the clogged up troops at the Ford. Reno actually diverted away from Ford A, and protecting the Pack Trains -- he got out of the way. And what saved anybody, was probably rumors of Custer, and eyesight of Benteen. Otherwise the slaughter would have continued on and on and on. As it turned out he could not even do that, and I do not think that comes as a surprise to anyone. It shouldn't have surprised Reno either. To me - the movement was unnecessary at the time he did it. Not convinced that they all were running low of ammunition, and really not convinced that Reno didn't expect any support to come to him at all. All that though, while they are factors in the decision making process, still point to the fact, I believe, that the decision to break out was the correct one. Had he waited any longer he would soon have nothing to fight with, and all his options, few as they were, would be gone. I think he had 1/3 of his command destroyed, and it was a mistake. I know he didn't ensure the company commanders all got their orders, and reported ready to move -- he just took off. That he could have held in the timber for a reasonable amount of time - to at least get his command organized is not disputable in my mind. And that if he was going to move, he needed to provide some form of fire power. Given the distance he covered, they could have led horses there.
I am not a Reno fan, nor a fan of anyone else that participated in this ghastly affair, except maybe Godfrey, who kept his head when everyone else seemed to be losing theirs, but I really, down to the bottom of my gut feel that Reno gets castigated for his execution, and rightly so, but his correct decision, seems to get thrown out of consideration, like the baby being thrown out with the bath water. I fine Weir, Varnum, DeRudio, Godfrey, Benteen, Wallace, Hare -- none perfect, but all doing their best to control a situation that went to hell -- the moment one man without consulting anyone to include any of his company commanders chose to break out. There was no discussion, there were no reports of men running out of ammunition given to Reno -- so adding that to his decision making seems a little extreme. Just several officers trying to salvage a situation; but then again, its fun TO AGREE TO DISAGREE - you may be right, but I just can't get convinced, and many have tried. I won't try to convince you back, anymore ... smile. With All Respect - Mark
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Post by Deleted on Apr 16, 2021 21:05:10 GMT
Well, it pretty simple to calculate. The method below is based on the calculations I would do to figure out how long it would take my company to destroy a battalion in the defense. It's somewhat simplified and I am lacking some information, like the target portrayal, the area the target takes up, how fast it is moving. I also would factor in a loss rate for my unit, then I would see if I thought I had enough time to do the job. If not, I might ask the boss for more troops, priority of artillery fire, engineer supports, a FASCAM minefield, or digging in better to reduce my losses and prolong the engagement. In training, it worked out pretty close. If I had time, I would have my jeeps move along the enemy avenues of approach and time how much exposure time I had to fire in. I would also factor in when I would have to begin to displace because if I waited too long, I'd be caught by the attackers. Thus, I would have to establish a decision point and decide how many bad guys got in front of a certain point. The magic number in terms of distance was about 1000 meters, which meant in most cases, my infantry platoon was pretty useless if I was trying to kill tanks and BMPs. enough of that and on to the approximation,
Each soldier carried 50 rounds. The Carbine had a rate of fire of 10 - 12 rounds a minute. This of course assumes a trained soldier. SLAM says only a small number of men fire their individual weapons, as low as 30%. Officers and NCOs stood behind the firing line in part to control fires.
If everyone fires at maximum rate 5000 rounds are fired in 5 minutes. (5000 rounds/(100 men * 10)
Since we know the Regiment was not well trained, let's arbitrarily lower the ROF to 5. Then it takes 10 minutes.
If we take SLAM's figure only 30% are firing. Let's assume this 30% is well trained and have them shoot at 7 rounds per minute. Let's assume the soldiers give ammo to the shooters or the officers and NCO's are redistributing the ammunition. Then it would take 23 minutes.
Lethality is a whole different matter, but closely related. If we assume the probability of nit was 0.25 and the probability of kill was .5, then each shot has about 12.5% chance of a kill.
Let's have them stay on the skirmish line for 15 minutes, and they are all firing at 7 rounds per minute. 100 soldiers * 5 * 15 = 7,500 rounds fired.
To get the number of good shots, we take 7,500 x .125 = 937 kills. Clearly the 7th did not fire at that rate nor did they have a high probabilty of hit/kill.
