Tactical Vignette, withdrawal from Ford D

[yanmacca]

I think that the main reason for heading north would be to cross unhindered, just like Reno did. Ford B wouldn't allow for this either!
People say the no-coms where heading that way [north], but they may have been heading north west, away from the river.
Custer could have thought that this far north would allow him the time to cross and re-form unmolested, but five hundred Cheyenne made sure that this was not possible, 500 Indians would do that I guess

[herosrest]

Apr 4, 2021 18:18:49 GMT quincannon said:

HR: I think you missed my point. Custer told NO ONE of his intentions to my knowledge, including you and I. If he had, which is certainly a possibility, those he told either died with him, or have never said a word about in in 145 years. So then I fully admit I am just as ignorant of Custer's intentions as you are, and that is the point.

I don't give a rat's behind what cavalrymen wore for footwear. I specifically addressed Infantry. Presumably you understand that someone who rides into battle requires different equipment than those who walk.

You try walking 50 miles a day, and at the same time carrying with you everything you own. You could not do it when you were 20 and full of piss and vinegar, and neither could the Indians, and be in any shape to move the next day and probably the day after that. I also doubt if you could have done a sustained 30 miles over a twelve hour period on foot. On horseback probably, but what shape would a man on foot, or a horse be to fight once they arrived? That is the key point I am trying to make here. You must not only march distances, but be ready to fight when you arrive. Otherwise the marching does you no good from any military perspective.

Yes Knit Picking what you post is meat and drink to me, mainly because you make a great effort in trying to bring out information for all of us to ponder. So consider what I do as refining, or as Ian, Mike, and I say in our modeling efforts - dry brushing - to bring out the finer details.

A running tribe or camp were able to move 50 miles because they simply didn't stop in an emergency. Eat and drink on the move and leave everything in their dust. With Sioux and Cheyenne, this was done mounted with possessions and supplies on travois pulled by ponies and dogs with remounts in a herd. They would keep going and outdistance any pursuit. If that was failing, they would scatter. 

Armies march to fight not to fail.

30/12 is 2.5mph.

Regards.

[herosrest]

Apr 4, 2021 19:30:41 GMT quincannon said:

Steve: The concept of the Spitz was known. John Churchill used such a maneuver at Blenheim. Had a Spitz been used at Ford D, the Spitz would have probably arrived in the very early morning hours of 25 June, about 0100 hours early, I suspect.

So no, I am not going to tell you what it is. You will have to find that out for yourself, but it has nothing to do with a spittoon, and everything to do with gaining and the maintenance of surprise.

I keep telling you that if you want to understand what happened on 25 June, you must understand the art of battle itself, and you seem not to have any desire to do that, so you are therefore doomed to a state of misunderstanding, because of you state of narrow focus. People trained in that Art do things certain ways. They do them out of a combination of doctrine, adherence to best practices, and force of long habit. That's why I maintain that Custer would not do this or that, and would do thus and so, in any given situation you wish to name.

If you ever ask anyone in the military if they like to cross any river tactically, or under fire, they will look at you as if you have a couple of screws loose, and they would be correct. You would have a couple of screws loose just for the asking. River crossings, disengagement while in contact, and breakouts from encirclement are to be avoided like the clap in a whore house.

You are talking to a Marine........... 

[quincannon]

"Armies march to fight" HR? No they don't, not always, at least not always right away. They march to get where they are going. Getting where you are going, and marching to fight immediately at the end of that march, involve two different techniques of march planning and march discipline.

"You are talking to a Marine" No I am talking to a policeman, who was in the Marine Corps for four years reaching the rank of Corporal, and who in the Spirit of the Cincinnati placed his sword back in its scabbard, and resumed standing behind a plow. As a Corporal in the Marine Corps or any other Military organization up to and including Heinlein's Mobile Infantry he would not be either exposed to or familiar with the subjects we discuss here. Were he a Gunnery Sergeant or Sergeant Major of Marines he would have been. Being a Corporal of Marines does not necessarily mean you know anything above and beyond that required of that rank and pay grade. Understanding the Art and Science of War is not required knowledge of a Marine Corporal. Understanding squad tactics and the basic tenants of leadership is.

If they could march as fast as you say the Indians could, how come they were run down and destroyed within nine months, mainly by Infantry or columns with a high density of Infantry? Just wondering. Now if you were talking Apache or Comanche I would be in full agreement with your analysis of Indian mobility. In fact I would say you might be giving them too little credit, but Sioux and Cheyenne are not Apache and Comanche. Look up the Great Texas Raid to Austin and the distance and time factors associated with it,  back in the days of the Texas Republic, if you really want to verify this with some fairly obscure research.

