Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Mar 29, 2021 20:01:33 GMT
Since we have no real information about anything about Ford D and positions. I put this into a seperate thread so as to remove the hyopthetical from more direct comparison to the facts, such as they are. The only thing we are remotely sure of is where the bodies lay. I am starting this off with a vignette which takes a possible deployment around Ford D and withdrawing South, based on my tactical knowledge, some awareness of period weapon range, and mounted combat. That said, Chuck with his light infantry background may find much to critique about my approach. AZ, with his horsemanship skills and repeated traverses of terrain would likely have a different outlook as well. I took this as not so much a mounted fight, but a withdrawal under pressure where we would be, in the modern vernacular, be conducting a delay and using techniques of bounding overwatch (which becomes fire and maneuver when the shooting starts). This would, in real life, be adjusted based on actually occupying the ground, but I think is a good first order solution. My overwhelming impression though, is Custer was not under intense pressure as he withdrew from the area. The purpose of this is two fold. I wanted to see where I might end up in this situation. I don't believe the Custer's deployment reflects a plan one way or the other, and I am mystified at the collapse from South to North and how elements, if there was intense pressure from the South got so far down that ridge. That said, I think this gives me a window to think about going backwards from end state to the beginning of the withdrawal from the Ford, which is me trying to backward plan as if Custer knew where he wanted to end up. Again, the blue circle represents the maximum effective direct fire range of about 300 yards/meters of the carbine. You can see I allow mutual support through overlapping fires throughout. A more accurate representation would be a rounded rectangle. First, the Initial Situation as I visualize it when Custer says, "oops." I only have two companies forward because I don't want to make contact along the river with all my units and I want to be mutually supporting and maintain some freedom of maneuver. Attachments:
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Mar 29, 2021 20:04:03 GMT
Map 2. Initial Bound. E and F move behind the rest of the battalion. The CP moves to keep an eye on the situation and control the bounds. I envision Custer either giving each commander the order of go there along this route in person, because there may be no time for an orders group and he is figuring it out as he goes, not having the benefit of radio, a sheltered command post, an acetated map, and grease pencils. Map 3. 2nd Bound.
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Mar 29, 2021 20:05:42 GMT
Map 4 and 5, 3rd and 4th bounds. Keep in mind, this is me thinking using my military, wargaming, and historical skills/knowledge, so it probably does not much resemble Custer's train of thought but it gets my mind in the game. Attachments:
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Mar 29, 2021 20:08:56 GMT
Maps 6 and 7, the final bound and the end state. The end state might be a little looser than it should be. I have opted to try and defend along the more complex ridge complex surrounding the cemetery hopefully avoiding the forward slope, but I might be more spread out than would be optimum. Of course, there does not seem to be shelter for the horses, but we are fighting for our lives here and we know from history, escape was probably not real probable. Perhaps we can inflict enough damage (Independently, but in combination with Reno/Benteen) to make them think that perhaps Today is not such a good day to die. Attachments:
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Mar 29, 2021 21:43:15 GMT
Here is an attempt to show in Google Earth Pro the combined LOS of the Regiment in the position I've selected. It's not the best because I have to stack them up, then vary the opacity to get them all to show, but it gives you an idea. It could be refined given the proper tools, but it does appear to offer all around fires. Remember, since the LOS is from a single point, you can't get the effect of the troop deployments or of the regiment as a whole. The view location is 45°34'15.31" N 107°25'47.65" W Areas which have a clear LOS are shown in green. Attachments:
|
|
mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
|
Post by mac on Mar 30, 2021 4:34:53 GMT
Nice Mike! I will wait to see what others (vastly better at this than me) have to contribute.
You say
"My overwhelming impression though, is Custer was not under intense pressure as he withdrew from the area.
The purpose of this is two fold. I wanted to see where I might end up in this situation. I don't believe the Custer's deployment reflects a plan one way or the other, and I am mystified at the collapse from South to North and how elements, if there was intense pressure from the South got so far down that ridge."
