dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
|
Post by dave on Nov 29, 2017 1:24:22 GMT
You did so well on that one Dave, would you like to try another, that may be a bit harder?
Admittedly I am out of my depth dealing with 2nd Battle of Manassas but will take a guess or two.
Most agree (not all) that the abandoned railroad cut at Second Manassas was key terrain, but ignore Brawner's Farm.
I am sure that the abandoned railroad cut used by Jackson did him more favors than the unfinished railroad cut did for Davis's brigade at Gettysburg. He used it as a defensive position against Pope on the August 29 and then attacked from there with Longstreet's troops later in the day.
Part I: Was Brawner's Farm key terrain, and if so why?
I don't know if Brawner's Farm was an important terrain feature but it was the sight of a historic legend beginning. The Iron Brigade made its name and fame on the evening of 28 August and denied Jackson access to the Warrenton Turnpike by holding against Jackson's force with the assistance of two of Abner Doubleday's regiments. The Iron Brigade and Jackson's Stonewall Brigade fought to a bloody standstill.
Part II: Would the railroad cut continue to be key terrain had Brawner's farm been taken and occupied by Union forces on 28 August ? If Jackson had gained the Warrenton Turnpike the evening of 28 August Pope would have realized he was attacking and not retreating, correct? John Pope's failure to properly use the Army of Virginia should have resulted in being cashiered instead of being sent to quell the Sioux uprising in Minnesota.
I apologize for taking so long to answer your questions but me and my laptop are not on the best of terms. I seem to have a short in the blessed machine that continually (3 times) erases my poor efforts of talking strategy with you. Sadly I know more about the Iron Brigade and individual units of both the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia than I do their campaigns except a few major battles. I am enjoying our conversations and hope you will continue with your posts, thoughts and questions. I do believe that Deadwood should opine more as he lives in the area and could post pictures of the sites. Regards Dave
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Nov 29, 2017 3:52:56 GMT
You need to read Hennessy "Return to Bull Run" Best ACW book ever in my estimation.
Mac answered this several hours ago via PM. He tied you on the Gettysburg answer as well, so with that in mind I will open future questions up to all.
Keep in mind these are not pleasant diversion exercises. They are teaching experiences, in conjunction with KOCOA.
The unfinished railroad cut, and the adjacent Stony Ridge were key terrain. The whole cut had to be held or you could hold none of it. I have walked every foot of it, last time with my dad and it was our last ever ACW outing. It was a mighty hard tasking for a corps with only four divisions. It was key terrain because Jackson could not hold his back door, Sudley Springs Ford, open without holding that entire line.
Brawner's Farm was near the very right flank of that cut. In fact it is in a field directly in front of the cut. By itself Brawner's meant nothing to either side unless you knew what Lee, Jackson, and Longstreet were up to.
Most folks think that Jackson came out of the woods in the late afternoon of 28 August when he saw King's Division moving across his front, on the Warrenton Turnpike, to pick a fight, much like waving a red flag in front of a bull. and in so doing was saying to Pope - here I am, attack me. But why there? Why not up at Groveton or on the Dogan property, all of which was across Jackson's front and on King's route?
Digress: While all this was going on Longstreet was fighting his way through Thoroughfare Gap, in Jackson's right rear, about fifteen miles away and heading for Gainsville and the Warrenton Turnpike. The place selected for their link up was none other than the Warrenton Turnpike that ran in front of Brawner's farm. It was a damned good artillery position as well, and where S.P. Lee placed at least forty guns which ripped Pope a new one when he insisted on continuing attacks on Jackson.
So what we have in this particular case is a piece of key terrain. that must be held or kept clear.
Had King known that Longstreet was coming, he would have continued to contest that place until his last man. He could also have moved to the other side of the road and occupied Stuart Hill which would have accomplish at least in part a hindering or delay of the link up.
The moral of the story is that often your scheme of maneuver chooses what is key terrain. The fact that it may be key does not always mean it is obvious to either the contemporary or like us the latter day observer.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Nov 29, 2017 4:12:09 GMT
This next one may sound easy, but in battle the easy is always hard.
During the entire portion of the Battle of the Bulge, from 16 December to the relief of Bastogne, was Bastogne key terrain?
|
|
|
Post by deadwoodgultch on Nov 29, 2017 12:59:38 GMT
The Germans made it key terrain, could have been bypassed. Still not a winner. I think SS units to the north could have been better supported. I will allow others to decide.
|
|
dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
|
Post by dave on Nov 29, 2017 15:23:10 GMT
As at Gettysburg, Bastonge was the nexus for 7 roads the Germans needed for their operation to take over the harbor at Antwerp. Regards Dave PS I will look into the book you suggested but I am currently reading Timothy Smith's opus Shiloh: Conquer or Perish which I believe is even more thorough and better written than Wiley Sword's classic!
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Nov 29, 2017 16:10:54 GMT
Nice answers, and accurate, BUT they are not answers to the question I asked
The question was - Was Bastogne key terrain for the entire period from 16 December until the they were relieved on 26 December?
|
|
dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
|
Post by dave on Nov 29, 2017 17:04:08 GMT
Bastogne was bypassed by the Germans and they all also passed by the town in the north including the infamous Malmedy disaster, so it was no longer key terrain after 21 December.
