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Post by Beth on Apr 12, 2021 17:51:04 GMT
Depriving the NA of their horses would have been like depriving an Army of all of their vehicles. They would still be able to move slowly, on foot, but have to leave all of their supplies and belonging behind. Welcome to Mhoyt. I look forward to more posts.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 12, 2021 18:28:24 GMT
Steve: You frequently mention making the best available decision. Most of the time here no one makes the best available decision.
The best decision is always to WIN WITHOUT FIGHTING. 99 percent of the time that option is available, and you do not need to be deep in Sun Tzu's Woods to see it. Just like Chess the objective is not to kill the King, it is to take away the King's options. LBH is a prime example of being able to win without fighting. This battle was completely unnecessary, and the campaign could have been won by maneuver that entailed very little in the way of fighting. By that, I mean maneuver on the part of all of the Army players Terry, Crook, and Custer.
I also wish to bring to your attention Custer's failure to adopt what later would be termed Liddell-Hart's "Indirect Approach". Why did Custer follow the trail? That was far from the best available solution. The Indians had already fought Crook, so you could expect that the Indian's focus would be to the south. Add to that, while Custer had no apparent knowledge of Crook's fight, he should have been smart enough to know that the back trail would be a place of Indian focus and observation. The best available option for Custer then would be to follow the trace of what is now Highway 212 from Busby to Crow Agency, and if he wanted a fight hit them in the north where he would be least expected. It was no accident, I think we can both agree, that the Indian first responders to Reno's attack in the south were very quick out of the starting gate, that being because that's where an attack was expected. Attacking from the north would have been a complete surprise I'd wager if Custer moved on the 24/25 under cover of darkness. Yes, I am sure the Indians knew of Terry in the north. He was being watched, but was too far away to pose an immediate threat
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 13, 2021 7:28:11 GMT
Once Custer got to the crows nest, he simply did the simple things badly, he rushed into a mission which he had no need to, mainly because he was worried that he may miss his last chance to shine before he went onto pastures new. What was he reported to have said on sharp shooter ridge "let's finish them up and return to our station"
The believe that the village would disperse was a concern, but may have been used as leverage when the battle was over. If he messed this one up then his superiors could use it against him to cover their own mistakes.
The final hours before the attack was dominated by thoughts of glory, one up man ship and bragging rights which would serve him well in the future.
Any plan was made in the saddle and not on a map table with company commanders present.
So it was no surprise that things went wrong as both he and Reno rode blind into battle.
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Post by mhoyt on Apr 13, 2021 9:48:11 GMT
Steve: You frequently mention making the best available decision. Most of the time here no one makes the best available decision. The best decision is always to WIN WITHOUT FIGHTING. 99 percent of the time that option is available, and you do not need to be deep in Sun Tzu's Woods to see it. Just like Chess the objective is not to kill the King, it is to take away the King's options. LBH is a prime example of being able to win without fighting. This battle was completely unnecessary, and the campaign could have been won by maneuver that entailed very little in the way of fighting. By that, I mean maneuver on the part of all of the Army players Terry, Crook, and Custer. I also wish to bring to your attention Custer's failure to adopt what later would be termed Liddell-Hart's "Indirect Approach". Why did Custer follow the trail? That was far from the best available solution. The Indians had already fought Crook, so you could expect that the Indian's focus would be to the south. Add to that, while Custer had no apparent knowledge of Crook's fight, he should have been smart enough to know that the back trail would be a place of Indian focus and observation. The best available option for Custer then would be to follow the trace of what is now Highway 212 from Busby to Crow Agency, and if he wanted a fight hit them in the north where he would be least expected. It was no accident, I think we can both agree, that the Indian first responders to Reno's attack in the south were very quick out of the starting gate, that being because that's where an attack was expected. Attacking from the north would have been a complete surprise I'd wager if Custer moved on the 24/25 under cover of darkness. Yes, I am sure the Indians knew of Terry in the north. He was being watched, but was too far away to pose an immediate threat This implies that Custer, could have take the indirect approach without being discovered. Certainly, the goal was to close with the village and attack it from the south, and drive the village north into Terry. In the meetings prior to Custer splitting off from Terry the conversation at some point was that Custer was to keep to the south and either attack or drive the village north into Terry. Mark Kellogg makes a reference to that (not everything in a 2 hour meeting makes it into a few paragraphs). Terry and Custer both believed the Indians could not withstand either column -- this has to do with the very bad understanding of how many Lakota were off the reservation (it certainly wasn't 1,500 which implies 500 or so warriors). If Terry did not believe that Custer could defeat the Indians, then asking him to put the village between himself and his resupply point (Terry and the Far West) was insane.