My view has always been that the soldiers only come under intense pressure when the warriors are able to close to hand to hand range.
At Ford D Custer holds his position until the very end. The accounts say that the warriors were content to fire into LSH until there was so little return of fire that they simply charged up the hill.
Company E, suicide boys notwithstanding, hold Cemetery until LSH falls.
Company L encounter no resistance until they reach Calhoun Hill area. Gall says that when he saw "Custer" coming along the ridge "Custer" was in no hurry, but then reacted quickly when he saw Gall. Company L hold the warriors at Calhoun for long enough for Company C to arrive and deploy on FF Ridge. The pressure begins when Lame White man assaults Company C's right flank from Greasy Grass.
This is a double envelopment where the "eye" of the envelope is a fairly quiet place until the warriors force a hand to hand spacing. Consequently there is probably no need for much in the way of supporting fire to get L,C,I away from LSH. My understanding is that the trick in these situations is always to extract the DLIC.
Cheers
|
|
|
Post by yanmacca on Mar 30, 2021 8:00:12 GMT
Would the idea of a practical withdrawal actually be on Custer's mind when he headed down off the high ground to the ford d flats?
Attack would be his priority at this point. Listening to what the ex-military say, these companies would not be lined up side by side, so for Custer to initiate a tactical withdrawal by bounds would be difficult to do if under pressure and I don't know if Mac will back me up here, but didn't the Cheyenne say that they crossed the river to engage the soldiers? If so then they shifted the balance some what and forced Custer to move back.
The only real pause the companies would have to put in Custer's orders to fall back in stages or bounds, would I guess be done around BRE and cemetery. Didn't the Indians say such a pause took place?
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Mar 30, 2021 10:17:18 GMT
Nice Mike! I will wait to see what others (vastly better at this than me) have to contribute.
You say
"My overwhelming impression though, is Custer was not under intense pressure as he withdrew from the area.
The purpose of this is two fold. I wanted to see where I might end up in this situation. I don't believe the Custer's deployment reflects a plan one way or the other, and I am mystified at the collapse from South to North and how elements, if there was intense pressure from the South got so far down that ridge."
My view has always been that the soldiers only come under intense pressure when the warriors are able to close to hand to hand range.
At Ford D Custer holds his position until the very end. The accounts say that the warriors were content to fire into LSH until there was so little return of fire that they simply charged up the hill.
Company E, suicide boys notwithstanding, hold Cemetery until LSH falls.
Company L encounter no resistance until they reach Calhoun Hill area. Gall says that when he saw "Custer" coming along the ridge "Custer" was in no hurry, but then reacted quickly when he saw Gall. Company L hold the warriors at Calhoun for long enough for Company C to arrive and deploy on FF Ridge. The pressure begins when Lame White man assaults Company C's right flank from Greasy Grass.
This is a double envelopment where the "eye" of the envelope is a fairly quiet place until the warriors force a hand to hand spacing. Consequently there is probably no need for much in the way of supporting fire to get L,C,I away from LSH. My understanding is that the trick in these situations is always to extract the DLIC.
Cheers
My thought here is if Custer brought his whole battalion foward and was not pressured, why didn't he stay at Ford D? IF he had fought, they would have found bodies there, but there are no markers (for whatever that is worth) up there. I am not very surprised that so long as the officers and NCOs were doing their jobs, the individual troops were able to hold off the Sioux/Cheyanne. Even at Isandawalna, the British did and they started to collapse, not when they ran out of ammunition (because it is now thought they were getting it even at the end, because they supply guys were dropping boxes behind each company) but when the Zulu were finally able to penetrate their defense. Like LBH, Isandwahnal, the battalion was not deployed for mutual support nor did they have field fortifications. Unlike LBH, the Zulu had few firearms. The Martini-Henry was probably a better weapon than the Carbine, even though it too was single shot. Of course, they also had bayonets, which did not help overmuch, but is better than a knife against a lance or axe.