So far I am 1 for 2 so will I make it 2 for 3? I am really proud for and of Mac for knowing about the Battle of Gettysburg. I know very little about Australia and its people except for Breaker Morant, the Gallipoli campaign and role of the Australian Navy in the Pacific in WW II. The Java Sea campaign with the USS Houston, 1st Savo Island, Guadalcanal campaign and onward with the US Navy, Marines and MacArthur's operations as well. Stout hearts and valiant allies.
Let's discuss the Battle of Shiloh next and determine if Grant's last line on the night of 6 April was a key terrain feature?
I am really enjoying these posts and I suspect many others are as well. You present very interesting questions and decisive answers based on facts not favorites and that is important. Regards Dave
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Nov 29, 2017 18:08:07 GMT
BINGO - It was bypassed by the Germans and after 21 December it was no longer key terrain, meaning holding or taking it offered no significant advantage to either side. At that point it became "emotional" terrain, very much like the Alamo.
Americans are a people adverse to casualties. We like to believe that anywhere we put our troops in harms way, that place is worth dying for. Reality though is different, but that does not stop the myth from growing. In this instance it was after 21 December a complete myth that Bastogne was the linchpin in the Ardennes.
Every crossroads, town, and village in the Bastogne Corridor was key terrain until it was taken or bypassed. Bastogne itself as Dave pointed out earlier was the confluence of several roads. Roads in the Ardennes are as valuable as pure gold. The sole purpose of resistance in the Bastogne Corridor was to buy time for a defensive line to be built up well west of Bastogne. Once done it did not matter from and operational perspective if Bastogne was held or not. It had been bypassed and surrounded, but Bastogne and all the rest of the pieces of key terrain in that corridor had already accomplished what they set out to do. Therefore possession of Bastogne offered no real advantage to either side, which is the very definition of key terrain.
Very well done Dave.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Nov 29, 2017 18:32:41 GMT
OK, let's discuss Shiloh/Pittsburg Landing.
Dave asked if Grant's line on the evening of 6 April 1862 was key terrain. By that I take it that he is asking if the entire line was key. So:
Was that entire line key terrain, or was that line only in part key? Would capture and occupation of part of that line offer a significant advantage to one side? If so, which part? Could part of that line fall and be a decisive battle winner for the Confederates" If so which part? Did all of that line have to fall for it to be decisive?
So in making your decision you must look at the complete line as it existed on the evening of 6 April, and decide, what part if any, or all must be taken if you are to have a decisive outcome. As a defender you must look at the same picture, and decide must I hold all of this to avoid defeat, or are there parts of the line that are so vital that they must be held, while accepting the fact you may have to withdraw from other parts.
Look at it from both the attack and defense perspectives. The answers will both be the same, and those same answers indicate what is key terrain.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Nov 29, 2017 19:18:36 GMT
I probably should mention here that key terrain is very much echeloned.
What is considered key terrain for a company level commander, may not be considered key terrain at battalion, brigade, division or corps level.
It is a direct reversal from the top down however. What is key to the corps commander MUST be considered key all the way down to the company
|
|
mac
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,790
|
Post by mac on Nov 29, 2017 20:45:34 GMT
Quick look at a sketch map and I think initially it is key as it allows troop movement across the river to reinforce the US. The line of Grant appears to follow the road system so holding that road for its easy of movement at least up to 6 April would be important; sadly I have no idea where the roads actually go . Cheers
|
|
dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
|
Post by dave on Nov 29, 2017 21:05:45 GMT
I get to go shopping with the wife so I will respond later tonight to the Shiloh questions. Dave
Beth can jump in regarding Shiloh as she lost family there.
|
|
|
Post by Beth on Nov 29, 2017 21:32:54 GMT
Unfortunately I have very little feel for Shiloh. It's high on my must visit places though.
|
|
|
Post by deadwoodgultch on Nov 29, 2017 22:02:46 GMT
Well, we do wonder. I changed the name of the thread, to better identify. I can do again, if need be.
|
|
dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
|
Post by dave on Nov 29, 2017 22:10:55 GMT
Reprieved! Trip postponed till tomorrow. Now to QC's questions.
The Battle of Shiloh was perhaps the most confused and misunderstood conflict of the entire ACW. Rumors, lies, made up stories and conflicting claims by 2 Union commanders, Grant and Buell, coupled with being located in West Tennessee created a witch's brew of confusion. Reporters were the first to report the conflict and there the rumors began, vexing Grant till his death
The Sunken Road and Hornet’s Nest position held by various Union regiments, brigades and division created a stumbling block for the Confederates. Instead of bypassing the small area encompassed by this position, The rebels allowed Grant the time to redraw his lines and amass a significantly strong point known as Grant's Last Line. By this action the Confederates made the Sunken Road and Hornet's Nest a key terrain feature needlessly.
At the end of the first days fighting, Grant had pulled his lines back atop a ridge overlooking the battlefield and possessing Pittsburg Landing which enabled his supply line to remain open. He created a very strong line of artillery, which was supported by 2 gunboats---the US Navy's role in this battle is very much overlooked---that defied attempts by the weary and confused Confederates to achieve the victory they needed.
Additionally, by retaining control of Pittsburg Landing, the Army of the Ohio was able to provide support for Grant's Army of Tennessee the night of 6 April and into the morning hours of the next day. Grant was not rescued as reported the press or Buell's report but the fresh troops were welcomed and used on the second day's fight
Therefore the position held by Grant that protected and retained control of Pittsburg Landing was a key terrain feature known as Grant's Last Line.
Hopefully I have made sense out my posting.
Regards Dave
|
|