azranger
Brigadier General
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Post by azranger on Apr 12, 2019 6:25:54 GMT
Here is a Donhue map and we know he beliefs it was E, F and HQ that went north traveling out BRE and returning across CR.
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on Apr 12, 2019 6:57:43 GMT
Maguire map 4 shows two routes to LSH plus a route from LSH down Deep Ravine.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 12, 2019 13:46:01 GMT
Don't think Ian needs to change the graphics on the map Steve. They were put there just to illustrate the maneuver that I outlined and were never meant to be so exact. So as long as the maneuver is generally correct then I think it satisfies the initial requirement.
I also don't think we need to consult anyone else's maps. While they might be valuable for another discussion, they only serve to confuse the present discussion for any reader, other than those who are regulars here.
The only questions we have to settle are.
1) Is the maneuver depicted on Ian's map consistent with best tactical practices under the given parameters of a known situation?
2) Does this maneuver provide possible answers for some unknowns, such as the position Martini left from, the view of the village at the last possible decision point before moving further northward, and the engagement at the W and follow up by pursuit?
I think it does on both counts, but there may be more counts, generated by other known incidents, that were not considered, ones that should either be included, or, on the other hand, if placed into consideration, that would make this maneuver invalid.
I guess what I am saying is that I only considered the tactics. I feel much stronger in my views here, because of Colt's look and like. He is the mobile guy, and I only a poor plow horse.
The only thing we must assume about Company E, is not who else was with them, but the idea that they were with the maneuver element, as was Custer, and either two, or three other companies.
I also wanted to make this as consistent as possible with the Wolf Tooth, thru JSIT narrative, particularly the direction that Custer took getting to the Calhoun Hill area. Wolf Tooth was on the east side of the battle area, and we can make the assumption that he was engaged and running somewhat parallel to those engaging and pursuing him. He could not see any flanking maneuver from his vantage point. All he could see was that someone was shooting at him, but had no idea if the shooters were one or five companies. What he did probably see is the battalion after it had rejoined and then proceeded further northward. It would be a logical assumption then for him to think those companies all remained together throughout his portion of the action.
I am also troubled by this notion of Companies E and F, along with the headquarters element being constantly joined at the hip. They may have been, but I think that it is more probably realistic to consider it a prime example of "OLD THINK". OLD THINK is what has everyone stuck waste deep in mud about this battle for a hundred and forty years. Is it not time we broadened our outlook and expanded the capacity of our minds, rather than wallow in the same old shit, that is sometimes given a fresh, but inadequate, coat of Shinola? We know E was with F and headquarters on only one occasion, and even then split by 600 or more yards at the last extremity. E&F&HQS together throughout is a myth, and will remain so until further information refuting that myth comes to light. You only KNOW, what you KNOW, and I am sort of tired of some making up what they KNOW, until it becomes habit for all of us. Aren't you?
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 12, 2019 16:16:57 GMT
I wonder was it at this separation point that Bouyer rejoined the column? To be true, I don’t know what route the column would have taken from N-C to Calhoun, JSIT map is similar with the roads, but I would have thought that any cavalry movement would take the best natural and softest route, but all the coulees seem to run against the grain. Going back to Custer, now this route to Calhoun hill would be by the main column, now this unit would need direction orders and if Custer is in MTC, could he direct them forward without having a decent vantage point, plus what advantage would he have if any, not being with the maneuver element.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 12, 2019 17:27:09 GMT
Ian: It is axiomatic, an article of faith, holy writ, that the commander place himself with the maneuvering, or, in this case, the bypassing elements of his battalion.
He has already detached a force to deal with the engagement. He must now guide and direct the maneuver. He will reel in his engaged force at some point, but he must be with those maneuvering to lend purpose and direction to that maneuver, and be on hand when any further decision need be made.
When he decides to maneuver, he must then come to grips with the fact that his observation and vantage may not be as good as on the higher ground, but he must cope with that as the possible penalty for the maneuver decision.
I think that the point is moot though. The higher ground is a better vantage point, but the coulee is adequate.
The coulees do run against the grain of the overall direction of march in this instance, and the general rule is that if you want to live you stay off easy ground, but it is still a general rule, not a sacrosanct obligation. Roads are put where they are for a reason. Generally they follow a pathway long used by somebody. Where roads are though is not all ways the way a tactician will go, but the reasons for that generally are not ease of travel, but rather, going the hard road for purposes of stealth and surprise. I always was amused when my company commander keyed in on defending or blocking high speed avenues of approach. I always did it, but I was much more concerned with the difficult routes into my position. That's the way I would come, thought I, were I commanding the enemy force.
It very well could be, even probable, that somewhere near where Martini left was also the place or near the place where Bouyer rejoined.
