mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Aug 8, 2019 23:50:37 GMT
Always my understanding here that Eichelberger was the man admired by the Australian forces as the leader who created the US successes in New Guinea.
MacArthur and Blamey seemed, to me at least, to have no grasp of the real "on ground" conditions.
Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Aug 9, 2019 0:34:32 GMT
I think you understand it correctly.
The 32nd Red Arrow Infantry Division was in a hell of a mess New Guinea in late 42. MacArthur sent Eichelberger there to get things moving and he did but much too slow for MacArthur. MacArthur moved his headquarters temporarily to Port Moresby, lived in a mansion, never visited the front, or the 32nd, bitched and moaned about how slow it was taking well fortified Japanese positions, incurring high casualties, not to mention the hundreds if not thousands of US troops down with disease, produced a publicity statement that he (MacArthur) was leading from the front, denied Eichelberger the Medal of Honor, for truly heroic conduct in the front lines, carrying a Tommy gun and personally disposing of Japanese snipers to inspire his troops, took all the credit, and sent Eichelberger back to Oz in a training assignment, until such a time as he needed him to pull Mac's fat out of the fire once again.
MacArthur is the worst example of a United States Army officer I can think of along with Holland M. Smith as winning the Marine shit ass of the century award. Both of them should have been shot as cowards.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Aug 10, 2019 11:58:29 GMT
He seems well matched with Blamey, both political operators, here is a quote
Australians of my generation - whose parents fought in the Second World War - grew up with a number of oft-repeated stories that were hardly complimentary to our nation's wartime commander-in-chief. "That bastard Blamey", as he was almost invariably called, was the man who accused some of our men of "running like rabbits" at Kokoda, though he himself was safe in Melbourne at the time. He was the bloke who escaped by plane from Greece taking his son with him and leaving many other people's sons behind to die or be captured. He was the police commissioner in 1930s Melbourne whose badge was found in a brothel. He was the general who dismissed his field commander in New Guinea in 1942 to save his own skin, and who in 1944-45 committed our forces to an "unnecessary war" in Bougainville and Borneo. In short, we heard that Blamey was selfish, corrupt and cowardly, and that we won the war despite Blamey rather than because of him.
The rabbit incident
Blamey addressed the men of the 21st Brigade on a parade ground. The men of the Maroubra Force expected congratulations for their efforts in holding back the Japanese. However, instead of praising them, Blamey told the brigade that they had been "beaten" by inferior forces, and that "no soldier should be afraid to die". "Remember," Blamey was reported as saying, "it's the rabbit who runs who gets shot, not the man holding the gun." There was a wave of murmurs and restlessness among the soldiers. Officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) managed to quiet the soldiers and many later said that Blamey was lucky to escape with his life. Later that day, during a march-past parade, many disobeyed the "eyes right" order. In a later letter to his wife, an enraged Brigadier Potts swore to "fry his [Blamey's] soul in the afterlife" over this incident.
Needless to say Blamey never visited the front and never understood the difficulty of the terrain, or the quality of the Japanese forces involved who had at least initially, a huge numerical advantage.
Maroubra Force (largely new militia units, average age 19, placed in Port Moresby to keep them "out of harms way")
In mid-1942, Major General Basil Morris, commander of New Guinea Force, ordered the 39th Infantry Battalion, which had previously been deployed as a garrison force around Port Moresby, was sent overland via the Kokoda Track to secure the Kokoda area and prepare to defend against a Japanese advance. The Papuan infantry Battalion of about 300 native troops with white officers, was already north of the Owen Stanley Range at the entrance of the Kokoda Track. These units were subsequently grouped together as "Maroubra Force" – named for Operation Maroubra, which was the Allied name for the troops in the "forward area" on the Kokoda Track – formed around the units of Brigadier Selwyn Porter's 30th Brigade, which was made up of part-time Militia soldiers. On 21 July 1942, the Japanese landed on the northeast coast of Papua and the Papuan Infantry Battalion was overwhelmed by the Japanese troops, and the entrance was captured on 29 July 1942.
