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Post by Deleted on Apr 1, 2021 22:25:58 GMT
Would the idea of a practical withdrawal actually be on Custer's mind when he headed down off the high ground to the ford d flats? Attack would be his priority at this point. Listening to what the ex-military say, these companies would not be lined up side by side, so for Custer to initiate a tactical withdrawal by bounds would be difficult to do if under pressure and I don't know if Mac will back me up here, but didn't the Cheyenne say that they crossed the river to engage the soldiers? If so then they shifted the balance some what and forced Custer to move back. The only real pause the companies would have to put in Custer's orders to fall back in stages or bounds, would I guess be done around BRE and cemetery. Didn't the Indians say such a pause took place? I thought the whole premise of this North to South flow was something made Custer change his mind about fording there and he decided to go back to LSH/BRE area. However, Map 0: Suppress the Far side. Bring 2 more companies up, move C company into position to cross. Map -1: Seize the far side with C CO. Map -2: Reinforce/Clear the far side. Map -3: Expand Continue movement by bounds forward. Attachments:
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Post by Deleted on Apr 1, 2021 22:26:39 GMT
The last two steps. Attachments:
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Post by Deleted on Apr 1, 2021 22:28:14 GMT
What I do not understand is why so many, including you Steve, seem to stick to these same combination of companies E/F --- C/I/L. What is the evidence for this? I see absolutely none. What I do see is people clinging to the old "Conventional" wisdom, that while it is certainly conventional, does not require it to be wise. There is absolutely nothing that says that E, for instance, must be joined at the hip with F. In fact the final disposition of these two companies gives one a better argument that they were not. If you believe they were in spite of what I have said, so be it, but then you must explain to me why these two companies E and F were evidently not using the dragoon doctrine of the day, covering one another, mounted and dismounted as evidenced by their final position six hundred or more yards apart. If C, I, and L were also joined at the hip, why did not all three of those companies depart at the same time?. They must have had ready access to their mounts, even though some of them might have been dismounted for a time. Three mounted companies do not require any covering. Being already mounted jump starts their withdrawal, therefore, no reason for not departing together. Would you send your Sergeant Major Steve? I sure as hell would not. He is too valuable in the fight. There is absolutely no evidence to support your theory that Sharrow was sent, or anyone was sent, or that hunting party was even at a place where they could make any difference in the matter, assuming they existed at all. Old wives tales, are just what most people think old wives tales are, old for sure, told by people who really can't or won't think for themselves. I probably should have left company designations off the diagram. It actually just confuses the issue. Bad staff work on my part.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 1, 2021 22:35:50 GMT
Several things here, Mike, Steve and I met an Army retired crew chief at the Seventh Ranch in 2019, but I believe the closest copter jocks are in Rapid City SD. Local rental would be costly. The Rapid group gave me a wild ride up a river valley to MT. Rushmore. I think the Ford D location slid further north and west than you have it. Also C,I,&L were attempting to open a corridor south for the entire command. IMHO as Steve said F was with HQ and E was acting as a rear guard, they were walking their blown horses up the hill the Cemetery from the flats. During this movement they lost the majority of their mounts and were pushed from the cemetery area towards Deep Ravine. And, lastly I think Sharrow would have been an excellent choice to send towards Terry/Gibbon.He was tough,experienced, and more likely to get through than lesser troops and if that's the case he would not have been alone. Witness other northern body placements. Besides, George knew he had blown it by not sending Herendeen through Tullocks. By the way speaking of Tullocks, if there had been no hunting party in Tullocks how did the arrowed buffalo that Terry's scouts find that was fresh killed get there? Regards, Tom Tom Helicopter ride. Rats. And no drones. Not that I own or intend to own any. I can live with the Center of the ford's mass as you suggest. The map tells me I could probably ford along the whol bank of the intermittant streams. Being there might be different. South, back toward LSH or South toward the village. My technique, stolen from Rommel's infantry battles was to mass as much crap is clear the near side and suppress the far side with as much stuff as I could get to shoot over the water obstacle. Then I would put a force as small as a squad or even a single fire team across, followed by the squad (-) or platoon (-), then I'd push my other two platoons across as fast as I could. After that, I'd expect the BN CDR to follow with the rest as fast as he could while I cleared the far side and pushed out so the crossing was out of direct fire range. This is a thought experiment on my part. I can send you the power point and you can move the icons around as he desire to illustrate how you would do it. In slide 1, I am set up so I can pull E and F under cover of I and L. But the point here isn't the letters, its two up with three supporting. I can either bring up the three or pull out the two with little effort on my part. Of cousre, I am not Custer, I'm an armored cavalryman, not a horsed cavalryman, and I'm heavy cavalry/armor and not motorized/light infantry. I don't know that Chuck would do it the same way I did and his way, whatever it is might even be better.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 1, 2021 22:45:45 GMT
Not really. I believe you stated from the outset that they were conjectural.
