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Post by yanmacca on Feb 18, 2018 14:01:40 GMT
Hi all, I have just finished a series of images taking in the route Custer may have taken on his way to battle ridge. What I have tried to do was in the first four photos, to keep to the edge of the bluffs, because reports of the column being sighted by Reno's men in the valley. First photo; shows the ground just as he hits the top of the bluffs and why he was seen by Reno's men. Second photo; covers the area between last photo and shows Reno hill in the back ground, and he was still in view of Reno's men. Third photo; takes us past Reno hill and on to Cedar Coulee, the column was still visible. Four photo; now if he veered off down Cedar or even some other route to the right, then I would guess that this would be the last point he was seen seen by Reno's men and vice versa. Fifth photo; is just a panoramic view of MTC, with ford B right at the top. Sixth photo; shows the ridge line which some say they used, it could be at this point that they encounter Wolftooth. Seventh photo; shows Deep Coulee and Calhoun Hill in the distance and his destination ahead.
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Post by dan25 on Feb 19, 2018 0:15:32 GMT
Not being familiar with LBH, is photo 1 where 3411 is?
I think Custer did view the village and Reno. If he didn't why would, "Big Village" be added to the message to Benteen? There wouldn't be any reason unless he seen a big village. Why not just, "Bring Packs, Be Quick"? Also if he didn't see Reno and the village, why all of a sudden was he concerned about getting the packs so quickly?
Photo 6, is that the ridge line that goes from Last Stand Hill down past Cemetery Ridge toward Ford D?
According to Wolf Tooth they arrived back from the Rosebud just in time to see the soldiers going down a ravine/coulee toward the river, so I have assumed that was when Custer was heading to Ford D.
regards dan25
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Post by yanmacca on Feb 19, 2018 10:42:44 GMT
Dan, 3411 should be on pic 4, I would guess that it is the part that juts out to the edge of the bluffs almost at the top of cedar coulee. After this point the valley would not be in view and if Custer went there he would see Reno and the village. Now this is the crux, as after this point only one man saw people on the bluffs and this was DeRudio, all the other sightings were made before Reno dismounted. I would guess that both commands [Custer and Reno] saw each other whilst still in transit and the men on the bluffs seen by DeRudio were scouts as these were seen after Reno started to pull back his skirmish line and by this time Custer would be getting near MTC.
Photo 6 is the ridge line called Nye-Cartwright and Luce ridge would also be in view. This ridge line is south of deep coulee and the ridge you elude to is north of deep coulee.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Feb 19, 2018 12:10:35 GMT
Dan, the color photo at the top of the page was taken at 3411, by Steve.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Feb 19, 2018 18:03:44 GMT
D25: A couple of things.
1) 3411 is only one man's opinion of being the place where Custer viewed Reno in the valley. It's a good place, but certainly not the only one. Therefore 3411 itself is not established fact.
2) The idea that Custer (in person) viewed Reno in the valley from 3411 or anyplace else, so as to be seen by anyone with Reno, is not established fact either. What is established fact is that Custer viewed the village and that viewing was the genesis of Cooke sending the note.
3) There has never been anything in 142 years of study that establishes as fact Custer needing those pack trains in whole or in part. What the note confirms for us are two things. a.) Benteen the village is here (on my front) get over here and into action. b) The note also indicates Custer finally being concerned about the packs, and reminds Benteen twice to cover them. There is nothing in that note that suggests Benteen guard those packs.
4) Be Quick - Bring Packs are two directive statements that are also mutually exclusive. You can do one or the other but not both.
Guard and Cover should be defined for you:
GUARD is close in security of whatever it is you are guarding. Company B already had the guard mission.
COVER is to place your force between whatever it is you are covering, at some good distance, on the most likely avenue of approach to the object of your affections. The most likely avenue of approach for the Indians to get to the pack trains was up the valley to, and then across Ford A. The note directed Benteen to get between any possible breakthrough of Reno and those packs.
NOWHERE IN THAT NOTE does it direct Benteen to come to Custer with pack trains in tow, Not only is that idea an amateurish and foolish interpretation by a lot of people who should know better over the years, it is also impractical to execute, and stupid in concept.