Bolstered by the arrival of the 53rd Infantry Battalion in early August, Maroubra Force then successfully fought to delay the Japanese advance through the Owen Stanley Range, before being reinforced by Second Australian Imperial Force troops from the 21st Brigade and finally halting the Japanese around Ioribaiwa. The 25th Brigade, later reinforced by the 16th Brigade, then pursued the Japanese north from Ioribaiwa as the Japanese withdrew back to their beachheads at Buna, Gona and Sanananda on the Papuan north coast
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 10, 2019 13:57:47 GMT
Mac, the way orders were given and how they were passed down through the line of command was thus, General MacArthur alerted General Blamey to the threat of a Japanese landing at Buna and were planning to hit Port Moresby via a route through Kokoda. Blamey did issue orders to General Morris, to prevent the Japanese from establishing a foot hold at Buna and control the Kokoda track. Morris didn’t think that the Japanese invasion was a major threat and for this job formed the Maroubra Force.
The Maroubra detachment contained five Infantry companies from the 39th battalion and light recon force named the PIB [Papuan Infantry Battalion] which had 280 PNG men and 20 Australian officers.
Only one company from the 39th [company B] and the PIB actually went forward on the 7th of July, to hold Kokoda, apparently the other four Infantry companies stayed in Port Moresby for extra training.
Morris didn’t consider the threat of the Japanese using the Kokoda track to actually attack Port Moresby by land, instead he thought that the prospect of the Japanese establishing an air base around Buna-Gona a more likely option.
Morris was convinced that the Owen Stanly mountains and the narrowness of the Kokoda track, would put off the Japanese, but to the Japanese, no terrain was impassable. The Kokoda track was too narrow for mechanized forces but the officer commanding whose job it was securing a foot hold between Buna and Kokoda [Colonel Yosuke Yokoyama, advanced guard of the ‘Japanese South Seas Detachment’], simply stripped down his infantry force of 2000 troops and employed 1.200 PGNs as porters to carry his supplies.
The first classes between Yokoyama’s troops and company B + PIB, accured at Awala, about 25 miles up the track. The Australians said that once the Japanese opened up, the PIB went bush [Aussie slang for run off] and company B retired to the Kumusi river, were they blew the bridge.
So, who was to blame for this failure to stop the Japanese before they moved down the Kokoda track, MacArthur’s, Blamey or Morris? I think that Morris should have taken the Japanese threat more seriously as they had shown up till then that terrain did not impede them, so leaving four companies out of the fight and leaving the onus on a single company plus a few locals to hold the Kokoda track was a big mistake.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 10, 2019 15:16:17 GMT
Port Moresby was the finest natural harbor in New Guinea. From there you could base and deploy ships to threaten and cut the San Francisco to Australia supply line, and base aircraft to make life in northern Australia miserable. Moresby had to be held. It was the only place on that miserable island worth the effort of fighting for it.
The first attempt to take Moresby was in May of 42 when the Japanese tried to take it by sea. That was the cause for for the Battle of the Coral Sea, which the Japanese lost. Landing at Buna was their second bite at the apple, and an advance across the Owen Stanley mountains via the Kokoda Trail the only option they had to take Moresby.
The Kokoda Trail was little more than a path for rabbits. Neither side using it could adequately supply itself. The jungle so was thick that you could not maneuver off the trail. Everything need to fight from water, to food, to bullets had to be hand carried. Resupply was almost a complete impossibility. No vehicle could negotiate the terrain.
SO, taking in the factors of METT-TC, Morris made the best decision he could sending one company up the trail to stop the Japanese. Numbers only count at the point of contact so one company was perfectly fine if the Japanese could deploy no more than one company of their 2000. The idea here was to delay, not stop. Disease and hunger would stop the Japanese if their advance across the Owen Stanley mountains could be delayed. Amateurs study tactics, and professionals study logistics. The Japanese had absolutely no chance to be successful on the Kokoda Trail. They did not have the means to resupply their troops nor evacuate their wounded, they did not have the capability to resupply by air,and were thus doomed to failure.
