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Post by quincannon on Nov 29, 2017 23:09:11 GMT
Concur in all aspects.
I am especially appreciative of how you handle the Hornets Nest, imaginary key terrain, that cost the Confederates the battle by draining off combat power that could have been better used crushing Grant's Pittsburg Landing flank.
I have not walked that ground, nor have I ever visited Shiloh at all. I am working off maps just like Mac is, but my opinion is that the whole line was key terrain. It appears very similar to what we discussed about Jackson's line at Second Manassas. Breaking that line in any place would make a withdrawal across the Tennessee River nearly impossible. Holding it on the other hand allowed two portals for Grant to receive reinforcements.
What surprises me a little is that the confederates did not cut off the Snake Creek crossing on the afternoon of 6 April. They never came near it. Here is where visual knowledge of the ground helps though. Seeing how that area is full of watercourses, it may very well be a swamp for all I know. and be very restrictive. Regardless Grant retained two portals to receive reinforcements, by considering the entire line as key, must hold or die, terrain.
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dave
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Post by dave on Nov 30, 2017 0:39:54 GMT
QC said: What surprises me a little is that the confederates did not cut off the Snake Creek crossing on the afternoon of 6 April. They never came near it. Here is where visual knowledge of the ground helps though. Seeing how that area is full of watercourses, it may very well be a swamp for all I know. and be very restrictive. Regardless Grant retained two portals to receive reinforcements, by considering the entire line as key, must hold or die, terrain.
The Federals had a better grasp and knowledge of the terrain around Pittsburg Landing than the Confederates due to West Tennessee not being suitable for plantation farming and the populace being Pro Union. In fact the Owl and Snake creeks were small slow sluggish tributaries and situated in swampy bottom hollows. The streams were both swollen at the time of the battle and were influences in Lew Wallace's chosen route to Pittsburgh Landing and I do not believe were included in Johnston's plans or orders.
The Confederate's maps were so poor they did not realize their attack was not directed at cutting Grant's army from Pittsburg Landing but forcing him back to it in his retreat. Albert Sidney Johnston predated Custer's actions in leading from the front lines during the battle while leaving Beauregard in charge at his headquarters in the rear. Beauregard was not in sync with Johnston's plans and directed the rebels in a NE direction instead of due North.
I apologize if I am going on too much about this battle. Regards Dave
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mac
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Post by mac on Nov 30, 2017 1:33:44 GMT
Don't apologize Dave it is all good stuff. I do remember now that Shiloh was a terrible piece of ground where the troops were operating in small packages in dense vegetation were they not? Cheers
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dave
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Post by dave on Nov 30, 2017 2:58:34 GMT
Mac The Confederate assault was postponed for a couple of days due to heavy spring rains which turned the main road from Corinth into a muddy river and the corresponding side fields and roads were all quagmires. This weather condition added to the terrain issues faced by the Johnny Rebs and stunted the surprise attack which was not a surprise to the far flung Union troops camped at the SW part of the Shiloh plain who heard the inexperienced Rebs firing at deer and clearing their weapons of possible damp powder from the humid conditions. The Confederates right flank attempted an assault late in the afternoon of the 1st day but the terrain was terrible. Dill Branch a small stream was composed of gullies, mud, tangled bush and elevated ground broke their attack quickly with a little help from the Federal's fire. The battle itself started about 2-3 miles from Pittsburg Landing along and through small farmer's fields and tangled underbrush and saplings which broke up the Confederate forces and tangled regiments and divisions from different Corps which created communication nightmares. It was one such assault just east of the Hornet's Nest through the Peach Orchard where Johnston was killed while leading front line troops in assaulting Union forces. Like Custer he had become a company commander in fact despite his position as the Army of Mississippi CSA. One the participants at Shiloh, Henry Morton Stanley, later of "Dr. Livingstone, I presume?" fame was captured by Union forces during the battle. I have listed a web site for an excellent map of the battle and terrain features that might assit those who have never been to the park itself. Regards Dave www.civilwar.org/learn/maps/battle-shiloh-april-6-1862
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Post by quincannon on Nov 30, 2017 16:31:41 GMT
I think we have to be careful in lumping Johnson in the same pile as Custer. Johnson was arguably the most combat experienced general officer in either Army. He knew what he was doing, and was aware of the risks he was taking. From what I have read, which includes your superb description of battlefield conditions Dave, I think we must ask ourselves would Johnson have placed himself in that same position had it not been for the need to see how the battle was unfolding close up, rather than fight the battle based upon reports filtering to the rear via message.
