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Post by quincannon on Aug 2, 2019 23:33:44 GMT
Mac requested this thread, and I hope you will all join in the discussion
NOTE TO DAVE: Prados in "Combined Fleet Decoded" calls Santa Cruz a clear cut victory for the IJN. Continuing on with our previous discussion, I find that opinion both disappointing and somewhat short sighted.
If you just look at the big hardware balance sheet we lost Hornet and Porter, and moderately heavy damage to Enterprise. The latter stayed around the South Pacific for awhile in a damaged but operational (barely) state, but she required and would get a major refit at the dawn of the coming year. The IJN had two carriers heavily damaged, both required a shipyard repair and refit. So I suppose if you look at the big hardware alone, you could rightly say that the IJN scored a limited tactical victory.
So why do I insist that the IJN lost on the basis of objectives not met. Firstly Task Force 61 was driven from the field. That left everything south of Guadalcanal open for the taking. The IJN was in a position after Santa Cruz to cut the supply lines between our bases to the south and Guadalcanal. No supplies, no troops, no ammunition, no fuel. Had that state been maintained for a week or two, the Lunga Perimeter would have been starved out and ultimately destroyed. The Japanese did not follow up Santa Cruz when they easily could have. So while they beat our carrier forces at sea they did not accomplish the overall mission.
Secondly Japanese Army reinforcements to Guadalcanal were part of the overall Santa Cruz plan. Some did get through but the majority were turned back or destroyed by land based Guadalcanal air power. So the reinforcement mission was also a dud.
Most notably however was the fact that the IJN air groups on Shokaku and Zuikaku were decimated. That was particularly true in attack (dive bomb and torpedo plane) crews. When you add these heavy loses to those suffered at Midway (again attack plane crews bore the brunt) the IJN was literally gutted of all of their experienced airmen, airmen that they could not replace. The IJN never ventured forth again with carriers until Philippine Sea in 44 and again they were destroyed, and this time with relative ease.
So when you apply the two features of the IJN plan not done, and the severe air crew loss, I find it hard to comprehend why anyone would think the IJN won Santa Cruz.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Aug 3, 2019 10:37:39 GMT
A couple of general points. Where/when does the technical superiority of USN aircraft over IJN aircraft become a factor, in addition to personnel considerations?
Is the IJN trapped strategically in between the knowledge of their own problems in replacing assets (carriers) and the appreciation of the need for aggression if they are to win? I fully agree they turned a tactical victory into a strategic loss. Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 3, 2019 11:49:19 GMT
I don’t know how much I could add to this thread, as I have mentioned many times, I have never really studied this theatre, especially from a US Navy aspect.
I will of course, keep tracks on how the posts pan out and add something if I can, but really this theatre is similar to the German expansion in Europe and Russia, in that they both strove all before them during the years between 1939 and 1942, but then started to slow up once the US and USSR, got their act together. After that it became a war of attrition on both Germany and Japan.
The Japanese had made their ambitions against the Chinese and the European colonies from 1937 and certainly where aided by the fact that in Indochina, the Vichy French [Indochina was a French colony] aided them to move right through to Malaya and Hong Kong.
After Pearly Harbor, and the subsequent US build up, the Japanese were in a similar position as the Germans in Russia. The Japanese had to station over a million men in China plus forces facing the British. The expansion out into the pacific and against Australia was too much for them and after their expansion was thwarted at the battle of the coral sea, Midway was the real turning point.
As I said above, after that it was a case of ‘war of attrition’ similar to what was going down in the west with Germany.
I remember reading that, later in the war, any new equipment was saved by the Japanese to defend Japan itself, thus any new armoured vehicles and fighter aircraft, were kept at home to engage enemy bombers and aid the defense of main land Japan, so maybe the allies superiority came from the fact that older Japanese aircraft had to hold their own against better allied fighters. The Japanese may have also kept the best pilots in the home islands too, to man the newer air craft.
