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Post by deadwoodgultch on Apr 13, 2019 22:16:31 GMT
I hope we don't tidy up post, this is not a place for correctness by others. If at some point you feel a correction is required insert it. Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Apr 13, 2019 22:28:21 GMT
Look at that second map Ian posted. The notation of Yates and T. Custer commands are what I have mentioned several times before and could never find the map associated with the notation.
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Post by herosrest on Apr 14, 2019 8:11:57 GMT
OK, 1. I link to Captain Sweet’s Battle Report, May 15, 1890 link - Sweet placed the markers for those killed in the valley and on Reno Hill, on Custer's battleground. His report explains how and why he did it. Fundemental battle study. He placed markers for those killed in the valley and Reno Hill on Custer's battleground. Sweet produced a report explaining what he did, how and why. He explained 'his' theory of the Custer fight. When you look at the markers that is what you see - his concept. This is because he had more markers than sites with remains as per his report. 2. R.B. Marshall was employed by US Geo service and made the 1891 map which Ian put up. That is the US Geo map 1891. It includes a chart of the markers as they were several months after Capt. O.J. Sweet's mission to place them. Note there are no markers in the area of the modern or previous park entrances. 3. The copy of Marshall's map which I posted, belonged to Charles Kuhlman and he used it as a scratch pad to develop his theory of the battle. Kuhlman never read Sweet's report and very few researchers of the battle - ever have. It is fundemental to understanding what you see on the ground at the monument. The markers. 4. Charles Kuhlman never saw Sweet's report and criticised Capt. Sweet in the strongest terms. Kulhman was damning of Sweet but we can read what a dilligent work the Captain undertook. He later served in the Philipines as did Patterson Hughes and became hooked up with the prostitution problems there. Interesting guy. To understand Kuhlman, you have to understand Sweet. Kuhlman devised a north south battle flow which began on Cemetery Ridge and Custer's Hill. I am not giving opinion - just outline of Sweet and Kuhlman who based his theory on the markers, knowing there were too many but not why or what Sweet did. Kuhlman did his best, describes a battle blow by blow almost to identifying who died at which markers and he was as mad as a cuckoo. He was nuts. Reference resource The Welch Dakota Papers. Who was Welch? I couldn't resist (this lovely Sunday morning) - Welch's theory of how it might have been.
Eggs? Sunny side up, please. Steak well done. Coffee black. French bread and lots of butter. Salt and no pepper. Will that be at the foxhole or in your tent, Sir!
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 14, 2019 9:55:24 GMT
Good morning HR, half litre mug of white coffee w/no sugar, shredded wheat w/semi-skimmed milk, scrambled eggs and buttered white toast, served on our dining room table please, then a cup of tea at the computer desk.
The Welch link is a cracking link, I am sure Mac will be into those Indian accounts when he returns from his hol's. I am going to go through some myself, but I have to lay six rolls of turf before we have our Sunday dinner, plus the Liverpool v Chelsea match is on, so I have a busy day.
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 14, 2019 10:52:30 GMT
I have an opinion that if any units detached, then it was only one Company which broke off and swept around the left flank, the main column of four [and the HQ] kept to the high ground. I think that to split the main column into two groups of 2 + 3, would be counterproductive, as it gives you two small groups which are not strong enough to deliver a knock out blow, doing this would give Custer one 80 man battalion and one 120 man battalion, which is lob sided to me, as the large battalion of 120 would be the main strike force, better to have a main battalion of 160, which is more practical. So if he did separate his battalion, it is only one Company which leaves the column.
It shows in this clip by Custer Apollo, how peoples theories get carried on through the ages, CA here is a classic example, he does mention that the Indians claim that they saw the grey horses near the ford, which is fair enough, but he then mentions where Custer and F Company stood to watch E scout the ford, how does he know that! This theory is based on the Grey time lines and this clip is brain washing anyone new to the battle from forming their own opinions, CA has obviously read Grey’s book and then made a film on what he read; therefore, Greys ideas live on.