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colt45
First Lieutenant
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Post by colt45 on Apr 12, 2019 19:23:26 GMT
If we go back to Yan's map with the heavy blue and yellow lines for reference, picture this: The JSIT map shows Custer coming into Calhoun hill from the east and Indians to the bottom left of the map. These would have been the Indians harassing the column where the W action occurred. Custer goes with the blue line maneuver element, but instead of following the road route, as Yan's blue line does, he maneuvers in the bottom of deep coulee, swinging around the left of his company or companies that are shooting on the W, and since Custer is maneuvering to the west of the W, the hostiles must be east of the W, answering the question of which way the soldiers at the W were firing.
Now as Custer comes around the left of the W the hostiles on the east side withdraw further east, back toward where 212 now is. Custer calls the engaged units back to his location and they all proceed up to Calhoun hill via Henryville or thereabouts to approach BR as per JSIT's map.
The map Yan posted shows how the drainages meet at about the point where Henryville is, and if the hostiles involved in the W fight had tried to break off by going down the east side drainage, they would have run headlong into Custer, which may have been what Custer was hoping for. It is a classic fire and maneuver that would have turned into an envelopment had the Indians gone that way. Instead, since they went back east, they escaped being caught between two units, so Custer pulls all five companies back together to resume the original plan of hitting the village from the north.
I think this scenario answers the question of whether or not some or all of Custer's companies went near ford B, and allows for Martini to be within 600 yards of ford B, and still allows all 5 companies to be at Calhoun hill for the move to ford D, and also why there are few to no battle relics close to ford B. What do you all think of this?
The Indians that went east were probably the same ones shown on JSIT's map that are north of Custer as he moves up to Calhoun hill. This would also make sense as the Indians with Wolf Tooth were doing a series of hit and runs and were not strong enough in numbers to become decisively engaged until much later, when Custer was down at ford D.
If I were in tanks, engaging an enemy at the W, I would leave a unit on the W to keep the enemy under fire, while I maneuvered the rest of my tanks in deep coulee to flank the enemy on the W. The low ground of the coulee provide concealment for the maneuver element. Using the area the road now exists on (blue line) would be a tactical no-no.
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 12, 2019 19:48:01 GMT
Hi Colt, you and Chuck are schooling us here in the art of war.
Reading the posts, it sounds as if Custer was fighting a serious engagement before he even got to Calhoun hill, having a portion of his force cover another as well as maneuvering and having seperation and rendezvous points, makes it much more complecated then just hitting the spurs and going from one point to another.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Apr 12, 2019 20:32:59 GMT
Flash, Flash, Flash, James McLaughlin, Indian Agent at Standing Rock beginning 1881 tells us that there were more than one group tracking Custer once he mounted the ridge. Aside from Wolf Thooth there were a number of others on the east side of the river tracking GAC, to include the village police. He was spotted before the Reno attack begins as Reno's advance was shielded by woods/timber along the river. Before the Reno attack Gall and others were attempting to mirror Custer's movements on the village side of the river. Once Reno began firing Gall et el went to interdict him. At this point there was consideration of fleeing. Custer was said to be heading hell bent for the lower end of the village, Ford D.
Reno, was blocked rapidly and the majority of the NA's arrayed against him returned to the village to help obviate Custer's command. These NA's got in behind him and others from the North end cut him off in his attempt to attack from the Ford D area., The folks who told McLaughlin this tale were Gall, Crow King, Mrs Spotted Tail Bull, and others. They all agree that they were surprise by Reno and that he could have had a bigger impact on the battle if he had not bailed.
Pretty good read, don't see it sited very often " My Friend the Indian."
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Apr 12, 2019 21:57:10 GMT
A totally plausible story Tom, except for the Reno impact thing, but that is conjecture on their part, and that is perfectly OK within the confines of the tale in total. It is quite plausible too that the Indians on the east side of the river would shadow and observe, give early warning, and start the decision process of where best to engage him. It is even better then, and shines a light on, Wolf Tooth's reasoning to engage and delay. Considering both together then it is not all that hard to calculate that Custer was beaten at the time of Wolf Tooth's first shot.
Colt. Another purely plausible version of the basic maneuver scenario, one that I like a little better than my own.
Just curious, Assuming that your company is really a two tank one mech platoon team, and the opposition is a platoon of BRDM's, who would you maneuver with and who would you leave to engage? Me, and it would be the mech left to engage, and the two tank platoons maneuver, if I had a choice in the matter, but I would also always lead with mech in that type terrain, with tanks fairly close up. The old cavalry platoons of the ACR offer you best maneuver options though, two scout platoons of six M-3's and two tank platoons. In that instance I would still lead with the scouts, but maneuver with the two tank platoons being led by a scout platoon, with the other scout platoon engaging. As you can see I am fond of fours, four platoons per company, and four companies per battalion.
