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Post by quincannon on Aug 12, 2019 17:30:27 GMT
"Silent Victory" by Clay Blair is a piece of essential reading on U S submarines in the Pacific. Blair himself was a submariner on one of the Gato boats, I forget which one, and his book has been around for forty or more years and stands the test of time.
In addition to the torpedo problems our sub's commanders suffered from much the same lack of battle awareness as their brothers in the surface fleet did. In peace time if every mistake you make lands you before a courts martial, chances are you will learn to avoid taking chances and be aggressive in peacetime, and it will carry over into your wartime performance. The old expression applies - Show me a man who has never made a mistake, and I will show you a man who has done nothing. Applying peacetime standards to wartime is a sure fire way to get your sub sunk.
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 12, 2019 19:35:19 GMT
There is thread on another military forum about the fighting on Iwo Jima and the tactics employed by Kuribayashi Tadamichi. Apparently, he forbade his troops from committing gyokusai and ordered them to fight to death instead. Kuribayashi, knew he couldn’t win this battle, so he wanted to inflict Americans casualties as possible, so to do this he wanted his troops to carry on fighting to the end. This is why he allowed the initial landings to move inland before attacking them, apparently doing this puts both sides on an equal footing, so the battle would be on of attrition. He knew that if they met the Americans on the beach, then he would not have the men or material to halt the landings and would lose a lot of troops in the trying. Here is a breakdown of the US casualty figures for Iwo Jima;
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dave
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Post by dave on Aug 12, 2019 22:35:57 GMT
Blair served on the USS Guardfish (SS 217) a Gato class boat. QC was quite correct about the inefficiency of the pre-war sub skippers who had been trained to conduct all torpedo attacks deeply submerged using sonar and not the periscope.
Mac if you ever run across a copy of Theodore Roscoe’s Submarine Operations be sure and get it as it is a jewel of information about sub operations overall as well as individual boats. Great photos as well. QC do you have a copy?
Full Fathom Five a Victory at Sea episode is really good Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Aug 12, 2019 23:48:52 GMT
Yes, I have both of Rosecoe's books, The other covers destroyer operations in World War II and is equally as good.
Speaking of WWII, my package arrived from Japan on Saturday, so you may expect a package to be off in your direction by the end of the week, probably Thursday as I have to go to Carson, and pass the UPS store on my way. Best Panzer book of all time in my view is included.. Did not know I had two copies but I did.
Back to submarine operations. We had 26 or so boats in the Philippines in December of 41. Most of the were new boats of the Salmon and Sargo Class. There were also a few old submarines of the S Class (unnamed). None of them did a damned thing as far as stopping the Japanese landing attempts on Luzon. We lost Sealion in the first couple of days of the war. She was tied up at Cavite doing a limited overhaul. To be fare the bombing that got Sealion destroyed our torpedo stocks and repair facilities, but the main reason for our failure was timid captains who were afraid to risk their boats. In war you take risks, and what Dave describes is the safe way.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 13, 2019 3:42:09 GMT
First off Ian I think it is well to remember that there were few if any equals to the Japanese Army in organizing a defense. They were masters at interlocking firing positions, and there was little any means of supporting fires including naval gunnery and airstrikes, that could unhinge one of their prepared positions. That means it is up close and personal if you have any hope of breaking up one of their defensive sectors.
What the did at Iwo Jima, and what they did again at Okinawa a month later was look at the factors of METT-TC, and decide that they did not have to put up a stubborn defense at the waters edge. Iwo and Okinawa were relatively large islands, when you compare them to the Central Pacific atolls like Tarawa. At the latter place, they did not have much room so they had to get down to the waters edge and contest every bit of ground. On Iwo they had plenty of room to stage a costly positional defense inland. At Okinawa they were also wanting to cause as much delay as possible, because as long as they were fighting, the fleet must stay off shore, which made them vulnerable to the Kamikaze. We took more naval casualties in February thru May of 1945 in the Iwo Jima and Okinawa battles then we did at any other battle of the war. Lost more ships too, with a huge additional number damaged.
At both Iwo and Okinawa, moving inland and defending, was just good tactics used by some smart guys.
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mac
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Post by mac on Aug 14, 2019 4:11:46 GMT
Thanks for that information Dave
Cheers
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dave
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Post by dave on Aug 14, 2019 16:06:53 GMT
The Japanese during WW II twisted the Bushido Code and used it to force their own troops into inhumane monsters treating POWs as well as using peer pressure to force their own military members to commit suicide or die attacking the Allies in suicidal charges and kamikaze attacks. This only my personal opinion. The same thing has happened in our modern world with the bastardized version of Islam. Wahhabism, exported from Saudi Arabia, has caused the deaths of thousands upon thousands of deaths while the internecine conflict between the Shia and Sunni Islam has continually created death. Lest we as a Western nation judge others, think of the Crusades, the Inquisition---12th century till the 19th century as well as the establishment of the Anglican Church, American slavery and the treatment and the treatment of Native Americans. The article cited below was an eye-opening reading for me as I realized how the powers to be in Japan prior to WW II have twisted the tenets of Bushido to fit their own needs and sacrificed millions of Japanese, Chinese, natives of Indo-China, Pacific Islands and people of other Allied nations. Regards Dave acelebrationofwomen.org/2017/03/the-bushido-code-the-eight-virtues-of-the-samurai/
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Post by quincannon on Aug 17, 2019 17:37:33 GMT
Dave: If you know any good anthropology students looking for a thesis you might suggest that they study one thing that I have noticed about the Japanese military of the World War II era, particularly the Navy. The Army was more insular, and I don't have a lot of data on them, but in the Navy there were a goodly number of officers who were dead set against dark ages notions of honor, and atonement for their sins of commission and omission by ritualistic suicide. What I have seen over the past I don't know how many years of study is that most of the naval officers that were against such practices were officers who had exposure to western culture to some greater or lesser degree.