However, to the point the best strategy was to WIN WITHOUT FIGHTING, I would say that was very hard to do. I would think that Custer kind of took the indirect approach, by not following the rivers (Which was expected with horses needing 6 gallons of water a day); although L. Hart used that to describe the compression effects of attacking an army frontally in WW I). This is why he was able to close with the Village - if he took the rivers he would have met the same fate as Crook, as the hunters would follow the rivers for game and Buffalo.
However you could WIN WITH LESS FIGHTING by taking the entire command and killing 20,000 horses and thus immobilizing the great majority of a village with probably at least 8,000 people in it. Even at this time, the U.S. press would have raked Custer over the coals if he killed a bunch of women and children (like at the Washita), and here there were no white hostages. The horses were from the DIME aspect the better target. Economically they were the primary currency of the Lakota (outside of selling Buffalo Hides), Militarily they greatly reduce the fighting capability of fighters with short range weapons. From a Diplomatic Standpoint it allows for the Lakota to resign to moving back to the reservation. From the Informational stand point it doesn't bring the negative press.
So yes -- go for the horse herd, but you need every guy you have to do it. Custer didn't see the herd, because it was unimaginably larger than what he was expecting.
VR Mark
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Post by mhoyt on Apr 13, 2021 9:58:22 GMT
Once Custer got to the crows nest, he simply did the simple things badly, he rushed into a mission which he had no need to, mainly because he was worried that he may miss his last chance to shine before he went onto pastures new. What was he reported to have said on sharp shooter ridge "let's finish them up and return to our station" The believe that the village would disperse was a concern, but may have been used as leverage when the battle was over. If he messed this one up then his superiors could use it against him to cover their own mistakes. The final hours before the attack was dominated by thoughts of glory, one up man ship and bragging rights which would serve him well in the future. Any plan was made in the saddle and not on a map table with company commanders present. So it was no surprise that things went wrong as both he and Reno rode blind into battle. Its a good point, could Custer gamble and sit it out a day, rest the troops. However, the thought was that IF the enemy found Custer they wouldn't attack, but that the Village would Scatter or Run. Custer had been through the attempt to run down a village before, and failed. IF Custer when he looked at that Horse Herd understands that Big Village = HUGE Village, and the warriors won't run - then maybe he would have rested. However, he didn't see or understand the immensity of the herd - the scouts did though.
I think Custer was trying to complete his mission; can you imagine what Benteen and Reno would have said to Terry if Custer sat out the day, and didn't strike the village and it scattered. I bet Custer knew what they would say. Custer had just scolded Reno over his screw up earlier, and he knew that Benteen hated him strongly.
So I don't equate it to glory, I just equate it to the best available option to him (given what he understood), and if he believed the village only had 500 warriors/1500 total Lakota/Tsisistas then of course attack it. Looking back on it, yes he should have rested the troops, and if he got really lucky, steal a night march and strike that horse herd in the early morning. His flank attack on the village was prevented by terrain features, and I believe he was really unlucky with how the terrain was laid out and how it funneled any potential flank attack and prevented him from supporting Reno. VR Mark.
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Post by mhoyt on Apr 13, 2021 10:10:38 GMT
In my belief where Custer made his mistake was right after he sent Martin back with the words "Benteen Come Quick - Big Village". This at least implies that Custer saw some of the village, and that it was larger than expected (they knew they were tracking a Big Village). There are several that believe that Custer didn't see the whole scope of the village. IF Custer saw 80% of that village, then he should have checked the advance, and never went down to Ford B, or north of MTC, he should have fell back. At this point he should realize there are 3x to 4x the warriors that he expects. This is the question that I often ponder (nope don't have an answer). I have to believe he didn't see the whole village; because if he did, his decision making after that was terrible or based on the extreme assumption that 200 men properly handled could beat back at least 1000 warriors.