My guess is that he would not have. A key to understanding this I think is that Johnson was wounded by friendly fire, much like Jackson, who was engaged in the same type of activity "seeing" when he went down.
Couple of other things to note as well. Troops fight better for commanders whom they "see" on the battlefield. Knowing that the guy who calls the shots is not afraid to be out there with you, is one of the best ways to boost your troop's morale in times of great stress. Secondly, leading from the front is a very bad description of what aggressive commanders do. It gives us vision of a commander always riding point. That of course is nonsense. Leading from the front actually means having your finger on the pulse of battle, taking away the inevitable delay in communications by being close up, able to direct immediate action. Good commanders have their principle operations subordinate along with them during these times, and all that is generally required is for those two to take a quick look at the map and say do this, negating wasted time, and the needless interference of headquarters malaise.
Another excellent Stanley map, like the ones you sent me. Is there anywhere that whole set can be purchased.
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dave
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Post by dave on Dec 1, 2017 1:02:45 GMT
QC You know far more than me regarding military leadership and you may be right regarding Johnston. I would offer an additional idea and that is that Johnston had retreated from Western Kentucky and a great portion of Tennessee without fighting and only stopped in Corinth because it was a nexus for two major railroads, the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, running east and west, and the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, running north and south, crossed in its downtown. The Confederates were concerned they would lose control of the whole Mississippi Valley. Johnston may have been an combat experienced general but he was a poor administrator and had allowed Beauregard to control all planning and operational commands once the battle began. Johnston was the most senior commander of Confederate forces yet he was positioned on the front lines exhorting the troops forward. It is thought that as he was shot by an .577 Enfield bullet which only Confederates were armed with that it was a case of friendly fire. Johnston apparently did not realize he had been shot due to an old dueling wound which had numbed his leg and died of blood loss just behind the front lines. Because Johnston had allowed Beauregard to control the placement of troops, the Confederate units at the front were scrambled from all 4 Corps and there was no cohesive leadership instead each general fought his own fight. I understand your point that troops, especially in the ACW, needed to see their officers out front but not the commanding general of the army. Lee never was allowed to go to the front except for the one time I know of at the Battle of the Wilderness when the Texas Brigade ordered "Lee to the rear!" I almost sound like I know what I am talking about yet I know many scholars disagree with my thoughts and they are much better read and educated yet I am so old that I can just ignore them. I listed the contact info for the Civil War Trust which is the source for all the maps I have shared with you. I have listed their web site regarding the excellent maps they present and perhaps how to secure copies of each battle. Regards Dave www.civilwar.org/about/contact
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Post by quincannon on Dec 1, 2017 1:55:02 GMT
No, not especially see them out front, that is not what I mean at all. They should be seen though, and that continues to this day. It is not an ACW thing.
Seeing though is something a general officer, indeed all commanders, must do. It is easier today of course, with all of our modern means, but essentially it is still a man with a map, a mind, and a voice, who sees a situation and an opportunity, and has the judgment to act quickly so the opportunity is not lost.
Was there ever a battle Beauregard did not screw up?
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dave
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Post by dave on Dec 1, 2017 2:31:34 GMT
"Was there ever a battle Beauregard did not screw up?"
Beauregard successfully nullified Benjamin Butler's Army of the James at Bermuda Hundred in 1864 and denied any assistance to Grant in his Overland Campaign. Beauregard perhaps did not screw up at Petersburg in June of 1864 when held up the Federals from occupying the city with his small command? Do you give him any credit? Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Dec 1, 2017 4:09:57 GMT
No, if anything Butler was more of a shit faced idiot than Beauregard, so beating Butler at anything above the level of - Dick and Jane went up the hill - is nothing that will get any credit at all. It was like Huntz Hall whipping Leo Gorcey
The U S Army in naming Camp Beauregard was playing its little joke on the State of Louisiana.