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mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
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Post by mac on Apr 14, 2019 12:02:39 GMT
you are correct Ian, so much "known" about these events is simply hearsay and opinion passed down as fact. This is a very important discussion (I am well short of up to pace with it) and shows that the archaeology, analyzed by experts (QC, Colt et al), actually does tell a story to a high degree of probability. Custer had an interesting journey north for AZ to work on. As I think Colt said this new interpretation as it is developing is another rebuttal of the Ford B excursion. Keep up the good work all! Cheers
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on Apr 14, 2019 12:21:14 GMT
Steve, Looking back at Yan's map with the heavy lines you can see how having part of the force go back down to MTC facilitates the bypass of hostiles that were in the area of the W. Part of Custer's force, if not all 5 companies, went to the W where the cartridge finds are. If all five were at the W when fighting broke out, Custer would not want to get the whole unit bogged down at that point, so he could have sent most of his force back down to MTC for the purpose of bypassing this area of resistance so he could continue on the mission of getting to the north end of the village. From the W, he should have been able to see that the village extended beyond ford B. The unit left at the W was probably ordered to join the main body after dealing with the hostiles at the W. This rejoin point could have been just east of Calhoun hill, as per JSIT's map. Colt
Thanks for your insight regarding cavalry movements.
My side boards are the accounts and if an account is wrong then it must be removed from the side boards. Martin states he was within 600 yards of Medicine Tail Ford when he was sent back. He showed to Benteen that location. Timing wise he could not have moved across MTC and up to Luce. Curley states he saw the Gray Horses split off in MTC. There are two Indians accounts of the Gray Horses also on a separate route. This past summer with my Crow friend we went to where he believes Curley made to observations from and where he moved to see the end. The first location does not have him crossing MTC but able to see MTC the second site is across Highway 212 and quite a distance from the battlefield. Curley lived there near the Old Elks and Grandma Real Bird and his cabin was moved to Wyoming . Curley's account could be wrong but I don't see any benefit to him. Thompson sees fighting near Ford B which puts all three witness accounts consistent with movement down MTC to within 600 yards.
I have no doubt that you can easily ride from NC toward the river. That is part of the Real Bird ride on the return to crossing the LBH.
I am more of a visual learner so maybe I am not seeing this correctly. I agree that there would be visual observation toward the Cheyennes and it is also where they saw Custer coming. So for me they would not go to help the Sioux because they know their families and sacred items were in jeopardy.
Another side board I am using is the Artifact map. If you start the W movement coming up from MTC the north end leads right into the artifacts on NC and that continues toward Deep Coulée and right at Battle Ridge.
When on NC if you turn west you end up going past the Butler Marker and on to where Deep Coulée meets the river and a crossing. When riding toward toward the Calhoun Area and Battle Ridge you ride along the axis of the artifacts. We then ride along the eastern NPS boundary.
I took a picture of the artifacts map. There is a lesser amount of artifacts that branch off toward the river which could be as you suggest.
If I combine the ride with Faron Iron coming out of MTC up to Luce with the ride with Chip Watts toward the CA and BR we pass over both artifact sites and only stopped by the NPS fence from riding along Battle Ridge.
I think this is a great discussion.
Regards
Steve
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Apr 14, 2019 14:56:50 GMT
Steve, Looking at the map you posted supports the idea that the first encounter was at Luce and the W. The maneuver element swinging around near the Butler marker to flank the hostiles by moving up deep coulee also fits, and the finds at NC would be from the firing element at Luce following the hostiles as they pulled off Luce and moved back east/northeast.
Your map is excellent. As you stated, the cartridge finds toward the river could have come from the maneuver element. Custer should have been with the maneuver element, thus he sends Martini back at that point, which would be within the 600 yards he stated.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 14, 2019 17:09:34 GMT
"I have an opinion" Ian
Perhaps this would be a good time to revisit one of the Principles of War OBJECTIVE.