As I stated in my post to Tom, I do favor the idea of attempting a crossing at the unnamed ford, which as we have spoken about Tom locates west of the Sage Motel at that point in the river. In conjunction with that I do not rule out Company E approaching the river on a different avenue of approach, possibly down the spine or finger of high ground that directly connects LSH with Cemetery Ridge. That route would generally follow the walking path and park road between the LSH monument and the visitors center. From there over Cemetery Ridge and directly down to the water, which puts E at the river just below the former location of the Kellogg marker. You can see where that marker was on the McElfresh Map. That makes all sorts of sense I think in that E's presence there, and presumably continuing around the river as it bends toward Ford D would flush out any hostiles waiting to enfilade the flank of the main body, and especially so if the main body intended to cross where Tom thinks at the unnamed ford.
That could also be the reason Company E was isolated later.
What Chuck would do is hit them where they ain't, and I believe it was another cavalryman with excellent tactical instincts, but otherwise in ill repute, that I learned that tasty little tidbit from. In this instance "where they ain't" (as far as we know) was at the unnamed ford.
WHAT I FIRMLY BELIEVE: Custer had no intention of losing this battle, and to win it, knowing he was outnumbered required that he use every trick in the book, tactically, and by technique, that it would take to win. He was not going to "do stupid". He already had, but he had no way of knowing that at the time, and in doing stupid, he was doing nothing more than using a tactic, the envelopment, that is specifically designed to unhinge and disjoint a superior in numbers adversary. As far as his small unit maneuver, removing it from his large unit operational mistake for a moment, he was going to array his force in such a manner as to provide for as much stealth and surprise as possible under the circumstances while keeping his eye closely focused on flank security. What amazes me is that he, in that regard, was operating in 1876 in an almost identical manner as the three combat commands of 4th Armored Division on the roads to Bastogne in December 1944. In his case speed, as it was for 4th Armored, provides a stealth factor. For Custer the flats in the highway interchange area, was his Chaumont, Warnach, and Bigonville.
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mac
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Post by mac on Apr 2, 2021 5:57:12 GMT
The point of my earlier question was that we are focussed on how Custer might cross the river when he decided not to cross the river. If he did cross, it seems to me that he would be putting himself into the valley with the village ahead of him and all the warriors that have already moved along the west side of the river past his right flank plus anyone (eg Hardin hunters) coming in from the north, east, behind him. I think that realization, on Custer's part, was why he opted to withdraw.
QC said "I do not rule out Company E approaching the river on a different avenue of approach, possibly down the spine or finger of high ground that directly connects LSH with Cemetery Ridge. That route would generally follow the walking path and park road between the LSH monument and the visitors center. From there over Cemetery Ridge and directly down to the water, which puts E at the river just below the former location of the Kellogg marker. You can see where that marker was on the McElfresh Map. That makes all sorts of sense I think in that E's presence there, and presumably continuing around the river as it bends toward Ford D would flush out any hostiles waiting to enfilade the flank of the main body, and especially so if the main body intended to cross where Tom thinks at the unnamed ford.
That could also be the reason Company E was isolated later."
I agree with this. I also do not see E and F operating as a tandem.
Cheers
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Post by Deleted on Apr 2, 2021 6:15:57 GMT
mac I wasn't focused on what he might have done after he crossed the river, I'm focused on why he ended up the way he did, all strung out over Battle Ridge to LSH to the draws. Once he decided to head back to what became the National Battlefield area, why didn't he huddle up and mass? He didn't have enough troops to defend the way quincannon favors by controlling BRE and Battle Ridge, among other areas. Maybe he was just focused on being offensive or perhaps he was attempting to execute a breakout? Oh well. There is more to learn and speculation is not fruitful in this matter.