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dave
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Post by dave on Dec 1, 2017 4:40:09 GMT
You are a hard taskmaster but fair regarding both Butler and Beauregard. I look forward to more questions on different battles. Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Dec 1, 2017 15:40:41 GMT
You're just saying I am fair because you know that I am both a member and President Emeritus of the Braxton Bragg Adoration Society, LLC.
Most general officers Dave are lackluster slugs, that were far better Colonels than GO's. They let a combination of ego and fear of making a mistake get in the way of superior battlefield performance. They become risk adverse and hesitant.
When you find someone who is outside that mold, he is what a general officer should be.
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dave
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Post by dave on Dec 1, 2017 16:11:58 GMT
Braxton Bragg was a difficult man to understand let alone a poor leader. His performance at Shiloh should been a warning to Jefferson Davis as to Bragg's competence but alas it did not. The manner of how he frittered away the victory at Stone's River was only equaled by his actions after Chickamauga when he failed to allowed the Federals to retreat to Chattanooga so he could mount a siege operation! It finally took a mutiny of the whole officer Corps under him to move Davis to remove him from command of the Army of Tennessee.
One of your favorites, Nathan Bedford Forrest, made the following comment to Bragg's face after the debacle of the Chattanooga campaign:
"You have played the part of a damned scoundrel, and are a coward, and if you were any part of a man I would slap your jaws and force you to resent it. You may as well not issue any orders to me, for I will not obey them. . . I say to you that if you ever again try to interfere with me or cross my path it will be at the peril of your life."
I knew you would be a big fan of his and lead the praise choir of you most admired general!!!!!!
Regards
Dave
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Post by quincannon on Dec 1, 2017 16:56:22 GMT
Jefferson Davis' relationship to Braxton Bragg, and many other officers who became generals on both sides goes back to his day as the Secretary of War, and perhaps even further to the Mexican War where Davis was the Colonel of the Mississippi Rifles.
Take out your Thomason and one of the early chapters tells us of Davis hand picking and stacking the deck with his preferred officers when the 1st Cavalry (4th Cavalry), and 2nd Cavalry (5th Cavalry) were formed in 1855.
The problem Davis had is that he could not see beyond his personal loyalties. That's how Bragg survived.
In fairness Bragg evidently was a good battery commander, but that's all.
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Post by BrevetorCoffin on Dec 1, 2017 19:06:28 GMT
It is no so much defending Dave. It is that the terrain must be worth either defending or taking to be considered key terrain. If you are going to spend blood than the place that you spend it must be worth the price. There are places than can be defended at LBH. None of them are any damned good for a defense (some better than others), and each of them have work arounds which tells you the place defended is not key at all. Key terrain, by definition, must either be held or seized, as a condition of battlefield success. Weir Point is high - end of story. The area immediately around it is broken, and it does not provide long range fields of fire around the extent of the perimeter. It offers some, but not nearly enough in the right places. Another thing to consider is having sufficient forces available to either seize or hold. Consider this. I already said that Cemetery Ridge at Gettysburg was key terrain. Had Hancock only had his corps there to hold it at the end of that first day, it could have been key terrain until Kingdom Come and it would have been of no use as key terrain at all. Don't any of you get discouraged about this. I never fully understood the concept until C&GS, which means I am either dumb as a box of rocks, or the subject itself is a bit hard to completely grasp. Weat Point is nicely placed for enemy ships cruising up the Hudson. Good location for that purpose. Hope all is well with you, QC.
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Post by quincannon on Dec 1, 2017 20:44:58 GMT
West point is one of those places that was key terrain on all considered levels, strategic, operational, and tactical. It has lost all of that importance with the forward progress of technology.
But, if you wanted to divide the colonies you did it by splitting them in the Hudson River Valley (Strategic). In the day when New York was raw wilderness above New York City if you wanted to control the prime means of relatively rapid movement you controlled the Hudson River. To do these things you must have control of West Point (Operational), not to mention West Point dominates the surrounding country including that on the east side of the Hudson (Tactical).
I am doing quite well David and thanks for asking.
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