The late war Japanese fighters were Ki-84, Ki-61 and NIK2-J, and these three types of fighters or in some cases fighter bombers, were well respected by the allies. It was Ki-84s which caused a lot of damage to US airfields on Okinawa, destroying many planes still on the ground. This was in April 1945 so the Japanese air force still had teeth. But they wasted a lot of experienced pilots in kamikaze attacks and these they couldn't replace.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Aug 3, 2019 15:02:36 GMT
A couple of general points. Where/when does the technical superiority of USN aircraft over IJN aircraft become a factor, in addition to personnel considerations?
Is the IJN trapped strategically in between the knowledge of their own problems in replacing assets (carriers) and the appreciation of the need for aggression if they are to win? I fully agree they turned a tactical victory into a strategic loss. Cheers
Off the cuff here, technical advancements really did not seem to have much impact until midway through 1944. Shear weight of numbers and Nimitz and his ilk tipped the balance of power. By shear weight of numbers I mean the number and quality of our flight schools, all branches and when we unleashed our industrial ability to turn out weapons of war, the Axis could not keep up. One thing in our favor was nobody was bombing our industrial heartland. I might interject here that the F4U A1 Corsair was no rattle trap, introduced in Dec./42. The P-38 Lightning was introduced in 1941, the Japanese hated and feared it. The P-38 proved excellent in gaining air superiority in the Pacific, and was the aircraft flown by American fighter aces Richard Bong, Thomas McGuire, and H. McDonald. For my money it was an early version of the Warthog, and for the time a better fighter. It was called the "Fork Tailed Devil by some. Armament for the P-38 included one 20mm Hispano AN-M2C cannon, and four .50 caliber Browning machine guns all in the nose. In addition, it could carry up to 4,000 pounds of bombs or ten 5 inch rocket (R.P.) projectiles under wing. Ian will recall that it was the primary air protector on D-Day.
You did however ask specifically about the Navy. Many of these were available in 41&42 and numerous variations should be considered. detailandscale.com/digital_books/USN_Marine_Carrier-Based_Aircraft_WWII/US_Navy_Marine_Carrier-Based_Aircraft_WWII.html
Enjoy.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Aug 3, 2019 17:23:41 GMT
The F4F4 Wildcat was an excellent fighter in the hands of a fighter pilot who knew how to use the advantages the aircraft had over the A6M. Both of these aircraft stayed in first line service throughout the war. With the Wildcat production was shifted to General Motors, along with the TBF Avenger and both would become the FM1 and later FM2 and the TBM respectively. Wildcats longevity in front line service is due to the fact that it was smaller than either the Hellcat or Corsair, and that was very good for operation on an escort carrier.
The Japanese did not develop a replacement carrier aircraft for the A6M, and I am not at all sure they even tried, for the A6M was still a very formidable opponent in the right hands. The problem at Philippine Sea was that the right hands were few and far between.
Ian points out that Japanese Army Air Force aircraft were indeed very good. The problem with that though is they were Army, and on day one of anyone's study of the Pacific War they learn that the Japanese Army and the Japanese Navy hated each other more than they hated any of the allies.
As 1942 turned to 1943 the Corsair and Hellcat made their appearance. Both were in every measure superior to the A6M , and the F6F Hellcat was actually aided in development by the close examination of an A6M captured in the Aleutians. The F4U 1, the Birdcage Corsair did not do well in its carrier debut on Bunker Hill. We had yet to learn how to land the damned things aboard carrier. We had to learn how from the Brits and that meant that the Corsair did not enter widespread carrier service until mid 1944. The Marines loved them, and if one were to point to the "one aircraft" that symbolized USMC aviation it would be the Corsair hands down. The F4U1A meantime had replaced the birdcage, and as they say the rest is history. By 1945 the F4U4 was both in the fleet and with the Marines. You would be hard pressed to find a better all around fighter than the F4U4 and that would include both the P38 and P51. The F4U5N was also a formidable protector of the fleet at night, but showed up a little too late for the war. It would be most useful in Korea. It had on board radar, and the advantage of fleet fighter directors that at honed their skills since Coral Sea and Midway. The Corsair was the longest produced piston engine aircraft in U S service as they were still building them in 1953.
