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Post by deadwoodgultch on Nov 25, 2017 21:35:55 GMT
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Nov 26, 2017 23:02:33 GMT
Deadwood Great post! I have enjoyed reading the report. I realized how lucky I am to live within 3 hours of Vicksburg and 2 hours of Shiloh, by far the best preserved battle field of the War. I also have access to the 128-volume, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (U.S. War Department. Washington, DC: 1880-1901), known as the Official Records or Official Records, Armies, or the O.R. through the University of Mississippi library which additionally provides access through inter library loan of hundreds of documents, diaries and publications. Some documents that I have are the papers of the Southern Historical Society documents, copies of the Confederate Veteran magazine as well as the lesser known but by no means any less The National tribune published monthly by The Grand Army of the Republic.
I highly recommend these publications as valuable sources of the personal stories of the individuals who fought the battles.
In this publication the: "2. Military Terrain The battlefield surveyor must also learn to view the terrain through the soldiers’ eyes. The military has developed a process for evaluating the military significance of the terrain denoted by the mnemonic KOCOA—Key Terrain, Obstacles, Cover and Concealment, Observation and Fields of Fire, Avenues of Approach and Retreat." Is of great interest to me and provides a different viewing process in much further detail than I have used. This publication is chock full of great ideas for us non veterans. Regards Dave
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Nov 27, 2017 11:24:54 GMT
KOCOA, is a mouth full when broken down. A major reason to at least view, scout, be familiar the battle space. It sure would have helped at the LBH.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Nov 27, 2017 17:40:04 GMT
All of which brings you around to the evaluation of the meaning of the words - Key Terrain. From that point the OCOA all follow.
"Any place or area, the seizure and retention of which marks a distinct advantage to either combatant"
What if any was the key terrain at LBH?
If you can come up with no reasonable answer, that begs the question, why fight for it?
Personally I can find no terrain that meets the key terrain criteria. Others may differ, and if so I would be more than happy to amend my evil ways.
KOCOA was a nice find. It is essential if anyone wishes to make a military analysis of terrain. It is equally applicable to both offensive and defensive planning, and I would suggest that everyone take a very deep dive into the material that Dave and Tom have provided for us.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Nov 27, 2017 20:48:14 GMT
What I am about to say is not totally locked into what Dave put forth. The benches behind/west of the village would be my first target. There you can disperse the pony herd and threaten the village with it's then back against the river. At least short term it would give GAC the high ground, if only short term. Now having said that we have to have GAC following up the Reno charge almost immediately and a call back to Benteen prior to or at the time of the attack. It also allows for several fall back positions. Isn't hindsight great! With scouting and scouts input maybe hindsight might have become foresight. And, you still have a blocking force between the pack train and the NA's.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Nov 27, 2017 22:20:26 GMT
Tom look at the definition again.
You are citing positional advantage and not key terrain.
There is nothing that I can see on that entire battlefield that must be seized and held that would offer such positional advantage as to be decisive.
Cemetery Ridge at Gettysburg was key terrain. Possession and retention of that ridge was the key to winning or losing. He who held it was the winner.
Same thing at Fredricksburg. The crossing points held by Barksdale's Mississippi Brigade were positional advantage, by Marye's Heights was the key terrain. Hold it and you win.
There is nothing at LBH that I can see that is so vital a piece of ground that possession and retention means you win or lose.
Key terrain might well be defined as something your side must either take or hold to SURVIVE the day of battle.
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Nov 27, 2017 22:31:07 GMT
QC I agree with you regarding the fact that there are no key terrain features that exist in the park. I can not imagine defending any position that Custer held that did not allow hostiles to approach unseen through the gullies that ran to the river. Could Weir point had served as a defensible position for Custer's five companies? Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Nov 27, 2017 23:21:31 GMT
It is no so much defending Dave. It is that the terrain must be worth either defending or taking to be considered key terrain. If you are going to spend blood than the place that you spend it must be worth the price.