Another way to look at it take the total number of killed and wounded and divide it by the number of rounds fired, we approach the actual Pk. Let's be generous and say the 7th killed 50 and wounded 150 for 200. We don't really know how many rounds were actually fired, but let's just say they only fired 40% of their on person load (we know the Indians found full cartridge belts and partially full cartridge belts, but apparently no empty ones, and their was ammunition found in the saddlebags. The total strength was about 700 men, so they had 35000 rounds on their person so they would have fired something on the order of 14,000 rounds or 70 rounds/kill. We ad also know the 7th was shooting high and some apparently just shot in the air.
What would, at this rate of kill, it take to force the Indians to disengage? Let's say there were 1800 - 2500 warriors and we need to kill/wound 25% of them. (Most people I knew say you have to kill /wound 50%, but that is soldiers vs. warriors). we would have to kill 450 - 625.
Thus, while I find it believable that people would think they are running out of ammunition, there was probably enough ammunition available for the fight, if the officers properly enforced fire discipline and the regiment was well trained in marksmanship. SLAM's (admittedly flawed) conclusion shows us that many, perhaps most of the soldiers would not be firing, unless they were experienced and/or there was an officer or NCO standing close to them motivating them to fire.
In a position with rudimentary field fortifications and well led, the Regiment may have been able to force the Indians to break off until either relief arrived or they inflicted enough casualties on them to convince them they should just leave them alone. This seems to happen at the Reno/Benteen position and (at Rorke's Drift) but not on the skirmish line, timber, or Custer/Calhoun Hill (and Isandlwana).
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Post by quincannon on Apr 16, 2021 21:45:12 GMT
Well Mark, if Reno's battalion was the 95th Rifles, and Reno was Richard Sharpe, I might be inclined to stay in that timber, but short of that being the case, I would just as soon take my chances with a break out.
Suffice to say though, there were no good choices, and no school solution to guide one in instances like these. So, in the end, it is left up to the judgment of the officer commanding, and history will eventually provide a verdict as to the right or wrong of everything, but history does still allow for kicking and screaming on the part of those who do not agree with the verdict.
As a sidebar I believe the ammunition allocation for each enlisted soldier was 100 rounds of carbine ammunition, and 24 rounds per revolving pistol. Of those 100 rounds there was on the order of 50 carried in saddle bags, and perhaps more, and probably 40 to 50 rounds on the soldiers person. That does not account for any rounds expended up until the afternoon of 25 June.
The point I am trying to make about the ammo though is not about marksmanship or control of fire. It is about when a decision must be made in light of a diminishing amount of ammunition. In that light there must be a point where you continue to fish or make the decision to cut bait. If you decide to cut bait, it is so you will have some bait left to fish at the next fishing hole you come to. There is no bait store along your way.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 16, 2021 21:54:56 GMT
Chuck, . I agree the decision is made by the commander - or an individual - about his perception about how much ammunition he has left at a particular time. there were troops and leaders thinking they were running low, and that drove the decision. How much was actually on hand isn't the question. But in the end, it comes down to the 7th had to kill or wound a certain number of warriors to make them lose their resolve and make a decision.
As I've said before, I think Reno made the best of a bad lot. Benteen might have saved him on the hill though. Someone else, you, me, Benteen, your third platoon leader, would probably make a different decision with unknowable results. Although, we could game some out.