The F6F3 made its debut with the Exxex Class carriers in the Spring of 1943. After the "big refit" of Enterprise mentioned above Enterprise carried them too, as did all the light carriers of the Independence Class The F6F3 and its successor the F6F5 were reliable aircraft that could take on the A6M and win, most of the time. The leading Navy ace McCampbell flew the Hellcat exclusively and scored 31 kills over mainly IJN aviators flying the A6M. At the end of the war though when the Navy had to choose which piston engine fighter to keep in service the Corsair was the choice based on its versatility as a fighter, and it relatively heavy ordnance load as a fighter bomber. The Corsair equipped many of the Navy's attack squadrons in the period 1946 to 1956.
I remember as a kid seeing Naval Reserve squadrons of Hellcats, and Marine Reserve squadrons of Corsairs at Naval Air Station Anacostia. When NAS Anacostia moved all flying to Joint Base Andrews they preserved one of their Hellcats and it is still there mounted at the entrance to the Navy/Marine facility on base.
FOR DAVE: Joint Base Bolling/Anacostia during the ACW was the home to Geisboro Point Cavalry Depot.
FOR THOSE WHO DID NOT KNOW: Bolling Air Force Base and Naval Air Station Anacostia were two of the earliest aviation facilities in the US. They were located side by side on land that had been in government hands since the ACW. the Anacostia Flats. Both border on the Potomac and are immediately down river from the Washington Navy Yard. They both shared the same runways, and were jet capable circa 1956, but all flying from both bases stopped about 1957 or so and was moved to Andrews. Both bases are still in use for a variety of other functions, and limited helicopter operations are still conducted there. Aviation junkies would be in Propeller Paradise still though, as all of the old buildings and facilities dating from just after the Wright Brothers are still in place and being used
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Post by quincannon on Aug 3, 2019 20:19:05 GMT
I did forget to mention a notable and indeed unforgivable error by Prados in "Combined Fleet" He states Callahan was the victor at Cape Esperance, when it was actually Norman Scott. Callahan was still Ghormley's chief of staff at the time.
I must disagree with you Ian as to the turning point of the Pacific war. Don't worry, you are in good company, but I strongly dispute Midway as being the turning point of the war. It certainly did help to sink four carriers and a cruiser, but we were still defending, and would continue to do so until the 7th of August 1942, the start of the Guadalcanal Campaign. Were I to pick a date for the Pacific war's true turning point it would be 13 to 15 November 1942, the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, which Dave's father participated in, serving in Portland. After 15 November the Japanese never conducted or even seriously contemplated an offensive maneuver. They were dead men sailing, and the best part is that they knew it if Captain Hara Tamechi is any good judge, and he is.
By the way Hara is important, in three ways in any study of the Pacific war. First he is the only man that was commanding a Japanese destroyer at the beginning of the war to survive the war. Second, he was a student of warfare, and found wisdom in the ancients. Third, maybe most important, he could write, and his narratives are full of detail. I believe deep down he knew the jig was up for the IJN as early as Java Sea in February 42, when he noted that ammunition and torpedoes were already ration restricted.
The mistake the IJN made was strategic. They developed a fleet to attack, and their ships had very little in the way of automatic defensive armament, and of course throughout most of the war did not have radar either. As you read "Shattered Sword" you realize that the IJN never gave much attention to defense. They were a one trick pony of attacking, always attacking as a means of defense. Task force defense, as you again read in "Shattered Sword" was stone age, not much advanced from World War I methods. As mentioned they had no radar to detect. They had no means of fighter direction, and while they did have a really good 5" twin dual purpose gun, but their automatic weapons for close in work were sadly lacking in both numbers and capability. They would remedy the auto weapons AAA later in the war by adding numbers, but there were no qualitative improves worth mentioning.
So put that in your memories and notebooks folks, the war turned on the nights of 13 and 15 November 1942, and Dave's dad was there.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Aug 4, 2019 10:58:42 GMT
They had no means of fighter direction, and while they did have a really good 5" twin dual purpose gun, but their automatic weapons for close in work were sadly lacking in both numbers and capability. They would remedy the auto weapons AAA later in the war by adding numbers, but there were no qualitative improves worth mentioning.
Darn beat me to it, this was going to be my next point.