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 2, 2021 10:27:56 GMT
It is hard to try and visualize just what Custer may have been caught up in when he reached, what he thought was his place of crossing. The area may have looked rather tame from BRE, but up close the area may have been a death trap, which he didn’t realize until he got up close.
When arrived, I would guess that he was on the flats with the river on his left, now rivers are usually lined with brush and scrub and even timber, aka Reno, so my guess is that he left flank was lined with heavy brush. Now according to accounts, the Cheyenne’s were waiting in the benches, which I guess is another name for this scrub/river area, so he had enemy in soft cover on his flank and the strength of this enemy was unknown, so this to a cavalry detachment would be a major issue as trying to neutralize these shooters would take all of their combat power, thus making their mission null and void, plus we now have told about the band moving back from the Harding route which would be on his right flank and of course we have Wolftooth kicking up maybe to his rear.
The accounts also mention Indians throwing caution to the wind and launching attacks on the column, so practically breaking cover and taking the fight to the soldiers on the flats.
Now I don’t know if any of you would think about turning around at this point, but in my mind this area is a death trap bordering on another Stalingrad as Custer could either pull back or dismount and fight a pitched battle with limited men and ammo.
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 2, 2021 10:39:02 GMT
Mike here is another portion of the map I uploaded earlier. Chuck, is this the area on the McElfresh Map. Beth, I am sorry to load these images up, but I tried one of the other routes and it left my desk top open to all and sundry.
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 2, 2021 11:25:32 GMT
One thing I forgot to add, if they did leave I,C & L on BRE and E, F & RHQ where forced to retire, then wouldn't it be the job of those on BRE, to cover any withdrawal?.
If this was the case, then why would the covering force be the first to move back south. I would guess that E & F and others be first to go south and one or two companies from the cover force provide "cover"!!!
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Apr 2, 2021 12:21:52 GMT
Ian, the benches are virtually naked,save for sage,Buffalo grass, and the like. They are raised ground, 100 to 200 feet above the river,generally a half to three quarters of a mile west. This may vary, south to north. This is where the scouts saw the worms moving(the pony herd).
Regards, Tom
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 2, 2021 12:52:27 GMT
Hi Tom, how are you.
Maybe this could be another direction which Custer received fire, so we have the river line, the benches, the group from Hardin and WT.
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Post by Deleted on Apr 2, 2021 13:51:13 GMT
One thing I forgot to add, if they did leave I,C & L on BRE and E, F & RHQ where forced to retire, then wouldn't it be the job of those on BRE, to cover any withdrawal?. If this was the case, then why would the covering force be the first to move back south. I would guess that E & F and others be first to go south and one or two companies from the cover force provide "cover"!!! In defensive cover, the covering force at some point expects to pass THROUGH the main body usually based on time or distance. A covering force may initially operate outside of supporting distance from the main body and is reinforced with extra combat power to do assist mission accomplishment until such time as it comes close enough to be supported by the main body. This is usually based on distance, time, or an event such as penetration of the covering force zone. Defensive cover is similar to delay or mobile defense. In offensive cover or in Reconnaissance operations, the covering force at some point expects the MAINT BODY to pass through the covering force after it has destroyed the enemy security zone, identified the enemy main body, and/or identified gaps or made penetrations into the enemy zone. Advance Guard is similar to zone reconnaissance or movement to contact. Cover is executed differently from Breakout which involves leaving a force behind which may not be able to join with the main body.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 2, 2021 15:38:10 GMT
Mike: You asked earlier my preferred method of conducting a river crossing. Given my druthers I would just as soon never cross a river. No one ever gets their druthers though, so to answer your question my preferred method would be the use of the 'Spitz".
During the ACW though the preferred method, based on all I have read of the Virginia Campaigns where crossing a river under fire was almost an everyday chore for cavalry, the preferred method was the "bullrush". Envision John Riggins run near the end of Super Bowl XVII against the Dolphins, and that will pretty much put you in the picture..
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Post by Deleted on Apr 2, 2021 15:49:14 GMT
A good method, I'm for that, although my reconnaissance background may handicap me.
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