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Post by mhoyt on Apr 16, 2021 22:25:07 GMT
Well, it pretty simple to calculate. The method below is based on the calculations I would do to figure out how long it would take my company to destroy a battalion in the defense. It's somewhat simplified and I am lacking some information, like the target portrayal, the area the target takes up, how fast it is moving. I also would factor in a loss rate for my unit, then I would see if I thought I had enough time to do the job. If not, I might ask the boss for more troops, priority of artillery fire, engineer supports, a FASCAM minefield, or digging in better to reduce my losses and prolong the engagement. In training, it worked out pretty close. If I had time, I would have my jeeps move along the enemy avenues of approach and time how much exposure time I had to fire in. I would also factor in when I would have to begin to displace because if I waited too long, I'd be caught by the attackers. Thus, I would have to establish a decision point and decide how many bad guys got in front of a certain point. The magic number in terms of distance was about 1000 meters, which meant in most cases, my infantry platoon was pretty useless if I was trying to kill tanks and BMPs. enough of that and on to the approximation, Each soldier carried 50 rounds. The Carbine had a rate of fire of 10 - 12 rounds a minute. This of course assumes a trained soldier. I think the high rate of fire for untrained men was 8.6 rounds in the 1873 Field trials; but it would never apply in this case. The average amount of ammunition fired in the 2 years in the field was 20 rounds per man per year (if they had two years in). There are other issues (I have fired this weapon), every time you push the trapdoor up and it ejects the round, you lose your sight picture. You can't fire 8 well aimed shots with a 1873 Springfield carbine per minute, because they are standing cardboard targets. Also because these ranges are extreme the sights have to be used, and an NCO or officer should be calling out ranges. However, in 15 minutes on a skirmish line - you only need to fire 3 rounds a minute to get low or if you have damaged loops for holding your ammunition you could be out. So poor trained troopers shooting at extreme ranges could run out - so initially this would imply you are right SLAM says only a small number of men fire their individual weapons, as low as 30%. There are many many people that question SLA's Men Against Fire -- me being one. There are good articles that support your statements. At Gettysburg I think they found about 1/2 of Muskets hadn't been fired that were recovered from the battlefield (although sometimes you are the one that dies first). If 1/2 of the troops are not firing, then that is ammunition that the NCOs and Officers should be controlling. What doesn't factor in here is this is white on white, and being white - just reading the accounts, I don't think many hesitated.... but we won't go into Social norms....please.
However, lets say the ammunition was redistributed.....
Officers and NCOs stood behind the firing line in part to control fires. If everyone fires at maximum rate 5000 rounds are fired in 5 minutes. (5000 rounds/(100 men * 10). Well 1/4 are holding horses, etc. But I concede that 5000 rounds could be fired in 30 minutes before Reno "broke out", if they weren't controlled by those NCOs and Officers. However, there are a lot of variables to why that wouldn't happen but uncontrolled men, poorly led and poorly controlled could have shot half. Therefore, Reno's commanders/lieutenants/NCOs should be rotating his men to reload their belts in relays before this happens. And you hear comments on they had shot half their ammunition.
Since we know the Regiment was not well trained, let's arbitrarily lower the ROF to 5. Then it takes 10 minutes. If we take SLAM's figure only 30% are firing. Let's assume this 30% is well trained and have them shoot at 7 rounds per minute. Let's assume the soldiers give ammo to the shooters or the officers and NCO's are redistributing the ammunition. Then it would take 23 minutes. Lethality is a whole different matter, but closely related. If we assume the probability of nit was 0.25 and the probability of kill was .5, then each shot has about 12.5% chance of a kill. I think the calculation was it took a lot more bullets fired to kill one Lakota in this fight. If Reno fired 5000 rounds at a kill rate of 1 in 100 he would have killed 50 Lakota, that didn't happen. He didn't probably kill or wound a total of 10 in the whole valley fight. That is a kill rate given 5000 rounds were fired at 1 in 500. That would be a .002 (or two-tenths of 1 percent) chance of a killing shot. Let's have them stay on the skirmish line for 15 minutes, and they are all firing at 7 rounds per minute. 100 soldiers * 5 * 15 = 7,500 rounds fired. I think this exceeds all rationale levels of firing that occurred, and implies a massive redistribution of ammunition amongst the soldiers which did not occur, and a rotation of the held horses where 1/4th of the men didn't fire at all. To get the number of good shots, we take 7,500 x .125 = 937 kills. Clearly the 7th did not fire at that rate nor did they have a high probabilty of hit/kill. Another way to look at it take the total number of killed and wounded and divide it by the number of rounds fired, we approach the actual Pk. Let's be generous and say the 7th killed 50 and wounded 150 for 200. We don't really know how many rounds were actually fired, but let's just say they only fired 40% of their on person load (we know the Indians found full cartridge belts and partially full cartridge belts, but apparently no empty ones, and their was ammunition found in the saddlebags. The total strength was about 700 men, so they had 35000 rounds on their person so they would have fired something on the order of 14,000 rounds or 70 rounds/kill. We ad also know the 7th was shooting high and some apparently just shot in the air. I recommend a review of the trajectory of the .45/55 and you need to aim well high with those sights. The trajectory is awful and you do have to aim high. However, this isn't super relative to this conversation -- I think if you saw the tables compared to a modern rifle, you would say damnnnnnn.