To take up the one trick pony idea and move to the Lunga Perimeter. The tactical approach here on the ground by the Japanese trying to retake the field looks quite primitive tactically, as a mass and charge approach. Is this correct, and importantly, how could they have done a better job of repulsing or ejecting the US? Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 4, 2019 19:48:37 GMT
Hi Mac, attacking against dug in defenders was hard at the best of times, but the US forces defending Henderson Field, were in trenches with barbed wire and probably mines too. The Americans had a lot of automatic weapons, but I am not sure if the Marines still had their 03 Springfield’s at this time as the M1 Garand was not available in large numbers to the Marine Corps. I am not sure if the Americans held all the high ground. I think the Japanese attacked at night, which is always a bad thing in the jungle. The Japanese attacked at three points, using three detachments, and like the three columns in 1876 [Gibbon, Crook and Terry], they made a lot of errors and probably had no communication with each other, resulting in bad co-ordination. First attack was against Bloody ridge and was led by Lieutenant General Maruyama. Second attack came from the west over the Matanikau river and was led by Major General Sumiyoshi. Third attack was made further upstream across over the Matanikau river and was led by Colonel Oka. Sumiyoshi's force; Five Infantry Battalions (2,900 Men) 1st Independent Tank Company (12 x Type 97 ‘Chi-Ha’ Medium Tanks) Fifteen Type 4 150mm Howitzers Three Type 92 105mm Guns Seven Field Artillery Pieces (probably 75mm Field Guns) Maruyama’s force; 29th Infantry Regiment (Eight or Nine Infantry Battalions - 5,600 Men) 3rd Light Trench Mortar Battalion (80mm Mortars) 6th and 9th Independent Rapid-Fire Gun Battalions (Type 94 37mm Guns) 20th Independent Mountain Artillery (75mm Mtn Guns) Colonel Oka’s force; 214th Infantry Regiment (1200 Men) Here is a map to show the movements;
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Post by quincannon on Aug 4, 2019 21:41:31 GMT
That map and order of battle represents the third attempt to take Henderson Field. In the October attempt portrayed there the Marines still had Springfields. Only the 164th Infantry Regiment of the Americal Division, the first regiment of that division to arrive on Guadalcanal had the M-1 rifle. The Marines had ample opportunity to equip themselves with the M-1 in 41 and 42, but the Marines did not want them, still married to the cult of individual long range marksmanship. Long range marksmanship is useless in the jungle, and the issue is very similar to the single shot carbine at close range that we see at LBH. Once the Marines saw what the M-1 could do in the hands of the 164th they soon changed their minds and re-equipped the Corps before its next major action.
The first thing the Japanese got wrong is that they thought the invasion of Guadalcanal was a large raid, meant mainly to destroy the seaplane base on Tulagi, and tear up a couple of months work on the airfield at Lunga Point. They anticipated an early withdrawal by the Marines. That stayed fixed in their minds for at least a month and maybe more,and as such their first two attempts to retake Henderson, was more along the lines of destroying small forces of Marines that were hanging way out on a limb. They never understood that the Navy had put a full reinforced Marine Division ashore on Guadalcanal and Tulagi, Marines that meant to stay there.
By October they knew it was not a raid, but rather a full scale invasion. Problem was though that the IJN had never prepared itself for amphibious warfare to any degree. Their methods were not far removed from Nelson's day. Transports were vulnerable to Marine and Navy air power, and there were a hell of a lot of men and the ships that carried them that littered the bottom of "The Slot" from the Shortlands to Iron Bottom Sound. The most effective means the IJN had was in the destroyer transports of the Tokyo Express. They would linger out of range of attacks launched from Henederson Field, wait until dark, move in and land their troop loads up around Cape Esperance (Just off the left side of Ian's map), and get out and away before dawn. Trouble is that while the IJN DD"s could carry either troops (about 200-250) or a few tons of supplies, they could not carry heavy equipment (see my later remarks) or did they have an efficient way to get their cargo ashore.