Therefore the best option available was to let the Japanese advance as far as they wanted, against minimal but sufficient opposition that caused delay and let the terrain defeat the Japanese. Eventually that is exactly what happened. The Japanese decided to back down the trail, and concentrate on holding Buna.
Actually the Kokoda Trail on New Guinea and the concurrent operations on Guadalcanal (these two places were competing for the same limited resources) brought into full display the fact that the Japanese Army was not prepared for full spectrum combat. They had neither the organization, training, or resources to compete on an equal footing with the Allied forces of the U S and Australia.
I fully believe that it is wrong headed to look at only one place or one or two factors when you discuss war in general or in particular. War itself is two warehouses that from which must be constructed an interrelated mosaic of combat. The side that has the proper pieces available in his warehouse to construct the mosaic faster, better, and with more pieces wins. It is never a chess match, what it is mostly described as, where both sides start off even, and skill determines the outcome. The warehouse is training, attitude, leadership, skill, production, reach, technical achievement, and sometimes pure dumb luck.
The Kokoda Trail was actually more important to Australia in real terms, than the Australians who fought but held Tobruk. One of the finest hours of the boys from Oz.
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 10, 2019 18:47:22 GMT
The Australian troops involved were titled as AMFs [Australian Military Forces], and in the case of the 39th infantry battalion, these were CMF troops [Citizen Military Forces] which was basically a militia unit, the 39th were volunteers from Victoria, the regular Australian soldiers called these men ‘Chocos’’ [Chocolate Soldiers].
The Japanese facing them were well trained troops plus the main body which followed up to take Port Moresby was the seasoned 41st Infantry Regiment who had fought in the Malaya campaign. At the start of the battle, the 39th Battalion had 1500 men, by the end it was down to 185.
Chuck, the line ‘Amateurs study tactics, and professionals study logistics’ is obvious to anyone with a brain, even rank armatures should know that you can only last as long as your logistics.
But having said that, the supposedly greatest General ever [Napoleon], counted on his army foraging for food whilst on campaign, Rommel too counted on captured British supplies to keep his advance going.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 10, 2019 21:39:15 GMT
Well then if anyone with half a brain knows that logistics are of vital importance and that you cannot even think rationally about waging war, operations, or battle without robust, dynamic, logistics behind you before you attempt such a venture, why do so many armies do it and fail each and every time.
Napoleon and Rommel did what they did because their logistical tails failed them. In Rommel's case, the British had a much longer route and harder time supplying Eighth Army than the Germans did, yet Eighth Army was well supplied and the Afrika Korps was always eating someone else's scraps. What happened to Napoleon in Russia when he outran his logistics, and what happened to the Afrika Korps?
Anyone with half a brain could have delayed the Japanese on the Kokoda Trail. Numbers meant nothing. Experience meant nothing, The terrain beat the Japanese, with the help of the Australians. The more numbers you have the more meals they consume, the more water they drink, the more ammunition they expend needlessly. You can't eat experience, nor drink it, or use it to shoot with. Logistics with the Japanese was always their Achilles Heel, and once you learn that as we did by April or May of 42, we knew how to beat them.
You cannot count victory by bean counting who took more casualties. You determine the victory by objectives obtained. Did the Japanese take Port Moresby? No. Did the Japanese retreat back down the Kokoda Trail? Yes. Who won? Australia.