What would, at this rate of kill, it take to force the Indians to disengage? Let's say there were 1800 - 2500 warriors and we need to kill/wound 25% of them. (Most people I knew say you have to kill /wound 50%, but that is soldiers vs. warriors). we would have to kill 450 - 625. I would say if you killed 50 warriors without seeing the soldiers taking significant casualties they would have broke off, and just kept between the troops and their families. The killing starts when a US Army force fails to return significant firepower. Since the troopers hit nothing, it didn't stop them.
Why did the Lakota leave the Rosebud, they hadn't ate for a day, and were running low on bullets. Their words. Thus, while I find it believable that people would think they are running out of ammunition, there was probably enough ammunition available for the fight, if the officers properly enforced fire discipline and the regiment was well trained in marksmanship. SLAM's (admittedly flawed) conclusion shows us that many, perhaps most of the soldiers would not be firing, unless they were experienced and/or there was an officer or NCO standing close to them motivating them to fire. I have been led to the conclusion it is very possible many in Custer's force ran out of ammunition or had jammed weapons. Thus, they throw them away and go to Revolvers (egads). If you lose your 50 rounds on the horse -- it could be easy to fire off your ammo. Men with ammunition in their belts could be those killed early (thus the first reached). If Custer's men even fired 20 bullets each, there should be 4000 bullets on the battlefield -- that is a trivial amount for a lengthy fight or even a 20 minute fight (to your point), but we don't get a fraction of that. I just think the battlefield was picked over, and it leads a lot of Creedence to the Ford D theory. Fox discounting the jamming of carbines, because only a few percentages of cartridges showed jamming. Recovered shells show a jam rate if I remember of around 3%. If the jam rate was only 1%, you should expect a failure rate of 14 percent of weapons after 15 rounds fired. If 100 weapons fired 15 rounds at 1500 rounds expended than 14 weapons should be jammed. No one talks about that happening, so I believe the amount of rounds fired is less than what most of the officers said that were involved in Reno's retreat. The running low on ammunition is the excuse to breakout, but was it really?
In a position with rudimentary field fortifications and well led, the Regiment may have been able to force the Indians to break off until either relief arrived or they inflicted enough casualties on them to convince them they should just leave them alone. This seems to happen at the Reno/Benteen position and (at Rorke's Drift) but not on the skirmish line, timber, or Custer/Calhoun Hill (and Isandlwana). Isandlwana is an interesting comparison with Custer - it does fit well, to spread out, not enough fire power to keep the enemy from closing. However, if those are Zulu warriors against Reno/Benteen I guarantee no one lives. The Lakota just valued their lives within their culture -- it was different with how the Zulu fought and their culture (both admirable warriors in their ways), they would sacrifice hundreds to achieve an objective. They would not have held back from putting the horns of the buffalo to those on that hill. So WHY do I crazily believe that they didn't shoot 5000 rounds. 1. No Company commander reported this to Reno for him to use that to make his break out decision. 2. The jam rate is too low. 3. The men who should have talked about being out of ammunition are the ones left behind, closest to the village who almost all lost their horses -- why are they not saying, I was really scared I had no cartridges. 4. The Lakota didn't take very many casualties at all (so those bullets were almost all fired at long distance targets). 5. Maybe some didn't fire (but I am not a SLAM fan). 6. Reno never used this as his justification.
However your entire argument is well founded, backed by many of the officers and a couple of NCOs in the valley's statements (although they had some motivation to back Reno); but not backed by one person who was left behind in the timber, when the uncoordinated "breakout" occurred.
Note: I don't believe Reno was drunk. I don't believe Reno was a coward. I believe he made a very bad tactical decision, lost control of his force, and then failed to regain it even after portions had crossed the river. Did he probably panic a little bit in the "breakout" yes; but that makes him pretty normal.
Thanks for taking the time to post back, Mark.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 16, 2021 22:37:22 GMT
Thanks for your excellent response and analysis.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 17, 2021 16:32:52 GMT
Mark: I still think you are focusing a bit too much on what a shambles the whole thing was, and not taking into consideration the making of a decision, in a timely manner. I don't believe anyone thinks that all was going smoothly with Reno, and everyone were doing their jobs with a maximum amount of efficiency. It was a goat rope, and Reno is to blame for at least 80 percent of what happened. That has never been in question, at least for me. What I do though is separate the goat rope from what I believe was the correct decision. Even the correct decision was bound to lead to a high casualty rate. That was to be expected.