The inability to get heavy equipment ashore, or when the IJN got very lucky, not nearly enough heavy equipment, meant that the Japanese could not build roads in the jungle, and no roads meant they could not move their supplies inland and to safety. No roads also meant that they could not move artillery into good positions, and could not supply them with anywhere near what the artillery pieces needed in the way of ammunition so that they would present a credible threat. For instance there are multiple reports in the Japanese records and narratives that the average artillery battery was limited to between ten and twenty rounds per day, not per-gun, but for the entire battery. That amount is not even enough for random H and I fires.
I will speak more about this later in this thread. The bottom line is that the IJN and the IJA was not equipped for full spectrum warfare. Right now I am going to eat a cool dinner on a very hot day here in the high desert, then watch Father Brown, followed by Aurora Teagarden on Hallmark. I just love chick flick mysteries, which I know does not do much for my manly image.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Aug 5, 2019 10:48:22 GMT
Thanks for the map and information Ian, we can always rely on you!! You touch exactly on what was bothering me QC. Why, with the forces they had, did they muck around and not act immediately against the US?
It is one thing to be ready to give your life rather than surrender, and quite another to wait and allow the other guy to get ready, then waste your life against his defense.
In regard to bolt action in jungles... my Mother worked in the war in the production of the Owen gun. I have a little experience in jungles and long range marksmanship is not a thing there. What you want is a weapon that is simple, works when wet and dirty, and throws out a volume of bullets. The Owen gun...
More later Cheers
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 5, 2019 11:01:31 GMT
Thanks Mac, I covered the Owen Gun on my website!
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 5, 2019 11:17:52 GMT
I wonder how the Japanese controlled their artillery during this counter attack. Did they have any intel on US positions? I don’t think they could have brought forward any artillery spotters to lay down support fire because even though they had field radios [type 94-6], I don’t think the terrain and the darkness would suit them, plus I don’t think they used them so far forward, but you never know. I would guess that the Japanese attacked like they usually did, with their LMGs and Grenade Dischargers right up in the front line to cover any Infantry charge.
Here is what the Americans thought of their tactics!
The Japanese lay great stress on offensive actions, surprise, and rapidity of movement, with all commanders and staffs operating well forward in order to keep themselves constantly informed of the situation. Their tactical doctrine is based on the principle that a simple plan, carried through with power and determination, coupled with speed of maneuver, will so disrupt the plans of hostile forces that success will ensue. Combat orders, in both attack and defense, from the highest to the lowest unit, generally carry the admonition that the "enemy forces will be annihilated." Surprise is an ever-present element, while the envelopment is the preferred form of attack. Thorough reconnaissance also is taught, and the practice of infiltration is greatly stressed. The Japanese willingness to attack a position with forces which other nations would consider insufficient for the task, is based on the assumption of their so-called military superiority. An explanation of this assumption calls for an analysis of Japanese psychology, national vanity, and past military successes, which is beyond the scope of this study. To the Japanese officer, considerations of "face" and "toughness" are most important, and they are therefore prone to indulgence in "paper" heroics. They have evinced boldness against poorly equipped troops; however, against first-class, well-equipped forces, it may be expected that they will adopt more circumspect methods. Despite the opportunities presented during 6 years of active combat, the Japanese have continued to violate certain fundamental principles of accepted tactics and technique. Their tendency to persist in such violations is based primarily upon their failure to credit the enemy with good judgment and equal military efficiency. Whether or not they have profited by recent experiences remains to be seen.
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Post by quincannon on Aug 5, 2019 15:43:44 GMT
Armies and Navies are direct reflections of the societies they spring from and that supports them. The individual superiority notion is not a product of the Japanese Army or Navy. It is a product of Japanese culture. Therefore to understand the military force you must first understand where they came from.
The Japanese lost Guadalcanal for the very same reason they lost everything else they had gained in the Pacific expansion of 1942. The reason is not an inferiority of personnel, bad tactics, bad hardware, bad leadership, or any of the other "front line" causes one may wish to point to. The reason is logistics. The Japanese having conquered a vast empire, nearly half the size of the Pacific basin, were unable to supply and sustain what they had grabbed. The reason they went to war in the first place is that Japan has virtually no natural resources of their own, and to be viable as a world or regional power, they need these natural resources under their own control. Of course they did go to war to gain these resources spreading themselves eastward to the Gilberts and Marshalls, and southward to the Coral Sea. Their landing forces were almost immediately followed by an army of technicians to place back into production those resources they had just seized.