Ian says he would engage with four and maneuver with one. Most everyone is still caught up with that damnable Company E, and those ugly goddamned horses.
Is there anything in the various narratives that say the gray horses were alone? Don't think so. Correct me if I am wrong.
When you decide to maneuver the maneuver becomes your main effort. Main effort for what? To reach your objective - that's what. Most all of you pillory Custer using the conventional scenario of two companies north, saying that he would not attack with two companies, and leave three behind. You, in saying this, have correctly determined that - the going north to the ford was the objective, and the force doing that was the main effort. While you mostly agree that this was silly, those same most are perfectly comfortable with a one company main effort going around through MT Coulee in a flanking effort in furtherance of reaching your objective in the north. You are applying a double standard. Custer going north with two was wrong, but your vision of a one company main effort is right.
The reason I like Colt's come back to me so much is that it possible kills two birds with one stone. He modifies the route I laid out very little, by putting the maneuver element deeper into Deep Coulee, and in so doing has a chance at the daily double. He can either join and continue north as I postulated OR he just might, if he is quick and stays hidden from the Indians to the east he may have a chance to envelop and bag them as a bonus.
You must all put your thinking caps on, as to the WHY someone would do something. Commanders think in terms of CAN and WHY, before the ever put the fine tuning on HOW.
Curley says the gray horses turned left in the coulee (MTC). Maybe Curley, but possibly some one else says the gray horses (E) were in the middle of the column. That could well be in the number two, three, or four position. We can ascertain from that only that Company E was neither leading or trailing. Would it not stand to reason that the companies in trail behind E would also turn left following them? Had it been that Custer wanted to only maneuver in the coulee with one, he would logically look to the trailing company, would he not. I'd bet dimes to donuts that each of you would do that too, thinking that the trail company was the most logical one to choose. You folks are still using OLD THINK, being ground down by one hundred forty years of misinformation and tradition. Try NEW THINK, it is quite refreshing.
I would also add that Steve's various rides over the years, have only shown one thing, that it is possible to ride where he rode. That is valuable knowledge for we must assume the places that were no go to him, would also be no go to those a hundred forty years before. It does not however answer the question of what routes would the tactician use, to further meet his objectives. While telling us where he would not go, it does not tell us all the possibilities of where he could go. Keep in mind here "no go" and "not go" are two different things. It takes more than riding around a piece of ground. It must be done with an eye both toward objective and tactics. When I walk in the park on a Sunday afternoon, it is completely unlike walking down that same park trail when someone may shoot at you around the next bend. You also must consider what is known to be "no go" or best today, would not necessarily be known as "no go" or best in 1876. All tactical maneuvers are filled with a good bit of trial and error even with good maps.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 14, 2019 18:26:41 GMT
HR: Marshall's map. It is an earlier version of the current USGS Map updated in 1967 and now as obsolete as Aunt Mable's Mode T Ford. That is in itself a disgrace, but another matter for another day.
Your posts, if 75 percent of them are unadulterated bull shit, still make the remaining 25 percent pure gold in terms of your ability to research and find this stuff. Tom and I were discussing your abilities which we both stand in awe of just yesterday as he was down by the river fishing and I enduring an April snowstorm. All this leading to.
Did Marshall draw that map and annotate the markers concurrently, or were those markers annotated later and applied by overlay onto a previously printed map sheet?. The Army Map Service uses this technique all the time to produce special maps, For instance a map sheet of say Fort Benning is taken, and a print overlay applied to show such things as ranges and training area boundaries. No markers near the old and new access roads, may be a factor of a time gap between the maps original drawing and printing and an overlay application with updated information being added at a later date. Do you have any insights here?