[Deleted]

With regard to marching. It depends much on training as well as commanders taking care of their troops while they march.

My main experience with long foot marches comes from Ranger School (But I spent more time in the hospital than I did in the school, having been hit with heat stroke which was very embarrassing for a Florida Boy) and, what was billed to us as a leisurely walk in the woods around Bastogne on the day the 4th AD broke into the town for the 35th anniversary of the battle. Most of the battalions officers went, about two companies worth of soldiers, and were treated to a punishing march in the coldest winter since the battle. The battalion commander, XO, S3, and four out of five company commanders wore their tankers boots, while I wore my oldest pair of combat boots that I had since I was a cadet and went through ranger school for me. After marching around the town, pausing at various vantage points, one being the break in point where I have a picture of me shaking hands with the guy that commanded my company in WWII just after he got a huge gold medal from the Luxemburg Government for his service, the march culminated in a parade in which the spectators pelted you with Nuts! (it was called the Nuts Festival). We got back to the 700 year old Inn, had roast elk for dinner and a lot of brandy, and then the next day crawled onto the bus because none of us were conditioned for such a march. However, all those other named officers ended up with quarters because of their boots whereas I was still mostly mobile, but not fit to fight at the end of that march. I think it was about 35 miles around the perimeter which we did in about 12 hours. We got worried as we got closer to Malmedy.

Later, the BG commanding the 1st ID (Forward) [aka the 3rd Brigade/1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) {the Big Red One}] decreed every unit had to do a monthly 20 mile march. We dutifully did a 100 mile road march in our tanks while the infantry battalions foot marched and the rest of the brigade just did walks in the forest or ignored him. After that, he made us all do 20 mile foot marches.

[quincannon]

Totally agree with training for marching. Remember when ARTEP's first came out there was an event where a rifle company had to force march 18 Kilometers then fire for record when they arrived at the end of the march. It was a bitch, but it was also excellent training and an object lesson for all concerned. Good training, but something that has to be built up to before, you can just go out one fine morning and do it.

Marching is FAR better than running as a form of PT too, at least in my opinion.

With regard to Comanche and Apache. These southwest tribes were culturally different from their northern brothers. The Comanche and Apache stashed their kinfolk in what could be best termed mountain fortresses or places so far removed from the beaten path that they were safe, and raided, in fact conducted almost what we would term today campaigns against their enemies as far from the place where they stashed their families as possible. Often that would be distances of several hundred miles. Colt lives down near one of the Comanche's best know strong holds the Llano Estacado, a forbidding place by any measure. Steve is probably familiar with the Dragoon Mountains of Arizona as well. The Sioux and Cheyenne kept their families with them, and in the end it was that family close presence that undid them. 

[herosrest]

QC - Science blessed the Planet with forms of transport and the more recent have greatly assisted mobility. Amongst many opportunities to excel, Marines undertake seaborne warfare and you were discussing the broad military dislike of river crossings.

It has been pointed out that Napoleon beat Hitler to Moscow and both did it at walking speed.

I shall dig out the detail of Stanley's attempt to spank the Sioux in August 1873, for you. Custer's report is a little OTT but he saw them off after a dawn attack on the regiments 10 company camp. Reno and Keogh were up North on the border. It makes me smile when the question on why Keogh rode to Ford A pops up.

Armies march to fight. They do quite a bit else besidea...... Happy with this?

[herosrest]

The report is included to Fighting Indians in the 7th United States Cavalry which is a trumpeters account of the Sioux War. He was there with them all and left a slightly less contentious history than Peter Thompson, although he was an 1877 avenger in Company M. The two actions, 4th & 11 th August 1873, left quite obvious impression on Custer. He could not catch a fleeing camp. His regiment were attacked in force. The book is mundane soldier's life hopes, fears and risks on th Plains with 7th Cavalry shortly after little Bighorn. Not most people's cup of stuff.

Regards.

[quincannon]

I dislike peppermint flavored toothpaste too HR, but that does not mean I will not use it to brush my teeth if that is the only choice in my bathroom medicine cabinet, courtesy of the madam.

[mac]

Apr 3, 2021 18:09:47 GMT @mikerobel said:

Apr 3, 2021 12:20:43 GMT mac said:

Fair enough Mike. I just feel Custer did not dawdle in making the decision to retire from the river.