Taking people to school Ian is the thing I find the most fun, and the most important of all the things we do on this board. It should be, and is, an informational forum. Why I think it is the most important thing we do, is that tactics never change. They are modified somewhat over the years by the changing of techniques and procedures, but as you can see with Colt's example of the tanks, the tactics he used in that example, would be something Custer would be quite familiar, and at home with. So if you accept that all tactics are both universal and timeless, we can apply today what Custer and others did in the ACW and beyond, in just the same manner that a Custer, would be very comfortable leading a tank company or battalion task force. I think that puts things in the perspective of when we say something is bad tactics today, it would have been equally bad in 1876. If it was bad then we can go on to assume that bright boys would not use them.
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colt45
First Lieutenant
Posts: 439
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Post by colt45 on Apr 13, 2019 3:04:59 GMT
Chuck, In the scenario you describe, BRDM's had a range of 3k with the saggar missile. If I am equipped my old horses, the M60A2, with it's 3k missile range, then I would leave 1 tank platoon on the W and maneuver with the rest. This leaves the engagement platoon with the same range as the bad guys weapon-wise. If I had only M60A1's, with the lesser range cannon, then I would probably leave the mech to engage and maneuver with the tanks.
If I have the M1A1/A2 tanks, I go with my tanks engaging and tanks/mech maneuvering. Just my preference, since I like to have good firepower in the maneuver element as well as sufficient firepower in the engaging element where possible. When there isn't an even split in my firepower, the maneuver element should have the heavier firepower vs. the engaging element.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 13, 2019 4:16:49 GMT
You're showing your age old son. My mech is the Brad with a TOW which outclasses the BRDM.
Did I mention I also like five tank platoons and a mech platoon of five Brads. I like the idea of a platoon being able to subdivide into heavy and light sections, when a platoon has to maneuver on its own hook.
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 13, 2019 11:27:43 GMT
Looking at what Cartright said [he of the ridge], that Custer and four companies took this route and at one point fired at enemy targets. He states that they found 103 cartidge cases along this route, all in groups of three, which could mean that one company only fired their carbines, say 34-35 troopers, each firing three rounds would come to around this total. This would mean that one company was detached and operating to the west, thats if this data is correct of course, I have tried to emulate his account by using a map, he says that once they came off N-C ridge that they turned back up deep coulee and round the back of battle ridge, which could mean that on the initial route, Calhoun hill was not used by this column.
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Post by yanmacca on Apr 13, 2019 11:34:52 GMT
I know that it is not my place to destroy an authors work but.. if you look at what some consider to be the BLBH bible by Grey, you notice his sequence in his time line, which looks different to what Cartright said, and this book has been a source for a lot of budding authors since its release, no wonder a lot of them shy away from what JSIT said and believe the Grey option.
3:43: Custer Battalion halts at mouth of Cedar Coulee.
3:48: Custer Battalion enters Medicine Tail Coulee. Custer formulates battle plan.
3:58: Custer Battalion split into two wings. Right Wing commanded by Captain Keogh to remain on Luce Ridge. Left Wing commanded by Captain George W. Yates to move down toward the river. Headquarters Staff goes with the Left Wing. Company F detail sent to Calhoun Hill.
4:08: Left Wing down by the Little Bighorn River in Medicine Tail Coulee.
4:13: Left Wing begins move up Deep Coulee. Right Wing departs Luce Ridge for Nye-Cartwright Ridge.
4:18: Right Wing arrives on Nye-Cartwright Ridge.
4:23: Right Wing departs Nye-Cartwright Ridge for Calhoun Hill.
4:28: Left Wing arrives on Calhoun Hill.
4:33: Right Wing arrives on Calhoun Hill.
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on Apr 13, 2019 13:03:41 GMT
I believe there are three groups of Indians on Custer as he climbs out of MTC. Wolf Tooth, a combination of Sioux and Cheyenne from MTC, and a returning Cheyenne hunting party. JSIT knows what his society was doing but others are involved.
Elks and Dog Soldiers have different stories of the same events. I am sure both are right. Hopefully this summer we will fill in the returning hunting party.
Regards
Steve
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on Apr 13, 2019 13:20:40 GMT
As far as the maneuvering Maguire does not have the separated groups moving to Calhoun. He has them meeting at LSH.
Maguires Map 3 which show two routes from MTC and writes in his report regarding the two trails:
"From the position of the dead bodies on the field I conclude that they retreated on two lines marked on the sketch as to concentrate at E (LSH) which was the highest point of the ground.
Maguire thinks they were on defense from MTC. I think we all agree that Custer was still on offense moving north out of MTC.
Martin never crosses MTC so he has to be part of the group that moved within 600 yards of MTF when he was sent back. I believe there is an account of soldier that claims he went back and his horse jumped across a gully which he later saw and believed impossible. That describes the gullies upstream MTC and why everyone crosses near Middle Coulée.
So my question to Colt is there any reason that they would split in MTC as Curley describes. He states the gray horses went down MTC and Martin states he did also within 600 yards.
Is there any screening maneuver that could have been considered to facilitate the group going straight across MTC and up to Luce and then through NC toward Calhoun?
Regards
Steve
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