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Mar 30, 2021 10:21:58 GMT
Would the idea of a practical withdrawal actually be on Custer's mind when he headed down off the high ground to the ford d flats? Attack would be his priority at this point. Listening to what the ex-military say, these companies would not be lined up side by side, so for Custer to initiate a tactical withdrawal by bounds would be difficult to do if under pressure and I don't know if Mac will back me up here, but didn't the Cheyenne say that they crossed the river to engage the soldiers? If so then they shifted the balance some what and forced Custer to move back. The only real pause the companies would have to put in Custer's orders to fall back in stages or bounds, would I guess be done around BRE and cemetery. Didn't the Indians say such a pause took place? My starting position is how I would have approached the riverline to prepare for fording it. Two companies are up and have seized the near side and can now suppress the far side. Were I to cross, two more companies would have moved forward to concentrate their fire on the farside and provide some flank security. Then, the trail company would come forward and cross supported by all four companies. First a set of fours, followed by a 'platoo ', then the rest of the company because that company too would largely be suppressing the far side while I get across. Once the lead company is across, the others cross, one at a time, until I have three across and two back. After that, I's work my way forward. But the point here is Custer did not attempt to cross, he started to withdraw.
|
|
mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
|
Post by mac on Apr 1, 2021 10:53:46 GMT
If Custer did cross, what would be his situation?
|
|
Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
|
Post by Deleted on Apr 1, 2021 16:20:40 GMT
I don’t understand the question. Do you want me to show how I would cross the river?
|
|
azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
|
Post by azranger on Apr 1, 2021 17:32:20 GMT
My current belief is that the battalion moved in two groups supporting each other. E,F moved toward Ford Ds and CIL moved further down BRE toward the highway. Custer was met immediately by the Cheyennes who were getting their horses across the river from the Big Village and on the same side as Custer was moving toward the Fords.
CIL moved down at least as far as the known site and I believe further. They were engaged by a returning hunting party coming from the Hardin direction.
I believe the Sgt Major and a trooper were sent to contact Gibbons and Terry. He didn't make it very far which I believe was due to the returning hunting party.
The retrograde began and at least 4 companies would have been on LSH for a short period of time. E is holding the advancing Cheyennes and F is with Custer on LSH. C.I,L continues toward Calhoun Hill. I believe C than was in lead moving toward the crossing place out of range of the village and fairly open where the carbine would have an advantage.
I believe E was pushed off Cemetery Ridge and moved into Cemetery Ravine and then crossed into Deep Ravine. I believe they were attempting to go back the way they came (I know I am in a subset of theories) but they went to far west down DR and ended up in the "Deep Gully" in Deep Ravine. Game over Sioux came across the travel corridor and Cheyennes came up from the river and across Cemetery Ridge.
Regards
Steve
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Apr 1, 2021 18:35:28 GMT
What I do not understand is why so many, including you Steve, seem to stick to these same combination of companies E/F --- C/I/L. What is the evidence for this? I see absolutely none. What I do see is people clinging to the old "Conventional" wisdom, that while it is certainly conventional, does not require it to be wise.
There is absolutely nothing that says that E, for instance, must be joined at the hip with F. In fact the final disposition of these two companies gives one a better argument that they were not. If you believe they were in spite of what I have said, so be it, but then you must explain to me why these two companies E and F were evidently not using the dragoon doctrine of the day, covering one another, mounted and dismounted as evidenced by their final position six hundred or more yards apart.
If C, I, and L were also joined at the hip, why did not all three of those companies depart at the same time?. They must have had ready access to their mounts, even though some of them might have been dismounted for a time. Three mounted companies do not require any covering. Being already mounted jump starts their withdrawal, therefore, no reason for not departing together.
Would you send your Sergeant Major Steve? I sure as hell would not. He is too valuable in the fight. There is absolutely no evidence to support your theory that Sharrow was sent, or anyone was sent, or that hunting party was even at a place where they could make any difference in the matter, assuming they existed at all.