So lets pull that into the Ford D Scenario. Custer sees the big village. He sees a mass of villagers that have fled from Reno's attack that crossed northeast over the LBH River, to put the river between themselves and Reno. Then those non-combatants see Custer coming down to flank the village, they flee north - then northwest back across the LBH. One battalion of Custer's command pursues along Greasy Grass - runs into the Deep Ravine, has to skirt around the Ravine by going NE - then back NW to get at the villagers (The Rain In the Face Map from Brady). The other battalion under Keogh in reserve moves north on the ridges from the N-C and Luce area to Calhoun Hill as the reserve Keogh needs to keep close. Those two columns never re-unite. The north battalion runs into a horde of warriors crossing the LBH -- who travel twice as fast as they do in formation. They dismount to fight. The south column is checking 75% of the warriors who came from Reno and/or the Hunkpapa part of the village. They are dismounted. Every time they try to mount and combine the force the warriors run them down, or drive off their horses. They never re-unite the firepower and are defeated in detail. (this is the current scenario I accept - although I will probably change my mind in 6 months). VR Mark
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Post by mhoyt on Apr 13, 2021 10:20:33 GMT
I have never really taken Curly or Thompson seriously maybe I should, but Curly was branded a liar by the Crows and has been caught out for exaggerating his story over time. But what you say Steve does butter my toast, as the route he described is the same route they found the casing, now that gets me interested.
Thompson, Hmmm…I don’t know, he ruins his account with daft tales of meeting Custer etc, but maybe he did see the firing lines on FFR and Calhoun.
What happened to Watson’s story, he knocked around with Thompson for a while, did he write an account?
As for Martini, he would have seen quite a bit if he left the command only five football pitches from the river, but really, he tells us nothing in his accounts. He sounds like Manuel in Faulty Towers, “I know nothing” as if his superiors put him under pressure to say only the basics. I believe Martin tells us that 1. Custer saw the village at some point; and at that point he 2. thought he could handle it. His journey provides timeline, and route intelligence. I like Martin's story, because as someone that has conducted historical interviews; it is simple - tells the highlights (which would be naturally remembered), doesn't embellish his role in the fight at all. Therefore, I think that is accurate. Thompson account is questionable to somewhat accurate in my opinion, odd crap does happen on a battlefield, (it did in Iraq, and Afghanistan, and I have also been in Libya as a contractor); people behave weirdly, and some of the incidents he sees could just be misinterpreted from his point of view (due to his lack of understanding the local cultures). Curly, I am on the fence on; but that may just be the interviewers fault. He knew enough to say that Custer was wiped out, so he saw something. VR Mark
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Post by mhoyt on Apr 13, 2021 10:23:46 GMT
Steve: I am happy you see some value, but it seems by your comments above that the value obtained could be just as easily had, without the convention. Back to Hoyt. The only thing that one needs to understand what happened at LBH is to recall what Heinz Guderian, commander of the 2nd Panzer Division in the mid 1930's, said when asked what his views on panzer tactics were - - - Gentlemen, he said, you do not hit with your fingers, you hit with your fist. Custer tried to hit with his fingers, and it did not work for him any better than it did for anyone else throughout the continuum of military history I think that Panzer Heinz would have stated that surprise, offense, audacity, and flanking were all great techniques, and to hit not only hard but fast. Faulty intelligence puts Custer into hitting with his fingers. If not he hits with 2/3 of his command with a reserve of 1/4 in Benteen, and the Packs. IF Custer knew the size of the force he wouldn't have split off Benteen.