I ask this because the Kuhlman Map you posted with his notations includes a lot of 20th Century information such as the visitor's center and current cemetery boundaries, none of which were there in 1891. I suppose it would be helpful to determine if there were any intermediate editions of the USGS Map beteen the original publication of 1891 and the last edition published in 1967. Kuhlman would, or could not, have used the 1967 edition.
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 14, 2019 18:35:11 GMT
Chuck, ‘please’ I didn’t say that I personally would keep four and detach one, I would keep everyone together, the reason I came up with scenario is that we have been looking at options and any evidence of two units on two different routes. I mean, why did you ask me to draw two lines on a map, why are posters saying that the larger group fired in support of the smaller group which could have been in MTC.
All was saying is that, if Custer wanted to detach anything, then it would be silly to detach more then one company, because I still firmly believe that he wanted to keep his force together to strike further north, as well as that I also explained that 2 + 3 would dilute his strike power.
Plus, I may add, I just castigated Custer Apollo for suggesting the same thing, the same idea that we have a group at the ford, and group plus the HQ on a hillock to the east, three companies over a mile away, who I may add are of as much use as a chocolate tea pot and a detail sent forward to battle ridge.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 14, 2019 18:58:49 GMT
I don't think you see my point Ian. If you detach one company, one platoon, one squad, one soldier for purposes of maneuver, that element maneuvering becomes your main effort. It is the maneuver now that becomes your thrust line. if not then there is no reason to maneuver.
I ask you to draw two lines on the map to illustrate a division of Custer's battalion, That division presumes that the weaker force would engage Wolf Tooth and the stronger force would maneuver around Wolf Tooth and continue north. It is the stronger force that is the main effort, and as far a separating the battalion goes, for tactical purposes they are not separated as long as the maneuvering main effort keeps a sting attached to the engaging force and can reel them in to rejoin.
Perhaps what you are saying after rereading that second paragraph a couple of times is what you call "detach": is what I am calling the engaged company, to differentiate it from those companies maneuvering.
It is Iron Law that the elements that are maneuvering are the strongest you can muster, they are the main effort, the commander accompanies them, and they by the very fact that they are the main effort means they are heading for the intended objective.
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 14, 2019 19:29:23 GMT
Steve, that map you posted is a better quality than my effort from the same map, you must have shit hot scanner software.
If you look at the W on the map, you will see anotherline of finds on Luce ridge, now these look as if they are from a different group then the ones in the W, maybe more directed to the eastern side of Luce?
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Post by quincannon on Apr 14, 2019 19:48:26 GMT
Why would you think they are from a different group Ian? It is far more likely that they are from the same group that was riding parallel to Wolf Tooth in pursuit.
Maps: Look at the map Ian posted on page three, the one with the annotations as to who was commanding what where, Look also at what it does not say. There is no mention of Company C on FF Ridge. In fact it attributes all those people to being under Calhoun's command. Calhoun's command though does not necessarily mean ONLY Company L, and we know all of the markers depicted in that area were not all Company L. Whoever made those annotations though made no mention of C, but what was his rational.
Red Hawk says three divisions came south along the ridge, and eventually collapsed one upon the other. What if these three divisions were in actuality three groups, separated in the line of march by tens of meters, instead of three company sized units coming the same way at intervals of three or four minutes or more. Then take Company I completely out of this movement, leaving you with one composite company traveling in three smaller parts under the same commander. This may make some sense here for the senior most people identified as being from C were the two sergeants. Harrington may or may not have been there. His body was never identified, and we know the two remaining most prominent member of C were Tom Custer on LSH, and Bobo with Company I.
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 14, 2019 19:59:12 GMT
It all depends on how accurate the identification of bodies on FFR actually are, did they know for sure that they are from C Company? But there again, no one from C Company was identified on the area in that map, well apart from three on LSH, again this falls into the realms of fantasy and has been manipulated by authors and the like for years and years, but yes you are correct, apart from TWC, Stungewitz, Wright and Bobo, the two sergeants could have been any body, that is why we have the story of some guy claiming to be one of them.
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