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Post by yanmacca on Feb 19, 2018 19:51:38 GMT
I may have made a mistake with the sightings, Lt. Varnum said he saw E Company around the area of Reno hill, this was a couple of minutes after they dismounted on the valley floor.
But again, if E Company was moving across Reno hill, they would be well gone by the time DeRudio saw men on the bluffs, which asks the question, if his command was moving down cedar coulee, what was Custer doing sat on a point in the rear.
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Post by yanmacca on Feb 19, 2018 19:56:57 GMT
I concur, why would Custer order Benteen to cover the pack train. The train had more men in its ranks then Benteen had troopers.
If Custer did want Benteen and his men to cover the pack train, then he is wasting over a hundred badly needed cavalry on a job which didn't need his attention, so would Custer or Cooke make such a mistake?
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Post by quincannon on Feb 19, 2018 21:28:52 GMT
Ian read the definition of cover and guard again.
Custer had every reason to want the pack trains covered. He had no need for Benteen to guard the pack trains. They were sufficiently, in fact over sufficiently guarded already.
Neither Custer or Cooke made a mistake in putting Benteen between the pack trains, and a potential Indian thrust at them.
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Post by dan25 on Feb 19, 2018 21:52:45 GMT
I want to thank every one for your help and corrections.
As for 3411, I agree there is no proven fact that Custer or anyone was at that exact location. It was what I learned awhile ago and foolishly keep repeating.
I understand your explanation for Guard and Cover, it's informative as usual. What I am having difficulty understanding is how guard and cover relates to the message sent to Benteen. The message say's, BRING ( to cause to come to or toward oneself ). As for "Be Quick" it's sort of self-explanatory. Please bear with me I have never been accused of being intelligent.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 19, 2018 22:48:38 GMT
3411 gives one a very good view into that valley Dan. It's not the only place though. It has become holy writ in the last ten years,and I believe undeservedly so. Just another one of those made up things that people have accepted as truth, but something not having a basis in fact.
To understand the meaning of that note, I believe you have to first put yourself in Custer's/Cooke's shoes as the originator, then Benteen's shoes as the receiver.
Custer, is somewhere on the bluffs, probably back on Sharpshooter Ridge, when the village first comes into view. He can't see the entire extent of the village from where he is, but can see enough to know that it is bigger, far bigger, than he had anticipated when he sent Reno down that valley with three companies plus. He evaluates by size alone that it's too big for Reno to handle in the way he (Custer) anticipated. He also knows that Benteen is off to the west, and thinks that by now he is probably returning to the main trail. He knows the pack trains are on the main trail, well to Reno's rear, and as yet nowhere near Ford A. He sees very clearly that if Reno breaks and retreats back up the valley to Ford A, and the Indians pursue him, as they most probably would, the Indians very well may run through Reno, or run him to ground, and the pack trains would be completely vulnerable. SO. He sends the note telling Benteen three things --- There is a big village. ---- Get back on the main trail pronto. ------ Bring the packs. It is the worst example of clarity in a fragmentary order I have ever seen, and Cooke should have been shot for composing it. Remember though it was written in haste by Cooke, presumably based upon a verbal order from Custer. The lesson therein is that military directives must contain Who, What, When, How, and Why to reach the standard of clarity demanded, and the fact that you may be in a hurry is no goddamned excuse.
Benteen receives the note shortly before he gets to Ford A. The packs are still well south of that ford, but Benteen is now between the pack trains and Reno/Indians. He is now in a position to cover the forward progress of the pack trains. He becomes aware of action taking place in the valley. He knows Martini came off the bluffs to meet him, and from that he knows Custer has gone that way. Benteen is a pretty smart guy. He knows Custer, and he also knows that there is no village on those bluffs, but rather the village would be in the valley, with access to both water and shade. From that he can deduce that Custer has gone onto the bluffs to get around the eastern flank of the village, and either hit the village in the flank, or more probably in the rear. Taking it a step further he then knows Reno is in the valley by sound if not visual, and he presumes that Custer will be there soon. At that point the most logical course of action for Benteen is to cross over at Ford A and come in behind Reno, still keeping the pack trains behind him. That completely fulfills what he can determine from the intent of Custer's note.