Ian you cannot look at units as if they are inanimate cardboard counters that you move around a board of battle space. Military units are living breathing things that must be equipped, fed, and attended medically. I know of units that were defeated not by the enemy, but rather by the lack of water purification tablets or means, and who were too sick to fight. The Japanese who eventually got off of Guadalcanal, had to be resupplied with nothing more than food from December 42 to January 43 so that they could be restored to a minimum of health so that they would just barely have enough strength to get aboard ships sent to save them. Other Japanese soldiers in the offensive that you provided the maps for earlier, literally went out of their minds with hunger. Others in several places resorted to canabalism to sustain life. At other times they would mindlessly charge to their deaths, which they preferred to starving. The Japanese Army organized and trained for combat on the Asian Continent and was not equipped mentally, physically, or by organization and training for combat on Pacific Islands where every thing they required must come by water, through hostile seas. They damned near lost on Bataan for all these reasons and would have if MacArthur had done what he was supposed to. Considering Bataan was a "gimmy" , that last statement is really saying something about Japan's ability to sustain combat power.
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dave
Brigadier General
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Post by dave on Aug 10, 2019 23:37:44 GMT
The American submarine campaign drove Japan to defeat by eliminating food supplies, fuel and other resources. Thankfully Japan failed to develop sonar and anti-sub tactics till it was too late Regards David
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Aug 11, 2019 9:54:19 GMT
Thanks for those details Ian! QC you are absolutely correct on the logistics front and throw malaria into the mix. Dave I would love to hear more on the American submarine campaign. Another quote In recent years, walking the Kokoda track has become popular with Australians who wish to share the hardships of the original soldiers, and to pay tribute to their dedication and endurance. Today, without the obstacles of wartime, and with a professional guide, it takes about eight days to walk the Kokoda track. Even under ideal conditions, the walk is strenuous and a number of modern walkers have died on the track. For the record I did it in 1975 and it was a 3 foot wide track through jungle where leaving the track meant risking not finding it again, nothing is changed as far as I know. Unbelievably steep. No guide, got lost, helped very generously by the locals bless them. I did not die. Got malaria but was medicated and so it was not problematic beyond feeling unwell. I cannot imagine the difficulty of doing it under fire!! Neither could Dugout Doug or Blamey I suspect. Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 11, 2019 11:41:24 GMT
No problem Mac, you must have been crazy walking the Kokoda trail! Even the Sullivan’s wouldn’t have been brave enough to attempt it.
Chuck, I wish I could write that post again because my point was lost in translation, which results as always in me looking like a someone who has no idea about military history. I started by praising the 39th battalion and their toughness and guts which seem to be in all Australian soldiers. The second part was about how these so called military geniuses like Napoleon, waged campaigns with no real supply system, but that seemed to be the order of the day, mainly because a lot of the European campaigns were fought in mainland Europe and probably in summer, which shows how Boney got it horribly in Russia. I suppose that if we look at the 1812 campaign, we can see how ambitious this plan was not only in the distances involved, but taking into contention just how strong the Russian army was. The Russian Artillery and Cavalry were some of the best in the world. So, Napoleon made a grave error and this goes against him as the military genius stakes. In WW2, we were facing two of the most stubborn regimes ever in Germany and Japan, Hitler was warned by his military advisers and Generals, about invading Russia, but they did it and paid the price. The Japanese are also just as thick, just look at how their troops had to cope with the hardships of island fighting, mainly because of the distances involved and, in an ocean, which suddenly became a death trap to their vessels. Many of their best troops simply faded away for lack of supplies.
The Japanese soldiers and civilians for that matter were led by men who saw the power of the A Bomb, but still refused to surrender, it took a second bomb to bring them to their knees, stupid stubborn bastards, so it was no wonder their army was badly let down.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 11, 2019 16:15:37 GMT
Ian: I keep mentioning the fact that for every 15,000 soldiers in direct combat, it takes 30,000 or more to supply, feed, fuel, take care of their health, and to man the training base. Armies learned that the hard way. It has a direct relationship to LBH the subject we discuss most here. Custer in part lost that battle because he did not have enough specially designated and trained personnel to handle is logistics.