Old wives tales, are just what most people think old wives tales are, old for sure, told by people who really can't or won't think for themselves.
|
|
|
Post by deadwoodgultch on Apr 1, 2021 20:42:27 GMT
Several things here, Mike, Steve and I met an Army retired crew chief at the Seventh Ranch in 2019, but I believe the closest copter jocks are in Rapid City SD. Local rental would be costly. The Rapid group gave me a wild ride up a river valley to MT. Rushmore.
I think the Ford D location slid further north and west than you have it.
Also C,I,&L were attempting to open a corridor south for the entire command.
IMHO as Steve said F was with HQ and E was acting as a rear guard, they were walking their blown horses up the hill the Cemetery from the flats. During this movement they lost the majority of their mounts and were pushed from the cemetery area towards Deep Ravine.
And, lastly I think Sharrow would have been an excellent choice to send towards Terry/Gibbon.He was tough,experienced, and more likely to get through than lesser troops and if that's the case he would not have been alone. Witness other northern body placements. Besides, George knew he had blown it by not sending Herendeen through Tullocks. By the way speaking of Tullocks, if there had been no hunting party in Tullocks how did the arrowed buffalo that Terry's scouts find that was fresh killed get there?
Regards, Tom
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Apr 1, 2021 22:18:31 GMT
If you are going to send someone for help, would it not be prudent to send someone in the direction where you KNOW help MIGHT be obtained, and that was certainly CLOSER to your position, than sending someone northward to a place unknown at a distance unknown on a wish and a promise?
A buffalo in Tullock's Creek stuck full of arrows does not mean a thing, with regards to your theory of a hunting party, unless you can provide for us the time the buffalo was killed. Absent that, all you have is a dead buffalo, which scared the living hell, supposedly, out of a bunch of Terry's Indian " Pseudo scouts" that were not worth the powder to blow them to hell evidently. You must tie the dead buffalo and one specific hunting party together somehow, and you can't do that. All you can say for certain is that someone with a bow and arrow killed a buffalo in Tullock's Creek.
You think McGuire was wrong in where he placed Ford D. Who made the map, and located the ford, you or McGuire? McGuire places Ford D exactly where it was, at the place where the old stage road crossed the river. There may well be a ford where you think it is, more north and west, but that is not Ford D, and in this instance having made the map McGuire is the final authority on where Ford D is located. Now if you think there was a ford more north and west of the known location of ford D, it may be of comfort to you to know that I do think there was a ford there too. What I do not know is if that was the place Custer was heading to. What I do know is that would be the place I would have headed to to cross the river, even though I would have had to expose my flank for a short time to get there. Frankly it is a much better place to cross if tactical maneuver against the known location of the Indian village is what you have in mind. In short you have no say where Ford D is. What you do have a say in is that there was another ford further north and west, that McGuire was not aware of presumably. Why should he be? He did not even have any indication that there was action anywhere in that area at the time he was on the battlefield. Noting Ford D on his map was probably nothing more than a reference point to him showing where Terry crossed a day after the battle concluded.
With regard to C/I/L: Unless they all left together, which has undisputed evidence showing they did not, only the lead company was attempting to open an avenue southward, with two others in trail behind the lead, with some time interval in between each of them.
You have no evidence that Company E was acting as a rear guard, or was intended to act as a rear guard. What you do have evidence of is that Company E was at some point separated from the main body of the battalion. That's all you have evidence of regarding Company E. You do not know when a separation occurred, and moreover you do not know why it occurred, although some good solid guesses of what could have been the reason, have filled the pages of this forum for several years.
If anyone was to act as a rear guard as far as intent goes, it was most likely Company F, but that would mitigate against them operating in conjunction with Company E, by violation of doctrinal distance factors alone. It is highly likely that at least three, and possibly four, companies were skirmishing on Battle Ridge Extension. As they skirmished they continued to back themselves up toward the LSH area. If that is the case then finding the headquarters and Company F being fixed there is quite logical. Having three or four companies skirmishing on BRE also fits better with an attempt to cross at the unnamed ford you favor north and west of Ford D.
|
|