Had not it been for seeing the scouts on the bluffs, recognizing them and following their direction onto those bluffs Benteen would have proceeded down that valley with the pack trains following dutifully behind him. He did see those scouts, he did follow them, and his first question to Reno was - Where's Custer. Little things often tell the tale as to what a person is expecting to see.
So BRING (to cause to come to or toward one's self) is fully answered. Benteen was fully under the impression he was doing what Custer wanted him to do. He was coming toward where he expected Custer to be. He was also using common sense, because he knew that to bring those packs to Custer via the bluffs would have nothing "quick" about it.
The height of intelligence is having the moral courage to tell some one you do not understand.
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Post by yanmacca on Feb 20, 2018 0:16:31 GMT
Benteen would I presume, would only be covering the pack train if his men were not engaged?
The pack train was a good distance behind Benteen maybe miles, so if Benteen was ordered by Reno to bring his companies in a rapid advance to support his attack, then he is no longer covering the packs.
Benteen was sent off to the left with no orders to cover any other unit, so really he fell into this role by chance when he gave up his scout.
Custer choose three cavalry battalions and a large Regimental Train for a reason and that was for each of them to be able to look after themselves for a short period of time, so all Benteen was doing was leaving a trail for the train to follow, because at the end of the day, Benteen was commanding a combat battalion and that meant being ready to commit everything he had to fighting Indians.
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Post by dan25 on Feb 20, 2018 1:12:23 GMT
QC, I appreciate your post. You made things very clear and easy to understand.
However not understanding military thinking it seems odd for Benteen to assume Custer would be entering the village therefore he (Benteen) would enter the valley behind Reno rather than going in the direction Custer had went. I would think that Martini would have told Benteen where Custer was when he (Martini) was given the message and the direction he was headed.
regards dan25
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Feb 20, 2018 2:00:52 GMT
Dan, You ask excellent questions, you apply logic, and I would think you are a critical thinker. The problem we all have is that the right questions were not asked of the right people at the right time. The officers and key EM's were not debriefed immediately after the battle. The NA's were not followed up with after they left the Little Bighorn. After defeat the NA's were in fear and often said what the white man wanted to hear. Some questioners and translators may have had an agenda. I think we often draw the easiest conclusion, pick goats and heroes to the detriment of seeking answers.
Sometimes we need to read between the lines. Wooden Leg, Marquis, Godfrey, Edward Curtis, John Stands In Timber, all tell a story of the battle and I think with little agenda. Only two of these folks were involved in the battle and only one was near GAC's demise. There are other NA insights worth reading.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Feb 20, 2018 2:10:19 GMT
Ian: 1) Benteen would once he got in front of the pack trains, and on the most likely avenue of enemy access to them would have them covered regardless of if he were engaged or not. 2) The pack trains were a couple of miles behind Benteen, very true, which is exactly where they should be for Benteen to cover them. 3) When Benteen was off to the left he did not have a cover mission. He did not have that mission until he received the note. 4) Custer divided his force into THREE combat maneuver battalions. ONLY THREE. The operative words are COMBAT MANEUVER BATTALIONS unless you have ever seen anything in a tactical manual that describes pack trains and their guard in the attack. Company B was useless as a maneuver force. Those that tell you that Custer had four combat maneuver battalions, DO NOT KNOW THEIR ASS FROM FIRST BASE. That does not mean that he didn't divide his force four ways. He did Put this in a modern context, the era you are most familiar with. Would you advocate attacking or maneuvering against the enemy with your ammunition, fuel, food, and mess trucks? Probably not, but that is what you would be advocating were you to consider those trains and its guard as a maneuver unit WHY DO YOU THINK, I am constantly harping on the fact that any commander past the stage of kindergardeners playing soldier in the school yard would have stashed those pack trains well out of the battle space, leaving minimal guards with them (10 to 15 should do the trick) and use all the people freed up by that process including Company B to beef up his attacking battalions? Combat maneuver battalions must be free to do what? MANEUVER, unrestricted maneuver. Dan: Benteen was forced to assume. Custer sure as hell didn't tell him anything. The short answer is that following Custer on the bluffs would take twice as much or more time than it would going through the valley. Custer did not go up