The biggest contribution Napoleon made to the battle field and warfare in general was canned goods, a means to preserve food on the march.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Aug 12, 2019 10:18:56 GMT
2.5-3 to 1 is what we had in support for operations. This very common. This support will not always be unit specific, but certainly theater and command specific. These numbers even go up exponentially when include civilian affiliated components.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Aug 12, 2019 13:11:53 GMT
The most telling commentary on Japan's ability to wage war, as I have related several times here, is Captain Hara's comments that as early as the Battles in the Java Sea in February of 1942 that torpedoes and man gun ammunition was severely rationed in the Japanese Navy. The companion to this is that fuel oil, and aviation gasoline was rationed from the time of the Pearl Harbor attack. You cannot fight a war and hope to win, against the greatest industrial power on earth, if that is the state of your logistics.
That is what happens if you try to go to war on the cheap. That is true if you are talking about Custer, and even more so today. Logistics is what puts the fight in the fighting man, and keeps him in a state to do battle. That is one reason I pay scant attention to the Rini's and Wagner's of this world, along with all of the Custer fanatics who claim everyone but Custer was responsible, that his tactics were fine, that he should have won, but for. The but for was that the 7th Cavalry and the rest of the United States Army was unprepared for war, organizationally and in its doctrine. Whether Custer used good tactics or bad, is immaterial.
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 12, 2019 15:46:00 GMT
What is more unbelievably is that Japan, Germany and even Italy, declared war on the USA at the same time. Why would these three nations act so stupid, well I suppose that Japan had their own reasons mainly to do with pacific region, but Germany and Italy, the German military had just undertaken the biggest campaigns ever experienced by them as a nation when they invaded the USSR, so why take on the another huge country with the might to out number in everything needed to fight a prolonged war. Italy declaring war on Germany was just ludicrous, I mean c’mon they struggled against every country they fought against. I don't think by December 1941, that Mr. Churchill was any closer with his efforts to bring American into the war, I would guess that the German and Italian Americans would be against such a war, in which case either country had no real beef with the states.
The bottom line is that these nations were led by loonies who surrounded themselves by yes men and their armed forces took an awful pasting as a result. In the case of Custer, looking at your basic US Cavalry trooper from that battle, he was armed to deal with an enemy who he thought would run, even the warriors knew that the soldiers were armed with single shot carbines and six shot revolvers, so they adapted their tactics to deal with that threat, mainly letting them firing their carbine then forcing them to use their revolvers, once they fire their six shots the Indians simply closed in with their hatchets and war clubs. The troopers would have been better off armed with sawn off guns and issued with two revolvers, even a lance would frighten the life out of the warriors.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Aug 12, 2019 16:56:50 GMT
Mac I am pleased to share what I know of the US Submarine force's campaign of WW II, though I expect QC to share his knowledge as well. American subs were plagued with defective torpedoes for nearly 2 years till the powers to be corrected the faults such as running deeper than set and exploders that did not. An additional fault, that was not corrected, was a circular run of torpedo which sank at least 2 subs, USS Tullibee and USS Tang with the USS Grunion another possible victim. It is unknown if any other American, Allied, German or Japanese subs suffered circular run fates. The US Submarine Service in conjunction with Allied air power devastated the Japanaese merchant marine, destroying 2,346 merchant ships for over 10.5 million tons in addition to sinking 686 warships. America lost 52 submarines with 1, the R-12 lost in a training accident, and 3,505 men. In cold stark world of mathematics it was a small price for the US to pay. The Australians had 1 sub active in WW II, the HMAS K9, which unfortunately was heavily damaged and used on for training purposes. I have a site for her below* I am listing a few web sites below that will provide more information about the submarines and the war they waged. One site in particular I recommend is On Eternal Patrol, which provides information on each of the boats lost and their crews are listed by name which helps keep their memories alive as shipmates and immediate family members are passing daily. I hope this is of some assistance. Regards David www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/npswapa/extContent/wapa/guides/offensive/sec6.htmmaritime.org/doc/subsinpacific.htmwww.historynet.com/us-torpedo-troubles-during-world-war-ii.htmwww.oneternalpatrol.com/www.bowfin.org/maritime.org/uss-pampanito/*https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMAS_K9
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