In considering why Companies ended positioned as they were it is good to start with E and F. Indian accounts tell us that Company E left the river and moved up to Cemetery Ridge (leading their horses) and that they then held that position to the end. I do mean the end, as it was the last organized point of resistance.

When LSH fell the warriors charged up from the eastern side (probably C,I,L were pretty much cooked by this time) and as they did so some men (probably around 15) who were still mobile ran away down to Cemetery Ridge and Company E, as Company E were still fighting. Ultimately,(very soon after) Company E's position was over run and some men ran down the SSL to Deep Ravine. This is how one Company F man was identified down there, but the rest were mainly Company E.

Given those accounts it is apparent to me that E and F were not together in the valley at Ford D.

The accounts also say that when E stopped on Cemetery, another Company that was mounted simply rode over the hill. I believe this to be Company L, since that would make them the first to leave. Hence I suggest if we are to pair E to another Company then it is perhaps L.

The maneuvering of the other groups would then leave Company F out on BRE.

Company C must be the second to leave if we are to believe Gall's account (and I do).

Last to leave is Keogh and Company I, and given how far they got things were falling apart pretty quickly by this time.

Cheers

I have several problems understanding your scenario here.  I'm not saying you are wrong, I'm saying I just don't get it.  You say that E Company withdrew from its position by the river and led its horses uphill to cemetary ridge, apparently without a fight.  Where did they start from?  How long do you think that walk took? 

To frame the discussion, lets consult the US Army Expert Infantryman's Badge Test for a 12 mile road march.    It states that a soldier with his normal equipment (weapon, ammunition, water, etc.) plus a 35 pound rucksack load must be able to complete the course in 3 hours.  So 4 mph or about 6.5 kph  They follow a marked route which provides ease of movement, consistent terrain features, and no obstructions along the route that require the solider to maneuver around and it should be similar to terrain the soldiers have been training on.  If there is a turn around point, it should be located in a place such that the soldiers don't obstruct each other as they turn around.  Many soldiers run the course.

No one I knew credited the infantry to be able to move at this rate cross country.  The speed we almost always used was 2.5mph or about 4kph.  I will accept whatever speed QC or AZ say.

On the below map each grid square marked by the blue line is 1km. Each hex is about 250m. Let's assume E CO starts in hex 0505 (but I will accept any starting point you select) and moves along the path 0605-0704-0805-0904-1005 which is 1.25km.  The time it would take for them arrive is probably, at best, between and 11 and 18 minutes, assuming they are not molested and don't have to fight their way back.

Next, another company, likely L, rode through them as they arrived on Cemetery Ridge, and on down to Calhoun Hill (HEX 1507).  Where do you think they came from?  If E CO was able to get into position unopposed, why would L rush straight through them and move to Calhoun Hill?  Let's assume L gallops at 11mph or almost 18 kph, so they can fairly easily go from E CO to Calhoun Hill, if unopposed, could easily do that in around 4 minutes.

Where do you think each company is when they start to fall back and where do they end up.  Tell me the Hex numbers and I will move them there and repost, or I can send you the powerpoint with the map and units and you can place them as you see fit.

View Attachment  

Sorry Mike I did not express myself clearly.

I have no problem with your original scheme of maneuver back on page 1. Further I do not have the expertise in your line of work to be a critic. Now that I look more closely it seems reasonable and I was just adding detail that I have gleaned from accounts to supplement the discussion.

I would add in that regard that in my mind all the Companies took casualties during the withdrawal from the river. This includes of course Tom Custer. Rain in the Face maintained all his life that he personally killed Tom Custer there with the Cheyenne.

Found and identified on Last Stand Hill

Ygnatz Stungewitz (C)

Willis B. Wright (C)

Anton Dohman (F)

Gustav Klein (F)

William H. Lerock (F)

Werner L. Liemann (F)

Edward C. Driscoll (I)

Archibald McIlhargey (I)

John E. Mitchell (I)

John Parker (I)

Francis T. Hughes (L)

Charles McCarthy (L)

Oscar F. Pardee (L)

Thomas S. Tweed (L)

• Two civilians

Boston Custer (QM)

Autie Reed

• One surgeon: Dr. George Lord (HQ)

• One trumpeter: Henry Voss (HQ)

• Four NCOs

SGM William Sharrow (HQ)

1SG Michael Kenney (F)

SGT John H. Groesbeck (F)

Accounts say no one from Calhoun Hill area made it back to LSH so these men were wounded or dead on LSH when C,I,L retreated.

The point being that the time Custer stayed in contact at the river was probably short but the withdrawal was longer.

I am fine with the travel times you list above. They tell us that things eventually unraveled quickly for Custer.