You can look at it another way too. Had not Reno broken out, he would not have linked with Benteen and the trains. In that instance Benteen and the trains would probably have been drawn into the battle as separate entities and defeated in detail. Joined together though, they possessed just enough combat power to avoid total disaster.
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 17, 2021 19:21:20 GMT
Problem is that, if Reno had saw that forward movement was a no go and forming skirmish would leave him fixed and prone for being out flanked, so decided to move back to ford A until further orders, then they would have blamed him for letting Custer down thus being threw throw into Levenworth and the key thrown into the Wenatchee River.
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benteen
First Lieutenant
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Post by benteen on Apr 17, 2021 19:26:14 GMT
First, MHoyt let me join the others sir in welcoming you aboard. Look forward to exchanging opinions and ideas with you.
As to Major Reno's action in the timber, I am going to use a term I use, and I am sure to some ad nauseam, "When you are in an untenable position. right or wrong DO SOMETHING" I have read the senior Officers in this forum explain how to properly execute a retreat, withdrawal, fall back, etc, and have no doubt explained correctly to a T. But what Reno did was none of those, what he did was a "Breakout" which is nothing more than a hell bent for leather charge through enemy forces to prevent being fixed and destroyed. I know that Capt Benteen said that Reno could have defended for a long time, but even though I believe he was the best Officer in the field that day, his opinion of the position means little to me because he wasn't there. You cant tell how long a position can be held by looking at a few trees. The Officers that were there stated under oath at the RCOI that Reno made the correct choice. If he had not they and the entire command would all be dead.
Now, where I have a problem with this "Break Out" is that some of the men didn't get the Word on what was going on. Who is responsible for everyone to get the word? Is it the Battalion Commander or the Company Commanders. I asked why no Bugle call to let the men know what to do and I was given what I felt was a good answer at the time, which was that it would alert the enemy that something was going to happen. But on thinking about it, so what, who cares if they know something is going to happen. They dont know What is going to happen or where. The troops are the only ones that are going to know what the bugle call means. So why no Bugle call. We know, unless he was dead, that he was attached to Reno's hip just like radiomen are attached to the Commanders hip in modern times, as they are the means of communication to the Command.
Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Apr 17, 2021 21:02:23 GMT
Actually Dan I think it was me who made the statement to you about the trumpet call. Trumpet in the cavalry my New Jersey friend, no bugles. That is beside the point though. If I am correct, and many times that is problematic, that few seconds of warning that something was up, may have been just enough for the Indians to scupper the enterprise. Don't know, but what I do know is that if it were done in the modern day, that RTO attached to the commanders's hip would be keeping his mouth shut too, and not be talking about anything on a radio, if your intention was to achieve some element of surprise.
No one ever said what Reno did was or was ever supposed to be pretty. The only question is was it the right decision, not was it done the right and proper way.
The proper way under such circumstances would be to gather you company commanders, tell them what you intend, set a time for execution, release them to their troop leading procedures , then execute. That of course depends upon time available, and I do not think Reno had that time, or at least thought he did not have that time.
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Post by mhoyt on Apr 19, 2021 19:11:33 GMT
Problem is that, if Reno had saw that forward movement was a no go and forming skirmish would leave him fixed and prone for being out flanked, so decided to move back to ford A until further orders, then they would have blamed him for letting Custer down thus being threw throw into Levenworth and the key thrown into the Wenatchee River. Having lived in Tonasket north of Wenatchee (my dad was US Forest Service), I would say that this would be a long toss of a key. Of course then I also spent a year in Leavenworth (at the staff college not the jail -- Thank goodness).
Reno was already outflanked, which is why the line fell back into the timber.
I don't think senior US Army Officers would give him UCMJ for holding his position in a fixing action. He certainly did not get UCMJ for his "breakout" without the forming up of his entire battalion, the use of the two trumpeters in Moylan's company to play "to horse", his leaving at least 13 men behind in the woods. His abandoning of the wounded. The failure to cover the fording site after crossing. The fire discipline on the line. So I really doubt that he would have got UCMJ for that.
As it is, I think it was a poor decision. I think command and control was impaired (Moylan maybe) from the start, except for French and his troop. He wasn't UCMJ'd because a commander in the field has to have operational flexibility in making decisions. He didn't flee from his command.