To secure all this newly gained territory they built a ring of defense to hold it. The typical fortress would contain an airfield to conduct reconnaissance, and project power from. In the minds of the Japanese these centers of resistance would be unsinkable aircraft carriers, that would be the very devil to take, because of the defense in depth they installed on each island fortress. What never entered their minds it seems is - now that we've got how are we going to supply it, so that our defensive ring can be sustained.
Amateurs study tactics. Professionals study logistics. In that respect both the Japanese Army and Navy were rank amateurs
The Japanese did not call Guadalcanal "Starvation Island", or the "Isle of Death" for nothing. More Japanese soldiers died of non combat accident and disease on Guadalcanal than they ever lost in direct combat once that soldier had reached the island. That is why the numbers are so low in Ian's order of battle listed above. It is actually recorded that from December of 42 onward until the final Japanese soldier left Guadalcanal in February of 43, that the Tokyo Express supply runs carried little else but food, in that they had to build up the strength of the individual soldier, so that he was in a minimum state of health to enable him to be evacuated.
When you go to war, look at everything you have in the way of tactics and operational capability. Then look at your means of supply. If the second (supply) is not capable of supporting the first (tactics and operations) it is high time then that you seek a diplomatic solution to what troubles you
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Post by yanmacca on Aug 6, 2019 10:59:06 GMT
Chuck, the supply problem was the same to the Japanses as it was to the Germans. Rommel was not only starved of petrol, but Infantry too and in many cases, by 1942 the Afrika Korps had more weapons then men. The German soldiers called this, ''many weapons, few men''. Supplying troops, even over land in either Russia or China, caught out both the Japanese and Germans, not only were these places lacking roads, in the case of Russia, the train lines were of a different guage.
The Japanese attempt to supply units in the vastness of the Pacific was made worse when the allies started to control the seas. I am the Japanese had to resort to supplying some troops by submarine, which would really restrict your tonnage.
Going back to Guadalcanal, if you notice in my others posts, I mentioned that the Japanese landed three type 92 guns, now these were long range bombardment guns which could fire a 35 pound HE shell up to eleven miles.
I guess the purpose of these guns was to hit Henderson field from long range, probable directed by artillery spotters on high ground. But giving the points we have discussed; I don’t think that the Japanese could supply these guns with enough shells to keep up a sustained barrage. I guess that the Japanese would want to keep moving these guns around because the US Navy and Airforce would be trying to locate them to knock them out.
If the type 92s kept their distance, then I don’t think the US troops on Guadalcanal could hit them. I know that the army and marines landed their 155mm guns on the 2 November and up till then, the Japanese’s held the advantage with their 105mm guns and 150mm howitzers, but I don’t think that they could keep up any bombardment without supplies.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Aug 6, 2019 15:01:54 GMT
Pretty much forgotten are the little boats of WWII, especially how they helped in Europe. Ian reminded me when he mentioned Rommel's supply issues. The Higgins PT boat crews operated their 78-footers in the Mediterranean region and these proved highly effective in managing control of waterways important to the Axis. Supply lines running from southern Europe into northern Africa were critical to Axis success on the African continent and Allied control of these waterways would play just as important a role when the Allies would move to retake th Aleutian Islands ese key strategic areas en route to their final assault on Italy and Germany proper. Primary adversaries in these waters became the German Navy "E-Boot" and "S-Boot" class vessels of similar design scope. Higgins boats were also active on the morning of the Allied D-Day invasion into Northern France. These vessels were used to screen potential German naval presence away from the landing forces and offered due protection to the amphibious operation as a whole.
While in the Pacific the Higgins ELCO brethren did a workman job in the disruption of shipping. The PTs played a role in the Aleutian Islands, Leyte, and through out other engagement. They even yanked Mac out of danger early in the war.
A number of these boats were given via Lend/Lease to both England and Russia.
Regards, Tom
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