That would make an exceptional paper I think.
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dave
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Post by dave on Aug 18, 2019 0:18:24 GMT
QC I believe Yamamoto would be the poster child for your theory! I would suppose that Japan'srtous desperate need for raw materials insured that the Navy would have a prominent role in her rise as a super power. She had to compete with the Royal Navy and the Americans in the number of naval vessels as well as a merchant marine. The navy had to be forward thinking and compete for resources with the army. I don't believe the Imperial Army had the impetus to charge into the 20th century as the navy did because they expected to defend the homeland more than occupying territory through out the Pacific. Regards David
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Post by quincannon on Aug 18, 2019 2:13:00 GMT
For about thirty years prior to Pearl Harbor the Japanese Navy had close contact with the United Kingdom. Their first dreadnought battleship Kongo was built by Vickers Armstrong. The rest of that class, three in number were built in Japan with a lot of technical assistance provided by the Royal Navy and the British shipbuilding industry. The two naval limitations conferences in London and Washington were attended by Japan's brightest and best naval officers. The point of division within the IJN were those that believed the second class status that Japan had coming out of those two conferences were either helpful or harmful. The helpful side of that argument were in general those that had experience in the west, while those that found it harmful were generally the stay at homes.
That argument would be another interesting paper for some budding history doctoral candidate. The helpful side reasoned that while Japan could not build or keep as many battleships at the US and the UK, neither could the US and UK build or keep beyond a certain limit. Of course both the US and UK could outproduce Japan, so while Japan was in an inferior position, neither the US or UK could exploit that inferiority.
You must also remember that the absolutely brilliant airman Genda served in London during the Battle of Britain, and learned an lot about the modern uses of air power from the Royal Air Force.
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Post by herosrest on Feb 4, 2020 20:43:38 GMT
A different take. The Japanese Army had immense force deployed in China, Manchuria and Mongolia before and during the Pacific War and clashed with the USSR. The definitive US campaign of the Pacific War was Tarawa during November 1943 where Japan's defensive perimeter was smashed by growing US might with defeat inevitable at immense cost to US military. Tarawa was the turning point. September 1942 through October 1943 was a war of attrition which blunted Japan's offensive capability. That capability was not intended for further conquest with invasion of Australia and conquest of New Guinea halted at Milne Bay. Fighting Squadron Sixteen (VF-16) F6F Hellcat pilots on board the USS Lexington (CV 16) celebrate after shooting down 17 of 20 Japanese planes heading for Tarawa in November of 1943. The F-6 became operational in September 1943 during strikes against Truk. linkThe Japanese had paused and unleashed Operation I-Go in April '43 and with this blunted they were over extended and without offensive capability in the Pacific. Operation Vengence had taken out Yamamoto. Operation I-Go
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Post by herosrest on Feb 4, 2020 21:47:44 GMT
The above is my take on the broader '42-'45 theatre war. During the first year, it was at Milne Bay under the air umbrella of 8th Fighter Group, that the Japanese were halted and prevented from focusing entirely upon the marines at Guadalcanal. 35th and 36th fighter squadrons fought themselves to a standstill at Port Moresby from April '42 and returned in September to support destruction of the Japanese invasion of Milne Bay.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 4, 2020 22:25:58 GMT
I am not so sure that our views are all that different HR. I disagree that Tarawa was as decisive or a turning point as you do, but we agree that the period between September 42 and Tarawa was the period of attrition necessary to make Tarawa and subsequent battles a success. Reading the narratives though, it was the fact that the Japanese got sucked into Guadalcanal, a fight they did not want, that prevented further aggressive action against Australia, and slowed and ultimately halted their adventures north of there.
I have changed my views somewhat over time, at first separating the Coral Sea and Midway battles which I always considered one campaign, from Guadalcanal. I now believe that Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal should be considered as one campaign, which together stopped further Japanese aggression. Defeat for the US in any one of them would, I believe, have caused the war to last at least a year and a half longer. Yes I did consider the A-Bomb in that last sentence. Having the bomb was one thing, but of absolutely no use until the bases were captured from which we could launch an atomic strike. Tarawa was the beginning of that road to such bases. So from that perspective, if I had to judge both of our opinions from an impartial perch, I could legitimately say that both of us are correct, but from different perspectives.