My personal opinion is given the previous Lakota encounters is he could have held. Many in his command believe he did the right thing. I believe that a Commander should have an understanding that there are 8 other companies and a 100 man pack train out there, and they will be coming to the sound of the fighting at some point. He should have been more patient. I do respect your points (mine are from being a 20th/21st century Army Officer - and it may not relate as much as I wish), and certainly I wasn't there. However, the Breakout itself became a rout, because it was disorderly at best.
Probably unforgivable, is not trying to cover the crossing after he crosses. That really bothers me -- he has to know that a moving column when it slows down the end will basically crash into the front making a mass of targets. Certainly Hare did, certainly French tried to get order back.
VR Mark
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Post by mhoyt on Apr 19, 2021 19:28:47 GMT
Mark: I still think you are focusing a bit too much on what a shambles the whole thing was, and not taking into consideration the making of a decision, in a timely manner. I don't believe anyone thinks that all was going smoothly with Reno, and everyone were doing their jobs with a maximum amount of efficiency. It was a goat rope, and Reno is to blame for at least 80 percent of what happened. That has never been in question, at least for me. What I do though is separate the goat rope from what I believe was the correct decision. Even the correct decision was bound to lead to a high casualty rate. That was to be expected. You can look at it another way too. Had not Reno broken out, he would not have linked with Benteen and the trains. In that instance Benteen and the trains would probably have been drawn into the battle as separate entities and defeated in detail. Joined together though, they possessed just enough combat power to avoid total disaster. I think he made the wrong tactical decision; if he can't charge the village, then he can engage (the target is right there). He was lucky Benteen hadn't been moving at breakneck speed to get into the fight -- or maybe if Benteen had, then he would have joined up with Reno, before the decision. If the decision was to breakout -- he should have bounded or led horses. He is only lucky that Benteen happened to be right there when he needed him, and whatever Custer was doing, drew the majority of the warriors away. Much more likely to get annihilated with what he did, vice staying in the timber. If he expected the casualties he took then he knew he would be combat ineffective after the movement. VR Mark.
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 19, 2021 19:48:37 GMT
I can’t recall the whole story Mark, but the timber defense was not as black and white as it seems. Were the horses in the timber? Was the timber thin enough to allow horses to go under brush? Were some troopers in the timber and others defending a depression in the ground which gave them cover? M Company kept their mounts whist on the skirmish line, the other two left theirs in the timber area and walked out on the prairie into skirmish. Reno just issued verbal orders, probably only heard by the men around him, the sergeants and officers of the other companies probably just seen these men mount and followed suite, those still in the brush probably didn’t get any visual or verbal although some may have thought they had a better chance of surviving if they stayed and hid.
Ian
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Post by quincannon on Apr 19, 2021 19:49:53 GMT
I am not at all sure Benteen could have joined up with Reno had he stayed in the timber. In fact I am not at all sure Benteen would have tried to do so, in light of the number of warriors that would have been between himself and Reno.
A breakout from encirclement is an offensive operation, an attack. If it is to be successful it must be sudden and fast. Sudden and fast is not consistent with by bounds or dragging led horses along.
He was lucky, no doubt, and Benteen came along AFTER contact was broken, but with Indians still in the area.
Do not fool yourself into thinking that Indians being drawn away from Reno would make a difference as to Custer's fate. It would not have. Custer was skunked by the Cheyenne. Those Sioux coming from Reno got there only in time for the last dance, and to eat the last bit of Potato Salad in the picnic basket.
Had Reno stayed in that timber he would most certainly been annihilated. Had he broken out and Benteen not arrived, he would have delayed his annihilation, but it would have certainly come his way. There is no question at all that Reno WAS combat ineffective when he reached the top of those bluffs, yet he gets the blame from many for not then going immediately to aid Custer, in a combat ineffective state, and not knowing where Custer is.
Now don't take anything I say that disagree with your views as being anything but the same as what actually did happen immediately after the battle by both those that participated, and those who arrived on scene in the immediate aftermath. THAT PART OF HISTORY is something that has not changed in a 145 years, and will continue for at least another 145 more.
I would be interested in knowing what you C&GS professor's views were on Reno in the timber. You mentioned that you disagreed with him but never gave specifics.
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