there for his health, or to take in the healing waters. He went on those bluffs to get at his objective, which was the village in the valley. Like I said Benteen was a pretty smart fellow, and knew just what Custer was going to do. In all probability upon hearing the firing in the valley, he thought Custer was already in the valley, and was very surprised when he asked Reno where Custer was, only to be answered that Reno did not know. You are Benteen. You know the village is in your front further down the valley. You can hear gunfire from that same place. Presumably that is the same place Custer is heading. Martini could not tell you any differently. Had it not been for seeing and getting direction from the scouts, Benteen would have gone into that valley thinking that was the fastest way to link up with Custer and fulfill his mission requirements. A tactical military communication should preferably be short and to the point, but it must include WHO, WHAT, WHERE, HOW, and WHEN. The only thing that note got right was WHO --- "BENTEEN" The rest was gibberish, open to anyone's interpretation. I tried my best to interpret it from Benteen's perspective. The fact that I had to try and step into Benteen's shoes means that the content of that note was fit only for wiping one's posterior immediately after defecation, and nothing more
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azranger
Brigadier General
Ranger
Posts: 1,824
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Post by azranger on Feb 20, 2018 13:30:47 GMT
I agree with Chuck that nothing is known as fact regarding 3411 being an exact location. It never was an exact location. I think it was Fred Wagner looking at topographic map that came up with name 3411. Where the exact location is remains unknown but there are not many choices either. Some think SSR since you can see into the valley but if you read Martin's account of what he could observe it may eliminate SSR. So SRR or along the bluffs after Reno Hill and before moving past Weir which is 3411 are the choices that I have seen in discussions.
In 2009 my son Scott gave me a trip to the battlefield. We both went on the trip. We had a rental car and after we stopped at Weir we moved on toward the next pullout at SSR. While moving down the road I told him to stop. I saw a place where I would have looked into the valley from horseback. It was obvious that you could look upstream and downstream from a horse while being concealed if you chose to do so.
Years later I read Fred Wagner's description using 3411 and thought he was talking about the same place. Britt Collie and myself a few years ago went to the location of 3411 on the topo map and it is closer to the SSR pullout but there is no 3411 elevation there. According to numerous GPS attempts it is at a higher elevation.
So I think we now use 3411 as a description of where Custer and Martin looked into the valley rather than a GPS coordinate. 3411 on a map is a name for an area (bluffs closer to the LBH river) and from our findings not a true elevation.
I think it relatively easy to come up with the general location based upon what persons in the valley state they observed and what Martin observed. One year we rode on top of SSR and yes you can see into the valley but it is only the frontage road and the red building that has Fort Custer in it. For me it eliminates SSR. We also know that Custer came around Reno Hill which we rode also. I think it is quite possible that the 5 companies rode at the 3411 map designator and that it where they saw the valley. It is also possible that Custer saw the same thing I did in 2009 and selected it to look into the valley. There are not a lot of other choices.
So I called my point fence post for awhile because there is a fence post there but after talking with Fred I think we are on the same page. Beer was involved so I don't know the degree of certainty. What we know is that 3411 on a map is not a location with a fixed point it was and is a elevation for a general area which if you are riding from Reno Creek and along side of Reno Hill would be place you could have lots of soldiers that could see into the valley.
So using 3411 to me is an abbreviation for "a proposed location for the observation area by Custer". The alternative is SSR and there are lots of supporters that it was SSR. All of these locations are within a short walk of each other. We know that wherever it is located it would be after Reno Hill and past Weir Peak. I think 3411 is about as specific as SSR.
Here is a picture from 2009 and at that time we had no idea who owned the land and probably thought it was within the NPS boundary.
What is important for discussions is that those believing that the 5 companies moved down SSR use SSR as the view point general location into the valley. Those that have a Cedar Coulee approach are more likely to chose a bluff location where you find the 3411 elevation written on some topographic maps. I think when Martin states he was on the bluffs I don't see how others think SRR is on the bluffs.
Hope that helps. 3411 is the bluffs adjacent the river and the alternative is SSR.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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