I once had a "lively" discussion on these boards with Montrose, before he deserted the colors, about the Central Pacific drive which he thought was a blunder, and, I suppose, an example of petty inter-service rivalry. Personally I think he was full of shit, but he is not the only one that has expressed that opinion. Those that do though, including Montrose, have no concept of what it took to defeat Japan, for without that Central Pacific Campaign there would have been no VJ Day for a long time after September 45, While we lost many a man taking those Islands, it would have cost us even more in blood not to have taken them. Next to Nimitz, MacArthur, from a standpoint of strategic thought, was a little boy in pink panties.
I once told Benteen (Dan) who made a vigorous argument about the non-necessity of Peleliu, that my only defense was that if Chester Nimitz thought it should be taken, and he did, that was good enough for me.
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Post by yanmacca on Feb 5, 2020 11:25:29 GMT
The war in the far-east and the Pacific, was one that really relied on air and naval might, not only to fight but to supply, in fact supple and re-enforce was so important that once the allies got their act together, the Japanese could not fight their land war beacuse of allied air and naval power. The result of this is that the Japanese really had no choice but to garrison any countries and islands they controlled and hoped for a miracle.
The result of this is that many of their land forces were totally cut off, well apart from the odd visit by an aircraft or submarine. I suppose that is why the Japs tried in vain to re-enforce some of the small islands with as much heavy ordinance as possible, which we can see on Tarawa, taking Betio as an example, the place looked like one giant bunker, bristling with as much weaponry as they could fit. link
The war on mainland Asia, was different, well different in respect that they could fight a land war, similar to a conventional war, well apart from the jungle and rain forests. The Japanese were still active 1944 and especially in Indian, where the Japanese 15th Army, around 85.000 strong, with three infantry divisions along with a tank regiment, tried to take India, which of course like all their late war attacks, simply couldn’t be sustained, but like always they did have some success early on, but they got stopped after 20 to 30 miles. That campaign, which looking at it on a map, looks rather a small in area miles, cost the Japanese over 50.000 men. So after taking such high losses on mainland Asia and losing control of the sea and air in the Pacific, would leave the Japanese no choice but to try and hold on to what they had, but the failure to keep these places supplied meant that these troops were destined to die.
So taking the Pacific theatre as an example, you could say that battles such as the Coral sea and Midway, did cost the Japanese in ships, aircraft and men, but I would add that the long game of surface ships, submarines and interception aircraft, picking off the smaller supply convoys and even individual aircraft and vessels etc, which these bases needed to maintain their strength, would in the long run ware these garrisons down, Making them vulnerable in a prolonged battle.
So I think that it was a gradual process, rather than one or two large battles.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 5, 2020 17:35:39 GMT
Yes and no. The Japanese Navy, despite their great numbers (initially) of ships and aircraft, actually waged the war in the Pacific on a shoestring. They did not have the fuel, nor did they have the industrial base and logistical infrastructure to wage a prolonged war in the Pacific. Their merchant marine was large, and more than sufficient for normal peacetime affairs, but not nearly large enough to keep their ill gotten gains from eventually dying on the vine. Captain Hara Tamichi in his work "Japanese Destroyer Captain" complains as early as February 1942 that main gun rounds for his Amatsukazi were severely rationed.
Take what I have said, then also realize that armies are structured to fight on large land masses, such as Europe, Africa, and China, and are really handicapped when they are called upon to fight on or hold smaller places like islands. It is not the tactical units, but rather the supporting forces, the Quartermasters, Ordnance, Medical, and to some extent the signal and combat engineer components that are the vulnerabilities of armies in such places. Armies must have all of these resources on land and in immediate proximity to the tactical units to fight well, and the pipeline to the rear must be secure.
Marines on the other hand are designed and structured to fight on land completely supported, by structure from the sea. Take the Guadalcanal Campaign for instance. After September of 42 there was no real and (this is important) sustainable threat to Marine supply lines. The Japanese Navy could interrupt those lines on an incident by incident basis, but could never decisively cut them. Had it been the Americal Division from New Caledonia that was chosen to invade Guadalcanal, instead of the 1st MARDIV. I suspect they would have been quickly thrown back into the sea. It was not the tactical, but the logistics that would have failed them. Later when they came to Guadalcanal, they were plugged into, and largely relied on the Marines logistics. The fact that they came to the Canal buy regimental combat team and not the whole division at once helped immeasurably in this effort.
So now reverse this, and look where the Japanese were able to deploy their army in a manner it was meant to fight, and they did fairly well, while at the same time not so well when tasked to hold out of the way, non-sustainable places.
Ian you are correct that no one big battle, or even one extended campaign can win a war. Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal were not in themselves decisive, but certainly vital. From May of 42 until Santa Cruz we were able to destroy Japanese naval aviation, from which they could never and indeed did not recover. The WHY of them not being able to recover is a different story, best told elsewhere. Without the air, they could not control the sea, and not being able to exert positive control of the sea, meant that there was no hope of a fortified ring around the extent of their newly one empire being sustained.
So yes not one big battle or campaign, but rather the fact of the tactical and operational gains of one campaign leading to success, then greater success, as the war went on.
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