Cheers

[azranger]

Apr 4, 2021 19:30:41 GMT quincannon said:

Steve: The concept of the Spitz was known. John Churchill used such a maneuver at Blenheim. Had a Spitz been used at Ford D, the Spitz would have probably arrived in the very early morning hours of 25 June, about 0100 hours early, I suspect.

You assume that they knew of ford Ds.  I don't. I think everything was done on the fly which is common for cavalry. They had to physically look at the fords from MTC to north of the Big Village. 

So no, I am not going to tell you what it is. You will have to find that out for yourself, but it has nothing to do with a spittoon, and everything to do with gaining and the maintenance of surprise.

Your approach comes from an officer viewpoint and that is great. Mine comes from being a USMC NCO and 42 years in law enforcement. For me I don't need to get past the lack of battle readiness for these particular troops. It doesn't matter if Custer knew of a Spitz maneuver if he soldiers could not ride a horse with an independent seat and could not make hits. I have worked with all sorts of individuals. I can tell you the ROK Marines are impressive. 

I keep telling you that if you want to understand what happened on 25 June, you must understand the art of battle itself, and you seem not to have any desire to do that, so you are therefore doomed to a state of misunderstanding, because of you state of narrow focus. People trained in that Art do things certain ways. They do them out of a combination of doctrine, adherence to best practices, and force of long habit. That's why I maintain that Custer would not do this or that, and would do thus and so, in any given situation you wish to name.

I believe I understand the art of war and the science of war. Please explain to me how Private William O. Taylor never rode his horse at a gallop nor fired his revolver from his horse. It doesn't matter if the officers are the best there ever was with practicing the art of war if the soldiers would fail at the maneuver. What I do know is that under fire it would depend on who is with you when you make a decision of what to do.

I think you can see the  art of war in what the 1874 Montana Expedition did against these same Indians. Their mission was stir up the Indians so the US Army would have to react while sustaining very few casualties.  


If you ever ask anyone in the military if they like to cross any river tactically, or under fire, they will look at you as if you have a couple of screws loose, and they would be correct. You would have a couple of screws loose just for the asking. River crossings, disengagement while in contact, and breakouts from encirclement are to be avoided like the clap in a whore house.

Why  would I have to ask anyone ? That seems so basic to me. It is not theory for me I actually have been there and done that. I think building entries are quite similar in regards to what the military and entry teams do. The major difference is in use of force that is acceptable. 

 What I learned in the Marines though has little application for the battle in June 1876. As a Marine we had lots of training and practical application. We never had to threaten to shoot Marines (soldiers) for not following orders like French and Godfrey had to do.

I think the gap between what officers knew and the abilities of these soldiers to implement was evident in the results. I don't think anyone could get to Ford Ds  horseback by 1:00 am and not be noticed before arriving there.

I would like to know at what distance might your horse sound off to other nearby horses? 

If the art of war doesn't include the knowledge of the enemy and the abilities of you own troops then I think you have a point. 

Regards

Steve 

[azranger]

Apr 3, 2021 22:59:49 GMT quincannon said:

Pay no mind to those two Mike. They live in one day 145 years ago and have not much of a clue what either of us are talking about, most of the time.

Good Infantry, under the conditions you describe for the EIB test, is good for about 30 kilometers a day and is ready, and in condition to fight, once they arrive. They can do more than that, but I do not think it is wise to expect that more day after day. Like the tracks on a tank, the combat boot is every bit as much a weapon as the main gun on your tank or the rifle the Infantryman carries into battle.

Chuck

I don't know who the two are but I know why I started to go to the battlefield in 2009. I could not understand how 5 companies of cavalry could be destroyed to the last man. Not sure where you get one day from. Decision making on the 24th made the events on the 25th occur. They were still engaged on the 26.  That appears to me to be at least three days. Since horses play a role in this battle how do you apply both the art and science of war for this particular battle.

The person that helped me the most was Col William Bender. He told me to read Blink and see how fast someone can make an assessment. For the most part it is done fast and accurate. In this case it appears something was missed. 

Clair a cavalry officer and graduate of West Point taught me the term retrograde. Something the Marine Corps left out of my education. He also taught me about decision making and that officers should make the best decisions. Col Bender added to it with stating the best available decision. That seems about right if you have to take into account the skillsets of your soldiers.

You added to my understanding of the timber area with the term Breakout. That explained what Reno did when surrounded in the timber. Thanks

My horse experience came from my job and the Arizona Mounted Officers School. 

My experience with the Indians comes from reading and spending time with descendants and relatives with those participants of the winning side.