IF the Army wasn't so focused on attacking villages, then take everything and wipe out the herd. VR Mark
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Post by mhoyt on Apr 13, 2021 10:47:36 GMT
Welcome aboard Hoyt. i too hope you will stay and be a frequent contributor. Good, rational, well backed up opinions are always valued here. Recalling now that we attended the same school, my center of gravity opinion was based primarily on the horse herd and infrastructure status as it pertains to who won the battle. Had the Indians won, as they did, and during the course of the battle the horse herd had been run off, with only the few horses that remained under control being the war ponies, habitually not with the horse herd , but rather tethered near the lodges, those ponies that were run off could have been rounded up. Again not an easy task, but not unknown. Had the ponies been run off and the infrastructure (stored meat, utensils, lodges, and supplies) been destroyed during the course of battle, none of that could have been reconstituted in a timely manner to be available when required in the coming winter months, which in June is right around the corner in Montana. Under that circumstance it would not matter what the outcome of the battle was. DO NOT take my comments as meaning that I would not have aimed at the horse herd. When you read through these pages you will find that not only would that be the first thing I would have done, but, I believe, the first thing Custer should have done. I will go a bit further though. Had he done it, and done it right, by a combination of driving the horses, and the use of a couple of set, well placed, prairie fires, he could have both put paid to the horses and scuppered the infrastructure. I think Sheridan knew well the value of infrastructure of all types, from livestock, to shelter, to crops, and food. He received his doctorate in the Valley of Virginia in 1864. Attack the horse herd, the lodges can't move (they need 6 horses each to fully move) and you don't need to burn a single lodge. Many of the warriors didn't have their ponies tied next to their lodge (you can read many accounts where they are trying to find a horse) -- why, after the village was set a day, the local grass is stomped down, or cropped. Horses need access to grass and water - so they stayed in the herd often. Certainly, it would vastly impact the amount of warriors that could come at Custer.
Sheridan figured it out after Custer was lying in the ground....why am I going for anything but the horses. Take the horses they are done. He did it, and they were done as fighters. VR Mark
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 13, 2021 13:19:31 GMT
In my belief where Custer made his mistake was right after he sent Martin back with the words "Benteen Come Quick - Big Village". This at least implies that Custer saw some of the village, and that it was larger than expected (they knew they were tracking a Big Village). There are several that believe that Custer didn't see the whole scope of the village. IF Custer saw 80% of that village, then he should have checked the advance, and never went down to Ford B, or north of MTC, he should have fell back. At this point he should realize there are 3x to 4x the warriors that he expects. This is the question that I often ponder (nope don't have an answer). I have to believe he didn't see the whole village; because if he did, his decision making after that was terrible or based on the extreme assumption that 200 men properly handled could beat back at least 1000 warriors. So lets pull that into the Ford D Scenario. Custer sees the big village. He sees a mass of villagers that have fled from Reno's attack that crossed northeast over the LBH River, to put the river between themselves and Reno. Then those non-combatants see Custer coming down to flank the village, they flee north - then northwest back across the LBH. One battalion of Custer's command pursues along Greasy Grass - runs into the Deep Ravine, has to skirt around the Ravine by going NE - then back NW to get at the villagers (The Rain In the Face Map from Brady). The other battalion under Keogh in reserve moves north on the ridges from the N-C and Luce area to Calhoun Hill as the reserve Keogh needs to keep close. Those two columns never re-unite. The north battalion runs into a horde of warriors crossing the LBH -- who travel twice as fast as they do in formation. They dismount to fight. The south column is checking 75% of the warriors who came from Reno and/or the Hunkpapa part of the village. They are dismounted. Every time they try to mount and combine the force the warriors run them down, or drive off their horses. They never re-unite the firepower and are defeated in detail. (this is the current scenario I accept - although I will probably change my mind in 6 months). VR Mark Hi Mark, I have a copy in a book of the Rain-In-The-Face map and his account, he does allude to Calhoun being left as a rear guard as he moves north.I have posted it up along with a simple key for others to view.
F – Custer’s trail & rear guard left G – Custer’s first stand H – fleeing no-coms cross river
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Apr 13, 2021 15:18:56 GMT
Beth Might I suggest you trim this thread. Specifically, move the Center of Gravity discussion to a new thread called "Center of Gravity". I would like to keep the thread more focused on the vignette of wargaming the withdrawal from Ford D in a manner which helps us work to a sequence which plausibly models how the Custer Battalion ends up in its final deployment. In general, I should think a thread should discuss a single topic; it should include branches and sequels, but not switch to a totally different discussion in midstream.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 13, 2021 15:37:33 GMT
Questions for Hoyt.
1) Who says Custer ever went to Ford B? What proof can be offered?
2) How do you know Custer divided his battalion into two battalions? The only guy with direct knowledge of the task organization that day who wrote about it afterward says that there was only one battalion, and that battalion was directly under Custer's command. Anyone else that has commented on the issue bases their comments on the way the forces were found, and evidently pays no attention to determining how they got there.
3) If you were going to set up a skirmish line or defensive position in advance of an anticipated or possible attack, would you place that line at the bottom of a hill, where you are forced to shoot uphill to the high ground in your immediate front? That's exactly what Calhoun did.