There are places than can be defended at LBH. None of them are any damned good for a defense (some better than others), and each of them have work arounds which tells you the place defended is not key at all. Key terrain, by definition, must either be held or seized, as a condition of battlefield success.
Weir Point is high - end of story. The area immediately around it is broken, and it does not provide long range fields of fire around the extent of the perimeter. It offers some, but not nearly enough in the right places. Another thing to consider is having sufficient forces available to either seize or hold. Consider this. I already said that Cemetery Ridge at Gettysburg was key terrain. Had Hancock only had his corps there to hold it at the end of that first day, it could have been key terrain until Kingdom Come and it would have been of no use as key terrain at all.
Don't any of you get discouraged about this. I never fully understood the concept until C&GS, which means I am either dumb as a box of rocks, or the subject itself is a bit hard to completely grasp.
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Post by deadwoodgultch on Nov 27, 2017 23:26:57 GMT
Chuck, Dave
The Bench is terrain, their CoG was the herd, and you could fire down on any attempting to get there. Terrain and thanks to The center of gravity (CoG) is a concept developed by Carl Von Clausewitz, a Prussian military theorist, in his work On War. I know you guys are familiar, some aren't.
Dave nobody said the terrain had to be in the park.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Nov 27, 2017 23:36:19 GMT
Center of gravity. The Herd. Take that center of gravity and destroy it, and you don't need key terrain. You just pack up and go home, very satisfied with what you accomplished.
The point is that the Herd was the center of gravity and it does not make any difference where the herd was. They happened to be located on high ground at the time, but had they been on low ground or by the river, or for that matter the parking lot at Burger King, their destruction negated the requirement to talk key terrain.
Now take the key terrain test - Absent the herd would the bench lands have offered a distinct advantage to either combatant? I don't believe it would. As with everything else in that area there are just too many work arounds.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 28, 2017 0:21:23 GMT
Now for Dave alone, knowing your interest in these specific matters.
Why was Cemetery Ridge key terrain at Gettysburg? Hint- It had nothing to do with the fact it was high. In fact it was not all that high.
Was Seminary Ridge key terrain or not? If so, why?
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Nov 28, 2017 4:26:56 GMT
Because Cemetery Ridge controlled access to several roads that lead to Baltimore and Washington DC and provided a rallying point for Meade?
Seminary Ridge was of no value after Hancock took control Cemetery Ridge except as a jumping off point for Lee's assaults on the 2nd and 3rd day. Just a guess. Regards Dave
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dave
Brigadier General
Posts: 1,679
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Post by dave on Nov 28, 2017 4:30:59 GMT
Because Cemetery ridge controlled access to roads which lead to Baltimore and Washington DC along with a rallying point for the rest of Meade's army to join the 2nd and 11th Corps?
Seminary Ridge was of no strategic value except as a jumping off point for Lee's assaults on the 2nd and 3rd days? Regards Dave
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Post by quincannon on Nov 28, 2017 15:17:22 GMT
Exceptional. The lesson of course being that it was not the ridge itself that made it key terrain, but rather what possession of that ridge controlled.
By the same token Seminary Ridge was nothing more than a line of departure on the second and third days. It controlled nothing of any significance, and that is probably why Lee chose not to make a fight of it on the fourth day, and instead withdrew. A Union counterattack on Seminary Ridge would have been just as bloody an affair as Longstreet's attack on 3 July. Lee had plenty of combat power left despite his previous losses, but defending Seminary Ridge would still have cost him more than he was prepared to lose and gained him nothing.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 28, 2017 15:33:24 GMT
You did so well on that one Dave, would you like to try another, that may be a bit harder?
Most agree (not all) that the abandoned railroad cut at Second Manassas was key terrain, but ignore Brawner's Farm.
Part I: Was Brawner's Farm key terrain, and if so why?
Part II: Would the railroad cut continue to be key terrain had Brawner's farm been taken and occupied by Union forces on 28 August ?
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