I am not studying this to see correct application of the art of war by the US military. 

Regards

Steve

[quincannon]

No I do not expect Custer knew anything about a Spitz. It was a known concept before his time, but its use at LBH would not have been appropriate under prevailing circumstances. All I wanted you to do was research the concept for your own base of knowledge. In short though a Spitz is an advance detachment from the main body of an organization that travels far in advance of the main body usually up to twenty or thirty miles in advance, to seize a clearly defined critical objective such as a bridge or crossroads that is in the zone of advance of the main body. It is specifically designed for the mission, and no two are ever alike, just as no two missions are ever completely alike. It is a combined arms force, mobile enough to substitute speed for stealth, and strong enough to hold what they seize until relieved. As I mentioned to Ian, the Spitz is what put the Lightning into Blitzkrieg.

You are beating a dead horse when you continually bring up the sorry state of training affairs in the 7th Cavalry Regiment. I do not think you will find anyone on this planet or in fact the entire solar system that would disagree with you, except Rini of course.

Generally speaking (Lieutenant Colonel) Bender and Clair gave you good and proper information. I have no dispute with them in that regard, although I would say that being a West Point graduate does not make you any smarter than anyone else. There are a hell of a lot of dumb ass jerks that have graduated from  Hudson High.

By the by I do not believe that Clair ever served in a cavalry unit any day in his career. I think he was strictly a tanker, which while similar is different in scope and emphasis. Mike and Colt can probably fill you in better than I. Remember that some of the units in the U S Army that carry cavalry designations presently were in Clair's time tank battalions, and today combined arms battalions. Cavalry in its true form in the U S Army is reserved for reconnaissance units, except in the First Cavalry Division, which carries the traditional titles regardless of their present organization. The same is also true for the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, which continues the traditional title although it is organized as a standard heavy brigade combat team. The 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Regiments are likewise still designated cavalry, although both of them are Stryker Brigades.

You are in fact learning the Art and Science of War by your own admission above by listening to people like Bender, Clair, and might I say Mike, Colt, and myself. Your experience in the Marine Corps only introduced you to the application at the lowest level of the Art and none of the Science. So why don't you just consider those I mentioned as helping you broaden your horizons.

Steve, it is not enough to know what was done. To completely understand you must know why it was done, or for that matter why it was not done. Sometimes to find those answers you must go back as far as the ancients. I assure you that Hannibal Barca used the same procedures as a Custer or Merritt or McKenzie. Caesar used the same mental calculations before he crossed the Rubicon. The continuum of military history is looking at what is past and applying it to the present and the future.

I am now going to give you a small example of what I am trying to get across to you, something you said above that you learned from me. Before I ever mentioned that what Reno did from the timber was not a retreat, but rather a breakout from encirclement, everyone that populated all of these pages were calling it a retreat. Some of the unwashed still do, and a small number of them should know better. If you look at it as a retreat, then it is no wonder that most people consider it a cowardly shambles of an episode of the battle. If you look at it for what it was though, not a retreat, but a breakout, from encirclement you can see that it was executed for the most part properly. it was the correct decision under the circumstances, and both Reno and what was done must then be looked at in a new light. Absent the application of the proper terminology to the operation and how the operation was to be executed, along with the associated drawbacks and pitfalls of the operation itself, then, one could never understand what occurred

[yanmacca]

Custer had never set eyes on the area in question before that day, but had to use the topography to get him to where he wanted, example, there was a line of bluffs which stretched the full length of battle ridge and these bluffs lined the rivers length from ford B to Cemetery ridge.
This is the reason why he headed for the flats up north, he had no choice at crossing anywhere after ford B so if he needed to cross the river he had to travel north of BRE and arch west.
So really his route was layed out before him if he wanted to cross.

[quincannon]

Custer may not have set eyes on his battle space, which was in itself a mistake of monumental consequence, but certainly some of his scouts had, and could inform him of places to cross. As we know though, places to cross, and places to conduct an opposed river crossing are two different bags of crap.

Generally speaking western rivers, at most times of the year that snake through the prairie, are full of fords. You can almost expect to find one near every river bend. Here in Colorado, most of the year you can wade across the South Platte in many places, and never get water above your knees. Problem is for those concerned with military operations, those conditions change rapidly, and what might be an exceptional ford at 0900, may be impassable by noon.

There is absolutely no substitute for timely, eyes on, reconnaissance, conducted in the final moments before engagement by the commander himself. Does not matter how good your scouts are, only a fool proceeds without himself seeing.