4) If you intend on attacking why attack with two companies, leaving 3 companies, 60 percent of your available force, in reserve a mile away from your intended point of attack?
5) Are you familiar with the vast artifact field found north and west of Last Stand Hill on terrain that was much too large to be skirmished over by only two companies?
6) Are you familiar with the John Stands in Timber map?
7) Are you familiar with the statement of Red Hawk, a Sioux who fought Reno in the valley, who upon returning to the Ford B area, states that he observed three divisions moving south along battle ridge, and when they were stopped the three divisions (which we take as being companies) all collapsed backward one upon the other?
8) Was the LBH staff ride conducted while you were at Leavenworth or is that something they added later? If so did you participate? I read a bootleg copy that the 3rd ACR used for similar staff rides they conducted by squadron. I found that it was pretty conventional, lacked quite a bit of imagination, and was quite dated in the data content.
As you drive along this highway of ours please recall that to the Sioux a ford means Ford B, and to the Cheyenne it means Ford D, and when these stories of Custer at a ford are told, that the Cheyenne actually fought Custer at a ford, and the Sioux only heard stories about it later.
Now you do not have to answer these questions here, and frankly when I joined the LBH boards I though pretty much the way you do now. I just wanted to give you some food for further head scratching, and contemplation.
Now what I would suggest we all do is get back on topic and address the problem posed a withdrawal from Ford D.
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on Apr 13, 2021 16:14:18 GMT
Martin puts Custer at Ford B and Curly puts him separating from those that went straight across to Luce, and then Nye Cartwright. Both Thompson and Martin describe fighting near MTF.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 13, 2021 16:55:44 GMT
And Martini, Curly, and Thompson, are not what anyone would call reliable witnesses. One could not describe a steel ball with his limited, at the time, language skills, and Thompson, when he told the story in his advanced age, was known to be mentally challenged. Curly told anyone, mostly Camp, what they wanted to hear.
I would feel much better about what they had to say, if Martini had language skills, Thompson's story was backed up, at or near the time of the battle, by Watson's testimony, and if Curly never knew Walter Camp. You may take that as my opinion, but if the story was being written for the first time today, using today's standards, which I adhere to, then none of what they had to say would be included for lack of verification.
No, Martini does not put Custer at Ford B. Martini had absolutely no means of knowing what Custer did, after he left Custer to ride back. Even if you accept the 600 yards as stone cold fact, 600 yards is not at Ford B, but rather 600 yards away from Ford B. That does not even take into consideration all the other variations of Martini's story told over time.
How long would it take Thompson and Watson to walk the distance Thompson said he did, dodging Indians and trying to stay hidden while doing so? If you think it could be done in time to see what he says he saw then so be it, but if you accept part of Thompson's story than you must accept all of it., squaw rescue and all. You are letting your friendship with Gerry Schultz influence your judgment here, in my view. Why in the name of God would two private soldiers who became unhorsed continue to walk toward the battle, when both of them must have known there were friendlies and a chance to obtain another mount in their rear? Moreover why would they choose to walk in that direction, not on Custer's trail, but rather in close, very close, proximity to a ten thousand or more Indian village? Then of course they must reverse direction and walk back the way they came so as to link up with Reno/Benteen. That too takes time, which inevitably leads one to the final question - why they did not report to Reno/Benteen what they saw. Those two, if their story was true would have the answer to the question everyone wanted to know the answer to --- where is Custer ----- Why Custer was fighting at that ford just ahead a half an hour ago. Christ Almighty Steve, that is the Holy Grail, and not reporting what they say they saw was clear dereliction. The whole story stinks to high heaven.
If Walter Camp asked Curly if Custer was on the dark side of the moon, Curly would answer in the affirmative.
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Post by Beth on Apr 14, 2021 15:39:06 GMT
Beth Might I suggest you trim this thread. Specifically, move the Center of Gravity discussion to a new thread called "Center of Gravity". I would like to keep the thread more focused on the vignette of wargaming the withdrawal from Ford D in a manner which helps us work to a sequence which plausibly models how the Custer Battalion ends up in its final deployment. In general, I should think a thread should discuss a single topic; it should include branches and sequels, but not switch to a totally different discussion in midstream. Gladly. I will send you a PM about where to divide the conversation.
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